The latter of course: facts are not themselves "things". We attribute facts to the world, but the attribution is, precisely, ours. I see a stone; I walk over a floor; but I neither see a fact nor walk upon one (this is not exactly true: perception is conceptual, but we'll put that to one side). — Streetlight

But it does not follow that facts are somehow essentially linguistic, that they have the notion of statement somehow built into them. On the contrary, on the account I have given they are precisely not linguistic (except, of course, for the small but important class of linguistic facts) because the whole point of having the notion of "fact" is to have a notion for that which stands outside the statement but which makes it true, or in virtue of which it is true, if it is true.

Which is why it is a good thing that nothing I have said argues this. — Streetlight

Yet it depends on what we mean by element, or protons, or number for that matter. — Streetlight

That we are what maintain the meaning of the term "gold" is that we determine whether or not this is gold. — Streetlight

Because this is about as straightfoward an example of a contradiction as one could imagine. This 'fixing' is not metaphysical. It is not an act that, once accomplished, like God's will, stands outside and beyond it's creation. Human agency maintains such fixing at each and every moment of conceptual employment. I cannot but repeat myself: if it is the case that, once we have fixed the meaning of "gold", whether or not this is gold has nothing to do with us, this "nothing to do with us" is maintained by no one other than - us. — Streetlight

But once we have fixed the meaning of such terms in our vocabulary by arbitrary definitions, it is no longer a matter of any kind of relativism or arbitrariness whether representation-independent features of the world satisfy those definitions, because the features of the world that satisfy or fail to satisfy the definitions exist independently of those or any other definitions.

How aren't they fiction? Weren't you stressing their lack of correspondence with actual states of affairs? — bongo fury

If we try to take these arguments against ER, we commit a massive use-mention fallacy: From the fact that a description can only be made relative to a set of linguistic categories, it does not follow that the facts/objects/states of affairs,/etc., described can only exist relative to a set of categories. Conceptual relativism, properly understood, is an account of how we fix the application of our terms: What counts as a correct application of the term "cat" or "kilogram" or "canyon" (or "klurg") is up to us to decide and is to that extent arbitrary. But once we have fixed the meaning of such terms in our vocabulary by arbitrary definitions, it is no longer a matter of any kind of relativism or arbitrariness whether representation-independent features of the world satisfy those definitions, because the features of the world that satisfy or fail to satisfy the definitions exist independently of those or any other definitions. We arbitrarily define the word "cat" in such and such a way; and only relative to such and such definitions can we say, "That's a cat." But once we have made the definitions and once we have applied the concepts relative to the system of definitions, whether or not something satisfies our definition is no longer arbitrary or relative. That we use the word "cat" the way we do is up to us; that there is an object that exists independently of that use, and satisfies that use, is a plain matter of (absolute, intrinsic, mind-independent) fact.

Realism here is simply that not just any account of how things are will do.

The alternative conceptual relativism presents a muddled picture. — Banno

A third mistake, also common, is to suppose that realism is committed to the theory that there is one best vocabulary for describing reality, that reality itself must determine how it should be described. But once again, ER [external realism] as defined above has no such implication. The view that the world exists independently of our representations of it does not imply that there is a privileged vocabulary for describing it. It is consistent with ER to claim the thesis of conceptual relativity (proposition 4), that different and even incommensurable vocabularies can be constructed for describing different aspects of reality for our various different purposes.

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The fact that alternative conceptual schemes allow for different descriptions of the same reality, and that there are no descriptions of reality outside all conceptual schemes, has no bearing whatever on the truth of realism.

Are there brute facts outside of such a framework? — bongo fury

Then the result is a meaningles statement: "matter is less dense than matter". — Tobias

Brute facts require the institution of language in order that we can state the facts, but the brute facts themselves exist quite independently of language or of any other institution. Thus the statement that the sun is ninety-three million miles from the earth requires an institution of language and an institution of measuring distances in miles, but the fact stated, the fact that there is a certain distance between the earth and the sun, exists independently of any institution.

Does it hold outside of such a framework? Are there institutional facts outside of such a framework? — bongo fury

There is a weaker and a stronger version of my claim. The weaker is that in order to have institutional facts at all, a society must have at least a primitive form of language, that in this sense the institution of language is logically prior to other institutions. On this view language is the basic social institution in the sense that all others presuppose language, but language does not presuppose the others; you can have language without money and marriage, but not the converse. The stronger claim is that each institution requires linguistic elements of the facts within that very institution. I believe both claims are true, and I will be arguing for the stronger claim. The stronger claim implies the weaker. — The Construction of Social Reality, Chapter 3, Language and Social Reality

I don't think we can identify something without distinguishing it from what it's not, and even then the same thing could be identified differently depending on the context of the thing. An O could be a letter in the alphabet or an O in tic tac toe, for example. — praxis

The concept of paper exists without people? — praxis

This is a paradox one might come across if they consider God's omnipotence. If the answer is yes, then there is one thing he can't do (lift a heavy enough rock), which contradicts the definition of omnipotence (being able to do anything). The same applies if the answer is no. How would you solve this paradox? — Cidat

Changing the name doesnt change the pill. Its so simple i dont understand why theres any issue. — Harry Hindu

If we call a dog's tail a 'leg', then a dog has five legs. There are no brute facts.
A dog has four legs, no matter what we call them. There are brute facts. — Cuthbert

We cannot impose an electrical charge just by deciding to count something as an electrical charge, but we can impose the office of the Presidency just by deciding what we will count as becoming President, and then making those people President who meet the conditions we have decided on. The intensionality-with-an-s of the sentence form "X counts as Y in C" is a clue to the intentionality-with-a-t of the phenomena. Because neither the X term nor the Y term permits substitution of coreferring expressions without loss or change of truth value of the whole statement, we have good reasons to suppose that the "counts as" locution specifies a form of intentionality. — The Construction of Social Reality, Searle

In the former case, you acknowedge that reasons exist. Well, those can't exist unless God does. So God exists. — Bartricks

No, but he does if we change what it means to hold that office.

That stone (A) is a bishop (B).

That rock (A) is iron (B).

Joe Biden (A) is the president (B).

In all cases, A counting as B is contingent on the human activity of how we count things as cases of B. — Isaac

But you're beating around the bush. Your example doesn't feature an expression of an opinion, but an insult. — Tzeentch

Depending on the terms of contract, you may very well be. — Tzeentch

What constitutes being a bishop? — Isaac

Likewise with "that stone is iron", it's contingent on the human activity of us classifying elements by their proton number. The moment we stop doing that, its status as iron is called into question. — Isaac

The question is, why can't we contend with shrugging our shoulders and disagreeing?
Why is there a need to punish people who we strongly disagree with? — Tzeentch

Of course we can think of examples where one's privately held beliefs can make one unable to hold certain jobs. In such cases a good argument needs to be made why that is so, but the grounds for firing someone would not be them expressing their beliefs, but them being unsuitable for a job. — Tzeentch

Institutional facts are so called because they require human institutions for their existence. In order that this piece of paper should be a five dollar bill, for example, there has to be the human institution of money. Brute facts require no human institutions for their existence. Of course, in order to state a brute fact we require the institution of language, but the fact stated needs to be distinguished from the statement of it.

They don't appear to me to be saying that, though. — Dawnstorm

We can't turn lead into gold just by deciding that it's gold — Michael

Of course we can turn lead into gold just by deciding that it's gold. We only need say that the definition of gold is now anything with between 79 and 82 protons. Voilà, lead is now gold. — Isaac

Assuming there was a contract involved that would be breached, yes. — Tzeentch

Any opinion should be able to be expressed without legal consequences, assuming they're expressed in a non-disruptive manner, and not a direct threat of or call to violence. — Tzeentch

I feel like Michael's distinction between mention and use is a red herring, because institutional facts aren't about language in the first place. — Dawnstorm

What's a lack of belief? — Agent Smith

Mill’s arguments for free speech are far better than his arguments for voting and other statist schemes—a Benthamite through and through. We are talking about one and not the other, after all. — NOS4A2

In opposition to this it may be contended, that although the public, or the State, are not warranted in authoritatively deciding, for purposes of repression or punishment, that such or such conduct affecting only the interests of the individual is good or bad, they are fully justified in assuming, if they regard it as bad, that its being so or not is at least a disputable question: That, this being supposed, they cannot be acting wrongly in endeavouring to exclude the influence of solicitations which are not disinterested, of instigators who cannot possibly be impartial—who have a direct personal interest on one side, and that side the one which the State believes to be wrong, and who confessedly promote it for personal objects only. There can surely, it may be urged, be nothing lost, no sacrifice of good, by so ordering matters that persons shall make their election, either wisely or foolishly, on their own prompting, as free as possible from the arts of persons who stimulate their inclinations for interested purposes of their own.

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The interest, however, of these dealers in promoting intemperance is a real evil, and justifies the State in imposing restrictions and requiring guarantees which, but for that justification, would be infringements of legitimate liberty. — On Liberty

The framing isn't obvious?

Why didn't you write "... and expresses an opinion about gay people I disagree with"?

Now suddenly it is a lot less obvious that this person did something that shouldn't be protected under the right to free speech. (Though one is always entitled to ask people to leave their house, of course) — Tzeentch

Why didn't you say "... and expresses an extreme political opinion"?

Should this person now be immediately fired? I think not. — Tzeentch

Why didn't you say "and curses, swears and used inappropriate language in a fit of anger"?

You may agree that your way of framing certainly nudges us into a certain direction, doesn't it? — Tzeentch