It sounds to me like you'd have to say that the real world is fair and just, — Moliere
But in what sense? What context? Can you define these terms as you contextually understand them.
The slippery use of language shows folk are uncertain of their metaphysical assumptions. We have physicalist terms like equal and balance being thrown around with it remaining unclear how they either complement or challenge these other idealist terms such as fair, just and good.
So are folk building in the strong division that thus resist its ontological bridging? Or do they assume the opposite that Nature is a functional whole and so separation is part of the game that leads to eventual reconciliation as a dialectical unity of opposites?
My approach is the usual one of hearing folk agonising about some puzzling duality and then explaining that this is merely a symptom of a greater holism – the triadic ontology of a holomorphic system.
If we are concerned that the Cosmos appears in some way fundamentally unequal and unfair, while humans have this idealistic potential for understanding fairness and constructing equality, then that dilemma is the place to start a larger ontologial reframing.
We can know that our terms make proper sense once they apply comfortably to both the polar extremes involved – from the most brute physics to the most enlightened philosophy.
What do balance and equality look like at the sociocultural level of human "morality". And what do fair and just look like at the cosmological level of thermodynamics?
We are getting somewhere when we can see they are polarities that encode a spectrum of state that constitute "the world inbetween" their limiting extremes.
This is the power of metaphysical logic. It dichotomises to arrive at a unity of opposites. Mind and matter denote to opposing limits. A useful distinction which gives us the measure of all things inbetween to the degree they seem either more mindful or more material. Our definition of terms is precise to the degree it has been framed as a logical reciprocal relation.
Mind = 1/matter in being the least materially bound condition we can imagine. And matter is likewise 1/mind in being the least mindful level of any conceivable real world process.
Anyone who cares about their philosophy would make the effort to ground their use of terms in this dialectical fashion. They wouldn't just grunt and gesture – as if pointing is enough and no explaining is required.
Proper definition is counterfactual and must point to what is present in terms of what is absent. But how does the grunter and gesticulator point to that which is the absent? What use is such a person on a philosophy forum?
Are polar opposites are simply the negation of some concept, like Justice/not-Justice, or if Justice is contrasted with injustice, or if Justice stands alone in relation to Fairness? — Moliere
Right then. The work begins. And perhaps some terms are so soaked in idealism (or physicalism) that there is no rescuing them?
I myself tend towards systems jargon like constraints and freedoms, plasticity and stability, vague and crisp, chance and necessity, etc, etc. I already inhabit a dialectical paradigm where work has been done to create robust reciprocal distinctions. There are a ton of terms that bridge the divide that reductionism creates. Those in system science speak their own language for a good reason. That is how they can share the same general mindset as a community.
If the talk turned to justice, this would be understood as some kind of optimising balancing act – as illustrated by a set of scales. Differences can be converted to equalities. A pound of cheese can be measured in terms of its equivalent – some sum of money being what matters to the shop keeper with physical goods to trade for hard cash.
Weighing the value of goods is prosaic. The exchange of money acts as the most impersonal way of establishing a biosemiotic connection between a society and its entropification. Definitions of a fair, just, balanced and equal deal seem to be synonyms of each other as the gap being bridged is so habitualised and ritual. Just read the price and pay the money. Or don't.
But then where we get to "moral" decisions that weigh the individual and their actions against their society and its norms, the weighing of the scales becomes a lot more difficult and complex. Pile up the sin on one side and what then is the good that can be placed on the other?
Is it an eye for an eye or juvenile rehabilitation? Does a crime of passion deserve an automatic market discount?
You have to see through these abstracted notions – fair, just, balanced, equal – to discover the pragmatic complexities they are supposed to encode. And that is even simply in the everyday human social context let alone when someone poses the very broad metaphysical question of whether the real world in general is "fair and just".
So if we take Hegel's philosophy we get a dialectic where the negation of the negation does not lead to the original concept, but instead is a process of sublation — Moliere
I find Hegel pretty clumsy. Peirce tried to tidy him up.
I think what needs to be added to the dialectic is the trialectical arc of rational development – the steps from the firstness of vagueness, to the secondness of dichotomy, to the thirdness of hierarchy.
So we start just with a pure unbroken "everythingness" that is thus also a "nothingness". Counterfactuality ain't even born. We just have an Apeiron – an unstructured potential.
Then there is a symmetry-breaking or dichotomisation. The hot separates from the cold in original Greek abstraction. It may start as a more seed of difference but then feeds on itself to become a general polarity. If we break the symmetry of 1 as the identity element, then we get both infinity and the infinitesimal as its logical extremes. Shrinking and growing arrive eventually at their own complementary bounding limits. Infinity = 1/infinitesimal and infinitesimal = 1/infinity.
So the antithetical arises not as thesis and its sublation – a temporal order – but is present right from the start as the other side of thesis in a more spatialised sense. It is already a pair of directions ready to unfold in mutual fashion.
But yes, in general the systems view is dialectic. But if you start in a pure vagueness of a structureless Apeiron, then you are thinking more thermodynamically as it is all about symmetry-breaking itself and not already into the realm of dyadic counterfactuality – Peircean secondness.
The universal and the particular as logic-grounding concepts have to arise from "somewhere" that is their own ground. And a logical vagueness is how to get that triadic game going. Peirce defined vagueness as that to which the PNC doesn't (yet) apply. (And generality as that to which the LEM fails to apply).
So this is Hegel+, perhaps. Sublation is what an action reveals by managing to leave that further somethingness behind. But from a fully relativistic point of view, attention is drawn to the mutality or logical reciprocality of the deal. Both are revealing their other as a "leaving behind". One isn't the first move, the other the second. It is a dependent co-arising.
Justness and Fairness are the teleological ends (top down constraints) and our human choices are the bottom-up freedoms. Or something along those lines. — Moliere
The situation is hierarchical and so local~global is the most general view of it as a dichotomous symmetry breaking. We have the community as the social level of mindfulness and rationality. We have the individual as the local degree of freedom – who is in fact having to juggle social diktat and personal biology as a microcosm of the same juggling act that society is having to balance its more general ecological equation.
Both global constraints and local freedoms are "being mindful" or making intelligent choices about the same basic issue – staying alive by maintaining an entropic capacity for running repairs and reproducing growth. But their "cogent" scales are as different as possible. Individuals must be able to make split second choices. Communities might prefer to remain essentially recognisable and unchanged for as far back and far forward as they can remember or imagine.
Can fairness and justice be made terms that fit neatly into this kind of systems perspective? You can see that the local and global view might be quite different.
If I am a rich kid and my envious schoolmates force me to share my lunch "equally and fairly", whose perspective carries the moral absolutism? Am I being robbed or socialised? Your justice could be my injustice. So you need a model of social systems that can weigh the scales in some balanced fashion. Which is where I came in with that point about Gaussian vs powerlaw distributions.
It is not just about whether thermodynamics can apply to such scenarios, it is about knowing enough statistical mechanics to understand the dichotomies that polarise a thermodynamical point of view.
Just take climate change. We are already having many more extreme weather events than the models predicted. But the models were too Gaussian and the reality more powerlaw. A straight line was drawn and this assumed linearity proved to harbour more non-linearity and feedback than allowed for.
Science hasn't even had the final word on science let alone ethics. But that doesn't mean it ain't thundering down the line.
I'm guessing that we'd say something along the lines that you have to accept the good with the bad, so that the world is neither wholly just nor wholly unjust, and the same would go for fairness. Since we're always in a state of growth or becoming it's going to be the case that we'll find ourselves on the side of injustice as well as justice as we progress.
How does that sound? — Moliere
I think that is a soft answer. We do have the power of choice and can vote for better. Back in the 1960s, science told us about all the terminal 2050 problems of climate change, peak energy, overpopulation, ecology destruction. The exponentialising and even super-expontialising of the growth curves had to be matched by their own exponentially-growing antidotes. Just to get back into a powerlaw regime, energy efficiency had to reduce demand just as fast as energy consumption was increasing it.
Computer chips are at least a technology hitched to such a curve and so are a pretty sustainable growth ambition. But most other things, like food, stable weather, cars, clean environment, are not.
But that is the world we are making – which is arguably unnatural to the degree it is unregulated growth and not the kind of long-run ecological growth where we have had a gradual increase in entropification in terms of biology climbing its ladder of organismic complexity.
So again, the OP question has to make sense by its context being defined. And everyone just jumps to the idealism of the Platonic kind of fair, balanced, equal, just and good that inhabits a realm of contextless abstraction – then wonders why they can't draw any kind of line back to the real world that must ground these as pragmatically useful distinctions.