Platonism. Sort of fits metaphysically, because it seems to me that abstract objects are parts of objective reality but I don't think they are more "real" or "perfect" than their instances.

No idea how that makes any sense to you. — Terrapin Station

Well, that's the point - it doesn't make sense to say that the world isn't like logic, because that would mean that the world is not what it is. If the world is what it is then the world is logical (logically consistent).

The Tao is not logical or illogical. — T Clark

If Tao is what it is then it is logical.

Or do you think logic is the fundamental basis of reality? From what you've written, I think you probably do. — T Clark

Yes, if reality is what it is then logic (consistency) is its fundamental basis. I can't see how reality could be otherwise.

Didn't think he was arguing against logic per se, if that is what you meant. That would be highly illogical, Captain. — 0 thru 9

To claim that the world is illogical is to claim that the world is not what it is. Therefore, the world is not illogical. The claim refutes itself.

Or in other words, the world isn't like natural language, except for that part of the world that is natural language. The same goes for mathematical language, logic, etc. — Terrapin Station

If the world isn't like logic then the world is like logic. That's what you get from absence of logic. To argue against logic is self-defeating.

If you look back at Bohr and Heisenberg's philosophical musings on QM (retrospectively named the 'Copenhagen Interpretation'), they seem lucid - and parsimonious - by comparison. — Wayfarer

The Copenhagen interpretation is less parsimonious than the many worlds interpretation because Copenhagen introduces an arbitrary assumption of a wave function "collapse" in an attempt to reduce reality to those logical possibilities that we observe. MWI accepts the reality of all logical possibilities that are defined by the wave function even though we only observe some of them.

I wouldn't have thought that the first quote above was written by the same person as the second. The first is impressionistic, intuitive, uncomplicated, and straightforward. Down home. The second is formal, uses technical terminology, and requires following a confusing chain of logic. How do you see them fitting together? — T Clark

Well, isn't that sort of like the yin-yang duality that is supposed to be the manifestation of Tao? :) The first quote was an intuitive/holistic characterization of existence while the second was an analytic/logical specification of what existence is and how it is instantiated in the structure of reality. I am sorry if this specification was confusing, I just tried to pack it into a few sentences.

I don't know enough about Wittgenstein to comment on him, but my view is far larger than logical positivism. Logical positivism limits reality to that which can be observed through the senses, but I see no reason to deny existence to things that we cannot observe. Any thing that is consistently defined via its relations to all other things exists in the sense in which it is defined. To deny it existence would be to arbitrarily accept certain logical possibilities and exclude others.

Both the Tao and objective reality could be identified with existence. — T Clark

But existence is not the individual things but rather the universal property that they all have in common. As such, existence can be said to be "invisible", "formless", "everlasting", "the ground of being", or "the absolute principle underlying the universe".

In addition to what you've written here, I think I remember another post where you state that existence is logical consistency. I don't really know what you mean. — T Clark

I mean logical consistency to be the property of every (existing) thing - basically, that the thing is identical to itself and different from others. This entails that the thing has relations to other things, and these relations can be reduced to the relations of similarity, instantiation and composition. Instantiation means that the thing has certain properties (or is a property of other things) and composition means that the thing has certain parts (or is a part of other things). So, if a thing is consistently defined by these relations (for example, not having the property of being a circle and a square at the same time) then it exists.

The way you spoke about Tao suggests that Tao could be identified with existence, the property of all things. In my view, existence is simply logical consistency.

"Nothing" in the absolute sense (absence of everything) is logically inconsistent and therefore impossible. If there were absolutely nothing then there would still be the fact that there is absolutely nothing, but this fact would be something, a property of reality.

We are able to put arbitrary thoughts, words or sounds together but that doesn't mean that these collections refer to something in reality.

Harry Potter exists in a certain way, for example as a collection of qualia in our consciousness. Whether he also exists as a concrete person in the physical world depends on whether he and his world are consistently defined. But such a world is apparently not identical to ours.

Inconsistently defined things such as triangular circles do not exist because they have no identity (triangular circle is a circle that is not a circle). They are nothing. We can think about them and our thoughts exist as a collection of qualia, but such thoughts refer to nothing.

But how do you explain the fact that we can think about impossibilities? Do these acts of thinking not really exist? — darthbarracuda

An act of thinking exists as a collection of qualia in one's consciousness. But if they refer to impossibilities such as a triangular circle they refer to nothing because impossible things do not exist.

So you can think the statement "The triangle is a circle", or you can speak it or write it down. The collection of qualia, sounds, or ink marks on paper is consistent and exists, but it does not refer to anything.

But why does this reason exist? — darthbarracuda

Because its non-existence would result in logical inconsistency, like a triangle being a circle.

The ultimate reason for why anything exists is logical consistency. What is existence anyway, if not logical consistency?

That doesn't tell you why the thing exists, but rather how anything exists. — John

I think it also tells me why the thing exists: the thing exists because it is identical to itself and different from other things.

How about taking logical consistency as a "brute fact"? That means, something exists iff it is identical to itself and different from others. This "brute fact" then generates the whole reality.

What is the warrant for induction, other than the customary association of effects with causes (and so on)? Those were the questions he was considering. — Wayfarer

But it seems he at least acknowledged there are stable regularities in nature. To me this seems the same as acknowledging there are laws in nature, even though it is unknown whether they will continue to hold in the future.

More a regular conjunction of events than a coincidence. — Wayfarer

But why would a conjunction of events be regular? Did he think there are regularities like the law of gravitation?

How did Hume explain the observed fact that when you drop an apple it always falls down? That it's a coincidence?

States of affairs. (Dynamic) ways the world is. — Terrapin Station

If it is a fact that the world is a certain way, then I would say that it is objectively true that the world is that way. This seems to be the usual concept of objective truth.

They can be translated from one to the other, and with enough imagination, probably to an equal degree. Which means that you have to explain why you posit subject-predicate as the structuration of the world, if it happens that non-finites clauses are just a co-extent with reality as finite ones. As of now the move seems arbitrary. — Akanthinos

As I said, non-finite clauses have a subject-predicate structure too, just not explicit.

If someone believes that there are facts that they can know, such as that one will fall if one jumps out of a window, then it would be very unlikely that they'd not assign "true" to the proposition "One will fall if one jumps out of a window" (assuming no unusual meaning assignments, etc.) — Terrapin Station

But what are facts if not objective truths?

Once saw a dude who claimed he was Jesus and that the bonfire wouldn't burn him. — Akanthinos

But I guess he didn't think that it was a fact and simultaneously that it wasn't true.

How about non-finite clauses? They certainly expresses states-of-affairs, but do not have a subject-predicate structuration. And yes, you can translate one from the other and then backwards again a thousand times, but how do you justify epistemologicaly the claim that reality is also so structured, which is logically incompatible with the claim that non-finite clauses can correspond to states-of-affairs? — Akanthinos

Non-finite clauses have an implied subject-predicate structure too, and they can be reworded to make the structure explicit.

How about every realistic phenomenon involving surrealist art which aren't expressed by the proposition "Surrealist art is exhibited in the local gallery". Do they find no place in your ontology? — Akanthinos

That was just an example of a proposition.

So, before language was evolved, we had no way to correspond to reality? That must've been rough. — Akanthinos

Well, there was non verbal language, like animals have, but that was much more limited.

I don't know anyone who would think that it is a fact that you will fall when you jump out of a window, and at the same time doubt that the proposition "You will fall when you jump out of a window" is true. But that seems to be your view.

So you wouldn't say that propositions necessarily have to do with meanings? — Terrapin Station

They have, but their meanings are in reality, in facts.

What's the subject-predicate structure of instinctual action? Of surrealist art? — Akanthinos

Propositions have a subject-predicate structure, for example "Surrealist art is exhibited in the local gallery." "Surrealist art" is subject and "is exhibited in the local gallery" is predicate.

Could you explain how language is capable of such a trick? — Akanthinos

The trick of corresponding to reality? Apparently, language evolved to do that trick because it was useful to communicate in a way that corresponded to reality.

What changes about the proposition when it is snared by a hunting mind, that it wasn't true before it could be put in words? — Akanthinos

A proposition is true or false regardless of whether it is thought by someone.

Usefulness is irrelevant to reality. The reality is that propositions only obtain when individuals think them. There's absolutely no evidence of them existing otherwise. — Terrapin Station

What I called instantiated propositions is what you called facts. If you jump out of a window you will fall - that is a fact and a true proposition.

On my view, a proposition only obtains when an indiviual thinks that proposition. You might not agree with that, but that's my view. Is that much clear? — Terrapin Station

Ok but I don't see how subjective truth is useful. I am interested in reality, not in beliefs.

I'm not saying that the fact of whether there is a window or whether you will fall if you jump out of a window is subjective. — Terrapin Station

But if it is a fact that there is a window then the proposition "There is a window" is true. And if it is a fact that there is no window then the proposition "There is a window" is false.

What I'm asking you is how that corresondence relation works, in mechanical/physical terms.

You can't talk about people pointing at things, saying things, doing things, etc.--that's not mind-independent. You're claiming that once the reference is set, it's mind-independent. — Terrapin Station

I said what is mind-dependent and what is mind-independent about statements. I don't know how to put it more clearly.

I don't at all agree with the distinction you're making. — Terrapin Station

I don't agree with your view that it is a matter of subjective judgment whether there is a window in a wall or whether you will fall if you jump out of a window.

So again, I'll ask you how, in that situation, the statement refers mind-independently. What are the mechanics of that? Just how does it work? — Terrapin Station

It's just the reference/correspondence relation between the statement and reality. If you point to a dog and say "This is a window", you refer to a dog with a word that refers to something else and therefore your statement doesn't correspond to reality and is false.

I didn't say it wasn't a physical world. I said the relationship between this world and another one is neither temporal nor spatial. — noAxioms

I would say that any things that are differentiated from each other make up a "space" of some kind, in which they are differentiated from each other. So you could have a one-dimensional space of natural numbers, or a two-dimensional space of complex numbers, or a space where on one axis is the price of a product and on another axis is the demanded quantity of the product (the demand curve can be said to exist in such a space). Or if you don't want to use the word "space" in such a general sense, just use the word "collection", "set" or a "multiset". Multisets are sets that treat identical copies of their members as different objects.

First, you need to differentiate between proposition and statement. Proposition is a feature of reality, completely mind-independent. Its truth in a world is mind-independent too - it is identical to the instantiation of the proposition in that world.

Second, a statement requires a mind to assign referents to words. But once those referents are assigned, the truth of a statement, based on the assigned referents, is mind-independent, depending on whether the statement corresponds to reality, that is, whether it corresponds to the instantiated proposition.

How would they mind-independently refer to something? Take the sound or ink marks "window." It mind-independently refers to something by ______? — Terrapin Station

I didn't say they refer mind-independently. It takes a mind to assign referents to words.

The subject-predicate structure is the structure of the window existing in the wall. It is a feature of reality. It is mind-independent. The sounds or marks on paper can correspond to this feature if we assign to those sounds or marks what they refer to in reality.

So maybe our answer lies in here somewhere. The sides of the square are identical, and thus are one side, but it exists four times as much as center point of the thing. — noAxioms

Or we can say that one abstract line is instantiated in four particular lines. The abstract line and the four particular lines are five different things.

What I'm asking you is how it works--basically in "mechanical" terms--that those words refer to something. You're claiming that they refer to something mind-indepedently. Well, how does that work exactly? — Terrapin Station

Words are just our names for things and relations in reality. For example, people in English speaking countries agreed to use the word "window" as a name for the openings in the walls of houses that serve to let in light and air. Words are useful in communication. If you want to tell someone about a window you just utter a simple sound instead of having to draw a window or show them a physical one.

The choice and use of a word is mind-dependent but the thing in reality that the word refers to is generally not. Whether there is a thing called "window" in a particular wall of a house is true or untrue regardless of how we call it and even regardless of whether anyone makes a statement about it. The truth is completely mind-independent. The proposition "There is a window in the wall" is a special kind of complex property, with a subject-predicate structure, and when such a property is instantiated in a world, it is true in that world.

And if someone makes the statement "There is a window in the wall" then of course it requires a mind to make a statement but whether the statement is true depends on whether there is a window in the wall in reality, not on someone's judgment.

Could you describe how you believe that works?--That is, describe the mechanics of it in some detail? — Terrapin Station

"If you jump out of window you will fall."

It is well known what the words in this statement refer to. Do you think that the truth of this statement depends on someone's judgment? That the statement may not be true and so you will not fall if you jump out of window? (of course we assume that usual conditions hold, such as the presence of gravity, the position of the window above the ground, you not having wings etc., which I am not going to enumerate)

Worlds have positions?? Can I say which is left of the other? Can these four identical worlds be put in some kind of order?
You're assigning nonexistent differences to the same thing and contradicting your own definitions now. — noAxioms

A space can consist of identical points, that is, points that are the same except for their position in the space they make up. Now imagine that the points are worlds - again, identical except for their position in the space they make up.