I do agree that aesthetic rationale applies an internal logic to the form, terms, means and structure in talking about art. But this logic serves to constrain the aesthetic in art, as it does in nature - there remains an aspect that transcends and even dissolves these categories of sculpture, dance, visual art, language or music. I think Kant refers to this as ‘the aesthetic idea’ - in relation to which all concepts, all thoughts and indeed all art, is but a rational approximation. — Possibility

I agree if this is to say not everything about the aesthetic can by captured in critique (or even words), i.e., the Sublime, but I think it's a scapegoat to throw the baby out with the bathwater to say that we are only "approximating" an idea (as it were, that taking the same unknowable place of the "object"--except if you only want to accept a certain type of rationality, logic, or end-place). Also, I'm not sure what "constrain" accomplishes other than to also say it does not meet a particular standard--one which changes nothing about our ability to discuss the aesthetic for everyone to see the public criteria of the form we have pointed out in a universal voice. It is not up to us to assent to the criteria, or an ultimate "idea", only to the critique--only that is subject to agreement.

I agree with all of this - but a rational discussion of art is still not objective. However, it is not ‘rational discussion of art’ that this thread refers to, but aesthetics in general - and it’s about this subtle distinction that I’m continuing to quibble with you. I think that aesthetics could be objective - but any discussion of it can only approach this possibility through uncertainty and a self-conscious capacity to transcend the laws of logic. — Possibility

Well if we have to discuss the hangup with "objectivity"/("subjectivity") we must--I believe Kant starts the death-nell (started by the idea of the metaphysical "object" with Plato) for "objectivity" by shriveling its application to only certain standards (self-contained, impersonal, certain, universal, pre-determined, having moral force, etc.) I get his desire to distinguish out the "subjective", as feeling, inclination, and all the other failings of the particular human; but, in doing so, he entirely removed the human voice and the natural human condition dictated by the limits of knowledge, our separateness from each other (which I discuss in my post about Wittgenstein's lion quote), and the powerlessness of rules/logic/rationality. Modern philosophy (Wittgenstein, Emerson, Heidegger, Nietzsche) puts a nail in the coffin by making the "object", "reality", etc. obsolete, and dialectically filling the object/subject distinction in with our ordinary criteria.

With the judgement of the Beautiful to aesthetics, however, Kant claims the standard of "objectivity" is not even used--we are not discussing the "object" (or the "idea"), we are not applying criteria for its identity or its certainty, universality, its "existence" apart from us. My whole point is that we give up "objectivity" but still have a logical rational discussion--we have everything else except the certainty that we will agree (or force to make us). Who needs the approximation other than to ignore the possibility of the voice of the other to speak for all of us, and to make us responsible for a cogent, rational response--we are answerable to each other; what are we missing?

...one example of what you mean by "sensations of the Pleasant, or the value of the Good".... — Mijin

It's not that there needed to be a reason; just some specificity--which you have now provided. I did suggest reviewing Kant's description of the Pleasant: "As regards the Pleasant every one is content that his judgement, which he bases upon private feeling, and by which he says of an object that it pleases him, should be limited merely to his own person” Sec. 7. As I noted above, this would be that you have a sensation, say, feeling sad or pleased by an object of art, that you may feel without anyone disagreeing.

The Good (taste) is “that which is ESTEEMED [or approved] by him, i.e. that to which he accords an objective worth, is good." Sec. 7. It is the value of the art or of its purpose, assigned by the individual based on their approval of an object, say, one with an exemplar, which others can agree regarding its worth, or interest.

They are both similar categorically, only to say your experience of art (it's pleasantness) may lead to the judgment that it has value (or good). The Pleasant would be the sensation, and the Good would be its popularity. Both are in consideration of the artwork (as an object), and both are attributable in their same manner to any object (a flower, a horse, a painting, etc.).

Of course, my point in beginning my remarks only concerned these concepts in contrast to the disinterested, impersonal, intelligible rationality that the judgement of the Beautiful has.

The ability to discuss anything rationally is not necessarily objective. When we render aesthetics in discussion, reduced to a particular language structure, objectivity often defers to certainty. Still, rational is not always logical. I don’t believe the possibility of failure makes discussion hopeless, only uncertain. — Possibility

I concede that aesthetic rationality is not "objective" (another post I think to argue that standard is based on Kant's desire to empower some judgment to be, say, irrefutable, but not based on a "real" "universal" object; however, I don't need agreement on either of those contentions to make my point here.

And I do allow for uncertainty, but only in the sense that it is uncertain that you will see what I see. I do claim that aesthetic rationale has a logic to it, though not a logic that ensures agreement or certainty in conclusions (not the logic you may want). This is an internal logic to the form of the art, the terms and means and structure--what makes a difference in sculpture compared to dance. Wittgenstein and Emerson inherit Kant but make every concept (here every form of art) categorical; each with its own class and criteria.

When we allow for this uncertainty - acknowledging purposiveness without agreeing on a stated end or purpose, or exemplary beauty/sublimity without agreeing on what is correct about its relation to form - the discussion itself allows for a relation between perspectives to approach objectivity in meaning beyond inter-subjective significance. This aspect of the discussion is irreducible, however. — Possibility

And I allow that we might not agree (on the end of purposiveness--though I'd want to re-read my Kant--or exemplariness of the art form) but the "uncertainty" of agreement here is not corrosive to the possibility of agreement (or even just "approaching" agreement), it does not make the discussion of art irrational or illogical. We do not "agree" on the terms and forms of art (though we may disagree about one criteria's "significance" over another in a certain work). Our "perspective" is not something personal (the art's "significance" to us) so much as seeing the art, for example, thoroughly, within the history of its form, taking in all available evidence, etc. It's not what matters to me, it's what matters in, say, making that art--what is meaningful to the art form. I'm not sure this reduces anything so much as broadens our stifled philosophical terms and conditions.

I don't understand any of that.
Can you give an example of the distinction(s)? — Mijin

I'm not quite sure it's unfair (or even rude) to say you're going to have to try harder. First, you say that you "don't understand any of that", which is grammatically referred to as a "naked this". What is the referent? Everything? The Pleasant and the Good? And so I'm not sure as well the distinction(s) to which you are referring? Also, do you mean you would like a scenario which better explains the distinction(s)? Or examples of (maybe?) judgments of each type? It might help to read my last threeposts, the first with quotes from Kant.

Following Kant (and subject to correction on the details), the argument here is that freedom is exactly freedom to do one's duty, and nothing else. * * * Duty, for the moment, is just what reason tells us ought to done.... But the purpose here is to draw attention to people who claim as a matter of right under freedom to do what they want... And I think the logic of the thing compels agreement. Yes? — tim wood

A very important discussion currently, so thank you for the post. What sparked my curiosity was the idea of duty and whether there is any compulsion. First, there is the distinction between the rational and emotional, or (Hume's) moral sense/innate moral judgment. I would argue that we can bypass this and still have a personal moral decision bound to reasonable action.

Starting with the idea that duty is "what reason tells us ought to [be] done", I would point out that this frames our moral decisions as occurring beforehand; rationally coming to a morality--a defined moral standard (in Kant's case), or theory, or the setting of what is a moral/immoral act (through authority, agreement, or other process, etc.--"regularity" Kant says). Morality and the "ought" have their place, but, like much of the moral, they have no force (apart from moralism, punishment, shame, etc.). I can make a case for what you ought to do (like Kant), and even have reasons that make sense (including internal coherency, categories or levels or rationality, etc.), but that does not ensure anyone will do what they ought to (see, e.g., Dostoyevsky). The same applies to the Good, though I believe teleology makes sense in relation to an object, say, in bettering our institutions.

Instead, imagine a case after our morality (beyond Good and Evil, as Nietzsche says)--a moral moment. As Cavell would say, when we do not know what to do; we are at a loss despite our deontological rules. Part of the picture here is that we are standing in the present, with a current context. And by this I do not mean a pre-determined context as in some thought-puzzle; a context that is as full and deep as the entire world, and that includes not only physical circumstances, but also our morality, all the distinctions we make and could make, and, most importantly, us as an unfinished work. One of Emerson, Wittgenstein, and Nietzsche's important contributions is that our action defines us; we are not here good/bad, right/wrong, but lazy, selfish, courageous, etc. Wittgenstein talks about "continuing a series" and taking an "attitude". Our action reflects on us; so consequences matter, but when we come to the end of a rule, who we are is at stake. Sometimes even, as Nietzsche and Thoreau point out, the "immoral" act is the necessary act.

So whatever moral "force" there is, it is not (only) immorality, punishment, or wrong/bad, but our responsibility (to ourselves, our words, our actions), our integrity--not so much our reputation, as our character--our moral identity, in a sense. People, obviously, sometimes don't care about these things (nor do they have to), but they are nevertheless subject to this human condition in the moral realm. As I have said in my post on Witt's lion quote--when we come to the end of knowledge of the Other's pain, we either accept or reject them (their moral claim on us). He says, "My attitude towards [them] is an attitude towards a soul. I am not of the 'opinion' that [they have] a soul." p. 178. We don't have knowledge that they have a soul, we treat them as if they do (or not), but the point being that we are in the mix here, our human frailty and possibility.

Now if our course of action is not defined (by, say, rules) ahead of time, nor by others (entirely); if we are lost and our character is on the line, what is our duty? If we can not rely on rationality to tell us what to do (should do)--say, definitively, certainly, "objectively", as it were, without our "person" being involved (though not emotionally/"subjectively")--are there criteria for determining our duty in that moment? Now here, all the moral philosophers I have read spend most of their effort pushing against simple morality/moralism (Wittgenstein, Nietzsche, Cavell, Emerson) so, what came to me first, actually, was the Bhagavad-Gita. Not that I agree with the answers themselves, nor feel that ours is a theological argument, but the situation and the type of discussion is an example of the type of grounds/criteria for a "reasonable" determination of our duty.

The case is that Arunja is going to war against his own family, and he is filled with doubt, pity, grief, etc., and turns to his "charioteer" Krishna for advice (imagine he is talking to himself). Krishna does not make a case for war (say, a "just" war), nor does he rely on how one should treat others--it is not a discussion of ends nor means. As part of the discussion, Arjuna keeps asking how he will know what to do, and Krishna is left with only being able to show Arjuna "his totality"--here again imagine Krishna is Arjuna's own voice to himself--to which Aruna says "You [I, as it were] alone fill the space" (20). It is similar to how Job's questioning is finally left only with the vision of the Leviathan--turning him back on himself to provide the answer.

Arjuna asks what defines a person whose insight is sure (54). They discuss discipline, detachment from emotions and goals, necessity, what differentiates an act from a motion, the need to ask questions, reflection, and the partial nature of our world's concepts and outcomes (only made whole by our action). Krishna advises "knowing the field", which is a way of saying the lay-of-the-land, which I take as making explicit the criteria of the (then-present) situation as well as of our concepts of action, courage, selfishness, flippancy, thoughtfulness, being reasonable, etc. These are criteria for defining a person in light of their actions. I submit that our duty is found in this space and the context and the ways our character/"humanity" is judged, not as right or wrong or good and bad, but nevertheless as rational (reasonable), rigorous, careful, detailed--as if our approach to a moral moment required an ethical epistemology.

Are we bound to our duty? In this sense we are; we are bound to our act. In these ways we are more responsible than just to rules/laws; we are, in a sense, created by our actions and finished as well (to a particular conception of ourselves). (The fact that here there are excuses and mitigation--such as lack of freedom to do what we decide is our duty--aides the point.) I believe these are not traditional philosophical rationale, but ordinary, everyday criteria. The "logic of the thing [that] compels agreement" is that we are disappointed by people, we no longer trust them, we believe they are fools, braggarts, cowards, etc.; that they made their choice in a moral moment thoughtlessly, hastily, self-servingly, recklessly, on a whim, etc. Do they care? Maybe not. Nonetheless, it can be true.

Well, I understand the part about the sublime delight in art's transcendence, but the Sublime does not negate the Beautiful. The Beautiful is still a rational discussion of claims to (for) everyone about what is correct/felicitous ("right") about an art's relation to its art form.

Universal validity/communicability is not objectivity. — Possibility

So if we agree on the first part, how is it "not objective"? I (and Kant) have already granted that it does not have an "object"--which I take in Kantian terms to mean there is no absolute, certain, pre-determined "right"--but does not having a final fixed point obviscate our ability to rationally discuss art? Maybe if we let go of the "objective"/"subjective" dichotomy, we can allow ourselves the grey areas (Witt. post-Tractatus). In other words, does the possibility of failure make discussion impossible/hopeless?

An objective object can clearly invoke subjective experiences however it is difficult to see how there could be anything beyond this to make a subject experience 'right or 'wrong' with reference to an objective value. I don't think it is possible to make an argument for why something is beautiful other than merely describing the object, feeling beauty needs first hand experience. — Tom1352

Yes, an art "object" can invoke "subjective [first-hand] experiences." Categorically, this is what Kant calls, the Pleasant--an experience that it is nice (say when you look at it), or whatever personal "feelings" you have . And Kant also allows that an art "object" can have good/bad "value" for us (@Tom1352)(although, again, "object-ive" is not a possibility there either). These two categories of the possibility of art do not wipe out the third means of addressing art, which is called the Beautiful (don't get caught up in the ordinary words--focus on the distinctions). It is not the "experience" of right or wrong, it is the rational discussion that is right/wrong (this is a rational category; not the kind of fixed Right!/Wrong! you may be thinking of); this is not in reference to the object, or its "objective" or "subjective" value. The thing to focus on is the form of the art--the way in which a story is told (think Northrup Frye's Modes and Genres); or the possibilities of the camera, the method, processes, framing, etc. in photography. These are the tools that a critic rationally uses to get us to try to see his insight into a work of art. For example, Cavell claims that the "modern" is now the discussion of the form through the work of art. The rest follows from my arguments above.

Speaking from a more neuroscientific point of view, there are of course aesthetic qualities to things for the vast majority of people. * * * And while it's fashionable to try to define standards of human beauty as arbitrary cultural creations... The more specific we get, the more subjective it gets though. — Mijin

We are bumping up against the limits of neuroscience (and sociology) here; and there is a categorical confusion here. What we can say about art through science refers either to the sensations of the Pleasant, or the value of the Good (popularity--@TheMadFool @Bitter Crank). What I am discussing is not a standard to judge the object, it is the ways a type of art has as its means. This is not a standard or "cultural creation" (as opposed to some "thing" created outside of culture?). And the more "specific" the claim gets, usually the better its argument--the more evidence it incorporates, the deeper the insight, etc. The Weltanschauung Wittgenstein would say, the comprehensive view. Of course, you may mean the more specific as the more personal (merely pleasant or good), and I would agree, but let's not mash everything together.

I think you might be thinking of the pleasant, not the beautiful. The "concept" of beauty is not determined (not an "object" in Kant's terms), and it is disinterested: not related to any individual "experience".

“Consequently the judgement [of the beautiful]... must claim validity for every one, without this universality depending on Objects. That is, there must be bound up with it a title to subjective universality” Sec. 6.

Compared to the pleasant: “As regards the Pleasant every one is content that his judgement, which he bases upon private feeling, and by which he says of an object that it pleases him, should be limited merely to his own person” Sec. 7.

I hope my (Kant's) point is clear about the nature of the claim here. “[ B ]ut if he gives out anything as beautiful, he supposes in others the same satisfaction—he judges not merely for himself, but for every one... which can make a rightful claim upon every one’s assent. ...the beautiful undertakes or lays claim to [the universal].” Id.

As to the criteria of our art forms: “It is not what gratifies in sensation but what pleases by means of its form... [that] is... the only [element] of these representations which admits with certainty of universal communicability” Sec. 10.

I would agree with @Thorongil that Kant's description of our judgment of what he terms the Beautiful allows for rational discussion (apart from just personal feelings or value judgments, etc.). Although we are not assured of aesthetic agreement (not just agreement in taste or value), we do have internal criteria (to the art) for what constitutes a beautiful painting or a movie that is well-made, etc.

But the value of this aesthetic, the identity of the aesthetic, depends upon the individual. — darthbarracuda

There is judgment just based on personal taste, but its existence does not negate the possibility of a different category of aesthetic discussion and agreement (you are entitled to "your" "opinion", but there is also the possibility of "informed judgment").

Part of the structure of an aesthetic claim to Beauty according to Kant (and drawn out by Cavell in "Aesthetic Problems in Modern Philosophy") is that I am making such a claim in a universal voice. I am making a claim (with rationale) on behalf of everyone for others to accept or discuss even though the outcome is not predetermined to be an absolute, certain conclusion (this is not an "objective" object, to the extent there are any). The art critic does not have better knowledge of the art, so much as a deeper perspective--their goal is to get you to see what they see (as @Moliere points out).

And I would tweak @Bitter Crank and @TheMadFool's emphasis on popular criteria (or "agreement"), to aspire to judgment based on the terms of that art (photography, modern dance, etc.--each having its own). A disagreement that regresses to simply unsubstantiated agreement (or personal taste) ignores the rational structure and evidence in art (as @Hanover points out).

It invokes a feeling of sadness to me, and a feeling of hope to you, which are subjective experiences that cannot be right or wrong. — darthbarracuda

We are also not making a judgment of value (as it were, that the critic has better taste; simply the authority to label a work "good" or "bad"). If there is an insightful critique, would we say it was "good" or "bad" (see @Moliere above) or are we more likely to say the critic is, in a sense, "right" or "wrong"? (Of course, these are different senses of the terms than someone solving a math equation.) In other words, if we say they are wrong, we can, for instance, discuss in what way they are not justified based on the entire context of the evidence in the work within the forms and terms and methods for that art, i.e., rationally.

This is the kind of claim that Wittgenstein is making when he describes the Grammar (criteria) for our ordinary use of concepts (each one, their own). He is postulating something which may be disputed based on the contextual evidence or a misunderstanding of the importance of, and what counts for, a concept (its criteria). The open-ended nature of aesthetic discussion leave some to dismiss it as "subjective" or irrational or emotional, but this may only be the desire for a standard of universal, absolute rationality (or to deny any rationality to art, actions, morality, etc.).

We see more and more that science, mainly physics, has strayed into the realm of philosophy and thought experiments. Seeing this what is your opinion on the subject? Do you believe science has become no longer the study of the world as it is, but as it may be? or do you see science as simply the persuit of knowledge no matter the form? — CallMeDirac

Straying a little from this OP, and given we do have philosophy of science (Kuhn, etc.), there has been a slow chipping away of the subjects of philosophy by science, though I don't begrudge science taking its place, nor believe that philosophy does not benefit from the lessons of science and that philosohy must be accountable to scientific advances.

However, the feeling of satisfaction with the method of science to provide certainty, predictability, universality, necessity, etc. has lead to an expectation that everything should meet that standard. Beginning with the Renaissance with Descartes and Kant dividing us from the "world", we've tried to sew that seeming distance back together with true knowledge, even logically necessary rationality. It reached a peak with the positivism of Comte, Carnap, Popper, and recently, even Stephen Hawking--the idea that only true/false empirically or logically-verifiable statements offer real knowledge of the world (the descriptive fallacy). This leads this scientific outlook (or its corrupted philosophical cousins) the feeling it can (and has more authority to) speak to the original and remaining purview of philosophy--aesthetics, morality, how to lead a better life, the investigation of our unreflected concepts, etc.

Even after Nietzsche, Emerson, Wittgenstein, Austin, Cavell, we still believe that science is the standard, and knowledge/theory the solution for the answer we demand. Despite its inability to teach us what we want to know about our moral realm, the problem of the Other, our skeptical doubt, etc., we still desire an answer of its certain form, thus its criteria for a valid solution are set in our cultural unconscious before even beginning to look. We want DNA and have forgotten how to (or fear to) assess the credibility of a witness and convict on circumstantial evidence. We follow the same desire to remove our responsibility in the face of the limitations of knowledge and the need for judgment, or assertion of ourselves, our acceptance of the other. This is science's belief its success allows its knowledge and standard to address our problems, "no matter the form".

There's a story of how Raven released the People from a cockle shell, stole the light, and brought it out to light up the world (the trickster?); another story of the beginning of our frailty, tied to our knowledge of the world; another story of a cave with a light that creates a new world, if only we could turn from our shadow.

These are origin stories. Theology? The genesis of everything? or (and?) Philosophy? (conducted through literature?** ) our (re-)birth, our birth to ourselves, the beginning of a journey, where everything is clearer, say, seen in a different light?

**Other stories: Hobbes' state of nature; Rousseau's first land fenced from that nature; Hume's creation story of creation stories (causality)...

real - not imaginary
real - not painted
real - not virtual
real - not made-up
real - not a hallucination
real - not a semblance — unenlightened

Is it a real painting, or a reproduction? Is it a real coin, or a counterfeit? Is it a real lake, or a mirage? Is it real magic, or prestidigitation? — Banno

how did we even come up with the concept of "real?" — TiredThinker

I see that @unenlightened and@Banno have already made the observations I would have based on Ordinary Language Philosophy (Austin, Wiggenstein, etc.) of the ordinary uses we have for the concept of "real", but the question remains of why did we come up with the philosophical (abstract) idea of "real"?

Now my history of philosophy is patchwork, but I offer that the common thread is the same desire that is behind "existence" or "consciousness": philosophy "came up" with its own picture of the world and its criteria for deciding what was real (thanks Plato) because of the problems created by our disappointments with our ordinary ways of judgment and certainty (such as in each case above). "We can't tell if they are lying to us? but we must know their pain? they could be a robot!" "I see tons of chairs; what is the 'meaning' of 'chair'? I don't see all of it! maybe what I see is not the 'true' chair?!" So, yes, our (philosophy's) imagination ran away with us to create, as one example, a quality opposed to the "appearance" of the world, and then that open question became an independent desire for a world/quality to be a foundation to our world --"reality".

I would only say that the skeptic's concerns about the world do reveal some truths about us: we are not ultimately in a position of knowledge toward each other. Our ideas of the structure of our world can not ensure, nor account for the failures of, communication. Philosophy's fear of the world, and desire for a solution to doubt, are not limited to philosophers alone: it is the human condition to want to reach past our partial, failing, contingent role in the world to something "real" that does not rely on us.

The self ‘is’ an expression, which is why [Heidegger] puts discourse as equiprimoridal [existing together as equally fundamental] with attunement and understanding. — Joshs

I agree here (though still not sure where this Heidegger is from--I assume Being and Time), though I don't see why our ordinary means aren't sufficient here. Our identity, as it were, our character, our individuality, our aversion to conformity Emerson would say, is not given, but claimed, by our voicing, our expression (including actions). Emerson removes the "therefore" and simply says " 'I think', 'I am' " as emphatic assertions, as it were: standing up for what matters to us, being responsible for the public language we say. To use your Heidegger--the self is an expression; it does not exist, it is expressed. As it is, we may not exist; we carve ourselves out, or not (aligning with others, along party lines, against our mother, etc.). Being and thinking are not ever-present states of the human condition--only possibilities.

And I agree with the post-metaphysical position you assume is necessary to any modern philosophy. I would only hope that you might see that the desire to have the relationship to the Other as constant, ensured, and/or pre-existent, and thus not subject to rejection/termination, is born of the same desire for the private, hidden self or subject--that these theoretical machinations are born of the same fear of our fragile, ephemeral (or lack of any) connection to the Other and of our personal burden to our voice and to answer the claim on us of the Other. This is not subject-object; it is two individual people left with the failure of knowledge to connect them.

Or perhaps you are thinking of something as easy as the context that precedes and allows for the possibilities of our concepts, communication.

...what makes things 'matter'[?] ...desire or need to do anything other than 'live'.... the ability to want things is what now drives our lives and allows us to want to do more than just survive. It means we have our own goals and desires to fulfill in life.... Without them, none of this would matter. — existentialcrisis

To return to the topic at hand, although I balked at the phrasing of "emotions" or "feelings" initially, I do agree that what makes us human is our interest, our attraction, our desires, our needs--as you say, what matters to us. Without that, not only would we just be surviving (which I would argue some only do), but those interests are the framework of all the criteria which shape our concepts. Unfortunately, philosophy has been neurotic about allowing our human expressions of these interests (or disinterest) to be what comprises us, without its theoretical nets.

The self is already a sequentially sel-transforming community. There is never a self-identical’I’ to return back to from moment to moment , because the very sense of this ‘I’ has been subtly changed by its being in the world. As Heidegger says, the self is a ‘between’ , not a private space. — Joshs

Your summation of Wittgenstein reverses his objective: he is trying to do away with the "private", the "self" (not to say, the personal). Yes, we are "sealed off from... the other" except through language/action (we could say we are even sealed off from ourselves (our subconcious) in the same way); this is not solipsism (there is nothing kept in reserve--our makeup is, as it were, entirely public), but rather a fact of our human condition. The Other just is separate--it is our responsibility to bridge that gap through expression and understanding (where does Heidegger conflict with this?); there is no more certain, theoretical explanation or solution for our situation--no "more intimate site", and, more importantly why do we feel the need for there to be?

Must we insist that explaining consciousness at a mechanistic level [is] any easier than explaining the subjective first-person experience aspects of consciousness? — Wheatley

In reviewing all the other responses, I don't believe this will be very popular, but perhaps, after Kant and after Wittgenstein, we can let go of the need for the "subjective" or "consciousness" or "experience". The personal, secret, suppressed, etc., occupy the same place in our world and language, except one. Philosophy has never been able to do without an internal, unique, special quality for me (e.g., my "thoughts", my "being", my "existence"), say, among other goals, to fulfill the desire to be unknowable or to have my expressions fixed to something certain or controllable ("intention" "meaning" "perception").

All conscious experience is meaningful to the creature having the experience. Consciousness is the ability to attribute meaning. — creativesoul

All(?) "conscious experience" is meaningful? We are unavoidably pierced through with "our experience"? constantly bombarded with meaning? How can we differentiate from the mundane, unmeaningful? Perhaps this is just to hold the keys to the castle--we have "meaning" and then we "attribute" it. That picture certainly makes it easy to ensure meaning, or wiggle out, or avoid our answerability to others for our expressions. Perhaps it is sufficient that something is meaningful enough to us that we say something, take a stand, disagree, etc.--and in this sense: be, exist--and simply leave it that our language (along with the world) works apart from (and before) any need for some hidden, private, mental process. Perhaps we are simply not as special as we would like to imagine.

Well this is a refreshing attitude I must say. And, as well, I propose, not without philosophical relevance. (I take some liberty in the exact wording of the quotes, but I believe the spirit is the same.)

By demanding and pursuing some perfect and excellent way of understanding the world, we really do nothing but discourage [participation from our friends in the talk of] truth, justice, and all of those things [that really matter]. — Garth

What jumped out at me is the "demanding" a "perfect" "understanding [of] the world". Wittgenstein, Heidegger, and Nietzsche (among others) all warn that the desire for certainty, universality, predetermination, predictability, pre-judgement, etc., occludes our ability to see the meaningfulness of our ordinary, differing criteria for the varying concepts we have in the contexts in which, and when, they are expressed. The harder we squeeze the less we grasp, Emerson and Heidegger say. Witt would say we sublime (universalize) our language's logic, strip from its context and ordinary criteria, beginning with the example that we might think all language works as naming--a word for an object. PI #38. A logic that "seeks to see to the bottom of things" and not "concern itself whether what actually happens is this or that." #89. To purify (#94) communication is, as @Garth says, to "discourage" the "participation" by humans--fallible, partial, unsure, etc.--in their friendship.

...demanding excellence from one another constantly, we do nothing but destroy the possibility of [the] genuine and authentic [and of] fun. — Garth

J.L. Austin decried the "profundity" of philosophy--for him, the desire for the descriptive fallacy--the difference between fervent ideological belief/theory and a real investigation of our concepts (which is quite fun in his case). Also, an important part of Emerson's work is its constant optimism (in the face of conformity and skepticism). Wittgenstein's interlocutor in the Philosophical Investigations is very adamant and certain--and Witt is constantly leaving them flustered with almost a mocking enigmatic humor. Nietzsche also found joy, courage, and a sense of humor was necessary for philosophy; even to title a book The Gay Science. This is not a trivial, tangential topic--the more certain and strict and strident we are, the less we see of the awe and fullness and fun of the world.

I would say though that, having let go of only being satisfied with a perfect solution, we are still (then) able to perfect our existing human world. Foregoing righteous justice, we can strive for a more just "good-enough" justice (from Stanley Cavell's discussion of Rawls). A new yet unapproachable America, Emerson says.

Quoting John Shotter: "...different directions their new inquiries would take [would show up], “in ‘frontier’ thinking – where the direction of new inquiry has regularly to be redetermined” — Joshs

This extrapolation of the evolution of our scientific paradigms is somewhat analogous to the extension/adaptation/change that does happen with our concepts (Witt discusses it as "continuing a series"). But how this works with scientific theories is different than in the moral realm or with modern art or political discourse, etc. In science, we may put facts together under a different paradigm, but we do not have facts in the other instances (though we might wish to have the "fact" of the certainty of our own "experience", etc.), and we are not changing a paradigm or theory; our words and our lives are tied together, though we are not always able to work out our differences--understanding is not ensured.

is it better to recognize that perceptions in general appear against a bodily interactive field? — Joshs

But here we do have a "verification color"--the swatch in the paint store (not a metaphysical "color"). We do not "misunderstand" each other about a color, we disagree in particular, intelligible, resolvable ways. If we agree, they are the same color (we do not each have our own and simply agree that they are the same). These distinctions and pathways are part of how the concept of color works. But the generalization of color schema for the meaningfulness of everything is to run roughshod over all the different ways concepts work (there is no universal theory of "meaning"). Our identification and description of color is different than that for objects or headaches, etc. (Stanley Cavell, in "Knowing and Acknowledging" from Must We Mean What We Say does a good job of investigating the ways in which we talk about color, pain, etc. regarding knowledge of other minds.)

The implication of a private "perception" (thought, intention, meaning) is to wish to hang on to our own experience (apart from that answerable to others)--they are not "language"; language is for expression (even to myself). As I explain in my other post on Witt's lion quote, his observation is that the desire for certainty, universality, predictability, and something private or hidden, is so that, among other things, I must know myself and can never really know the other. If I say something, I always have something extra to hold back:"my experience", so that I can avoid the responsibility I have to what I express.

That is, perhaps the notion that there is such a thing as an unchanging word use is an derived abstraction, rather than the true case. Husserl pointed out that objectivity is the result of intersubjective correlations. We convince ourselves that what is in fact only similar from one person to the next in our understanding of social conventions like words is identical. — Joshs

And here, in order to hold onto the idea of an internal, private something, we fold ourselves over with theoretical explanations, rather than looking to see how a concept is used (this is not "an unchanging word use"), in an expressive event (not all expression) in an ordinary (temporal, situational) context.

How should a psychotherapist proceed in understanding what their client means in their use of word concepts if not by attempting to discover the idiosyncratic ways in which such concepts are interrelated with a personal system of meanings for that client? — Joshs

My understanding, limited as it is, is that therapy is to bring the client to terms with the ordinary repercussions of their idea of themselves, and with the regular reactions one might have to their trauma, in contrast to the "personal system of meanings" created by their denial and avoidance. So, basically, exactly the opposite of finding "them"--dragging them into the public world.

We then [when we have differences] say they distorted , misread, misinterpreted the ‘true’ meaning of the concepts because we assumed that ...how did you put it?... “ they are not "changing" anything about the workings of that concept.” — Joshs

A. Saying there is a "'true' meaning of [a] concept" is to miss my point entirely that there is no "meaning"--there are ways that a concept is meaningful to us, and these are exactly the different criteria that frame its functioning. Also, "true" (and false) is not how most concepts (other than, e.g., true/false statements) work--you wouldn't say an apology was false, other than to say it was disingenuous.

C. People do not normally (have to) examine the workings of a concept in order to use it correctly or know when someone else is not. We grew up in a world where you must say "I do" in order to get married, that you must acknowledge some wrong in order to apologize correctly, that there is usually something fishy when you ask what someone intended, what the difference is between a game and just playing, etc. These, by the way, are the tools of Ordinary Language Philosophy (like Wittgenstein)--that there are ordinary uses for our concepts and that they work in different, semi-rational (not certain but intelligible, discussable) ways.

B. Though speaking of "semi" rational, you are now using political discourse as an example, which we can say anything about--no amount of my pointing out something isn't fair (part of how fairness is measured) may help. Though this is not to say that it is impossible to have a meaningful, productive conversation about politics--the existence of its failure does not negate its possibility. We are responsible for our denial of the other and our acceptance of our disappointments in our refusal to continue the conversation of justice. Calamitizing based on our failure in, say, the moral realm, is the skeptic's resort to throw up their hands about every concept and desire to, say, internalize something (for me), or otherwise find some solution to maintain the idea of a nevertheless workable world outside of our responsibility for/to it. I would point out that it is exactly the creation of a private world that allows someone to claim "that's not (you don't know) what I meant!" or otherwise renege on their bond for their expressions. Austin points out that it is the saying of "I do" that is crucial in marrying someone, not the idea of an internal experience of "meaning it" (apart from just a normal lie)--reserving a private experience is, among other things, the desire for a world apart from our failings.

Can two people, sharing the ‘same’ context of use, still end up with slightly different sense of meaning of a word? — Joshs

Reading this from the perspective and terminology of Wittgenstein: There is a context, but it is not a fixed thing, nor "shared", nor the "same". The purpose of a context is an endless, if necessary, event of distinctions, if we need to understand in what sense a concept is/was used (by someone). Let's try to let go off equating/connecting "meaning" with words (language), and broaden the idea of a "word" to Witt's term "concept", so, "Can two people... end up with slightly different sense of a word [concept]?" Yes, misunderstandings happen all the time; see the different senses of just the expression "The sky is blue" above, or "knowledge": of a fact, of a skill, acknowledging the other, etc.

Does not a single individual, alone, in using the ‘same’ word over and over, end up slightly changing the sense of meaning of that word ever so slightly from day to day? — Joshs

No. The individual (feelings, intention, cause) does not change the senses of words. They may use a word (concept) in its different senses, but they are not "changing" anything about the workings of that concept. That's not to say there is not the possibility of the extension of a concept, particularly into a new context, that does change/add/diminish/invigorate/cheapen our concepts, but this is as much to change our lives/culture as our words, so not "immediate" nor "intimate" and without the idea of an "identically ‘shared’ discursive meaning" (though it can be said that an individual can change our lives/culture).

if you believe it makes any sense to talk about a world independent of out construals of it — Joshs

This is a misunderstanding. When I said "facts do exist apart from us", I meant: apart from us personally--our feelings about them--not, as apart from humans in (or in relation to) a metaphysical "world" or "reality". Though my point that facts are based in method doesn't mean that we can't have an opinion about how the science was done, or also about the paradigm they are a part of--but the rationality of that discussion is its own matter (as Kuhn, etc. discuss).

In briefly reviewing the essay: I do like the idea of an "event", which brings in the context Witt focuses on as well as Nietzsche's sense of the historicity of our concepts; I believe I studied someone French in the '90s--DeLeuze? And I'll grant there is change and extension in the sense of our concepts as well (over time; or in the moment, along certain possibilities), but I still think there is a confusion here between the personal and the public in terms of control, "intention", "meaning", etc. The explanation seems tied in knots to hang on to the idea of something unique and ever-present and "affected" to/by us, compared to Witt's (and Emerson's, and Austin's) idea that we mostly don't (and don't need to) assert ourselves into our expressions--not everything is an "event". In response to "cognitive and affective processes ...to situate or attune the context of our conceptual dealings with the world." I would say we usually only situate ourselves and examine the context of the concepts we use ("our conceptual dealings") in order to clarify (afterwards) the sense of an expression to another. "The sky is blue." "Do you mean: we should go surfing? It's not going to rain? or are you just remarking on the brilliant color?" All these concerns of course may not need investigating (either to the Other or myself) based on the context.

quote="TheMadFool;483467"]The mystery in all this is whether the distinction subjective and objective significance is real or just a figment of my imagination?[/quote]

As I said differently above, Witt would say that the way a concept matters (its importance, significance)--publically as it were, not to us personally--is baked into the criteria of what counts for us in sorting out all its distinctions in different contexts from our lives and living: for identity, performance, judgment, consequences, etc.. Our personal feelings do not change that (say, each time). We may feel a particular way, and so say something based on that (or without thinking), but that does not change the concept and the senses in which it is used in contexts, or the way those are discussed (their/our rational).

Yes, but this statement must be thought by someone. It doesn’t rest in some eternal space of fact. When it is thought, it is thought with certain aims and purposes in mind, and arises within a certain context. There is always a reason why it should occur to someone at a certain point in time that a watch needs a battery to run , and that reason pertains to their concerns at that point in time. — Joshs

Part of this confusion ("must" 'always") is the idea that everything that is said is connected to a thought (or feeling) or to some intention. Our reasons for saying something most of the time are only developed afterwards when we are asked why we said (or did) something outside the ordinary course of a concept within a certain situation (see J.L. Austin). If I say "A watch needs a battery to run", that is strange enough to elicit such responses as "Don't you know there are spring-powered watches?" or an explanation such as "What I mean is that everyone needs energy to stay productive, so take care of yourself." Someone is responsible for a statement--it is not connected to an internal (hidden) cause (this is not to say that people do sometimes consciously try (intend) to say something particular--controversial, deliberate, etc.). And, though I don't think this is the place for this discussion, facts do exist apart from us. That is the allure of them--that the methods of science remove our responsibility for them.

The particular felt significance the fact has to them cannot be separated from the fact itself. — Joshs

Again, saying the significance of a fact is "felt" by us reduces our relationship to facts to a private, non-rational, personal connection. It may be true that we feel a certain way about a fact, but hardly always, and never necessarily. Most times we simply accept the larger paradigm that gives the fact significance in a scientific theory--doubting a fact/theory is not a feeling; it's a claim.

The way a word concept matters to us not only colors but co-defines the very sense of the word. Wittgenstein shows how the use of a word in activity with others determines its meaning. That implies affective as well as ‘rational’ sense. — Joshs

This is so close I would only clarify that "us" is not "me". The way a concept matters is baked into the (most times unspoken) criteria people have developed through the ways we live for identity, performance, judgment, consequences, etc., for that concept. Our feelings do not change that, though our actions might (including claiming only a personal connection to language). Wittgenstein uses these criteria to show that our concepts are flexible and intelligible in different particular senses, but there is not a "meaning" that is determined by (connected to) "use" so much as if we look at the use of a concept in a certain (present) context we can see the particular sense of that concept there (see my post on Witt's "use" of his lion quote). Again, if that is not assumed, accepted without concern, we must turn to the Other and asks them to explain what (external) sense they were using.

Do you make a distinction between feeling and emotion? — Joshs

I'm not sure it matters here. If we say that emotions are like hunger, anger, love, etc. and that "feelings" are our emotions about situations, statements, opinions, etc., we are still removing things that matter to us like, interest, need, fairness, right/wrong.

Feeling is another way of talking about the way something appears to me — Joshs

I would say if you have an opinion about a situation, it muddles the discussion to say that is "the way something appears to me" as that gives the impression that this is something internal to only you, that you hold that opinion beyond our public language and the distinctive forms of our concepts. Adding that "feeling" is another way of talking about what is basically solipsism only makes the matter worse, as then it is reduced to an unintelligible position with the assumption that it is as valid as a rational discussion. You can of course feel however you want and claim that your point of view need not have any justification other than it is yours, but that narrows the grounds for agreement and isolates you to taking a stand without any responsibility to others by simply maintaining something private, i.e., its a copout.

any concept is understood from someone’s point of view. — Joshs

Concepts (action, knowledge, an apology, etc.) are public and so understanding is not from a "point of view" so much as, say, two people getting clear about a particular context and the sense in which a concept is being used; of course we can have a position on that ("That wasn't the act of firing the pistol, it was a mistake.") but our position ("feelings" if you like) does not dictate the grounds of that discussion.

Awareness always implies a ‘mineness’ to experience. — Joshs

Saying "experience" is mine implies that it is not also others as well. Granted, you are you, in the sense of being separate, but to say your experience is different than any others' is to claim a ground where you can not be reached or that you speak uniquely by the shear fact that you claim an (imagined) quality for your self. Now this is not to say that "awareness" is not different than being unaware, say, of the implications and consequences of what you do and say, and that you can't deliberately decide what expressions you commit yourself to, or to consciously enter into a contract with society regarding justice, etc. But our being aware does not imply (ever) that the experience is yours, only that the choice (or not) and the responsibility for the consequences are yours to make and suffer.

Is duty an emotion? Is fairness a feeling? I might agree that part of what is important to us, what matters, is "what we want to do and what we don't". But to limit what interests us to emotions is to cheapen our motivations and remove our reasoning altogether.

Having the ability to feel sad or happy about something allows us to view things as good or bad depending on the way it makes us feel. — existentialcrisis

Even as an intuitive theory of moral guidance in judging good and bad, "the way it makes us feel" seems arbitrary and, I want to say, left to a state of nature. In any event, even if we do have moments where we are left without guidance, most of our actions are simply following rules and standards ordinarily unquestioned--beyond that, our actions morally define us. What would it look like to have an emotional state always deciding what is good or bad? If you are angry and hate something, does that automatically make it bad? For everyone?

If you are beating your wife and she kills herself, you are responsible; but not morally responsible; you're just a &!$! who beats women and who everyone is going to blame for the death even though you may not be legally culpable. There's already all the tools in place in society to say, e.g., "responsible" is, say, subject to the consequences. And there are many different kinds of consequences; no friends, lose your job, fall into alcoholism by guilt and blow your own brains out. It is not a moral problem--if you are abusing someone, you take the results of those actions. To ask when we are morally responsible is to be in a situation where we do not know already what the consequences are. What matters in this situation. Then you are in charge and,will be judged for determining what to do based on what reasons; how you proceeded or reacted or stood idle..

I could argue that "mental content" (consciousness, thought, meaning, belief, etc.) is a construct, i.,e., does not "exist", if you like, in all animals, but I'm not sure you'd like it as I've already hammered away at this with Mmw in my post about Wittgenstein's Lion-Quote, and, because it is Ordinary Language Philosophy, I think it comes off as if I'm not playing by the rules because all I'm trying to do is get you to see a different angle rather than argue on the same "terms".

This is a philosophical God very strictly defined as "Having the knowledge and power requirements to create a specific universe". There is no mention of anything else. So dismiss all else. Morality... * * *

Everything you need to consider to solve the issue is within the strictly defined definitions and words. Anything outside of these terms is irrelevant. So that being the case, consider how I conclude the probability of a God being a first cause is infinite to one. Does having multiple possible first causes negate my reasoning for claiming this? — Philosophim

Well here I partly beg off. I don't believe philosophy is served by the modern vogue of creating contextless, pre-defined situations (trains and people in trouble as showing us anything about our moral realm)--but I walked into it, so that's on me. I'm trained in Ordinary Language Philosophy, which attempts to flesh out the contexts in which/when we would be talking about, say, causes, in order to see what we want in "strictly defining" the criteria beforehand, say, limiting "[e]verything [ I ] need to consider". If we are not considering "chains of multiple first causes" (moral chains, chains of actions, of identity, etc.) other than the creation of the "universe", then I'm not sure I can help. If the "universe" is just the first thing created, than the question thins out so much as to not hold anything; if you mean the universe to include everything without exception (the "universe" of possible/inevitable things), then everything is caused initially together. Which is to say, this is teetering into a discussion of solipsism/behavioralism and/or determinism/free-will, or devolving due to terms that can mean multiple things without any investigation into what necessitates them here other than adherence to a certain logic. The cart is before the horse I'm afraid, which, again, rigs the game.

I would suggest Emerson's Self-Reliance and American Scholar as examples of his rallying-cry in the face of skepticism, though they take some work to see as commenting on analytical philosophy (Kant, Descartes, etc.); and if you read A.J. Ayer's book "Language, Truth, and Logic", then you will understand the humor/fun in J.L. Austin's "How to Do Things With Words". Nietzsche is similar to Emerson in being hard to see as an extension/critique of Kant, etc., but his references to joy and courage are more explicit though the reason is as complicated/intricate as in Emerson. Good luck and good cheer.

Yes. There can be multiple first causes. But what is necessarily concluded is that all causality reduces down to a first cause. There may be separate causality chains that reduce down to separate first causes. This may be a step in countering the conclusion I made, but it alone is not enough to counter the conclusion I made. Can you flesh it out and show why this counters the claim? — Philosophim

Well, if we are allowing for "multiple first causes", then it opens the field to say that there are infinite chains. We can say the movement to pick up your cup has at least a biological/physical cause, and that stepping in front of a bullet also has the same cause yet also other causes (sacrifice, love, moral duty). Let's say we grant that there is a First Cause to every chain,and that these two causes are simply separate chains, each with a First Cause, then the question is, for each different chain, what do those First Causes consist of/in? You've give us two answers.

In a sense we are sliding into the question of whether every thought is "intended" or whether every movement is an "action"--is God behind movement or just actions (specific movements recognized as an act)? Or both as different causes? And what is it to say the Devil is the cause? Emerson is asked " 'But these impulses may be from below, not from above.' I replied, 'They do not seem to me to be such; but if I am the Devil’s child, I will live then from the Devil.' No law can be sacred to me but that of my nature. Good and bad are but names very readily transferable to that or this; the only right is what is after my constitution, the only wrong what is against it." Are we always acting from the "God" within us? If so, why is Emerson imploring us to rely on that instinct.

Again, is this to refute your claim? I don't think so. But, as I said, perhaps the premises have their own motivations which dictate the form of the answer.

There is an actual difference between a belief and a report/account thereof. Do not conflate the two. We put our reports of another's belief into statement form, we do not put another's belief into statement form. Only they can do that, if they're capable of expressing their belief with language. — creativesoul

And this is to only use a particular ("philosophical") sense of the concept of belief, that is specific but absent any ordinary context, which leads to a framework (picture Wittgenstein would say) that there is something internal (unspoken or hidden) which may or may not be capable of expression, but especially in language. (As I pointed out above, there are other senses of belief that don't have to do with language, even expressions of belief). This is the imagination of thought as a mental process or image or activity which is either constantly happening or, when it does, is something private or internal to me--undetectable by the Other unless reported. Cavell identifies this as a secret, but that does not account for the space (or not) between this particular sense of belief and language. To this I can only say, from Wittgenstein, that this sense of belief is necessitated (created?) to satisfy a purpose. Cavell would explain this as either the desire to be (or fear of being) unreflectively entirely expressed in every report, i.e., that there is no "belief" without language, that our account is equal to our belief. Or the desire to remain unknowable--that we maintain something of ourself (belief) beyond language so that we can, say, slide out of our accounts because they do not entirely report something hidden in us.

The "profundity" of philosophy was a serious nemesis for J.L. Austin, who is actually very funny at times. He was trying to show the difference between serious investigation and fervent ideological belief/theory. Also, an important part of Emerson's work is its constant optimism (in the face of conformity and skepticism). Wittgenstein's interlocutor in the Philosophical Investigations was very adamant and certain--and Witt is constantly poking them or leaving them flustered with almost a mocking enigmatic humor. Nietzsche also found joy, courage, and a sense of humor was necessary for philosophy; he wrote a book called The Gay Science. This is not a trivial, tangental topic. Maybe the more certain and strict and strident we are, the less we see of the awe and joy and fullness of the world.

"Not All Belief Can Be Put Into Statement Form"

Not sure if I'm just the schlub who's taking the bait on a gag, but I would think we'd have to investigate what "statement form" is, and what we are talking about when we say we "believe".

Obviously "putting something into statement form" is not meant simply as opposed to: not stating it, as in, not expressing it in words; though belief can be simply: not doubt. It could also be said to be an outlook, a perspective, an "attitude" Wittgenstein says (p. 152). And, say we believe that the Other is in pain. Do we state that?--"I believe you are in pain"--or do we move to help them, call 911, etc. (Of course we CAN say it, as above, but it is not in the "form" of a statement, to express or claim anything; it is to acknowledge the Other--in this case, possibly, to reassure them that you are with them, that you accept that they are not lying, etc.

I imagine we are actually, however, tied up somehow in the philosophical problem that statements (their "form") are either true or false, and everything else is belief--or, however that one is better explained--or some tangent thereof. (This begs the question: how do we change a worded expression from a "belief" (form?) to "put" it into "statement form"?)

we might have to work backwards. There are numerous examples in Wittgenstein, J.L. Austin, and Cavell, of statements being subject to other, say, "truth-value" standards than true-falsity (other "forms"?). To say "I'm sorry", is to state something, but then what is the form? You can call this a "belief"--to consign everything not certain, universal, or true/false to the rubbish bin--but do we really say that we "believe" we are sorry? Some might say it is the expression of a belief (or knowledge) of something inside of me--my sorry-ness? But "I'm sorry" is a statement in the form (sense) of an apology. And an apology can be done correctly, or incorrectly--it can avoid any acknowledgement of wrong-doing (one of the criteria of doing an apology correctly). It can be sincere or insincere. Now, if I "believe" you; can I "state" that? Sure. Can I call your apology true? false? And again, what would it be a 'statement' of? My (internal state of?) belief?

My passive-aggression? or what it is about "inner ineffable confidence" that to express it properly includes something other than words? (actual confidence?)

Not properly

To attempt a serious reply, take a look at how the pre-chosen criteria for an answer (allowable with unexamined terms) dictates what is acceptable to consider, i.e., the game is rigged.

Either all things have a prior cause for their existence, or there is at least one first cause of existence from which all others follow. — Philosophim

Here, have we thought about the possibility that both are the case? And what would it take for that to be a possibility? First, the term "existence" is murky. Can you point to some thing's existence? the existence of a concept? Or, more importantly, what is it to say that something exists? that it is differentiated from another? that it is here rather than not here (and when would we say that)? that, for me, something has value and importance to affect my life? All of these things?

And so what sense of "existence" are we using here? Well, it appears to be (necessarily?) tied to the idea of a cause--maybe what something is made of, how it turns out, or its purpose. Now, it seems possible that we want some control over how things exist (turn out, continue on, are driven, etc.), so we necessitate a "cause" (The proximity of Descartes meditations can not, I would think, be ignored, and his attempt to find/create something fixed in order to try to solve the problem of skepticism.)

Any deviation in particulates makes it a different universe. — Philosophim

I won't argue whether there is a cause or what started the cause, only ask it be considered whether the idea of "causality" taken back to an initial point starts to thin out. Say I grant that one cause/thing is caused by something prior, etc. When we get back to the First Cause and turn to look forward, yes, we can see possible ripple effects through time (materially, biologically, evolutionarily, etc.); but is every outcome dictated? Morally? Creatively? Aesthetically? Or, in other words, does "everything" have a cause? The 'choice" of the same lunch I have every day? and, even more, a determined one? And where are we drawing the line? Again, what is important about "existence" and "causality" for us in this context? I'm not sure this is exactly an argument against your conclusion (or failed conclusion), so I'm not sure we can call these "flaws" rather than maybe the pitfalls of pre-constructed logic.

What do you mean - then nothing is happening?

Other than a joke, it is also a play on the idea that the words 'nothing' and 'always' and 'happening' have different senses depending on the context, your focus, your interests--to show that 'exists' changes too, as does 'identity'. Your vantage point is harmless to the extent it includes everything and connects everything, and I grant you that, but does it have to occlude everything else?--my interests, my vantage point, the myriad of other ways in which the world exists, in the sense that it comes alive only for me. I can understand though the wonder and awe and comfort and company and connectedness in having something in common with everything else. Cheers.

I think the forefront of modern analytic philosophy (not discussing social topics) is Ordinary Language Philisophy, which was reacting to Positivism (among other things), first with Wittgenstein and then J.L. Austin's response to A.J. Ayer. The current proponent is Stanley Cavell, who is ground breaking in his methods of changing our perspectives, and the breadth of its application, though there are others, Cora Diamond, Mulhall. Try an essay from Must We Mean What We Say.

I hate to say this--it is merely meant for humor and not to be flippant (blasphemous?)--but it needs to be said in light of the question implied by the title of the post... Answer: 5 to1

Self organization is not something we can break free from, or step aside from, even in pure self aware reflection we are self organizing. This perspective has very broad consequences for understanding everything, but in terms of identity and I am, it puts those static notions in doubt, and replaces them with an evolving process of being, as a biological system, where self organization is always taking place -however it may manifest itself. — Pop

I understand this as an underlying, necessary occurrence, and maybe you are aligning this with Descartes' desire for something to connect us (to).** But the idea of something inseparable from us, however fundamental, does not replace our possibility to claim our existence, our responsibility to, even, or we may, in a sense, not exist at all. Emerson's method is to investigate the concepts in these words; bring them back from hovering alone in space with Descartes (like "exist"), e.g., say, that consciousness is not a condition of humanity, but a state of being that comes and goes, like sadness, or focus. This is to say that we may be speaking apples and oranges here, only that "thought" and "being" are also not constants, and so neither "static" nor "notions", but more akin to activities, and so saying an evolving biological system "replaces" them is more like ships passing in the night, e.g., are evolution and character in the same conceptual realm? That being said, your desire/claim that: "I am an evolving process of self organization" is legitimate (you could be making the point that you are like all of us, or that there is hope in being human, etc.). But to say that all of us are is a different claim (factual or general), without the moral force of one claiming their own identity--"I am the means of production!" I'm not saying our thought or identity cannot be forced on us, but, in that case, do I exist?

** Some say the trouble Descartes got into was he set his standards and terms first, and then started investigating his thoughts, but each word has its own criteria already (before us) and each sense its own conditions. Are we looking or insisting? That's only to say: is there a goal and/or desire for certain implications which may have created the form of the concept?

We are an evolving process of self organization. We are not a static - I am. We think because we are conscious, there is no choice in the matter. — Pop

I can agree that "We are not a static - I am", but, in what sense are we agreeing? Factually, sure. But we can also disagree: "I am a static; I've always been a Bruins fan". And maybe if one part stands still, anyways, not all of us does. Sure, but that is to say.... what? Something is always happening? And who would disagree? (Until I'm 18 in Vernon, B.C. on the weekend, and then nothing is happening.)

We can be said to think unconsciously (say, without words, or attention--perhaps working on a Rubix cube), and we can say we choose to avoid thinking ("I'm too busy to think about the funeral arrangements", or "I'm going to clear my mind of any thought"), or even choose not to be conscious (unaware). If we desire to stretch these terms beyond their ordinary use, they loose traction to do anything for us but what we want. Maybe we want them to be given or our nature, but then maybe we overlook what makes them special and that can be lost.

All that uncertainty can be made certain by acknowledging a singular process that in many ways is self evident in the universe and life, though not entirely understood - Yet! Yes it is a god concept - works much the same way as a god, but it places the power of god in the individuals hands, and it gives everybody and everything an equal power of god, by understanding that everything belongs to a singular process of self organization. — Pop

Making uncertainty certain could be said to be the goal of every philosopher since before Plato; but it's like grasping harder, where everything falls through your fingers says Emerson (and Heidegger). Wittgenstein would say the desire for certainty creates a particular picture of our concepts (blocking the actual view) and that without any specific context there is nothing to grab onto at all, so we are back floating around with Descrartes, searching for the thing that will hold down the universe.

The picture is: meaning, thought, any inner processes (how some use Forms of Life), corresponds to the world. We know one (world) through the other (word/meaning)--correlation.
— Antony Nickles

Agreed, in principle. The picture....the mental image as I use “picture”......corresponds to the world, such image I would call intuition, but the remainder of the inner process must ensue before there is knowledge. Different metaphysics, similar principles. — Mww

This is a description of "the picture", not as a theory proposed by Witt (or me). It is also not referring to 'pictures' as, say, mental images; it is the theoretical framework forced on us by the desire for certainty (predictability, universality, etc.). The metaphysics (or Forms of Life, or Use, or any other postulation to solve the problem (separation) of the Other) is created by the need for something other than the stopping point at which we become responsible to each other. This is to veer into territory better suited for another post, but one of Witt's points is there is no space between our pain and its expression to allow our own "knowledge" of it. We express our pain (or hide it); we don't "know" it. Similarly, usually there is no space between the world and our language; no (metaphysical) "reality" to which our words correspond. I say usually because our doubt--our confusion, our fear, our lack of control of the Other--along with other (moral, aesthetic, etc.) problems, create the feeling of space--and thus the need for some connection--between the word and the world. But the Other is separate; we can't agree or convince each other; things fall apart, irreparably sometimes; our standards run afoul. The picture allows a vision of the world where these things are manageable, avoidable, or solved--by knowledge, logic, argument, etc.

it's just we have a relationship to the Other that is more than knowledge ("know" in a different sense--aaaand I just lost Mmw because this is Witt as Ordinary Language Philosopher.)
— Antony Nickles

Kindasorta lost me, I guess, insofar as I attribute no philosophical authority to ordinary language. But I’m still interested in this “know” in a different sense, from its point of view. — Mww

I'll take the second part first. I have discussed elsewhere that Witt is pointing out that knowledge in this sense (our ability to be certain, say, about the Other), comes to an end sometimes. We are separate, and that comes out in ways that cannot be resolved by "knowledge"--either of the Other, or of our world or our language, say, to convince/logically force the Other. As I added just above recently, language is not just word-object or true/false statements; there are myriad uses ("senses" Witt will say, grammars) of a concept--they have numerous possibilities in which they can be meaningful (even projections for new meaning into new contexts), and have different criteria, judged different ways, in each sense, in each categorical context--knowledge as fact, knowledge as skill/familiarity, knowledge as acknowledgement--its many ordinary formations.

Now when you say you attribute no philosophical authority to ordinary language, that is understandable. That is a view of Witt and other ordinary language philosophers shared by much of philosophy. This definitely would be another post, but the observations of OLP are not made to be assessed as statements (about the world, etc.). OLP makes no claim to defend ordinary usage ("common sense") either (say, against "philosophy"). The descriptions also have no authority other than the extent to which someone else sees what I see--the statements about: what we say when, e.g., when we say we "know something", etc.--are philosophical evidence--but they are not facts. Though neither are they merely beliefs. There may be disputes, e.g., over whether it is really the case/sense, whether it applies in this particular context, and whether, even if we accept it, there is any philosophical implication to the issues that concern us, say: does the sense of knowledge as acknowledgement really impact the Problem of Other Minds? OLP is not to compete with traditional analytical philosophy (say, on its terms), but to revolutionize it (from within) entirely.

[concepts have different meanings. Or, the grammar of concepts are not etched in stone, so the] reasoning using concepts is adaptable to circumstance.
— Mww

......Concepts have different "uses" as in different ways in which they make sense.....

Doesn’t that say the same thing? — Mww

In the paragraph above in which this is included is the implication that there is a competition here between knowledge and belief--a way for certainty (stone), and a failing of "difference"/"adaptability". Witt is trying to see past those all-or-nothing pictures by showing that our concepts have varying senses (say, than this dichotomy). But the criteria for you "knowing" your brother's character compared to you "knowing" Newton's laws are not different "meanings". We don't (reason doesn't) "use" or "adapt" concepts. Just because they are not certain, universal, predictable, etc., or that because they are varied, sometimes generalizable, projectable, subject to circumstance, etc., does not make the different senses (and each of their criteria) of our concepts, flimsy, personal, or without implications. You'd have to explain why you'd say you "know" the sun will come up (not that there are no reasons, I guess), not because it's common sense, but because that does not fit the criteria for the concept of "knowledge"--(there'd have to be a reason to doubt it would come up)--My examples of apologies, etc. are better. You CAN say whatever you want ("adapt concepts to circumstances"), but at a certain point you will be said not to be making an apology, no longer playing a "game"; you will be outside any category of a concept, or lying, evading, joking, insincere, avant garde, or maybe called insane (the goal here is not claiming normative force).

A concept is, after all, nothing but a representation of something. A representation, in and of itself, has no meaning. It only attains to a meaning upon being conjoined with something else, and the only way to conjoin, is to reason. To think. It is here that it becomes more rational to insist concepts are fixed, concepts do ensure something, otherwise we couldn’t ever claim any knowledge whatsoever. — Mww

Witt's view of concepts (the same term used by others but with a different framework around it), is that they are categorical (as I said, in sort of a Kantian sense), not representational. It is not "idea" and "reality" (or whatever). A concept is a class held in place (loosely) with criteria (say, for judgment, standards, identity, etc.). The "conjoining" of meaning with anything, by reason or agreement, etc., to "ensure" or "fix", say, our thoughts--the "insistence", the need of it--is the pull that forces a certain view of how meaning must work; the picture, the theoretical threshold. The fear of the fallibility of us, of our concepts, leads to calamatizing "we couldn’t ever claim any knowledge whatsoever."

If we are not certain of a specific representation of a specific quantity, conceived, say, as the number 1, we wouldn’t have any ground at all for what stands as the absolute truth of mathematical expressions. — Mww

Here try to see that "the absolute truth of mathematical expressions" being "grounded" in "certainty" is the grammar of mathematical expressions; it is the way they work, the criteria for being what they are. Is it not easier now to see that there are other expressions that have other criteria? different ways in which they work? Maybe they do not rely on certainty; there may even be no "ground". Our moral realm still has rationale, though it might fail; our aesthetic world still has knowledge, only perhaps not always agreement. Can we never make any claim whatsoever? i.e., is discussion impossible outside the conditions of grounded certainty?

we see what counts as reasonable for each concept may indeed be different — Mww

Seeing the variety of conceptual rationale is one of the main points of the PI. "Seeing what counts" for a concept--even for the different senses of a concept--is to see two things (at least) about the grammar of a concept: the criteria ("what counts") are the structure and limits of that concept. If you stray from the grammar of a concept, the criteria resolve the identity of an action under that concept--e.g., what it can not be (or must fulfill) if it is to be "knowledge". But the criteria also elucidate what "counts"--as in, what 'matters'--under a concept; the human cares and needs reflected in our criteria. "Reasoning" is not internal; grammar is also the ways I which a concept can be meaningful, or at least usually (as humans can do whatever they want for whatever reasons they want), say, "What's your reasoning for doing it that way?"--"for more aerodynamics" or "less weight"; but maybe not: "I felt a moral obligation".

But the number 1 is completely meaningless by itself, and actually wouldn’t even have been conceived at all, if it weren’t for a need only it could satisfy. — Mww

And here we can see a need giving a concept the criteria for its grammar (one of which is the satisfaction of the need). Should we call this the concept of singularity/uniqueness? or of numerical primacy? or a series? All? Are there contexts where there could be confusion between which sense applies? (not here but maybe under the different senses of knowledge, good, should, etc.) We have different criteria for how these senses are used, e.g., different conditions, and different consequences for using them outside that criteria, say, the rigidity for inclusion under one sense or the other. These distinctions go on as far as the need to clarify, even beyond their limits (e.g., the "bad" as the "moral" as Nietschze might say).

I think therefore I am.

Thinking is a function of consciousness, where consciousness is the fundamental activity and thinking being its result. So the sentence can be rephrased:

I am conscious therefore I am.

This is closer to the truth, but now the sentence highlights what was implicit and inconsistent in the original phrase –there are two identities where there can only be one.
I am conscious and therefore I am. It can be rephrased:

I am consciousness - the therefore I am, is superfluous - what I am is consciousness.

I like it. It now cannot be reduced any further, and it is closer to the truth of our being. I believe, at its base. I like the way it does away with false identity and equalizes and unifies everyone.
What do you think? Is it logical?

For the statement to be meaningful, consciousness needs a definition. My definition of consciousness is: an evolving process of self organization. So, I am an evolving process of self organization - sounds about right to me, what do you think? Dose it work for you?

The construction is a challenge to the notion of identity and its product the ego, so an exploration of this might lead to insights about human nature. — Pop

Emerson in Self Reliance says "Man is timid and apologetic; he is no longer upright; he dares not say 'I think,' 'I am,' but quotes some saint or sage."

If this is, as I believe (as does Stanley Cavell), a critique of Descartes, Emerson has taken out the "therefore"; our identity/existence is not contingent (on consciousness, on thought--on anything). But what is left is a standing up for ourselves. As it were in Emerson's example, I no longer speak from others mouths. I am saying this! I am claiming myself! "I am an evolving process of self organization!" Yes!, you be you. But this identifying is not ego, so much as a courageous carving out for ourselves (even if aligning with others, along party lines, against our mother, etc.). It is the opposite of "equalizing and unifying". A ramification of this active claiming is that: not everyone thinks, or is. If you want to be, if you want to be said to be thinking--something must be done! Being and thinking are not given, ever-present states of the human condition; sometimes we act like others without consideration, speak their opinions; some are even ghosts of themselves, lost to themselves. We are not ensured or given; there is only the possibility to think, to be.

You say the lion sentence is to be taken as a fact demonstrating an impossibility. It is only to be taken as a fact because its author so stipulates, but the sentence does not demonstrate an impossibility. — Mww

No, he/the sentence does not demonstrate it, but, Yes!! Witt is asking you to take/accept/imagine it as a fact. Whew.

The conviction that the feelings some dude in pain are inaccessible to us when in truth “we CAN know”, but choose to be convinced we can’t.... — Mww

Again, got it. You go on to assume Witt is using the comparison as a moral equivalency (between our position to the lion and the Other), but that is going one step too far--what you say above is the stopping point with the lion. Also, we are not "choosing" to be "convinced". Picturing knowledge this way expresses our conviction with regard to the Other: I want to know him only by knowing his inner (thought processes, meaning, intention, etc.) or outer (traditions, form of life, etc.), and, since those are not accessible/sufficient, we conclude we cannot "know" the Other (as the Interlocutor says), when we can. But we do have a relationship to the Other; it's just that it's more than knowledge ("know" in a different sense--aaaand I just lost @Mmw because this is Witt as Ordinary Language Philosopher.) Our relationship to the Other (and meaning, Form of Life, etc.) is not predetermined, certain, universal, predictable, not partial, unconditional, free from doubt, etc. There is a gap between us and Them that only we can fill (if necessary)--we know the Other in the sense we acknowledge them, their expressions as meaningful, or reject them.

we [are] relieved of moral responsibility... so can’t be held liable for denying the accessibility of them [the Other's feelings] — Mww

This (which is taken out of the context of @Mmw's discussion, but it) is, in a nutshell, what we want as humans, and which creates the Picture of philosophical (positivist) knowledge. We no longer have to be responsive to the accessible expressions of the Other; no longer have to span the distance of our separateness.

And all that needs doing..... is to grant that... the grammar of concepts are not etched in stone, so the reasoning using concepts is adaptable to circumstance. — Mww

And here all we need to tweak is that "reasoning" (or, us), do not "use" concepts. Concepts have different "uses" as in different ways in which they make sense, say: "to know", as I have discussed elsewhere, a phone number, the theme of a poem, a person's intent, when a star will appear on the other side of the moon, etc. But these senses are not adaptable "to" a circumstance, nor, again, adaptable by reason (or by a person); the "use"--the sense(s) a concept has--is part of the context at the time (as it were, to be determined, if necessary). Just because they are not fixed (do not ensure anything), does not make them adaptable, nor irrational--just that what counts as reasonable for each concept, in context, may be different.

It is not that we CAN NOT know/understand the other.....we decide that without knowledge......we have no obligation to respond to their pain.
— Antony Nickles

It is never our knowledge of others that predicates our moral obligations. — Mww

The issue is the problem the Other creates in being unknown (unknowable (with certainty) the interlocutor will claim, since we cannot know what is going on with their experience--internally; or by some shared external something)). Now this response in a sense moves past the other--the claim on us of them, not others generally, but this person, in front of us, in a present moral situation, say, writhing in pain--past that to find our obligations spelled out in morality, our moral knowledge. As if Kant were not just trying to remove our feelings or instinct from our moral action, but remove what we can't be certain of (beforehand) entirely--including the Other.

The idea of a sentence or a word in isolation is only a thing in philosophy--stemming from the desire to tether it to something determinate, certain, universal.
— Antony Nickles

Yes. Tethering to the irreducible, the apodeitically certain, is the whole modus operandi of human reason, and consequently, for possible mutual understanding because of it. — Mww

Here I should say that there is nothing wrong (false) with the Picture of knowledge that the Interlocutor wants, and there is nothing impossible about it--we can, of course, 'know' the Other, say, scientifically (for what good it does). And the mode of (philosophical, rational, logical) "human reason" is not nonsense, or incorrect. However, the desire to "tether to the irreducible" is the same desire for certainty of the Other that Witt is pointing out comes to an end (categorically) in the human condition. We are separate; there is no understanding that is ensured to us mutually. If there is a miscommunication, or a disagreement, or a refusal to recognize the Other--their cares, their sensibilities, their history--there is nothing that "knowledge" or "reason" will do apart from our willingness to refuse to give up on the process of understanding. The "possibility" for that understanding has a breaking point, an ending moment. But, again, most of the time misunderstanding does not happen--there is no need for concern over the Other; no need to ask about intention or what they mean, but that is not the situation philosophers care about. The desire is to never come to that moment by treating every communication and the process of understanding as the same; setting the bar for certainty and predictability, and solving for that problem. It is to put the cart before the horse, and the philosophical criteria from that desire for certainty leave us blind to the Other, unable to capture all the various ways we save understanding--excuses, apologies, clarifications, acknowledgements, concessions; i.e., reasons, to allow for the possibility for understanding.

Witt credits language use for understanding, or lack of it, but proper philosophy reduces language to its components, and those are the actual ground for understanding, and by association, the prevention of misunderstanding. Rather than worry about what a word means in a language, it is a better effort to realize how words originate of themselves, for then we find the meaning of a word is given BY its origin, and understanding henceforth becomes a matter of its relation, and its meaning becomes merely a matter of convention. — Mww

And now we've come full circle to the "ground for understanding" again; the search for how meaning is given to a word--here maybe by its origin, relation, convention; "language as components"--this is the search Witt is showing forces a picture on us, a certain pre-determined theoretical framework based on our fears and desires. Saying Witt "credits language use for understanding" is to impose that picture onto Witt--attribute to him the desire which he is attempting to reveal. It is important to note that when Witt is saying, paraphrased: "Look at the Use!" (#340), that is not to say that "use is meaning" (use as opposed to... ) but: Look! See how language functions many ways beyond this prejudice for certainty, universality (beyond the person); to see that language is not just word-object or true/false statements; to recognize that there are myriad uses ("senses" he will say, grammars) of a concept--they have numerous possibilities in which they can be meaningful (even projections for new importance, into new contexts), and have different criteria, judged different ways, in each sense, in each categorical context--knowledge as fact, knowledge as skill/familiarity, knowledge as acknowledgement--its many ordinary formations (imagine, even "certainty" in different ways in different places). As if Plato pushed past Socrates' accomplishment in his (Plato's) desire for a standard of knowledge which led to the picture of the forms. Socrates was an ordinary language philosopher first in asking "what do when say: when...", say, we ask about justice. One ordinary answer is: might makes right--that is actually a part of the world of justice; it's a legitimate, rational answer. Maybe not the best justice, but how can we say that the idea that "what is good for the stronger is good for the country" is not part of the concept/possibility/conversation of justice? It's the basis for trickle-down economics. Socrates (and definitely Plato) do aspire to a (more just) answer, but along the way we are investigating our (normally unnoticed, unexamined) concepts--this is the benefit of ordinary philosophy. Plato went too far in imagining a hidden world to fit his desired conditions rather than see the criteria existing in the world. Why ask the question if you know the answer?

But Witt's point is that the grounding we want is a wish; a decision before we look (start our investigation)--starting with a demand for a certain standard. We understand each other most of the time because of the ordinary everything; all the training, all the watching, all the mistakes, etc. Our language is weaved into our lives and world, not in any specific way, but in all the complex, subtle, crass, general, lazy, vague, precise, poetic ways in which we live and judge and how we disagree and know and forget and apologize. Witt is trying to expand our vision to see all the different ways language works in various activities; even just at a particular time/place (the context of the event, the people there, the expectations, the accompanying histories, the feelings). All language can not be reduced to one explanation, a theory.

The point he is making at this moment in the PI is that, despite our wish to interact with the Other based on knowledge that is certain, and with understanding grounded in something that would prevent misunderstanding, our knowledge of the Other comes to an end, and we are left with: not an empirical problem to solve, but a moral situation in which we are responsible for our effort (or lack of) to understand the Other--together, through questions, rebuke, ultimatums, education, exasperation, breakthrough, learning what matters to each other, clearing up hyperbole, generalized terms, different senses, etc. You might say words have meaning; I would say that more important than ensuring that process is to see that words are meant.