Sure I did. You're not paying attention. Is Searle's use of language (his model of language) about language-use? Is language-use a state of affairs? If so, then his model is about a state-of-affairs. If not, then what it Searle saying (modeling)? What is he talking about? Yours and Banno's interpretation of Searle's model defeats itself.Well, yeah. But you've yet to demonstrate that it doesn't represent what it models, you've only shown that it's possible to model language in other ways (as about a state-of-affairs (mental and physical states) in the world.) — Isaac
model: an example for imitation or emulation.I don't see why. I can model a car with cars, I could build a model of a brick out of bricks... — Isaac
I addressed this. The christening changes some of the properties of the object but not others. Christening a particular stone 'a bishop' changes some of its properties (the way we treat it) but not others (how heavy it is). Christening some things 'gold' changes some of its properties (the way we treat it) but not others (how heavy it is). — Isaac
...because a human institution decided so. — Isaac
The direct realist argues that I'm looking at you and the indirect realist argues that I'm looking at your reflection. I don't see why we can't say both. — Michael
that iron has 26 protons isn't a human decision. — Michael
A model is not the real thing. — Harry Hindu
Consider a group of Harvard Business School students on graduation day.
In one possible world, they each individually decide to go out into the world and make as much money as possible, for the good of humanity.
In the other, they meet and agree to go out into the world and make as much money as possible, for the good of humanity.
Are these two different? Well, it seems that in the first, each says "I am going out to get rich". In the second, "We are going out to get rich". We-intentionality is different to I-intentionality. — Banno
Iron doesn't even exist but for a human decision to group all things with 26 protons into one group. — Isaac
Iron is a class of objects, not an object. — Isaac
A. Regardless of what (if anything) we call a 'dog' or a 'leg', dogs have four legs. There are brute facts.
B. Dogs having four legs depends on what we decide to call 'dog' and 'leg'. There are no brute facts. — Cuthbert
The stuff we refer to by the word "iron" exists even if we don't use the word "iron" to refer to them. And I'm saying that the things we refer to by the word "iron" have 26 protons, and will continue to have 26 protons even if we change the meaning of the word "iron". — Michael
Iron is a class of objects, not an object. Classes are human inventions with human criteria and humans bring them into existence by declaration, they neither exist nor have properties without humans. — Isaac
I think you can both be right, — Xtrix
I'm saying that the things we refer to by the word "iron" have 26 protons — Michael
When I use the word "iron" I might be referring to members of a class, but I nonetheless am referring to the members of the class, not the class. — Michael
I think you can both be right, — Xtrix
The realism discussion is one side saying it's word-to-world, while the other insists it is world-to-word; and they are both correct. — Banno
what, if anything, do you think is here in contrast to what Searle has said, or to my view? — Banno
These (human-christened) statements are true. Yet they are true not in virtue of a "state of affairs" in the world; they are not true for the sort of reasons that some 'factual' statements) are true. — Banno
We refer to all things with 26 protons as "iron", so in your proposition {the things we refer to by the word "iron"} is tautologous with {all things with 26 protons} so by substitution, your proposition is the things we refer to by the word "iron" all things with 26 protons have 26 protons. True, but trivially true. — Isaac
I feel like Michael's distinction between mention and use is a red herring, because institutional facts aren't about language in the first place. — Dawnstorm
The use-mention distinction is important. There's a difference between using the word "iron" in the context of saying "iron has 26 protons" and mentioning the word "iron" in the context of saying "'iron' refers to the element with 26 protons". Isaac and StreetlightX appear to be saying that because the latter is an institutional fact then the former is an institutional fact, but that's a non sequitur precisely because of the use-mention distinction. — Michael
They don't appear to me to be saying that, though. — Dawnstorm
We can't turn lead into gold just by deciding that it's gold — Michael
Of course we can turn lead into gold just by deciding that it's gold. We only need say that the definition of gold is now anything with between 79 and 82 protons. Voilà, lead is now gold. — Isaac
Institutional facts are so called because they require human institutions for their existence. In order that this piece of paper should be a five dollar bill, for example, there has to be the human institution of money. Brute facts require no human institutions for their existence. Of course, in order to state a brute fact we require the institution of language, but the fact stated needs to be distinguished from the statement of it.
that a stone is a bishop — Michael
What constitutes being a bishop? — Isaac
Likewise with "that stone is iron", it's contingent on the human activity of us classifying elements by their proton number. The moment we stop doing that, its status as iron is called into question. — Isaac
So would we say that "You can't change iron into gold" is true eternally? Or is it only true for people to whom it's meaningful? — frank
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