The upshot of which was all about assertion. There’s nothing to learn about the nature of belief from Moore’s paradox. — Srap Tasmaner

Well, if one were to take a Wittgensteinian approach to language then surely the use of the assertion "I know that p but I am not certain" has something to do with the meaning of the proposition "I know that p but I am not certain", and so if there's something problematic about the former then there's something problematic about the latter, and so the claim that one can have knowledge without being certain is problematic.

You accept that we sometimes wrongly attribute knowledge to ourselves and others. Perhaps it's wrong to attribute knowledge when the subject lacks certainty. Getting something right obviously isn't sufficient for knowledge, else any true belief (e.g. a lucky guess) would count as knowledge. Maybe justification isn't a sufficient addition. A justified true belief that lacks certainty might just be a justified guess.

If, with a little goosing and a little encouragement, they can come up with the right bit of info, then they did know — Srap Tasmaner

For example this. Perhaps they didn't know; perhaps they just made a successful justified guess.

The cases I was talking about were ones where a subject who does know is unwilling to assert that they know because of their uncertainty — Srap Tasmaner

I understand that, but my point is that if one can know that p but not be certain then it should be acceptable to say "I know that p but I am not certain", although prima facie it isn't.

This is much like Moorean sentences. Even though it is possible for it to be raining and for me to believe that it is not raining it isn't acceptable to say "it is raining and I believe that it is not raining."

Perhaps the assertion "I know that p" is implicitly the assertion "I know that p and I am certain" and so the assertion "I know that p but I am not certain" is implicitly the contradictory assertion "I know that p and I am certain but I am not certain"?

We can say of the shy schoolboy or the forgetful grandfather that he does know something, even though we would not classify them as highly confident that they know.

...

And indeed there’s nothing so unusual about people expressing doubts about whether they know something, rather than what they know. — Srap Tasmaner

So how do we make sense of "I know that p but I'm not certain"? If we take knowledge to be justified true belief then surely it is one/some/all of these?

1. I know that p but I have some doubt that p
2. I know that p but I have some doubt that I am justified
3. I know that p but I have some doubt that I believe that p

If we take (1) as an example, how do we make sense of doubting that p?

Or is it the case that even though I can be correct in saying "John knows that p but he is not certain" it would be irrational for John to say "I know that p but I am not certain"? That would seem to make it a Moorean sentence.

To me, certainty sounds like a psychological state, something like “maximal confidence,” and it’s irrelevant. It could turn out I was wrong even if I was certain. — Srap Tasmaner

To risk resurrecting our previous discussion, can we have knowledge but not have maximal confidence? "I know that p but I am not certain" could be seen to be something of a Moorean sentence.

'utterance' means speaking out loud. Or do you have a different sense in mind? — TonesInDeepFreeze

Speaking or signing or writing. Perhaps "linguistic expression" is the more inclusive term. So the question is whether or not a proposition (or if we want to be more inclusive, "truth-bearer") is identical to a linguistic expression, or is in some sense dependent on a linguistic expression. If so then if some x is a proposition then some x is a linguistic expression, in which case if it is raining then some x is a linguistic expression and if no x is a linguistic expression then it is not raining. This seems to me to suggest antirealism.

Alternatively propositions are neither identical to nor dependent on linguistic expressions, in which case it can be that some x is a proposition even if no x is a linguistic expression. This seems to me to suggest that propositions are Platonic entities.

Depending on the context, 'proposition' stands for something different from 'sentence'. But you use 'p' for a sentence (you negate it, so it's a sentence). I don't see how one would figure out anything about platonism or anti-realism from your argument. — TonesInDeepFreeze

If a proposition is a sentence then the conclusions are:

1. if it is raining then some x is a sentence, and
2. if no x is a sentence then it is not raining

And if a sentence is an utterance then the conclusions are:

1. if it is raining then some x is an utterance, and
2. if no x is an utterance then it is not raining

This appears to connect the occurrence of rain to an utterance, suggesting antirealism. Realists would argue that there is no connection; that there is some possible world where it is raining but where nothing is uttered.

If a proposition is not a sentence, such that it's possible that some x is a proposition but no x is an utterance, then it suggests Platonism, as how else would one interpret utterance-less propositions?

The semantic turnstile as opposed to the proof turnstile is not important in this context. You don't even need any turnstile. — TonesInDeepFreeze

Maybe I don't need it but I thought it would be simpler to use it. Maybe I misunderstood what it meant.

I thought it would be enough to say "some x being a bachelor semantically entails that some x is an unmarried man".

I didn't think I'd have to say "for all x, if x is a bachelor then x is an unmarried man, and so if some x is a bachelor then some x is an unmarried man".

But if I'm wrong I'm wrong. So thanks for the correction.

And with your corrections we can then address the crux of the issue: the conclusions that if it is raining then some x is a proposition and if no x is a proposition then it is not raining. So is this Platonism (of propositions) or antirealism?

Since "proposition" and "true proposition" are not in your argument itself — TonesInDeepFreeze

I'm not sure of the proper procedure for specifying definitions, but I did have these two (unnumbered) lines are the start:

T(q) ≔ q is a true proposition
P(q) ≔ q is a proposition

And note that I used the symbol ⊨ (semantic entailment), not the symbol → (material implication). Which is why I didn't think your second premise is needed.

I did say that "maybe it's simpler to just understand T(q) as 'q is a true proposition'." So that gives us:

T(q) ≔ q is a true proposition
P(q) ≔ q is a proposition

1. T(q) ↔ p
2. T(q) ⊢ ∃xT(x)
3. ∃xT(x) ⊨ ∃xP(x)
4. p → ∃xP(x)
5. ¬∃xP(x) → ¬p

3 follows from the two definitions.

1. "it is raining" is a true proposition iff it is raining
2. If "it is raining" is a true proposition then some x is a true proposition
3. If some x is a true proposition then some x is a proposition
4. If it is raining then some x is a proposition
5. If no x is a proposition then it is not raining

The logic is not correct. Line 3 (whether original or reviesd) is a non sequitur. — TonesInDeepFreeze

Line 3 is ∃xT(x) ⊨ ∃xP(x).

That some x is true semantically entails that some x is a proposition, given that truth is predicated of (and only of) propositions.

Maybe it's simpler to just understand T(q) as "q is a true proposition". If some x is a true proposition then some x is a proposition.

I think you need to look at the context of that reply. It stems from this post:

We've been taking as a starting point "snow is white" is true iff p and then discussing p, whereas I think we should instead take as a starting point snow is white iff q and then discuss q.

Snow is white iff snow appears white, or
Snow is white iff snow reflects all wavelengths of light, or
Snow is white iff snow has a mind-independent sui generis property of whiteness, etc.

We can then bring this back to truth-predication by understanding that if "p" is true iff p and if p iff q then "p" is true iff q.

"Snow is white" is true iff snow appears white, or
"Snow is white" is true iff snow reflects all wavelengths of light, or
"Snow is white" is true iff snow has a mind-independent sui generis property of whiteness, etc. — Michael

When I say something like "snow is white" is true iff snow reflects all wavelengths of light I'm not also implying that "it is raining" is true iff snow reflects all wavelengths of light. I'm simply trying to provide more substance to the truth of "snow is white" than what the trivial T-schema offers.

The example of "7 + 5 = 12" was just a hypothetical, like the three examples of "snow is white" above. I'm not committing to any one of them as a matter of fact.

I have since edited it to ∃xT(x) and ∃xP(x) as I believe that's the correct application of existential introduction?

And the point is the conclusions on lines 4 and 5. It's easier to understand in ordinary language:

1. "it is raining" is true iff it is raining
2. "it is raining" being true entails that some x is true
3. Some x being true entails that some x is a proposition
4. If it is raining then some x is a proposition
5. If no x is a proposition then it is not raining

As I said above, it seems to suggest either Platonism (of propositions) or some form of antirealism. That's the point of the argument.

I think the below should avoid the need for that.

T(q) ≔ q is true
P(q) ≔ q is a proposition

1. T(q) ↔ p
2. T(q) ⊢ ∃xT(x)
3. ∃xT(x) ⊨ ∃xP(x)
4. p → ∃xP(x)
5. ¬∃xP(x) → ¬p

Does this logic work?

If it is raining then some x is a proposition. If no x is a proposition then it is not raining. These could be seen to be problematic conclusions, as it suggests either Platonism (of propositions) or some form of antirealism.

But in any "adequate" system, there are statements such that neither the statement nor its negation is derivable. So derivability doesn't work for defining 'is true'. — TonesInDeepFreeze

I wasn't defining "is true", only stating that "7 + 5 = 12" being derivable is the necessary and sufficient condition for "7 + 5 = 12" to be true.

Is that a proposed formulation somewhere?

It doesn't work in ordinary mathematics. A sentence is either true or false but not both. And a sentence is true if and only if its negation is false. But with our ordinary mathematical axiomatizations, there are sentences such that neither the sentence nor its negation are derivable. — TonesInDeepFreeze

Is 7 + 5 = 12 derivable?

Yes, I think I clarified my position here.

Your thoughts and feelings themselves are real. — hypericin

My thoughts are real. My thoughts are not mind-independent. Therefore some things which are real are not mind-independent. Therefore “real” doesn’t mean “mind-independent”.

As the T-schema doesn't give the intension of "snow is white", then it doesn't allow translation between "snow is white" and "schnee ist weiss". — RussellA

You're putting the cart before the horse. Tarski is saying that if "snow is white" is the translation of "schnee ist weiss" then "schnee ist weiss" is true iff snow is white.

I really don't understand what you're asking.

In simple terms his argument is just that "Schnee ist weiß" is true if and only if snow is white, where "snow is white" is a translation in the meta-language (which in this case is English) of the object-language (which in this case is German) sentence "Schnee ist weiß".

You seem to want to know how it is that the English sentence "snow is white" is a translation of the German sentence "Schnee ist weiß". That's irrelevant to Tarski's point. He just argues that assuming that it is the translation the T-schema follows.

Whether or not any given meta-language sentence is a translation of any given object-language sentence is a separate matter entirely.

If I understand what you're after, because the meaning of denoting (designating) is central to Tarski's Semantic Theory of Truth. — RussellA

In the sense that words have to mean something for his theory to have any relevance, sure. But Tarski doesn't need to give a comprehensive account of meaning to make his point.

How exactly does "snow" denote snow ?

In the ordinary sense, "snow" denotes snow because "snow" denotes snow. — RussellA

What does this have to do with Tarski?

This means that unless we are absolutely certain, we ought not call something "knowledge", because it could turn out not to be knowledge. — Metaphysician Undercover

Why? I don't need to be certain that something is true to assert that it is true. I will have Weetabix for breakfast tomorrow. I'm not certain that I will, but I'm still going to say that I will.

We don't require certainty to assert things. If that were true then we ought stay silent on everything except anything that is necessarily true. It would make for a very quiet, impractical world.

Do you not agree that as epistemologists, if there is a possibility that the thing which appears to be knowledge is not actually knowledge, then we ought not call it "knowledge"? — Metaphysician Undercover

No. I'm happy with fallibilist knowledge. It's consistent with ordinary use. The list of things we claim to know is greater than the list of things we claim to be certain about, and so clearly what we mean by "know" isn't what we mean by "certain".

So my argument is that if it has to be actually raining out for us to correctly call what Alice has "knowledge", (as Andrew asserts), then we ought not label what Alice has as "knowledge" unless we are certain that it is raining out. — Metaphysician Undercover

And this doesn't follow.

You start by saying that it has to actually be raining for Alice to know that it is raining. You then conclude by saying that we have to be certain that it is raining for Alice to know that it is raining. So as I said in my previous post, you are asserting that if we are not certain that it is raining then it is not actually raining. What evidence or reasoning is there for this? Most of us accept that sometimes we are not certain but it is actually raining.

Now to say that the rock exists is not to say something about the rock. Existence is not a predicate in the way being granite is. — Banno

Maybe not in classical logic, but perhaps classical logic doesn't really fit with ordinary language, hence the development of free logic which makes for claims like "God does not exist" possible, and which some of us accept as true.

Or if you want to continue with classical logic then consider what I said here:

That fairies exist is that ∃xFx, where Fx means "x is a fairy". If ¬∃xFx then fairies do not exist. Some x is my nose but no x is a fairy, therefore my nose exists but fairies don't.

All this to return to the answer to your question: It is true that the rock existed yesterday. — Banno

From my understanding @hypericin isn't asking if the rock existed yesterday. He's asking which theory of time is correct: growing block, presentism, or eternalism.

Mind independence is simply what "real" means. What is your problem with this definition? — hypericin

So my mind isn't real? My thoughts and feelings aren't real?

Also a toy gun isn't a real gun, but (for the sake of argument) toy guns are mind-independent.

"Real" doesn't just mean "mind-independent". Which is why I have often said that antirealism isn't unrealism. It's unfortunate that realism is called realism. It leads to the kind of equivocation that you appear to be making here.

I have it on good authority that Biden reclassified everything at Mar-a-Lago just by thinking about it.

Michael’s reasoning attempts to make us believe that a President must follow “established procedures” as outlined by another president’s executive order — NOS4A2

That's what the court said.

and that the lower courts get to decide what the leader of the entire American military can and cannot declassify — NOS4A2

I didn't say that.

Remember when Trump tweeted "I have fully authorized the total Declassification of any & all documents pertaining to the single greatest political CRIME in American History, the Russia Hoax. Likewise, the Hillary Clinton Email Scandal. No redactions!"

Did that declassify all those documents?

And let's imagine that Trump were to tell some relevant subordinate on record that some document is to be declassified and published but then privately thinks to himself that he's changed his mind and it isn't to be declassified. Would it be illegal for his subordinate to start the bureaucratic process to declassify and publish the document? According to NOS4A2's reasoning, yes. Which is absurd.

This is an assumption. You can invite people to share your assumptions, but you can't really bang them over the head with them. Assumptions have no weight. — frank

It's also true.

If it were false then it's negation would be true, irrespective of our certainty and judgements and justifications. Which would be a contradiction.

Then your hypothetical does squat, as Srap says, toward justifying your claim. We still cannot ever correctly judge that what Alice has is "knowledge", in the real world, because any such judgements could always turn out to be incorrect. Your example only applies to a hypothetical world, in which it actually is raining. What good is it, if it doesn't apply to the real world? — Metaphysician Undercover

Your argument seems to be that if we cannot be certain that it is raining then it is not actually raining and that if we cannot be certain that it isn't raining then it is not actually not raining. This doesn't follow and is even a contradiction.

Sometimes, in the real world, it is actually raining, and sometimes, in the real world, it actually isn't raining, irrespective of our certainty and judgements and justifications.

Nothing from that quote supports your claim, whereas the quote saying "declassification, even by the President, must follow established procedures" supports mine.

That someone has the authority to do something isn’t that they can do that something telepathically. Again, an employer cannot fire their employee just by thinking about it.

“Established procedure” is that the president is the ultimate authority on classified materials and can declassify at will. — NOS4A2

As the ruling says, he must still follow a procedure. An employer has the right to fire someone at will, but simply thinking "John is fired" isn't actually firing someone. He'd need to actually tell John, remove him from the payrolls, etc.

A footnote to that quote from the court ruling says "As explained above, Executive order 13,526 established the detailed process through which secret information can be appropriately declassified."

The president can do whatever he wants with classified documents. — NOS4A2

He can set the classification status of a document. He cannot decide that it's his personal property and take it home with him when he's no longer President, or refuse to return it when the new administration requests it.

To repeat the recent appeals court ruling, "In any event, at least for these purposes, the declassification argument is a red herring because declassifying an official document would not change its content or render it personal. So even if we assumed that Plaintiff did declassify some or all of the documents, that would not explain why he has a personal interest in them."

And besides, his lawyers are refusing to assert that the documents have been declassified, so this is even more irrelevant.

"Do not try and read the classified documents—that's impossible. Instead, only try to realize the truth."
"What truth?"
"There are no classified documents."

Trump claims he can declassify top secret documents just ‘by thinking about it’

There doesn’t have to be (a process), as I understand it. If you’re the president of the United States, you can declasify just by saying ‘it’s declassified’, even by thinking about it. Because you’re sending it to Mar-a-Lago or to wherever you’re sending it.

Hmm, so where else did Donnie send classified documents? We already know of a classified folder at the Trump Tower. Maybe there are more documents there. And maybe also Bedminster. Who wants to bet on more search warrants?

And on the issue of declassification, there was a court ruling in 2020:

Declassification cannot occur unless designated officials follow specified procedures.

...

Because declassification, even by the President, must follow established procedures, that argument fails.

To make a different analogy, if a pointer is measured to be pointing North along the North-South axis, then what direction is it pointing along the West-East axis? — Andrew M

Isn't this like asking for the z coordinate of a point plotted on a plane?

You seem to be asserting that a thing which a person might name as a triangle, has an independent property, which you call "being a triangle", which is separate from being named a triangle. How could you justify such a claim? — Metaphysician Undercover

The independent property is having three edges and vertices.

A "property" is a concept — Metaphysician Undercover

Properties are something that objects have. Objects don't just exist as some property-less simple. They have a nature, including a mass, an extended position (i.e. a shape), and often a certain kind of movement.

That we decide which words refer to which properties isn't that the object only has these properties if we refer to it using these words. This is the fundamental mistake you keep making. If something has three edges and vertices then it is a triangle even if we do not call it a triangle.

Do you just not understand/disagree with how reference works, or the use-mention distinction?

This is how "truth" is most commonly used. When someone is asked to tell the truth, the person is asked to state what they honestly believe. — Metaphysician Undercover

If I ask someone to tell me the truth of where my kidnapped wife has been hidden I'm not interested in where the person believes my wife has been hidden; I'm interested in where she's actually been hidden. The request to "tell the truth" is premised on the notion that things actually are as this person believes them to be. I have no interest in an honest belief if it's erroneous.

What is "a number"? Are you taking a position of Platonic realism here? — Metaphysician Undercover

No. A number is a value. It is the "propositional content" of one or more mathematical symbols. For example, $0.25$, $1\over4$, and $2\over8$ are different mathematical symbols that refer to the same mathematical value/number.

How do you honestly believe that there are objects called "triangles" which have never been called by that name?

Being called a triangle and being a triangle are two different things. Something can be a triangle even if it isn't called a triangle. The word "triangle" has a meaning, and objects can satisfy that meaning even if we do not talk about them. Something that satisfies the meaning of the word "triangle" is a triangle even if we do not call it a triangle.

Decapitation is going to kill me even if I call it a non-fatal injury. Saying something doesn't make it so, and not saying something doesn't make it not so.

The issue is, that the thing must be judged to be of that kind. because a "kind" is something artificial, created by human minds, a category. A natural object isn't just automatically of this kind or that kind, because it must fulfill a set list of criteria in order to be of any specific kind. And, whether or not something fulfills a list of criteria is a judgment.

This is where we disagree. Objects exist and have properties even if we are not aware of them. We define the word "triangle" such that an object is a triangle if it has such-and-such a property. If some object exists and has such-and-such a property then it is a triangle, even if we are not aware of this object and/or it having this property.

I think the relevant metaphysical dispute is regarding the claim that objects exist and have properties even if we are not aware of them. Your argument depends on this claim being false. Are you, then, assuming something like idealism?

This does not tell us whether "there are 66 coins" is the product of a judgement, or whether it's something independent from judgement. Nor does it tell us if there is 66, or 67 coins. It really tells us nothing. It is a useless statement. — Metaphysician Undercover

It's not a useless statement. It's a sound argument.

1. There are only 66 coins iff "there are only 66 coins" is true
2. There are only 67 coins iff "there are only 67 coins" is true
3. There cannot be both only 66 and only 67 coins
4. Therefore, "there are only 66 coins" and "there are only 67 coins" cannot both be true

Do you disagree with one of the three premises, or do you disagree that the conclusion follows?

This part in the court's ruling is very important:

In any event, at least for these purposes, the declassification argument is a red herring because declassifying an official document would not change its content or render it personal. So even if we assumed that Plaintiff did declassify some or all of the documents, that would not explain why he has a personal interest in them.

Trump's (and his supporters') "defence" that he declassified them is irrelevant. None of the statutes cited in the warrant concerned the classification status of the documents. Declassifying a document doesn't make it Trump's property. And declassifying a document doesn't make its contents no longer a matter of national security. Normally when a document is declassified it is done so because it is no longer an issue for its contents to be made public, but if we were to accept Trump's "standing order" to declassify documents when moved to Mar-a-Lago so that he could continue to work with them then presumably they are still a matter of national security and their public release would harm the United States, showing once again Trump's utter incompetency and the danger he posed as President.

Also I like this little swipe at the district court:

Here, the district court concluded that Plaintiff did not show that the United States acted in callous disregard of his constitutional rights. Doc. No. 64 at 9. No party contests the district court’s finding in this regard. The absence of this “indispensab[le]” factor in the Richey analysis is reason enough to conclude that the district court abused its discretion in exercising equitable jurisdiction here.

Donald Trump, 3 of his children sued for business fraud by New York AG

New York Attorney General Letitia James filed a lawsuit Wednesday accusing former president Donald Trump, three of his grown children and executives at his company of flagrantly manipulating property valuations to deceive lenders, insurance brokers and tax authorities into giving them better rates on bank loans and insurance policies and to reduce their tax liability.

The 222-page civil complaint asks the New York Supreme Court to bar Trump, as well as Donald Trump Jr., Ivanka Trump and Eric Trump, from serving as executives at any company in New York, and to bar the Trump Organization from acquiring any commercial real estate or receiving loans from any New York-registered financial institution for five years.

It seeks to recover more than $250 million in what James’s office says are ill-gotten gains received through the alleged deceptive practices. While the lawsuit itself is not a criminal prosecution, James (D) said she has referred possible violations of federal law to the Justice Department and the IRS.

You seem to be saying that the numeral "66" is already related to the coins, prior to being counted — Metaphysician Undercover

In the sense that the numeral refers to a number and that number is the number of coins prior to being counted.

For there to be "66 coins in the jar", it is necessary that "66" is the symbol which has been associated with the quantity of coins in the jar. You seem to think that the symbol "66" is somehow magically associated with the coins in the jar, without anyone making that association. How do you believe that this comes about, that the symbol "66" is related to the coins in the jar, without someone making that relation? — Metaphysician Undercover

It's not magic. We agree to use the word "triangle" to refer to the shape of some object that we have seen. Now every object with that shape -- even objects we haven't seen -- are triangles, even though we haven't explicitly used the word "triangle" to refer to each of those objects individually. They are triangles by virtue of having the same shape as an object that we have referred to as having a shape named "triangle".

The same is true for the numeral "66". We've already agreed that the numeral "66" refers to a specific number, and so any jar containing that number of coins, even jars of coins we've never counted, have 66 coins.

You make the mistake of saying that because we need to explicitly assign a particular word or numeral to a particular kind that we need to explicitly assign that particular word or numeral to every individual of that kind. This is false. We need to do the former to establish meaning, but we don't need to do the latter.

Truth alone cannot resolve contradictions, because two people will both insist on knowing "the truth", even though they contradict each other. — Metaphysician Undercover

They can insist anything they like. They'd just be wrong. At least one of them doesn't know the truth. It's really quite simple.

The T-schema is useful here. There are 66 coins iff "there are 66 coins" is true, there are 67 coins iff "there are 67 coins" is true, there cannot be both 66 and 67 coins, therefore "there are 66 coins" and "there are 67 coins" cannot both be true.

This is consistent with how we actually understand the meaning of the word "true". I don't know why you're trying to make it mean "honest belief". What evidence or reasoning is there for that?