"I cannot know what is going on in him" is above all a picture. Witt, PI, p. 223.
— Antony Nickles

Can you help me out with [the] picture? Picture of what, picture of what kind, how do I know it as such, what am I enabled to do with it, what am I enabled to do because of it......and whatever else may apply as far as this topic is concerned. — Mww

This is a legit question for this post, as I skip over the picture to just make a case that the same desire (for the picture) comes from the entire human condition (our separateness). Maybe the best sense of the picture is: a model of sorts; the positivist model of meaning that Witt toyed with in the Tractates (that he is now diagnosing in the PI--"why did I/we want to think about it that way?"). The picture is: meaning, thought, any inner processes (how some use Forms of Life), corresponds to the world. We know one (world) through the other (word/meaning)--correlation.

" [From the Interlocutor:] 'A name signifies only what is an element of reality. What can not be destroyed; what remains the same in all moments.'... This was the very expression of a quite particular image: of a particular picture we[**] want to use." #59 **"We" being what philosophy has wanted in the past--certainty (not"destroy[-able]"), fixed ("the same"), universality ("in all moments")]

If we can't know one (the Other's mind) we can't know the Other (this is the denial). It is the view of (a picture for) meaning as statements that refer to objects; that true/false is the measure of meaning.

" 'The mind seems able to give a word a meaning'... But this is not something that seems to be so; it is a picture." p. 184

It is here important to point out that this is what Witt is trying to show as the shortcomings of philosophical 'knowledge'--its attempt to solve the skeptical doubt of other minds ("I can't know--be certain--what is going on in them"; "I can't but know what is going on in me"--or "I absolutely can not know what is going on with them"---because it doesn't meet the standard of the positivist's "knowledge".

" 'Either he has this experience, or not' --what primarily occurs to us is a picture which by itself seems to make the sense of the expressions unmistakable..." #352

Witt points to the lion; as if, in THIS case, yes, we CAN NOT--but, with the Other, we are ABLE TO, however, we would rather rely on the Picture: where knowledge (of the inner, of agreed meaning, etc.) stands in our place, excusing us from any relation to the Other--to their expressions which ask to be answered, perhaps; "mistake"-nly (see quote above); unjustly, selfishly, by closing our eyes shut, etc.

Clarification: since Witt's focus on "use" seems to be a stumbling block, I wanted to point out that it is not the idea that someone makes a decision or some conscious casual force for a sentence to be used one way and not another (even in a very specific way); the same confusion that every word/action is 'intended'. In literary criticism this is the confusion of asking what the author themselves 'meant'. The context tells you the use, it allows for the determination of it. "Every word has a different character in a different context." PI, p. 181. The idea of a sentence or a word in isolation is only a thing in philosophy--stemming from the desire to tether it to something determinate, certain, universal.

I'll leave you to it; only to say: my whole point is that Witt is not here "making a claim". That is not why this sentence is here. It is used in a different sense in the context of this text. Of course you can take it that way (it is a possibility of those words alone) as it is possible to drop in on one comment of a post.

"If a lion could talk, we could not understand him."

I will argue that it is essential to put the above sentence in the textual context in which it was written to see its USE here by Witt--(...) that it is used in its sense as an uncontested FACT (not to be refuted or interpreted, nor an open question, nor a thesis, etc.)
— Antony Nickles

I can grant the sentence is being used as an uncontested fact, but if it is not be contested, refuted or interpreted asks the question....why did he say it? Apparently Witt is allowing himself to do something with it, even if only to demonstrate something else, which seems to require some sort of correspondence with an uncontested fact. Doesn’t the fact need to be interpreted in order to determine its correspondence? — Mww

As I said in my first post: he is using it as a fact in comparison to the choice (the conviction) in the sentence before, to show that we are in a position to the other (beyond knowledge) in response to their pain. It is not that we CAN NOT know/understand the other ( as with the lion, see ** below) we decide (cave to our desire) that without knowledge (in its sense of certainty, independent from us, etc.) we can not know the other--we have no (further) obligation to respond to their pain.

**Though, as I have said, you can certainly debate the fact if you want, or discuss it in its other possibilities; just trying to get people to see that its use here by Witt is as an uncontested fact, again, for comparison. Maybe it helps to say that: it can be both of these things, along with others. Just because it can be used in various ways, or that it "makes sense"--as in: you know the words and how they go together, say, independent of any context--doesn't mean that it can't be/isn't used in a particular sense--here, as an uncontested fact; it is the context (here, textually) in which its sense is seen.

Again, this should (will I am thinking more and more) be a separate thread about Grammar, and intention, action, etc., but I do see some profit here (with this thread) in pointing some things out.

Yes, I can know what you are going to do; "look he is going to ask her out!"
— Antony Nickles

"...you can’t know he asks until he actually does." — Mww

Just to point out, this isn't predicting the future (especially not ensuring it). It is "going to do", not, know that he actually does it. And, of course, importantly, we can be wrong (or, as you say, something can intervene), but that only proves the possibility that we can. Witt is pointing out that possibility, in comparison to the Interlocutor's refusal to admit that we can "know" the other (even knowing their secrets) without "knowing" what is internal in the other. Importantly, these are two senses of knowledge within its Grammar (possibilities): to know (to guess with evidence, experience of the person, etc.) as opposed to knowledge as certain, prediction, infallibility, etc.

.'Meaning' is like the imagined 'hidden' inner process. A concept's grammar is its possibilities of sense--not a fixed 'meaning' like a definition either. "It's a blue day."
— Antony Nickles

It is because concepts do have specific meanings... which obtains a meaningful statement coincidental to speaker and listener. * * * understanding is a logical procedure in which the objects must align with the subject necessarily in order for there to be understanding in the first place. — Mww

We're almost there, but I put 'meaning' in quotes as connected to the hidden, inner process, because it is the (confused) picture Witt is trying to figure out why we want to insist on. Part of that picture is the idea that "concepts do have specific meanings." The PI starts with the idea that there is more (in his term, ordinary) rationality in the world/our language, than fixed, certain, specific; ALL the different ways each concept makes sense (the possible, available--even the unforeseeable): see two types of 'know' above (also, we can 'know' our phone #, which is the sense of knowledge (in its Grammar) that "we can remember it"). Meaning is not a noun, in this sense, not an adjective (meaningful statement), because meaning usually comes up afterwards (though we occasionally are trying to mean a specific sense, e.g., writing a speech; taking into consideration in advance an obvious possibility of it being taken in a different sense in a given context, etc.) We usually just say things and it works out fine (as you say). The point is nothing is fixed at all ahead of time (the 'object' and 'subject' do not align--the people do); we are endlessly responsible to each other to clarify, re-phrase, apologize, etc. (although we can give up). This frailty is not determined or resolvable by philosophy, logic, Forms of Life, our thought, 'meaning, intention, rules, science, etc. It is the open-ended process of communication.

Witt does say its amazing that we can communicate at all.
— Antony Nickles

...I can see, however, that Witt’s detractors might say exactly that, considering they might think Witt made common language use FUBAR because of his very own philosophical investigations. By the way.....did Witt have any peers playing the role of serious detractor? — Mww

All the positivists turned against him; Russell, Godel, the "Vienna Circle"; I would put A.J. Ayer in that boat (who J.L. Austin eviscerates: He and Witt share in responding to the 'descriptive fallacy'--the idea that everything said is a (true/false) statement; that everything is word--world, meaning--understanding; Austin showing there are other "truth-values", e.g., felicity to the Grammar of a concept, in Witt terms. But Austin is just a destroyer (thinking that refuting the skeptic is all we need); Witt is looking for why we want that in the first place (leaving the door open for the skeptic, putting us at the end of the failure of knowledge).)

[Your admitted paraphrase (of me):] with a human in pain we have to add more assumptions to avoid feeling empathy. * * * I think it is problematic to not realize that the animal us is what is being denied when we assume our way away from empathy with other humans and animals. — Coben

This extrapolates from the consequences of what I am proposing Witt is uncovering in a way that shows you understand where I was coming from, so, again, thank you. You are headed in a different direction (a different interest), which is fine, so I would only say that I (and I believe Witt here) am not so much making a case in place of empathy, so much as diagnosing the desire, as philosophers--to side-step the fallibility of others, their separateness, with, say, knowledge--that starts with the human (common) desire for certainty, and the need to respond to, fill in, that gap (to the other). I would say, before that view of ourselves, there is not even the possibility of empathy, that the denial of our 'human condition'--here I mean our relationship to (the limits of) knowledge--is a desire to avoid any other relationship to the other (animal, as you rightly point out we should add; which also brings up our instinct to see the other (their pain) as the same (as ours)--also avoiding any difference in people (and the people of difference), even further negating them--as we do not want to see our separateness because then I must respond to the other, bridge that gap with, in a sense, me--take their expressions as a claim upon me (e.g., my empathy).

Not that a call for empathy is not needed (even, philosophically), but just that I think there is merit in achieving the ethical perspective that Witt is attempting to get us to see--to see our human reaction (denial) to our condition with the lack of knowledge of the other; especially given the still prevalent influence of positivism (although cloaked now), which is a product of the common (cultural/human) desire for fact and evidence to take the place of individual judgment and putting ourselves in a position to (for) the other--letting ourselves (bravely) be called out, without certainty, for the other, rather than shirking that; e.g., to only rely on DNA evidence rather than seeing that circumstantial evidence, judging an unreliable witness, etc., is sufficient to convict (however fallible); also, e.g., we rely only on science to understand other animals, rather than realizing we are in the same position to them as to another human; as I say it in my other response to you: that we are responsible for our response to their expressions (in the face of our separateness and the inability of knowledge to bridge that gap).

We do have this problem with dolphins. They are clearly communicating, but are they using language? Might we figure it out and be able to say something to them? — Marchesk

I hate to police, but you might notice (I try to point out many times) that this thread is about the difference between: taking something (a statement) as something (a claim) for yourself, and putting yourself in the position of the other (Witt) to see how it is USED (not its other implications) given a certain context; the above--opinions about understanding lions/dolphins--is to ignore my effort here entirely. So, you're not wrong or have a trivial interest, only maybe, imagining this thread as a different topic--and, maybe, hurting my feelings? ; ) Maybe the other responses might help with the difference between 'meaning' and 'use'?

[Witt] [r]einforcing that non-humanness of animals and the non-animalness of humans actually, in the long run, I think does damage to the very goals you are attributing LW with. We've had a long hallucination that we are radically different from animals (and then also even other races of humans) — Antony Nickles

Yours is a thoughtful response, taking into consideration my effort here; I appreciate it. I will say a bit of clarification for me in another reply, and I understand and share your disappointment with his (repeated) distinguishing our biological differences--which I would only say he is (insensitively) using to contrast our 'humanity' positivism would like to ignore--but I am heartened by your association of seeing (desiring to see) a person in a way (for me, past them to something else more certain, less 'human'--per Witt) with the idea of seeing an animal in a way--say, as meat--without noticing the sympathetic. I would say the "seeing as" or "aspect-seeing" that Witt gets into later (pp. 193-208), ties animals and humans together in our ability for denial of the other, say, their pain. There is a great book of back-and-forth essays (four) called "Philosophy & Animal Life" in which, in response to an essay by Cora Diamond (in response to another), Cavell argues a rational argument for the ethical treatment of animals is impotent because it does not address the human desire to see the other (animal) as, in a sense, "inhuman"--not seeing the (moral) aspect of our similarity as animals: that we are responsible in the face of our separateness and the failing of knowledge to bridge that apart from our response.

I have attempted to re-write the OP to address the problems we're having/what I eventually get to (ya only know what you're saying at the end of a paper).

So, are we going somewhere here? — Banno

I'd rather not here (see the edit above)--maybe another post; his path from TLP to the PI and the "rationality" (rigorousness? ability to be subject to study/criticism?) of everyday life, "ordinary language", I may take up in another post about Ordinary Language Philosophy generally. Here I wanted to focus on the ethical argument Witt is making (and the subtlety of 'use' I guess because everyone can't seem to wrap their head around that).

Wittgenstein was never a positivist. — Banno

Weeeeeeell, I'll grant you that. But (though this is said provisionally, i.e., I don't want to argue it here) he did skirt it and was left with nothing to say, and spent the PI filing in that blank (everything other than word--world, true/false statements). More to what I AM arguing here, in the PI he is wondering what the positivist's desire (need) was, which I will argue he did share (as does his other/former self--the Interlocutor).

“the picture is a model of reality” (TLP 2.12)

I think the picture theory ran deep enough to carry well into PI... — Banno

The SEP article you quote is Wittgenstein as a positivist. In the PI, the positivist is the Interlocutor--he is wondering how he got himself into the gordian knot of the Tractatus. He is diagnosing the creation of the picture theory.

I think the picture theory... this is what he has in mind when he talks about the lion; we have no picture of what would be going on.

And I think that we do have at least something of a picture of what is going on. — Banno

If you want to take a position on the content of that sentence, go ahead. I don't have an argument against this; I am not arguing with that. However, I am arguing that Witt had something else in mind (he is using the sentence in another SENSE): here (with the lion) there is not a choice (it is in its sense as a FACT that he is USING it), but with us (with the conviction; in wanting a picture theory) we have a choice, and, in doing so, we shut our eyes to the other.

That first paragraph is quite beyond my keen. — Banno

Yes, this is ships in the night (the arguments are categorically incompatible--back to the "rough ground" as Witt would say; which I would argue is the text--maybe seeing it a new way). I can understand if you don't care to follow it, but I don't think I'm speaking German ;) Always willing to help, of course. And I do edit some of my responses, like my last one, to try to make them more clear and responsive to where I feel the misunderstanding is.

The context is guessing thoughts, and the talk of pictures relating this to his picture theory of meaning; it's the whole picture that we do not understand, as opposed to when some specific utterances are seen as lacking sense (this is dealt with around ∮500). "If a lion could speak we could no understand him" is the expression of a conviction, not a piece of reasoning. — Banno

Well, this is very-much appreciated (someone's been reading--maaaaybe not my post, but it's something). I agree with you that he begins with guessing thoughts and that "it's the whole picture that we do not understand." I would point out the picture is not Witt's, so much as positivism's, but, whatever. But, yes, Witt is trying to investigate: why do philosophers (anyone) hold onto, need, create, this picture (of meaning being internal thought)?

I ask that you look again at my argument that the quote is being USED as a fact (though it is, makes sense as, and can be addressed as--independently--a hypothetical opinion, or questionable claim, whatever--fine; that is not what's happening here/what Witt is doing with it--I'm not sure how to write that any better (it's starting to make me self-conscious); I mean looking at USE is a major point of the PI); He is using it, here, as a fact, for comparison with a conviction (above)--a belief chosen and held onto strongly (and maybe the above back-and-forth with Luke might help). Not (used as) an expression of belief (nor a piece of reasoning). The PICTURE is, in those terms, an (expression of our) denial of the other. I am adding to "the picture"'s motivations, our own (it's our picture anyway), in that it is a human doubt and fear that creates (is expressed into) the picture, but also that its solution--for certainty, rationality, predictability, universality, predetermination--is the same solution that wishes to deny the human in the other (and ourselves); the failing, the responsibility, the unpredictability, irrationality, etc.

I'm not sure how Witt is not seen as looking at "specific utterances" (say every utterance of the Interlocutor?) and sometimes pointing out how they don't "make sense"--yes he can be less than forgiving with this, but it is not a dismissal (insensible idiot!) so much as to bring to light the distinctions between having said one thing as opposed to another, for being judged as falling outside that category, subject to the consequences for that concept, etc. (the Grammar of the concept). He is rather curt and unforgiving though.

Have a look at the sections around about ∮500. — Banno

507. " 'I [the interlocutor] am not merely saying this, I mean something by it.' -- When we consider what is going on in us when we MEAN (and don't merely say) words, it seems to us as if there were something coupled to those words, which otherwise would run idle. --As if they, so to speak, connected with something in us." [With the talics in original, in all CAPS.]

The 'meaning' being the something, connected to words, or connected to some inner process (set apart from our responsibility). But we don't 'mean' what we say, usually--'casually' at all--and we don't have to, in the senses: be careful with it, say it emphatically, for reasons, etc. Yet we can still answer the question (afterwards): What did you mean? (or, "Did you mean to say that?") But that is not usually asked unless we say something strange, etc. These are some of the Grammar of 'meaning' (something).

Sure, the context is important. If that is the whole of your thesis, then we have no disagreement. — Banno

The textual context: the role the sentence plays on this page. Based on Witt's discussion (and my other evidence), the sentence is used as a fact, not as an open question. (I wouldn't put it as a 'disagreement' so much as an inability, or lack of interest, to see, so far.)

Have a look at the sections around about ∮500. — Banno

Okay...done. ; )

StreetlightX made a thread on this topic a few years back.

Lions and Grammar — Banno

The quote in that thread is taken (mis-taken) as an open-ended call for speculation too. Instead of inner processes, he's fixed 'Grammar' in the place of those, in the same way Forms of Life is used as well, just grabbing the quote for its own reasons. As a discussion of Witt's term Grammar, it misses the mark for that reason and others, but that is a different discussion.

I think Wittgenstein was making a joke. Either that, or he was wrong. — Banno

This is philosophy? Troll much?

I am having a hard time figuring out if the OP does deal with the issue your cartoon humorously took up. But since the cartoon does — Coben

The cartoon is all most people take from Witt, which is sad (and wrong) as I think he's one of our most important modern thinkers. Also, again (previously addressed to others here), the idea here is to see that the sentence is not an opinion or a claim of some kind (to be answered with an opinion or alternative claim). If there is some confusion, I hope I can help.

“...To say "He alone can know what he intends" is nonsense: to say "He alone can know what he will do", wrong....”
(From your Witt, P.I., p. 223)

Am I suppose to gather from all that, that I can know what he intends, if only I choose the right word for the concepts? So I say...did you intend ____?; he says, nope, not that. So I say, well, did you mean ____?; nope, not that either. I see a serious problem here, don’t you?

On the other hand, I say, did you mean ____, and he says, no, I meant _____, to which I say, oh, cool, I get it now, or I could just as well say, ohfercrissakes, that just doesn’t make any sense at all. — Mww

This has two things going on. Acting and intending, and the knowledge of those. To intend (to do) something, and, to mean (something) have two different ways they work (or don't)--different Grammars. Witt is explaining the Grammar of knowledge in these instances (Grammar, as: let's say, everyday logic, roughly; or: the way in which knowing intentions makes sense or doesn't). Yes, I can know what you are going to do; "look he is going to ask her out!" With intention it is harder, but imagine them both as not a hidden internal causal process--that intention is like an excuse; it only comes up after something gets screwed up; "Did you intend to bring a gun fishing instead of a pole?" "Did you intend to slap her instead of apologize?" Something unexpected happened or outside (the Grammar of) our expectations. What Witt is trying to get at is that, if you want to say there is a hidden internal 'intention' or 'meaning' that you (alone) KNOW (say, beforehand, certainly, specifically), that is not the way knowledge and intending work--if you insist on that (and mean it, say, as a philosopher), you are denying the other; if you say that in normal conversation, it's going to sound like nonsense too (though we could probably imagine a scenario). Now I can intend to do something: "I intended to roll for Sixes, but I'll have to take Chance."(in Yatchze), and we too can know your intention (you only had those two spots left, course you're gonna roll for sixes. If you intended to roll for chance, then there would be questions.).

[H]ere’s the kicker. All I wrote just now? All I’ve ever written, actually? I submit, My Good Sir, that it is impossible for you to tell, if I got it right, whether I used my grammar (reasoning) correctly with respect to your understanding, or merely from my own, and they happen to coincide from sheer accident. And, if I got it wrong, it is impossible for you to tell whether I chose my meanings with the intent to make you think I got it wrong, when I understood you perfectly from the get-go. Both of which catastrophically falsify Witt’s prophecy given above. — Mww

Witt does say its amazing that we can communicate at all. But trust me I can tell when you're reasoning is wrong. : ) Grammar sits apart from us, prior to us--in the language/world. But if we understood each other by coincidence or accident, would it make a difference? But you have hit on the crux of the matter for me, which is that trickery, pretending, lying, charade, joking, trolling (@Banno), etc. look exactly like the real thing (maybe), so: how do we KNOW! And this is when we have to see that 'hidden processes' and 'having a secret', are two different ways of thinking of (viewpoints on) the uncertainty of the other (The "Problem" of Other Minds).

how you correlate reasoning to grammar....
— Mww

....briefly (...), the OLP....idea of grammar is that each concept, say, knowing, or, an apology, has its own (or multiple)....ways it can make sense, how it works (or fails): e.g., understanding--when can you say someone else understands something? how do you explain it? what is proof for understanding, say, math, a poem, a person? etc., each concept having its own (subject to change and adaptation as we change our judgments, standards, lives, etc: what is justice, these days?).
— Antony Nickles

So grammar is the science of application of concepts? Can we say that? If concepts have a plurality of meanings, grammar is the method for picking the better of them? Ok....to what end?

When I pick use a word representing a concept, and indicate some meaning by it, is that word intended to demonstrate my reasoning, or is it chosen to align with your understanding of my reasoning? — Mww

Obviously this needs to be an entirely different thread. Science doesn't come into it. 'Meaning' is like the imagined 'hidden' inner process. A concept's Grammar is not the reasoning we go through, but the (external) possibilities of sense--not a fixed 'meaning' like a definition either. Part of it is the way we judge in reacting (the lines along which it could make sense): "It's a blue day." "Do you mean, we should go surfing? or that the sky is a magnificent color?" "Well, I meant both", or "No, I'm just sad." A little harder to understand as fitting in the field of acceptable Grammar: "Today's the day I wear blue!" But also the limits of sense, as with the failure to apologize by offending instead. These are not determined (fixed by us or decided) beforehand. We don't always 'mean', or 'intend', what we say (say resolutely or casually) because most times those things do not come up until we say something strange. This is all very quickly said and better addressed with Witt's text on Grammar, or OLP in general, which I may get to eventually.[/quote]

What I should have said is Witt is using its impossibility; as I did say, using it as a fact
— Antony Nickles

On your reading, he's using the impossibility as a fact. Okay. — Luke

I got my "it"s confused; not using the impossibility as a fact, using the statement as a fact.

My argument is that this is not being used as a conditional statement
— Antony Nickles

How can it be otherwise? Lions can't talk. — Luke

Yes, it is a statement, among other things. It is not being used for its possibility to state something--to claim itself as a fact; to stand to be refuted; it is being used in its uncontested fact-ness, for comparison to a choice. As you say, Lions can't talk. If someone says they cannot know another, that is a belief. "A dog cannot be a hypocrite, but neither can he be sincere" p. 229 This fact is being used in comparison to a baby who will be able to pretend, but not without learning many things beforehand.

And to provide the full quote from p. 56 (right after#143): What we have to mention in order to explain the significance, I mean the importance, of a concept, are often extremely general facts of nature: as are hardly ever mentioned because of their great generailty."

If these terms [knowledge and understanding] are not synonymous, then doesn't this create a problem for your reading of:

"I cannot know what is going on in him"; and

"We could not understand a lion if it talked"?

Doesn't it loosen the connection you are wanting to draw between these? — Luke

Well, you got me there, though I believe the point still stands. He is going back and forth between the two, and the difference between wanting certain knowledge, and being able to understand the other, intersect here in Witt's use in their mutual sense of: trying to figure out what to do with the other, how to address them. Object of knowledge? or understanding how to go on with them? (both maybe?)

So some, out of the same desire, have latched onto his term of Forms of Life, as a communal agreement, or a type of rule, that ensures the meaning of words.
— Antony Nickles

It sounds as though you take this to be a misunderstanding of Forms of Life. If so, what do you understand "Forms of Life" to mean or to be about? — Luke

This is also outside of this text, but Witt points out the variety of our forms of life to get us to see the variety of how the world makes sense (has reason)--not just word=object, or true/false statements. I only point out the analogous use some people make of it as with hidden internal somethings--the desire to secure language from skepticism (ground it from confusion, misunderstanding), to remove the human from the activity of communicating.

If you want to be able to fix words or speech to something inside the brain (ideas, thoughts, mental occurrences; what has been termed 'qualia') then hanging onto that makes it hard to shift to seeing the motivation for that, which Witt is pointing out.
— Antony Nickles

Where does he talk about "fixing words or speech to something inside the brain"? I don't find the relationship between mind and body to be an immediately apparent goal of his investigations. — Luke

Well this isn't the stretch where that is looked into in detail, that's on me. But the interlocutor's desire to have, his worry about, something "hidden", is evident here. If something isn't hidden in the other, it could be there is nothing I can hide, or nothing special about me--which leads to the thought: I can't know his pain, but he MUST be able to know it (and I, me)(see @Mmw here)--which is the desire not to have to understand the other, be responsible (and for what I say). "Thought is connected to words, and I know those words, so I know him"--without me having anything to do with it. I'm just working from the very end of that journey, where he is exploring the ethical situation we are left with when that desire is abandoned.

"I cannot know what is going on in him"

"We could not understand a lion if it talked."

The first is a refusal, the second is an impossibility.
— Antony Nickles

I'm not sure what you mean by an impossibility. Is it impossible that lions can talk? — Luke

What I should have said is Witt is using the statement in its sense of impossibility; as I did say, using the sentence as a given fact (it could be other things--in other texts, in other uses). The use (its fact-ness?) is more important than it being an isolated statement (an opinion or claim to be answered by an opinion or refuted). The problem is, isolated/taken as just the words, you are not wrong in everything you are saying. This is why Witt falls back on "use"--how it is meant (in what sense).

Wittgenstein is getting us to imagine that a lion could talk.... It's a conditional statement and hardly a self-evident fact. — Luke

My argument is that this is not being used (I'm not sure it helps to underline it anymore) as a conditional statement (though it can be seen that way--it is one of the possibilities of its grammar--but you would have to ignore the context) In this case (in this text, in relation to everything around it), he is not asking us to imagine a talking lion--it is being said as an accepted fact ("if", "then", no buts). If he is asking us to imagine something, what sense do the sentences around it make?

I suppose that [getting the reader to see from a different viewpoint] might work for one who hasn’t an entrenched viewpoint already. It may also work, even for him, if OLP made enough sense to displace it. — Mww

Ouch. ; ) It is tough because OLP is more of a method and viewpoint than a theory; it doesn't have any force or particular logic to itself other than: "Hey, do you see this too?"". The place where I thought it made the most sense (other than J.L Austin's response to A.J. Ayer, though he doesn't bother to explain himself) was in Stanley Cavell's essays in Must We Mean What We Say, particularly the title essay--basically about intention--and "Knowing and "Acknowledging" which steps through the problem of other minds (like Witt here) but methodically and more straightforward.

I’d be pleased to see how you correlate reasoning to grammar, from your “...one of the main points of Ordinary Language Philosophy would be there are different kinds of reasoning ("grammar")....” — Mww

These may be another post(s), but, well briefly (Cavell addresses this in that title essay too), the OLP (Witt) idea of grammar is that each concept, say, knowing, or, an apology, has its own (or multiple) say, ways it can make sense, how it works (or fails): e.g., understanding--when can you say someone else understands something? how do you explain it? what is proof for understanding, say, math, a poem, a person? etc., each concept having its own (subject to change and adaptation as we change our judgments, standards, lives, etc: what is justice, these days?).

I’d be interested in what you have to say about Kantian “grammar” with his categories. — Mww

My Kant is questionable, but "grammar" would classify an action being a certain action--being identified as such. You can try to make an apology, but if it is said sarcastically it may not be understood/accepted as an apology (its a further rebuke, etc.); there are reasons essential to it being an apology; criteria it must meet. We could look at each concept as a category. To be in its category, a concept has its limits (when does a game break down into only playing?) This is a far cry from Kant's desire for his categories, but the structure of grammar is analogous--the sense of inclusion and exclusion, the rationality of criteria--though not the "imperative" of his logic/reason. There is not the same force (should) and inclusion is not determined deontologically (beforehand, for certain), but only usually after an act. "Did you mean to apologize? that just sounded like complaining. There wasn't any acceptance of wrong; no request for forgiveness!"

I meant it as indicating the opening statement as affirmation, in accordance with continental dialectical reasoning, re: German idealists in general. The antithesis, then, follows as subjecting the opening to negation, or just some sort of modification.... Still, I could have used point/counterpoint, so...... — Mmw

Not to belabor this, but I would suggest Witt ( and OLP) does not play by those rules: affirmation, negation, points to counter, etc.--again, these (mostly) are not meant as statements, say: to be taken as true/false distinctions, or as claims. He's trying to get the reader to see from a different viewpoint. I only worry about trying to force this text to meet a pre-determined criteria (idea of reason), as one of the main points of Ordinary Language Philosophy would be there are different kinds of reasoning ("grammar") for each concept, each word in a sense: "knowing" "understanding" "acknowledging" "reason" and even for just a kind of situation, and even without being closed, fixed, or certain. And I wouldn't call Witt a German Idealist, but even Hegel's method was to unpack simple juxtapositions, and Kant had roughly the same idea as grammar with his categories (though singular criteria and limited application).

I just went off on a rant over the gross dissimilarities between emperical invisibility and rational invisibility, and how silly it is to juxtaposition one against the other. — Mmw

Again, I hate to be a stickler, but the juxtaposition is the whole point. The comparison with "emperical invisibility" (out of sight) starts down the road to figure out why philosophers might make up the idea of "rational invisibility" (as a hidden 'thing', not just unexpressed) and all of its offspring.

Also, do you think Wittgenstein uses the terms "know" and "understand" synonymously? — Luke

After looking around in the book, I would say, sometimes its close, but not here. As with most words, the 'grammar' of the word allows for many senses (and for new ones). Knows, as: has knowledge; as: acknowledges; as: familiar with; as: know how to continue, etc. Understands, as: understands how to (do a procedure); as: commiserates with (a person); as: can follow (what someone is saying, their point), etc.

They are not fluid as much as multifaceted. At one point Witt says: "The grammar of the words "knows" is evidently closely related to that of "can", "is able to". But also closely related to that of "understands". ('Mastery of a technique.) #150. And also at one point talks about how understanding a sentence is being able to paraphrase it, but understanding a poem can only be said one way. After his interlocutor says: "Then has 'understanding' two different meanings here?--I [Witt now] would rather say that these kind of use of 'understanding'' make up its meaning, make up my concept of understanding."#531-532. Concept not being an idea but a term to encompass all the different senses, uses, possibilities, etc. of a word (its "grammar" he calls it).

But on page 223, knowledge (saying, I know) is most often used by him to mean the certainty people want for their words or other people--the positivist version of knowledge--either as a fixed internal or external thing ('thought' or 'tradition'). Understanding here is I would say more tied to: can follow what they are saying (the point; why; where they are coming from, etc.) We might not be able to say what a clarinet sounds like (#78), what a game is (#75), but we can demonstrate that we understand those things (are familiar with, can be said to; e.g., give examples, compare to a flute, etc.) He is not using a definition of understanding nor does understanding consist of one thing.

I think you need to provide more support for this reading. Why couldn't it be another example of "the convincing expression of a conviction"? Or something else? — Luke

There are other ways this sentence could be used, yes, but that doesn't mean I have to refute all of them (that it is any of those). The reading is internally coherent and based on the textual evidence. I realize it might be hard to see/accept, but I have pointed out the comparative examples, his actual statements about how he uses facts, his use of them elsewhere, the impact to the rest of the text, and the parallel structure to the previous sentence (if you switch the clause) that highlights the comparison:

"I cannot know what is going on in him"

"We could not understand a lion if it talked."

The first is a refusal, the second is an impossibility.

Is there (do you have) another way (attempt) to account for all of this evidence? The statement is not enigmatic if you accept and focus on its use. It is a "very general fact[ ] of nature (Such facts as mostly do not strike us because of their generality)” #143. Could he have used a simpler fact? Yes. Could it maybe not have been from an imagined world? Maybe. Is he goading the positivist? Maybe he feels this stark contrast, however fantastical, would be shocking enough for people to reassess the need to have a fixed referent.

Wittgenstein isn't the easiest philosopher to get a handle on and "if a lion could talk" is one of his more enigmatic statements. — Luke

I would say that the point of putting this fact here is enigmatic, but that's my whole discussion (start with letting go of the assumption that this is used as the kind of "statement" philosophy historically defines--say, a claim based on a theory). I will also say that it is illustrative of Witt's method of looking at the use of language, which is indicative of Ordinary Language Philosophy--is this a threat? an apology? a refusal? a plea?

I'm also curious about the other parts of your discussion title re: qualia and forms of life which you said little about in your OP. — Luke

I do mention those in the post, but they come from a viewpoint based on a desire for certainty basically. If you want to be able to fix words or speech to something inside the brain (ideas, thoughts, mental occurrences; what has been termed 'qualia') then hanging onto that makes it hard to shift to seeing the motivation for that, which Witt is pointing out. So some, out of the same desire, have latched onto his term of Forms of Life, as a communal agreement, or a type of rule, that ensures the meaning of words. I would need maybe a little more to understand where you're getting hung up, or what you are interested in discussing, but I appreciate the consideration.

First, it is not made as a claim nor said as a statement to be considered (which are obviously within its possibilities of sense). This is a lesson in how words (sentences) can be used in specific ways. The use of this statement is as a fact, to be contrasted with the conviction, or the strangeness of traditions. Let me put it another way: if a lion talked, we would no longer understand it to be a lion. We can of course understand lions, say, study them. But, yes, this is simply meant to be an uncontested fact, used for comparison. The choice (conviction) regards the other (person).

I'm wondering what text you read to take him to believe effect outweighs intention; not that I feel you're wrong, but I'm curious. J.L. Austin and Stanley Cavell say intention only comes into a situation when something goes wrong or unexpected. As in: "did you intend (mean) to do that?" Or, "did you intend to stop that robber?" The effect might "outweigh" that because the effect could be anticipated from the act--it is one of the expected outcomes, so why ask what they "intended"?

I've read it all twice and thought about it. You may be right that the sentence needs to be read in context, but I don't understand the context. — Daemon

Maybe try not to think of it so much as an argument with a thesis as a reading to put you in a certain perspective to a certain history of philosophy (particularly positivism). Maybe start with trying to see the purpose of the lion-quote on this page: as a fact to contrast against the rest of the paragraphs (within all the possibilities it could be taken or used--within its 'grammar' Witt would say, or the 'sense' of it used here), and then work backwards, as the ripple-effects begin with that sentence and go deeper, contrasted to other mis-readings.

(I hadn't "replied" to your post, so you may not have seen this)

Hi Antony, I've given it my best shot and got nowhere really. I respect your wish to have a particular kind of discussion, so I'm going to express my views about Wittgenstein in a new thread. — Daemon

Well, I'm sorry to hear that you don't feel you can contribute, and for my flippancy. I'm not sure the "particular kind of discussion" I'm suggesting should preclude much, but, if you want to talk about something entirely different, than, yes, another thread would be appropriate (I hope you will tag me with it, or however that works). Of course, if you simply disagree, I'm willing to hear why; or if it's just confusion, I'll take any questions you have. Thank you in any event for reading it, twice.

Note: In responding, I want to point out that all the quotes being responded to are Wittgenstein’s (not mine)—I'll underline those; and use quotes from Mmw’s response. Also, labeling Witt’s sentences as “Thesis” is not exactly accurate. These are not claims to true statements (similar to the point I’m making about the lion-quote). He is not advancing a theory. He is trying to get us to change our perspective on an historical philosophical picture, imagine a different view of our terms and beliefs and framework (paradigm Kuhn might say).

"Thesis:"
All this would be guessing at thoughts; and the fact that it does not actually happen does not make thought any more hidden than the unperceived physical proceedings.

Antithesis: What does not actually happen? — Mww

As a Ordinary Language Philosopher, Witt creates imagined scenarios to flesh out the consequences of people’s beliefs (here, roughly, the belief in something internal connected to words as meaning). In this case, the examples above this quote, of guessing at thoughts, are the situations or circumstances that may not actually happen in ordinary life.

I ask a guy to assign meaning to a language he doesn’t understand mandates a mutually perceived physical proceeding… There is nothing to hide so it being hidden is superfluous. — Mww

The “unperceived physical proceedings” are the writing and the jig-saw puzzles, etc.—which are hidden in the sense of, away from view. The point is those are analogous to the confused picture of something hidden, internally, “Qualia”, meaning, some mental occurrence. This is not to say people are see-through (it can be hidden privately, as I’ve said). I think maybe having decided a picture/theory/belief already, may be getting in the way of understanding the terms (words) and how Witt is relating them to each other in the different paragraphs, which do not stand alone.

Still, it must be the case that he [the other whose thoughts we are trying to guess] thinks something — Mww

No; it’s not the case (do you always think? do you always think before you speak?). Witt’s point is ‘thinking’ in the sense I believe you are using it (that it is (always) connected to speaking; as ’meaning’ is believed to be connected to words, like a definition) is a picture created from a desire to force the issue, as I discussed in the post. One confusion is maybe the belief that ’thinking’ can only be meant one way; consider: deliberating, reflecting, imagining, formulating, etc. And how words work is not for us to “assign” (usually), say internally. Try to compare pre-determined ‘meaning’ to asking someone after they have said something, “What did you mean?” or someone saying, “I didn’t mean that I was thinking about it in that I hadn’t made a decision, I was just considering your feelings first”. Examine in the text how he points out that I could tell what you intended (‘mean’) before you do (see below)—and this is not to read your mind or guess some ever-present thoughts (or physical situation) connected to your actions and speech.

…the thought… must have happened, and is only hidden from me, to whom it did not happen, but cannot be hidden from the guy from whom I’m asking a meaning be given. — Mww

Again, the idea is not an internal occurrence. If you change the picture of thinking, we can know what someone is thinking, for example, as intending: (“she’s going to eat that donut”), even when the person is blind to it themselves (“she says she’s not an alcoholic, but she’s going to drink again”). Ordinary Language Philosophy, like Witt, is about unpacking these words philosophers use (‘knowledge’ ‘thinking’ ‘meaning’) to see them in an ordinary context, and the variety in sense they have, in order to examine the motivations for pushing them into the boxes philosophy has historically.
—————-

"Thesis:"
If I see someone writhing in pain with evident cause I do not think: all the same, his feelings are hidden from me.

Given the evident cause, I immediately grant him the objective reality of being hurt — Mww

I think you’re on the right track with the rest of what you wrote; Witt’s immediate point is: why would we start with doubt backed up by a picture of some hidden occurrence? but the further point, I discuss in the post, is that we do not have to grant the other their pain—we can ignore the person on the street; treat a slave as less than human, etc. The “a posteriori judgement” is not immediate or given, say, apart from us (maybe let go of “objective” and “real”).

I can and I do think, mediately, all the same, his feelings are necessarily hidden from me, in that the causality of his representations are not contained in the physical representations of them. — Mww

The idea of causality is part of the picture of meaning being taken apart here. Is it continual? ever-present? always accessible? There could be no ‘cause’ nor any ‘pain’; he could be faking, acting, etc. And, oppositely, why can’t the “cause of his representations” be contained in the physical? “He is in pain—it looks like a heart attack.” “He’s not in pain—that scream is too forced to be real.” And if I understand what you mean by “error of modality”, things like intention, attitude, etc. are ordinarily discussed after the fact, rather than always determined prior to an act; and, as the general theme of the PI, the modalities (“grammar” he says) are different for every type of action. Maybe I have those terms wrong of course; not my specialty.

—————

"Thesis:"

"I cannot know what is going on in him" is above all a picture. It is the convincing expression of a conviction. It does not give the reasons for the conviction. They are not readily accessible.

Antithesis:
If I know, or if I do not know, something, I must have reasons. And they must be accessible to me, otherwise the knowledge is quite empty. — Mww

Again, take a look at re-thinking ‘know’ and ‘reason’. If you know something it might make sense to ask HOW you know, or maybe in what way you know something, but would it (always?) make sense to ask what my ‘reason’ is for knowing something? maybe “I know what year I was married because it’s my password.” but ,e.g., “No reason; I must have heard it somewhere.” But is that knowledge “empty”? To me it is nothing, but maybe to the other person it is the answer to the crossword they were killing themselves for.

Knowledge can be defined as a judgement valid because its ground is objectively necessary. That which goes on in him is subjective in him, hence inaccessible objectively in me, therefore I am justified in claiming I cannot know of it. These are my readily accessible reasons derivable from a definition. — Mww

Knowledge could be defined like that, but it is not its only sense; “I’m in pain!” “Okay, okay! I know you’re in pain. Just wait, I have to get the top off this Tylenol.” This is an acknowledgment that the other person is in pain (“I [am acknowledging] you’re in pain”). Scientific knowledge can be facts (grounded in method); knowledge can be skill (“I know how to take apart a Chevy engine.”), etc. And it is the reasons for the decision not to know their pain that are not accessible, but, importantly, “readily”, say, without asking. We may be a psychopath, we may have seen them suffer so much we are numb, etc. The reason for the “picture” is that positivism wants to secure knowledge of the other, or deny its possibility, in order to avoid our responsibility for them, answer to/for them.

A conviction can be defined as a judgement valid because its ground is objectively sufficient. I am certainly authorized to say what goes on in him is objectively sufficient, under the condition that he and I are both the same kind of rational intelligence, in that I allow him the same ground for his as I require for mine.* * * “I need reasons for my convictions if I cannot arrive at knowledge from conviction alone. — Mww

My understanding is a conviction is just another word for belief, although “strongly held”; one way to see it might be that we have to stand for our beliefs, where knowledge can be said to be apart from our relationship to it. “I hold the belief you’re not in pain strongly, against any attempt to plead with me to see it.” or “I didn’t know he was in pain, there was no evidence.” And if you don’t have an ‘objectively sufficient judgment’, can you not know their pain? (Sympathize with it, recognize it, etc.) Witt might say the belief (conviction) in your criteria of reason shuts your eyes to seeing a wider world. That belief is a “convincing picture” because it preys on our doubt and our desire to avoid the other (and ourselves), say, behind objective rationality.

And, yes, I would suggest reading the text as one piece rather than singular statements (to be refuted), and I hope that my post is worth more than just anti-thesis.

You may be right that the sentence needs to be read in context, but I don't understand the context. — Daemon

By context, I mean the textual context--its use in relation to the rest of the language around it.

Yes .

I would go with Emerson (a pastor) who Nietschze mirrored. Also, taking up N.'s focus on seeing the context of an actual moral moment that can't be decided ahead of time by morality or rationality, but must be decided by a human, and the conditions of that, might be best taken up with modern Ordinary Language Philosophy like Stanley Cavell's readings of Nietschze.

I’m interested in the connection between: how to govern, with: understanding our discourse. As if finding out what mattered, how it matters, how it is lost or abandoned, allows even the possibility to do what is right. An epistemology not of knowledge or morality to lead the republic, but of method, understanding the conditions of our consent and agreement.

@creativesoul: I’m thinking of the structure of current political/social discourse in the framework of analytical philosophy, so, unlike a continental position, I wouldn’t say the content of the event or topic would matter specifically—maybe, where people appear to disagree but also seem to be talking past each other? the sense of impossibility of agreement? can philosophy account for the disappointments of our democracy?