Why not? — Monist

Because if such an alternative existed, it wouldn't exist.

"an apple is an apple", but why? I do not get why any certain thing called 'x', should be 'x'. — Monist

Well, what would be the alternative? A thing that is not what it is? An apple that is not an apple?

IF the quantum wave is actually saying the particle is in more than one location at the same time then why do we need probability in the first place? Simply say that the particle is in whatever location and also in another location. — TheMadFool

I see the quantum wave as an object whose mathematical (quantitative-structural) properties specify how it will interact with other objects. I don't mean that a quantum wave is less "real" than a point particle; it's just something that is there, although a different something than a point particle. The probabilistic character of the quantum wave is of course at the heart of interpretations of quantum mechanics. Currently I prefer the many-worlds interpretation because it doesn't seem to need more assumptions beyond the Schrodinger equation of the quantum wave, like wave "collapse". It just assumes that the quantum wave evolves according to the Schrodinger equation, with the mathematical consequence being that when the wave interacts with a many-particle object, parts of the wave that correspond to different possible values of a variable (for example, point position) stop interfering with each other and become separated into non-interacting parts of reality ("worlds").

A problem with the many-worlds interpretation is that an infinite number of possible values of a variable corresponds to an infinite number of worlds and it is not clear how to calculate frequentist probabilities when there is an infinite number of possibilities. Maybe a reconciliation of quantum mechanics with relativity theory will provide a solution to this problem, perhaps by limiting the number of possibilities to a finite number.

In general, history is very important. Have you heard of Richard Gregory's top-down theory of perception? — Magnus Anderson

No, but I take history into account by including in the definition of an object the object's position in spacetime.

Let's say we have two apples both of which are completely identical except in one regard: they occupy different positions. Are they identical or not? The answer depends on whether an apple's position constitutes its identity. — Magnus Anderson

We can also define the identity of an object by its relations to all other objects. The object's parts are only some of the other objects. Since the two apples have different positions relative to other objects, they have different identities. If they had the same positions relative to all other objects, they would have the same identity, which means they would be one apple, not two.

As far as I understand the quantum wave is just the probability of where a particle is located. — TheMadFool

Do you mean that the particle has a position in a point of space like the escaped convict and the quantum wave is only an expression of our incomplete knowledge of the particle's position? This idea was refuted by experimental tests of Bell's theorem: no local hidden-variable theory can be a correct description of quantum mechanics, where the hidden variable is a single point position of a particle, for example. This doesn't rule out non-local hidden-variable theories such as Bohm's but these theories seem incompatible with special relativity because they introduce superluminal speeds.

One object cannot occupy two locations in space at the same time and it is this impossibility that gives objects their identity. — TheMadFool

Yes, I would just add that this depends on how the object is defined. For example, in a sense it is true that my desk can occupy two locations in space at the same time - one leg here, another leg there! That's because the desk is defined as an object that is extended in space. But if by "location" we mean the spatial extension of the desk then it is true that the desk cannot occupy two locations in space at the same time - because it would violate the definition of the desk and so we would be talking about a different object than a desk.

This should be kept in mind when interpreting quantum mechanics. There is no point particle that occupies two points of space at the same time, but there is a quantum wave, defined as a spatially extended object, that occupies two or more points of space at the same time. Alternatively (and equivalently, if I understand it correctly), there is a point particle that occupies two points of space at the same time if the definition of the "point particle" allows the particle to move not only forward but also backward in time.

2. We know that the system (person A and the dice) is probabilistic because the experimental probability agrees with the theoretical probability which assumes the system is non-deterministic. — TheMadFool

I wouldn't say that theoretical probability assumes the system is non-deterministic. Rather, it assumes that the system has certain regularities that enable us to calculate frequencies of possible outcomes. In the example of throwing the dice, the regularities are (deterministic) laws of physics that transform initial conditions to outcomes.

I think nothing in the most general sense can be defined as an "object" that is logically inconsistently defined. For example: a circle that is not a circle. There are objects that are circles and there are objects that are not circles, but there is no object that both is and isn't a circle. That's why I put the word object into scare quotes in the first sentence; there is no such object, and the inconsistent definition as a whole has no referent.

I think the IIT theory might be a very good theory of identity - every system that integrates information is a conscious individual. But as a theory of consciousness I think it fails, as it gives no reason to suppose that the integration of information couldn't happen, as it were 'in the dark'. — bert1

I don't know whether Tononi's specific approach to quantifying the intensity of consciousness is correct but the general idea of associating the intensity of consciousness with organized complexity is supported by neuroscience and also seems to make intuitive sense to me. More specifically, it is organized complexity in a dynamic form, based on processes of differentiation and integration, or repulsive and attractive forces between the parts of a whole. Intrinsic properties of parts are "subsumed" in the intrinsic property of their whole (collection). Differentiation of parts may intensify the intrinsic property of the whole by giving it different contributions but may also weaken the intrinsic property of the whole by fragmenting it. Conversely, integration of parts may intensify the intrinsic property of the whole by concentrating them but it may also weaken the intrinsic property of the whole by losing their different contributions. So there would be intrinsic properties of different intensity on different levels of composition of structure: for example, there may be weak intrinsic properties on the level of atoms, intense intrinsic properties on the level of neural networks, and weak intrinsic properties on the level of a group of people. By intrinsic properties I mean non-relational, non-structural, monadic, qualitative properties, some or all of which may be identical to qualia of consciousness.

Either way it seems arbitrary to me to confine experiences to neural structures, which in the most general reductionist sense is just a certain configuration of atoms. — TheHorselessHeadman

Why stop at atoms? Atoms consist of electrons, protons and neutrons, and protons and neutrons consist of quarks...

it just "seems strange to me", that an entirely new phenomenon could arise in the universe, (suddenly blue exists), because atoms acquired a certain combination of molecules and ions in the brain. — TheHorselessHeadman

In my view, the new phenomenon is the combination of atoms, molecules, cells etc., and so it is necessarily there if the atoms, molecules and cells are there. It may seem strange to regard a combination of objects as an object in its own right; if somebody showed you an apple and an orange and asked you how many objects there are, you would probably say two, and not three, where the third object would be the combination (or collection) of the apple and the orange. But then again, apples and oranges are combinations too, because they consist of atoms, and atoms consist of subatomic particles, etc. It seems tempting to conclude that the only "real" objects are the smallest, indivisible objects at the bottom and everything else is "just" combinations of them without any new intrinsic or uncomputable properties. But why would it be so? There are actually also holistic views of the universe - for example a version of panpsychism called cosmopsychism - according to which the universe as a whole is the only "real" object, and everything else is "just" de-combinations from it. These two views seem to be special cases of a more general view according to which all combinations (collections) are "real" objects, not just the empty combinations or an all-encompassing combination.

So in the example of general anesthesia I would probably view it in the same way as bert1 expressed, as the anesthesia disrupting the unification of the experiences, and maybe pain as an example isn't a fundamental conscious property but an amalgam of different kinds. — TheHorselessHeadman

Yes, but if the anesthesia disrupts the unity of human consciousness, then the specific combination of neurons we experience as pain no longer exists, and so there is no consciousness of pain.

Now let me return to something you said earlier:

Then there's just the question of why we don't experience everything all at once then, why my consciousness doesn't stretch to include the rest of my brain, and out through my skull, into the air and across the globe and include yours as well ;D So it appears that there are some boundaries. — TheHorselessHeadman

On the basis of study of neural correlates of our consciousness it appears that the "intensity" or "level" of consciousness possessed by an object is positively correlated with organized complexity of the object. High organized complexity means that the object has many different parts which are also richly integrated/connected (as opposed to high unorganized complexity, which means that the object has many different but independent parts). General anesthesia usually seems to reduce organized complexity of brain processes by disrupting their connections, thus reducing consciousness of the brain to a negligible level. On the other hand, when a person is in a deep, dreamless, natural sleep, organized complexity of brain processes is reduced by the presence of long delta waves that homogenize the brain processes, so there is too much connection and too little differentiation in the brain. Similarly, loss of consciousness during an epileptic seizure correlates with increased synchronization of brain waves. The cerebellum has four times more neurons than the cortex, but damage to cerebellum, unlike damage to cortex, has practically no impact on consciousness; it turns out that while there is rich differentiation and interaction in the cortex, the cerebellum has many small modules that process information locally, without much interaction with other modules. Giulio Tononi has proposed a measure of organized complexity for the determination of the level of consciousness called "integrated information."

But who then experienced the pain? Are we not talking about the same thing?

How do you know it is consciousness that is switched off, rather than unitary identity that is disrupted? — bert1

I am not sure what you mean by unitary identity, but I think my consciousness was switched off during general anesthesia because I don't remember any experiences from that time. I guess I can't rule out that I actually experienced the pain of a lancet cutting into my body or a fantastic orgasm or whatever and then forgot it, but that kind of begs the question.

And it doesn't mean that I believe that individual atoms are having complicated experiences as we do. But that different atoms, just as they have different measurable chemical properties they might also have different types of experiences. It sounds completely nuts, but maybe some type of atom (let's say all carbon atoms) just experiences the color green, and others experience what we identify as pressure, another as what we identify as warmth. — TheHorselessHeadman

Do you think that the atoms of a dead human body have these experiences? Such experiences probably exist on the level of neural structures, not atoms, and can be temporarily switched off by general anesthesia.

Everything just appears, and I might think "Hey, no, I can control things. I can snap my fingers anytime I want." But those words also just arrived. — TheHorselessHeadman

Yes, we can act intentionally only when the intention pops up in our mind. If nothing pops up, tough luck. So much for libertarian free will. On the other hand, if we are lucky enough and the intention appears, it often seems to have causal power that drives our intentional actions. Maybe consciousness is a particular causal mechanism.

conscious experience could just be a side-effect, like smoke rising from a train-engine and which has no bearing on the train itself. — TheHorselessHeadman

Or it could be like the engine itself. Consciousness could be a particular kind of matter, or both consciousness and matter could be particular kinds of "stuff", for lack of a better word.

A never-ending life does not necessarily entail repetition. Moreover, more complex bodies or mental structures may hold qualia we can't even imagine yet.

A Big Crunch doesn't seem likely from current data. Expansion of our universe is currently accelerating and the most likely scenario is that it will expand forever but at some point it will end up in heat death where all stuff is homogenously distributed in space and thus supports no life. Maybe an extremely intelligent civilization evolved over billions of years will be able to manipulate some parameters of the universe to ensure endless continuation of life.

What I see our friend saying is that he seeks gnosis as described in this link.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_9QI3nlinYQ — Gnostic Christian Bishop

Well, I'm curious about general aspects of reality and existence. I also think it would suck if I bit the dust at the end of this life and that was it.

So your perspective is that our greater complexity is just a pointless extension of our basic animal nature - and there is no real point in self-reflection at all, let alone revising our behaviour patterns or seeking information, except perhaps to increase chances of ‘survival’ in a losing game...? — Possibility

Survival instinct must arise somewhere at the start of evolution, unless you assume an intelligent creator who can create living beings without a survival instinct and then can keep them in a safe place where they can live and evolve - which doesn't seem to be our world, although we may already be becoming such intelligent designers by applying genetic engineering or cybernetics.

That said, we don't need to always act with the conscious intention to survive or reproduce, even when our actions do promote our survival or reproduction: we can simply enjoy food or sex. And complex beings like today's humans can also indulge in activities that don't directly satisfy their survival or reproductive needs; they can even afford to indulge in activities that are detrimental to their survival or reproduction, as long as they have the means to reverse or mitigate such detrimental effects (for example pharmaceuticals, surgeries, etc.). As I said in the previous post, love (or similar feelings like happiness) seems to accompany accepting behaviors, so theoretically an organism can develop love for things that are beneficial or detrimental or neutral to its survival or reproduction - by accepting the things (as opposed to resisting them).

By the way, I don't argue that we are purely extensions of our animal nature. Who knows, we may have started our evolution in a spiritual/non-material world, perhaps even with an intervention of an intelligent creator, and arrived here later. My argument is about evolution and feelings like hate and love in general.

Hate seems to be a quale that accompanies a behavior where we resist something (it is also closely related to qualia like pain and fear). On the other hand, love seems to be a quale that accompanies a behavior where we accept something (and is closely related to qualia like happiness and trust). Evolution by random mutations and natural selection tends to cause that we hate (resist) and love (accept) the "right" things, that is such things our hate or love of which improves our chances of survival and/or reproduction. The unfortunate organisms that happen to hate things that are beneficial to them or love things that are detrimental to them tend to fall out of the gene pool in the long run. Evolution by random mutations and natural selection is of course a crude and long-term mechanism but it does seem to cause in the long run that organisms hate at least the most important things that are detrimental to their survival and/or reproduction and love at least the most important things that are beneficial to their survival and/or reproduction. In more complex organisms this basic hate and love are transferred also to more sophisticated things that may not be directly related to survival and/or reproduction, for example love of biologically important information may transfer to love of science or philosophy (that is, love of science or philosophy is driven, through complex cognitive structures, by the more primitive love of seeking and understanding biologically important information). On the other hand, hate of information overload may transfer to hate of science or philosophy.

Memory’s ideas recall the last heard tone;
Sensation savors what is presently known;
Imagination anticipates coming sounds;
The delight is such that none could produce alone. — PoeticUniverse

Nicely put. Unfortunately, delights are sometimes replaced by horrors. My comforting hope is that the horrors as a learning experience will facilitate prevention of future horrors.

Yes, for while there isn't anything as temporary that is identical to itself over time, there needs to be a Permanence to make the events possible. — PoeticUniverse

In a sense, everything is permanent, because its existence is logical consistency and logical consistency is timeless; a logically consistent object cannot not be logically consistent and thus it cannot not exist; time just falls out of the picture. But how do we reconcile this timeless permanence of all objects with our experience of the passage of time and the evolution of our identity over time?

Well, theory of relativity describes time as a special kind of space: in addition to the three "normal" spatial dimensions there is a fourth spatial dimension that is mathematically a bit different and can be usefully regarded as time. A spacetime, then, is a kind of 4-dimensional geometrical object that exists timelessly and this object has a certain structure that constitutes objects in spacetime and has regularities that we know as laws of physics.

Our conscious selves are some of the objects in spacetime which are extended not only in the three "normal" spatial dimensions but also in the time dimension; their extension in the time dimension measures on the order of tens of milliseconds (that's the temporal span of human conscious experience). My conscious self at this moment and my conscious self a few tens of milliseconds further are different objects in spacetime which are however closely connected through laws of physics and their character is such that a certain representation of a prior self is contained in the later self and the later self experiences this representation as a memory. The later self also contains a certain representation of an even later self and this representation is usually less specified than a memory and is experienced as an anticipation. The experience of memories and anticipations together with the overall experience of the self that contains them seems to constitute the experience of the passage of time.

I used to be amazed by the question of why there exists something rather than nothing. I am still amazed by it but I experienced some resolution when I asked myself what "existence" actually means. What does it mean that something "exists"?

My answer is that "existence" in the most general sense is logical consistency: something "exists" if it is logically consistent; or in other words, if it is what it is and is not what it is not; or if it is identical to itself and different from what it is not. This is the most general definition of existence because anything that exists must satisfy this condition of logical consistency or identity. It is actually the definition of existence in mathematics.

You may agree that anything that exists must be identical to itself and still disagree that anything that is identical to itself exists. But that would just narrow the definition of existence: you would pick a subset of objects from the set of all objects that exist under the most general definition of existence. The reason why the objects of this particular subset exist is the same reason why all objects exist (logical consistency); the objects in this particular subset just have some particular interesting property, for example they are part of an object that in physics is called "spacetime" and thus they are subject to laws of physics and can be interacted with. We could also say that the objects of the particular subset exist in a particular way.

I'm baffled by your reply. What else did you think I said? And where yet did you say anything useful about the nature of this "energy density" which you have to go off and measure? — apokrisis

I said that energy is mathematically related to the acceleration that the space point imparts to another space point during an interaction. It means that energy can do work.

You said some posts back that energy and dynamics cannot be explained only by math; that we also need a "material principle". I don't understand what you mean by the material principle, and I just outlined how energy and dynamics (acceleration during interaction) can be explained by mathematical relations and how they are related to spacetime curvature, a geometric property of the mathematical object called spacetime.

The kind of existence of an abstract object (property) is such that the object has instances. And the kind of existence of a concrete object is such that the object has no instances.

If you are trying to imagine where objectively existing abstract objects would exist, one answer could be: nowhere. Just as the universe exists nowhere, as there is no underlying space for it.

Another answer could be: in the collection of all possible objects, which are related by the relations of similarity, composition and instantiation. Some of those objects form topological or metric spaces, including the one in which we live.

Perhaps, but do abstract objects exist independently of their being thought, and if so, how would that "existence" look? — Janus

Yes, I think they exist independently of being thought because they are properties that different objects have in common; they are ways in which different objects are similar; they are conditions that different objects satisfy if they are of a particular kind. But I don't think we can visualize abstract objects, because they are not objects in space. (We may be able to visualize their particular instances or a typical instance.) But apparently we can inductively infer their existence by noticing in what ways different things are similar.

So what exists as "an object" is completely arbitrary, and dependent only on the way that human beings assign properties. if someone assigns properties, there is an object there. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, an object has properties even if no one assigns them to it. Planet Earth is round no matter whether someone assigns roundness to it. It was also round before anyone believed it was round, or before anyone even existed.

So an object is identified as something individual, particular, and unique, while a subject is identified as something specific. One is a particular, the other a universal. — Metaphysician Undercover

Huh? An object is a particular and a subject is a universal? Where did you get this terminology?

We could say that biology and physics are distinct subjects within the subject of natural science, just like Euclidean space and non-Euclidean space are distinct subjects within the subject mathematics. However, we cannot allow that biology and physics proceed from contradictory axioms, because this would signify incoherency within the subject of natural science. — Metaphysician Undercover

But biology is part of physics; properties of biological objects are physical properties. Curved space is not part of flat space and flat space is not part of curved space.

Any mathematical object can be regarded as a "possible world".

Curvature is a geometric property of spacetime and is related by Einstein's field equation to energy. Spacetime curvature and energy determine each other through Einstein's field equation.

First, I see no definition of "object". Second, you say "axioms are properties of an object". Third, opposing axioms may describe different objects. Why this is totally confused is that you have no principle to differentiate one object from another object because you have no definition of "object" — Metaphysician Undercover

Object is something that has properties.

In other words, we could make up an endless number of random axioms, each describing a different object, therefore mathematics would consist of an endless supply of random objects, each with its own axiom. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes. That's the most general idea of mathematics.

Now, let's get logical. Within logic we have subjects. You cannot attribute to the same subject, opposing predicates, without contradiction. — Metaphysician Undercover

Is there any difference between object and subject?

Mathematics is a subject, so we cannot attribute to mathematics, opposing hypotheses, without contradiction. — Metaphysician Undercover

We don't attribute opposing axioms to the whole mathematical world, only to its parts (objects in the mathematical world). For example, zero curvature of space does not hold in the whole mathematical world but only in Euclidean spaces. And non-zero curvature of space does not hold in the whole mathematical world but only in non-Euclidean spaces.

Is it just that? The claim would be that it is some quantity of something. So the structuralism of the maths still leaves open the question of how to understand the material part of reality’s equation. — apokrisis

Maybe we could say that energy density is a mapping (defined by Einstein's field equation) from spacetime curvature to real numbers at a given point in spacetime? This mapping is in turn mathematically related to acceleration that this point can impart to another point during an interaction as the energy does work.

In mathematics, existence is logical consistency, so everything that is consistent exists, and exists necessarily (because it cannot be inconsistent) and truths about it are necessary truths.

We must tack on a tensor field to specify some energy density at every point in this spacetime. We have to tell Lorentzian spacetime how it should actually curve. A literally material constraint must be glued to the floppy Lorentzian fabric to give it a gravitational structure. — apokrisis

Energy density is a quantity (number) that is related via Einstein's mathematical equation to spacetime curvature. Pure mathematics.

And even then, the quantum of action - how G scales the interaction between the energy density and the spatiotemporal curvature - remains to be accounted for. — apokrisis

Maybe G can be derived from some general principles and maybe its value is specific just to the spacetime in which we happen to live and may have different values in other spacetimes.

Within mathematics in general, there are numerous contradictions such as Euclidean vs. non-Euclidean geometry, — Metaphysician Undercover

Not sure if you missed my reply:

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/219667

The problem I see with this is that if a mathematical "object", say the number five, has no existence apart from its concrete representations, then it cannot qualify as an object at all, since its representations are potentially infinite in number. — Janus

Abstract objects and their particular representations are inseparable. There cannot be one without the other. Representations cannot exist without that which they represent, and that which is represented cannot exist without its representations. If there is no number 5 then there are no 5 objects.

I think it is better to think of a "mathematical object" as a way of thinking or speaking, so the sameness consists in the human action. It's like, for example, traveling by train from one station to another; the journey is both always the same and yet different every time, just as each instantiation or representation of fiveness is. There is no perfect form of fiveness, just as there is no perfect form of the train journey. The sameness in both cases is the result of the human process of abstraction. — Janus

The sameness is also a fact about the external world.

So formal truths have a sort of... transcendality? Transcendency? Whatever. They go above and beyond possible worlds, basically. — MindForged

If you mean truths that hold in different possible worlds, then these truths constitute a more general/more abstract/higher-order possible world.

Maths is spatial, or at best, spatiotemporal, and doesn't speak to energy or action in any basic way. It about the logical syntax of patterns and structures, and not about whatever breathes physical fire into those equations. — apokrisis

Spaces are indeed traditionally studied mathematical objects and time is treated in theory of relativity as a special kind of spatial dimension, completing a more complex mathematical object - spacetime. Now, this spacetime in which we live is not empty/uniform but it contains additional structure, like embroidery in a sheet of cloth, in the form of objects extended in space and time (which we perceive as extended in space and moving through space, changing and enduring in time), and there are also certain regularities in these extensions that we call laws of physics, laws that govern how spatially extended objects move and change in time and in relation to each other, how they interact with each other, and how these attractive and repulsive interactions define their boundaries. We may use concepts like "force" or "energy" to describe these movements, changes and interactions. Force is the product of an object's acceleration and mass, where mass is a quantity related to spacetime curvature in the place where the object is located. Energy is an object's ability to exert force over space, that is, a quantity that determines how the object accelerates another object in interaction.

So spacetime with its complex structure seems to be a specific mathematical object. One of all possible mathematical objects, and one whose structure allows the existence of what we call living conscious objects - like us.

Your comparison isn't completely right. Finite mathematical objects exist both like the uncarved material and the carved material. I suppose you compared the carved material to the representations of mathematical objects in human consciousness.

So sure, when maths is understood as just a realm of everything that unconstrained syntax will produce - a Borges library - then it seems to bear no real relation to a reality in which limitation or finitude is apparent everywhere. — apokrisis

The relation between such an unconstrained world of math and a limited finite world is that the limited finite world is a part of the unconstrained world of math.

In any case, the sense in which Platonism says that numbers (etc) are independent of particular minds, is simply based on the observation that they are the same for anyone capable of counting. But at the same time, they're only perceptible by a rational intelligence. So they're 'intelligible objects', or the objects of reason, which are fundamental to the operations of rational thought, and indeed to science itself. — Wayfarer

If they are only perceptible by a rational mind it doesn't necessarily mean that they are inside the rational mind. They may be perceptible only by a rational mind and still be outside the rational mind - that's what Platonists/realists are saying. They are saying it because it seems inconceivable that truths about numbers didn't hold before someone perceived them or will stop holding when there is no one around to perceive them. Maybe a more accurate word would be "to infer" than "to perceive", since abstract objects like numbers don't seem amenable to sensory interaction. But to infer the existence of an object doesn't mean that the object only exists in the mind that is doing the inference. Scientists make inferences (predictions) about the external world and test them.

Not only is this mathematical realm full of junk, but it's also full of contradictions. Go figure. Because of such contradictions, mathematics is clearly not logical. So, which is more reliable, mathematics or logic? — Metaphysician Undercover

Only consistently defined objects can be part of the mathematical world.

Axioms are properties of an object (also called axiomatic system). Axioms like "The continuum hypothesis is true" and "The continuum hypothesis is not true" would be contradictory if they were properties of the same object but they are not contradictory if they are properties of different objects.