So I asked YOU on what you conclude as the fate of the cosmos. — Copernicus
Take away all laws of physics or the natural order. That's true chaos. — Copernicus
That's entropy. — Copernicus
Any large-scale or permanent chaos would doom the universe. — Copernicus
The big picture
In summary, the theory that entanglement entropy gives rise to spacetime proposes a revolutionary reversal of our conventional understanding:
From geometry to information: Instead of spacetime being a fundamental backdrop in which quantum mechanics operates, the geometry of spacetime and even its existence are determined by the patterns of quantum entanglement within a more fundamental, information-based reality.
A computational universe: The universe can be viewed as a massive, continuous quantum computation, where spacetime, time, and gravity are the emergent macroscopic consequences of how information is processed and entangled at the quantum level. — PoeticUniverse
Empirical data says chaos exists. You argue otherwise. — Copernicus
It really is a silly concept when you really think about it (clearly). — punos
Not so uninteresting as some. — Banno
So sure, take Maxwell's equations and apply gauge symmetry, and "the answer just jumps out"; but don't then claim that the theory is ex nihilo; it used Maxwell's equations and gauge symmetry. — Banno
No one forced you to engage in a topic you have only contempt for. — unenlightened
You are waving words around as if they were arguments. What is abduction, and how does it help? — Banno
If we follow Hume, our best theories of physics function because our habits are such as to recognise patterns in the stuff around us, — Banno
Why take regularity as something given and without genesis? If regularity is an EFFECT, this would completely change the issue of the laws of nature and their origin. Since, and this is not casuality, these laws are also presented as something given and without origin. — JuanZu
The move from any finite sequence of specific statements to a general statement is invalid. More formally, from f(a), f(b), f(c)... we cannot deduce U(x)f(x). This is the "scandal of induction". It is a philosophical problem - scientists and engineers just move on without paying it much attention. But it is part of the plumbing of our understanding of the world, and will niggle at those who worry about such things. — Banno
Most famously, perhaps, is falsification, a very clever response. Instead of proving that U(x)f(x), why not assume it and look for a counter-instance - and x that is not f? We can't prove an universal, but we can disprove it... or so Popper supposed. There are problems there, too, of course. — Banno
Now all of this is the standard history of the philosophy of science - regardless of what some here think. — Banno
Point is, I'm right about it. Where the answer sits at present is more in Bayesian Calculus, which accepts Hume's point, and instead of looking to justify our scientific theories as true, looks to choose which ones are most believable. — Banno
I don't grant that we have ambiguity because we need to lie to ourselves with fictions and both believe and not believe something at the same time. — Leontiskos
If I have to believe that my country is out-competing the liberal west even when I know it is not true, ambiguity isn't going to save my boat. — Leontiskos
This "always larger view" is the transcendent fiction. So what are the contradictions and what is the fiction? — Leontiskos
Equal opportunity combined with an allowance of consequences can seem like a contradiction, but I think we agree that this is only true when one is thinking about equality of outcome rather than equality of opportunity. — Leontiskos
...Although I would say that we are only partially socially constructed. There are important "constraints" on the theory that we are socially constructed. — Leontiskos
If I recall, I originally said that liberalism requires the lie of value-neutrality, and you said that such a thing was the transcendent fiction that undergirds liberalism. ... When I use "fiction" I mean something like a "noble lie," i.e. a lie that is meant to have a beneficial effect. — Leontiskos
So if liberalism (or else pragmatism) is a thing that exists in some places and not in other places, and if its central tenets are the points you outlined about equality of opportunity, consequences, etc., then is liberalism something that ought to be sought or not? In other words, you are implying all sorts of arguments for the normative superiority of liberalism while at the same time resisting the conclusion that liberalism is normatively superior. — Leontiskos
Put differently, if we fall away from liberalism you will apparently just "switch" from liberalism to pragmatism. Analogously, someone who champions motorboats might move from motorboats to sailboats when the gasoline runs dry, but then protest that what they really championed was not motorboats but rather boats in general. — Leontiskos
Right, I'm more sympathetic to the idea that nature's regularities have evolved like habits than that they are given as eternal verities by some imagined lawgiver. — Janus
Second, the turning of a ‘now’ into the next ‘now’ sits on the thinnest knife edge imaginable, the previous ‘now’ wholly consumed in the making of the new ‘now’ all over the universe at once in a dynamical updating—the present now exhausting all reality. The incredibly short Planck time would be the processing time and that is not much at all. — PoeticUniverse
Presentism vs Eternalism vs spaceless Quantum Field Monads fun vid: — PoeticUniverse
You are obscure Apo. — bert1
You have to sound reasonable when you make your grant application. — apokrisis
Is that a law of nature? I think it's the advice of a propagandist. Scream softly or the children might hear. — unenlightened
Is that a law of nature? I think it's the advice of a propagandist. Scream softly or the children might hear. — unenlightened
Soon after you start listening. — Banno
We know induction is invalid. — Banno
replied:
the unexpected — Banno
Yes! Again, we are not disagreeing with what's been said; I'm just pointing out that this is not logic. — Banno
One has reason to suspect a general principle lurks. It is worth shaping up in systematic fashion through deducing the consequences of such an explanation and then seeking the evidence that would offer inductive support. Or abduction as inference to the best explanation. — apokrisis
You already have your causal relation, before you start on the logic of checking it. You bring it in to confirm your bias. That's the criticism. — Banno
Abduction is not a formalisable process that can provide an algorithmic answer to Hume's scepticism. — Banno
It's a leap of faith. — unenlightened
I would have thought that the cosmos would display something more like inertia, but regardless of what one calls it, there is no evidence of it from the future, and the move from past to future, or from explanation to prediction, remains unsupported by any logic or evidence. — unenlightened
Your theory — Banno
Abduction doesn’t define a relation of consequence between premises and conclusions; logic requires a structured notation, absent from abduction. Abduction might be a good name for a psychological process, but it ain't a logic. — Banno
The term “abduction” was coined by Charles Sanders Peirce in his work on the logic of science. He introduced it to denote a type of non-deductive inference that was different from the already familiar inductive type.
It is clear that, as Peirce understood the term, “abduction” did not quite mean what it is currently taken to mean. One main difference between his conception and the modern one is that, whereas according to the latter, abduction belongs to what the logical empiricists called the “context of justification”—the stage of scientific inquiry in which we are concerned with the assessment of theories—for Peirce abduction had its proper place in the context of discovery, the stage of inquiry in which we try to generate theories which may then later be assessed.
As he says, “[a]bduction is the process of forming explanatory hypotheses. It is the only logical operation which introduces any new idea” (CP 5.172); elsewhere he says that abduction encompasses “all the operations by which theories and conceptions are engendered” (CP 5.590). Deduction and induction, then, come into play at the later stage of theory assessment: deduction helps to derive testable consequences from the explanatory hypotheses that abduction has helped us to conceive, and induction finally helps us to reach a verdict on the hypotheses, where the nature of the verdict is dependent on the number of testable consequences that have been verified.
Gerhard Schurz has recently defended a view of abduction that is again very much in the Peircean spirit. On this view, “the crucial function of a pattern of abduction … consists in its function as a search strategy which leads us, for a given kind of scenario, in a reasonable time to a most promising explanatory conjecture which is then subject to further test” (Schurz 2008, 205).
Harry Frankfurt (1958) has noted, however, that abuctiion is supposed to be part of the logic of science, but what exactly is logical about inventing explanatory hypotheses? According to Peirce (CP 5.189), abduction belongs to logic because it can be given a schematic characterization, to wit, the following:
The surprising fact, C, is observed.
But if A were true, C would be a matter of course.
Hence, there is reason to suspect that A is true.
But Frankfurt rightly remarks that this is not an inference leading to any new idea. After all, the new idea—the explanatory hypothesis A—must have occurred to one before one infers that there is reason to suspect that A is true, for A already figures in the second premise.
Frankfurt then goes on to argue that Peirce suggests an understanding of abduction not so much as a process of inventing hypotheses but rather as one of adopting hypotheses, where the adoption of the hypothesis is not as being true or verified or confirmed, but as being a worthy candidate for further investigation. On this understanding, abduction could still be thought of as being part of the context of discovery. It would work as a kind of selection function, or filter, determining which of the hypotheses that have been conceived in the stage of discovery are to pass to the next stage and be subjected to empirical testing.
The selection criterion is that there must be a reason to suspect that the hypothesis is true, and we will have such a reason if the hypothesis makes whichever observed facts we are interested in explaining a matter of course. This would indeed make better sense of Peirce’s claim that abduction is a logical operation.
Frankfurt ultimately rejects this proposal as well. Given, he says, that there may be infinitely many hypotheses that account for a given fact or set of facts, it can hardly be a sufficient condition for the adoption of a hypothesis (in the above sense) that its truth would make that fact or set of facts a matter of course. At a minimum, abduction would not seem to be of much use as a selection function.
One may doubt whether this is a valid objection, however. Echoing what was said in connection with underdetermination arguments, we note that it is by no means clear that “accounting for a given fact” is to be identified with “making that fact a matter of course.”
For all Frankfurt says, for a hypothesis to account for a fact, it is enough if it entails that fact. But virtually no philosopher of science nowadays holds that entailment is sufficient for explanation. And it would seem reasonable to read the phrase “making a given fact a matter of course” as “giving a satisfactory explanation of that fact.
Even so, it is remarkable that there is no reference in Peirce’s writings on abduction to the notion of best explanation. Some satisfactory explanations might still be better than others, and there might even be a unique best one. This idea is crucial in all recent thinking about abduction. Therein lies another main difference between Peirce’s conception of abduction and the modern one
There is hype around ai, but it's already been transformative. — RogueAI
And I don't think anyone here has presented a clear enough account of abduction to give me pause. — Banno
In order to address your argument, it would have to be clearly expressed. — Banno
The Sora 2 videos I'm seeing don't look like hype. They look amazing, and the technology is only going to get better. — RogueAI
So we'll never know. — Banno
The problem I see is that if everyone uses AI its development will be profit driven, and it will thus not be judiciously developed. — Janus
If there were no regularities, there would be no laws. — Janus
So of corse there are no 'well-documented occurrences of exceptions to nature's "laws"", as you say... because when they happen, it's good scientific practice to change the laws so as to make the exception disappear. — Banno
Whitehead’s central idea is that reality is made of events, not substances — what he calls actual occasions. — PoeticUniverse
Post on time as cogent moment or a hierarchy of durations….
Hierarchy theorist Stan Salthe dubs this the "cogent moment". Henri Bergson had a similar idea.
If the world is understood in terms of a hierarchy of processes, then they all will have their own characteristic integration times. Time for the Cosmos is not some Newtonian dimension. It is an emergent feature of being a process as every process will have a rate at which it moves from being just starting to form a settled state - reaching some sort of cogent equilibrium which defines it as having "happened" - and then being in fact settled enough to become the departure point, the cause, for further acts of integration or equilibration.
So this view of time sees it not as a spatial line to be divided in two - past and future - with the present being some instant or zero-d point marking a separation. Instead, time is an emergent product of how long it takes causes to become effects that are then able to be causes. For every kind of process, there is going to be a characteristic duration when it comes to how long it takes for integration or equilibration to occur across the span of the activity in question.
We can appreciate this in speeded up film of landscapes in which clouds or glaciers now look to flow like rivers. What seemed like static objects - changing too slowly to make a difference to our impatient eye - now turn into fluid processes. They looked like chunks of history. Now we see them as things very much still in the middle of their actualisation. They will be history only after they have passed, either massing and dropping their rain, or melting and leaving behind great trenches etched in the countryside.
So the present is our intuitive account of the fact that causes must be separated from their effects, and the effects then separated from what they might then cause. There is some kind of causal turnaround time or duration - a momentary suspension of change - that is going to be a physical characteristic of every real world process. Thus there is some rate of change, some further "time frame" or cogent moment, that gets associated with every kind of natural system.
At the level of fundamental physics, this turns out to be the Planckscale limit. Time gets "grainy" at around 10^-44 seconds. The Planck distance is 10^-35m. So the Planck time represents the maximum action that can be packed into such a tiny space - the single beat of a wavelength. That primal act of integrated change - a single oscillation - then also defines the maximum possible energy density, as the shortest wavelength is the highest frequency, and the highest frequency is the hottest possible radiation.
So the shortest time, the smallest space, and the most energetic event, all define each other in a neat little package. Actuality is based on the rate at which a thermal event can come together and count as a "first happening" - a concrete Big Bang act of starting to cool and expand enough to stand as a first moment in a cosmic thermal history.
Then psychological time for us humans is all about neural integration speed. It takes time for nerve signals to move about. The maximum conduction speed in a well-insulated nerve, like the ones connecting your foot to your brain is about 240 mph. But inside the brain, speeds can slow to a 20 mph crawl. To form the kind of whole brain integrated states needed by attentional awareness involves developing a collective state - a "resonance" - that can take up to half a second because of all the spread-out activity to become fully synchronised.
So there is a characteristic duration for the time it takes for causes to become the effects that are then themselves causes. Input takes time to process and become the outputs that drive further behaviour. Which is why I mention also the importance of bridging this processing gap by anticipation. The brain shortcuts itself as much as it can by creating a running expectation of the future. It produces an output before the input so that it can just very quickly ignore the arriving information - treat it as "already seen". It is only the bit that is surprising that then takes that further split second to register and get your head around.
But between this physical Planckscale integration time and this neural human information processing time are a whole host of other characteristic timescales for the processes of nature.
Geology has its own extremely long "present tense". Stresses and strains can slowly build for decades or centuries before suddenly relaxing in abrupt events like earthquakes or volcanoes.
A process view explains time in a more general fashion by relating it to the causal structure of events. Every system has some characteristic rate of change. There is a cogent moment graininess or scale created by the fact that not everything can be integrated all at once. It requires "time" to go from being caused to being a cause. There is a real transition involved. And that happens within what we normally regard as the frozen instant when things are instead finally just "actual". Brutely existent and lacking change, not being in fact a transition from being caused to being a cause in terms of our multi-scale accounts of causal flows.
One of the features of the whole tradition of process thought, from Anaximander onwards (including Peirce, and to a lesser extent Bergson), has been the view that order in the world has in some sense emerged from a background of disorder, flux or chaos.
Anaximander characterized the cosmos as developing through the limiting of the unlimited, and emphasised the precarious nature of what emerged in this way, characterizing its existence as an ‘injustice’ that eventually would have to be paid for. Even the Pythagoreans accepted the dichotomy between the limited and the unlimited. Heraclitus, to some extent defending Anaximander against later philosophers, characterized the cosmos as in perpetual motion and emphasised the central place within it of strife and conflict. It is only through a balance between opposites that the existence of anything is maintained, and nothing is permanent except this principle, Heraclitus claimed.
As noted, Peirce also assumed that necessity in the world arose from chaos and chance through limitation. Recently, it has been argued in process physics that it is necessary to postulate an ‘intrinsic randomness’ or ‘self-referential noise’ to generate a self-organising relational information system, sufficiently rich that self-referencing is possible.
Hierarchy theorists, notably by Howard Pattee, Timothy Allen and Stanley Salthe, among others, who have argued that emergence is associated with new constraints emerging which are not in the initial conditions. While developed without reference to pre-twentieth century thought (or to Bergson), this conception of nature revives Anaximander’s conception of cosmos as having formed through the limiting of the unlimited (an idea also taken up further developed by Schelling at the end of the eighteenth century).
Along with the notion of different minimum durations, or different process rates, this has enabled Pattee, Allen and Salthe to clarify the nature of both emergence and hierarchical ordering in nature. Treating time as pulsational rather than atomic and treating causation as essentially a matter of constraining, overcomes a number of difficulties in Whitehead’s philosophy,
How was the music of the 'double-halving' vid? — PoeticUniverse
Yet, we can't tell the difference among the three modes; how can we find out? — PoeticUniverse
I would think handing your half-formed prose to a bot for it to improve it is plagiarism, regardless of the number of words changed or inserted. It's a different thing from you deliberately searching for a synonym. — bongo fury
The Conceptual Boundary of Authorship
The act of submitting half-formed prose to an autonomous processing system for "improvement" raises a profound ethical and philosophical question regarding the locus of authorship.
I would posit that this practice constitutes an illicit appropriation of intellectual effort—a form of plagiarism—irrespective of the quantitative degree of lexical or syntactic transformation enacted by the machine. The core violation lies in the delegation of the substantive process of refinement and telos (purposeful development) of the text to an external agent without explicit, critical engagement.
This is epistemologically distinct from the deliberate, conscious act of a human agent consulting a thesaurus to seek a more precise synonym. The latter remains an act of intentional, informed choice that preserves the continuous thread of human intellectual stewardship over the text's final form and meaning. The former, in contrast, risks dissolving the very boundary between personal expression and automated fabrication.