If we were able to divide the world into subject and object, internal and external, private and public, and to put colours firmly in the subjective, internal, private zone, then all would be good for many folk here.
But colours are demonstrably a part of the objective, external, public world. — Banno
A flick through the pages will show many arguments directed towards me as if I had maintained that colour is nothing but an objective, external, public notion. That is not what I have been maintaining, so those arguments miss the their target.
I have not offered a substantive account of the nature of colour. I do not need to, in order to show the poverty of the scientistic view. Indeed I think there is reason to doubt that any theory of colour will be complete. — Banno
Congratulations for finally spelling out your position. Not sure why it had to take so long.
The simple way it fails is that there is everyday talk about colours and then there is scientific talk about colours. The first requires no real philosophical clarification. The second absolutely demands it – precisely to head off a collapse into everyday lumpen realism and its evil twin of everyday lumpen idealism.
In our everyday linguistic practice, even animism is quite acceptable. We can complain about how it only ever rains on the days we have off, as if the weather operates with malign intent. No one is particularly confused by this kind of mixed message talk. It can seem both true and false at the same time while also doing the intended job of sharing a viewpoint about how life itself can seem unnecessarily against us.
But in philosophy of mind, you have to start being more rigorous. The confused ontic commitments of everyday social chatter have to be brought to the surface and given a hard working over.
What is missing from all your posts as far as I can tell – given their normally sketchy and evasive tone – is recognition that human psychology is socially-constructed in a way where we are all taught to objectify ourselves as subjective creatures. And that is just how the system semiotically works. To live in linguistic communities, we must become our own narratives. We must have a running story of "our private self" that stands in fruitful contrast to the "other" that is "the real world out there".
So the "big mistake" you are trying to correct with all this beetle in a box guff is not the bug but the feature – at least so far as everyday community life is concerned. It is a division we must participate in creating for there to be this thing of socialised humans doing their human social thing. The creation of a private realm that makes sense of there being a public ream, and vice versa.
Science understands this aspect of the human psyche. We have social psychology that can tell us exactly how it all works. Self-awareness, autobiographical memory, socialised emotions, the "faculty" of creative imagination or of rationalising reason – these are not things in need of a neurobiological explanation but a social-constructionist explanation. These are ways in which the neurobiology of mind has become extended by Homo sapiens making the semiotic step to being also the new thing of linguistically–structured lifeforms.
If we clear that little issue out of the way – which is the level a lot of your "philosophy" gets stuck at – then we can get down to the more basic issue of what the neurobiology has to say about sentience, awareness, consciousness, etc. The more difficult "hardware" level issues of accounting for the phenomenology of "being a mind".
So the problem ain't scientism. The problem is failing to divide the general problem of "consciousness" into its separate semiotic parts.
Set some example case like "why does red look like red", the first thing we ought to do is reply that well, there is this simple socially-constructed level to that story, and then there is this deeper neurobiological level which seems to be what you are actually interested in here.
And clearly, Wittgenstein is not a great place to start if we want to move smoothly into that deflationary science-based approach. Anglo logicians had no clue about the evolutionary structure of human cognition.
Whereas Peircean semiotics would be precisely a good place to start. It was highly influential to the development of social constructionism in the early 20th C and had become equally as relevant to the neurobiology by the late 20th C.
So sure, you can set things up that you are here to fight the good fight against scientism. For you, humanism or whatever has to come first. And any dialectical framing of the metaphysical issues – this dividing into subjective vs objective, etc – has to be already a wrong step because ... well, Hegel was a silly old fool.
My criticism of this is that it is a stale position that talks past what is of relevant philosophical interest.
The phenomenology of colour experience can't be deconstructed simply as linguistic analysis. Although sure it is worth doing that properly, and so appealing to the relevant social psychology there.
But then what folk are really bothered by is that the firing of neurons is supposed to generate these ineffable feels somehow. And the question becomes how is science – as the not so everyday linguistic community – best explaining that.
Rehashing Wittgenstein might help a bit with the social constructionism perhaps – at a stretch. But it is quite unequipped for the neurobiology. And trying to draw a boundary around the whole topic in terms of the "pragmatics of everyday linguistic communities" is a sad defensive tactic.
There is no reason not to do philosophy of mind properly. The answer to bad metaphysics is well organised inquiry.