But do either of them tell us anything about space? — Mww

No more than our experience of matter tells us anything "ultimate" about matter I guess.

As long as appears in “objects appear extended” means objects are presented to us as being extended. Or, objects make their appearance to our senses by being extended. And not…objects look to us like they are extended. Only in this distinction does ↪Wayfarer
’s A369 quote make sense, and indeed the conception of spatial extension itself, re: “… outer appearances (if their reality is conceded)…”. — Mww

I'm not clear what the distinction would be between "objects are presented to us as being extended" and "objects appear extended". "Objects make their appearance to our sense by being extended" seems ambiguous and could be interpreted to mean that they really are extended and that on account of that they can make their appearance to our senses.

I would say that our senses are not pre-cognitively affected by objects, but that we interpret whatever it is that affects our senses pre-cognitively as objects. But alas, sometimes it all just seems like a word-game.

So, the above doesn't answer the question as to how there could be time prior to humans if time is observer-dependent and there were no suitable observers back then? We can't even say there was a "back then" because that presupposes time. — Janus

I know! That's the point! The objection to idealism will frequently be raised 'how can you claim that "mind creates world" when we know the world is far more ancient than the emergence of h. sapiens?' Which from a realist point of view is a slam dunk.

So I'm appealing to the Kantian distinction which enables him to say that he is an empirical realist - yes, this is empirically the case - but also a transcendental idealist - nevertheless, it is still in some sense mind-dependent - but not in a simplistic or obvious way. As Bryan Magee notes in his Schopenhauer's Philosophy:

This, incidentally, illustrates a difficulty in the way of understanding which transcendental idealism has permanently to contend with: the assumptions of 'the inborn realism which arises from the original disposition of the intellect' enter unawares into the way in which the statements of transcendental idealism are understood, so that these statements appear faulty in ways in which, properly understood, they are not. Such realistic assumptions so pervade our normal use of concepts that the claims of transcendental idealism disclose their own non-absurdity only after difficult consideration, whereas criticisms of them at first appear cogent which on examination are seen to rest on confusion. We have to raise almost impossibly deep levels of presupposition in our own thinking and imagination to the level of self-consciousness before we are able to achieve a critical awareness of all our realistic assumptions, and thus achieve an understanding of transcendental idealism which is untainted by them. This, of course, is one of the explanations for the almost unfathomably deep counter-intuitiveness of transcendental idealism, and also for the general notion of 'depth' with which people associate Kantian and post-Kantian philosophy. Something akin to it is the reason for much of the prolonged, self-disciplined meditation involved in a number of Eastern religious practices. — Bryan Magee

And the reason I mention Andrei Linde is because I think he articulates a version of 'the observer problem'. The observer problem raises questions about the role of the observer in determining the reality of the quantum world. And I think the 'Kantian' resolution to the problem is the most elegant.

So now we need Kant and Quantum and relativistics and Husserl to explain dinosaurs.

I agree that we don't know the transcendental, in the sense of the independent-of-our-experience-and-understanding, conditions for the existence of that experience and understanding. I just think the attempt to frame that mystery in terms of mind or matter, or any of our categories of understanding, or their absence, is a fool's errand. I think it's better to acknowledge the limits of our understanding, and leave the great mystery wide open, not primarily to make way for faith, but simply for the sake of honest assessment.

As to faith, I think any of us is free to believe whatever we want, or need, to, provided we don't force our ideas on others. I'm no fan of philosophical correctness in any of its guises.

So now we need Kant and Quantum and relativistics and Husserl to explain dinosaurs. — Banno

:lol: No we need them to make it appear difficult to explain dinosaurs. Maybe dinosaurs were conscious subjects and so there was time in their time. :wink:

I just think the attempt to frame that mystery in terms of mind or matter, or any of our categories of understanding, or their absence, is a fool's errand — Janus

Whereas I see it in terms of the quest. (Take a look at the poem currently pinned to my profile page.)

So now we need Kant and Quantum and relativistics and Husserl to explain dinosaurs. — Banno

Might be easier to explain them to dinosaurs, although I’m finding it tough going. ;-)

Whereas I see it in terms of the quest. — Wayfarer

That's very romantic. Good luck trying to explain something that is beyond human experience and understanding in terms of human experience and understanding.

….could be interpreted to mean that they really are extended and that on account of that they can make their appearance to our senses. — Janus

That is what is meant by the term appearance, yes.

That makes sense to me.

Good luck trying to explain something that is beyond human experience and understanding [Non-manifest Image] in terms of human experience and understanding [Manifest Image]. — Janus

:up:

Maybe you can succinctly explain to me, Janus – what @Wayfarer obviously can't (re: ) – the function of "transcendental idealism" in contrast to "empirical realism".

, a noice juxtaposition of views.

Can either of you posit a way in which you might both be right?

A quest without an outcome?

(I'm also intrigued that Kant appears to concede dualism in that passage.) — @Wayfarer

I don't read that as Kant conceding dualism, — Janus

No, Kant is part of the egocentric movement. So, yes, Wayfarer's comment makes sense.

There is of course the basic dualistic character of Kant's philosophy in the sense of phenomena/ noumena or for us/ in itself, but that just reflects the ineliminably dualistic nature of all our thinking, and in no way entails substance dualism. — Janus

I read Kant's "dualistic thinking" as (an attempt at) 'ontologizing epistemology' (i.e. reify knowing) by designating "for us" the tip "phenomena" of the iceberg "in itself" above the water line "noumena". So on what grounds does Kant posit the "in itself" from which he then conjures-up the "for us" to 'retro-construct' with various "transcendental" sleights-of-mind?

I don't read that as Kant conceding dualism….. — Janus

“…..The transcendental idealist, on the other hand, may be an empirical realist, or as he is called, a dualist. (…) A370a

The transcendental idealist is, therefore an empirical realist, and allows matter, as appearance, a reality which does not permit of being inferred, but immediately perceived.(…) A371

From the start we have declared ourselves in favor of this transcendental idealism, and our doctrine thus removes all difficulty in the way of accepting the reality of matter…” A370b

A is B, B is C, therefore A is C? That’s one way to read Kant as conceding the dualism with which the present general dialectic is concerned.

But that’s not even the most important part. Notice no mention of particular things, no mention of determined objects, but only of matter. If one then concedes Kant to mean the appearance of matter is not, and cannot be, the perception of named things, it becomes clear in relation to your….

I would say that our senses are not pre-cognitively affected by objects — Janus

….that in a Kantian sense, our senses are indeed pre-cognitively affected by objects. Senses are affected pre-cognition. Affected antecedent to their phenomenal representation, hence, antecedent to being thought, which is antecedent to be cognized as a particular form of matter, or, which is the same thing, as a particular object.

You’re probably thinking along the lines that as soon as we know what a thing is, our senses are not pre-cognitively affected. Which is fine, as long as you don’t consider what happens within the cognitive system itself, that tells it it has nothing to do when it receives an input to the senses from something already determined.

All sorts of inconsistencies arise if one considers the system stops doing its job, no matter the reason. On the one hand we have a system that works one way for knowing a thing, and on the other hand we have a system that works some other way for remembering the thing it knows. So far, so good. But what tells the system the known thing and the remembered thing relate to each other, sufficiently enough to be identical, and furthermore, what happened in the case where they do not so relate?

What’s the difference between saying we know the thing as a tree and remember it as such, or, we cognize some matter as being, e.g. a tree, every single instance of that matter being an affect on our senses? If there is no difference, it then suffices to say the latter very well could be the case, the immediate advantage being the removal of any operational inconsistencies, insofar as the cognitive system works in its procedural entirety each and every instance of the appearance of matter to it.

And what entails that matter affects the senses in such a way as to be consistently represented? Why…its being given to us as extended and shaped in a certain way in space, of course. As such, as far as concerns the senses, there never is a tree, a branch, a leaf. Or even the dirt all that came out of. There isn’t even any “coming out of”. There is only matter of certain extension and shape that were once not given, then were.

In general, then, as long as the matter’s extension and shape don’t change, the representations of them won’t change, and they all will end up being known as a single consistent thing to all observers with congruent cognitive systems, so everybody experiences the same thing. So when you asked that guy how many branches he sees, by all accounts he should see just as many as you, insofar as his senses are affected in exactly the same way, by exactly the same matter, as yours. All else being given….language, rationality and so on.

TA-DAAAA!!!! I mean….how much simpler can it be!!!!

Do others here feel a certain disquiet in the framing of these arguments in terms that date from the 1700's?

Anyway, up to 31 votes and the discrepancy remains. If anything, the realist vote is dropping.

(Take a look at the poem currently pinned to my profile page.) — Wayfarer

You added the reference to the Emily Dickinson poem after my initial response and your reference to it reminds me of a point I've made many times in conversations with you: that poems do not explain, they evoke. (By the way I very much like that poem, and Emily Dickinson is one of my favorite poets).

Maybe you can succinctly explain to me, Janus – what Wayfarer obviously can't (re: ↪180 Proof
) – the function of "transcendental idealism" in contrast to "empirical realism". — 180 Proof

Probably @Mww would be a better candidate for that task. I will come back to respond to this as greater length and to all the responses I've received. but I have little time for the next few days. I'll be interested to see what unfolds in this discussion in the meantime.

I voted "The question is too unclear to answer".

If I believe that there is an external world but that it is properly described by something like quantum field theory and not by our everyday talk of cups and chairs, am I a realist or an idealist? I would say that I'm neither. Not all anti-realisms are idealisms.

If I believe that there is an external world but that it is properly described by quantum field theory and not by our everyday talk of cups and chairs, am I a realist or an idealist? — Michael

Why, or how, would a quantum field theory qualify as idealism?

Why, or how, would a quantum field theory qualify as idealism? — Banno

I don't think it would.

Then I don't understand why you did not vote for realism.

Then i don't understand why you did not vote for realism. — Banno

Because I don't believe that something like "the cup is in the cupboard" is a proper description of the external world.

I don't believe that something like "the cup is in the cupboard" is a proper description of the external world. — Michael

How very odd. In several ways.

"Proper" implies the use of some sort of norm, presumably a scientific one. I'd have taken "the cup is in the cupboard" as pretty "normal", to cross my metaphors.

One simply cannot produce a sentence that sets out that the cup is in the cupboard in terms of quantum field theory. Yet that the cup is in the cupboard is presumably the sort of thing that can be true or false.

There's also the curious use of "external" - external to what? That's found also in the PhilPapers question I used in the OP, so I guess it might be grounds for saying the question is ambiguous.

I don't think an anti-realist who voted for non-skeptical realism in this question would be alone.

I'd have taken "the cup is in the cupboard" as pretty "normal", to cross my metaphors. — Banno

It is, but I don't think we normally talk about the external world.

Yet that the cup is in the cupboard is presumably the sort of thing that can be true or false. — Banno

That doesn't entail realism. Things are still true or false even if idealism or some other anti-realism is correct.

It is, but I don't think we normally talk about the external world. — Michael

Really? What is it we talk about , then?

That doesn't entail realism. — Michael

It seems we need to differentiate realism as opposed to anti-realism from realism as opposed to idealism, in order to proceed. But that would require setting out clearly a distinction between anti-realism and idealism. A good topic.

I'll posit that an anti-realist might hold that certain statements are neither true nor false when they do not stand in a suitable relation to an observer. Presumably Schrödinger's cat is such an instance, and perhaps you would add the properties of the cup while it is unobserved in the cupboard.

So does the cup in the cupboard, unobserved, have a handle?

A realist would say it does, an anti-realist might say that there is no truth or falsity to the issue.

Really? What is it we talk about , then? — Banno

Cups and cupboards and other everyday stuff, as opposed to quantum fields.

It seems we need to differentiate realism as opposed to anti-realism from realism as opposed to idealism, in order to proceed. — Banno

Yes, which is why I answered "The question is too unclear to answer".

I'll posit that an anti-realist might hold that certain statements are neither true nor false when they do not stand in a suitable relation to an observer. Presumably Schrödinger's cat is such an instance, and perhaps you would add the properties of the cup while it is unobserved in the cupboard.

So does the cup in the cupboard, unobserved, have a handle?

A realist would say it does, an anti-realist might say that there is no truth or falsity to the issue. — Banno

I think there's a distinction between truth bivalence and external world realism. There's no prima facie reason that the former requires the latter. If it is possible that "it will rain tomorrow" is true, and if eternalism is false, then a statement can be true even if it is about something that doesn't exist. So a statement like "it will rain tomorrow" can be true whether external world realism is the case or idealism is the case.

Yes, which is why I answered "The question is too unclear to answer". — Michael

Ok, that's a different reason. Seems to me that the juxtaposition against idealism is clear from the question. There were indeed seperate questions about metaontology, with 12% opting for antirealism, and another on scientific anti-realism, with 15% leaning towards anti-realism.

I think there's a distinction between truth bivalence and external world realism. — Michael

Isn't that exactly the same as the distinction between realism/antirealism and realism/idealism? That is, we seem to agree that someone who rejects bivalence towards the stuff around us may also reject idealism. And someone who accepts idealism might accept bivalence.

But how each of these might be filled out remains an issue.

Hence the example as a way of cutting through the finesse. I say the cup in the cupboard is better thought of as having a handle than as being in some odd state similar to a quantum superposition. I don't think that we can usefully claim things such as that the world is "properly described by something like quantum field theory and not by our everyday talk of cups and chairs".

I'd be keen to see other answers: Does the cup in the cupboard, unobserved, have a handle?

I say the cup in the cupboard is better thought of as having a handle than as being in some odd state similar to a quantum superposition. — Banno

So do I.

Objects in the external world are correctly described by quantum fields. Cups aren't correctly described by quantum fields. Therefore, cups aren't objects in the external world. Unobserved cups aren't objects in the external world either, and for the same reason.

I don't think that we can usefully claim things such as that the world is "properly described by something like quantum field theory and not by our everyday talk of cups and chairs". — Banno

Neither do I. But I do think that it is correct to claim that the external world is properly described by something like quantum field theory.

The familiar world of cups and cupboards is of course properly described by our everyday talk of cups and cupboards (and not by quantum field theory).

And so the familiar world of cups and cupboards isn't the external world.

Therefore, cups aren't objects in the external world — Michael

Then I don't understand what your "external world" is. I take a cup to be paradigmatic of an object in the world.

Notice that I dropped the word "external". What is achieved by using it?

There's a line of thought that takes quantum stuff to be somehow more fundamental than cups. I am thinking that this is what you have in mind with talk of "proper" descriptions. That is, there's a valuation going on here were quantum talk is considered better than talk of cups; and this despite our apparent agreement that one cannot in quantum terms ask someone to get a cup from the cupboard.

Seems to me fairly plain that we have here two very different activities - making tea and building super colliders - with differing languages. It follows that nether way of talking has some innate superiority.

Then I don't understand what your "external world" is. — Banno

It's the world that quantum field theory describes. Do you agree that there is such a world? If so then either a) cups can be described by quantum field theory, or b) cups aren't objects in that external world.

Notice that I dropped the word "external". What is achieved by using it? — Banno

Presumably something, hence why the question you (or rather PhilPapers) asked was "External world: skepticism, non-skeptical realism, or idealism?"

Again, this is why I answered "The question is too unclear to answer". You haven't defined "external world" or "realism" in your question.

Seems to me fairly plain that we have here two very different activities - making tea and building super colliders - with differing languages. It follows that nether way of talking has some innate superiority. — Banno

I'm not saying that either has some innate superiority. I'm saying that they each describe different things. Quantum field theory describes the external world, everyday languages describes a non-external world.