@Banno @Ludwig V @javi2541997 @Ciceronianus @frank @Richard B @Janus @creativesoul

Lecture X: skipping seven pages in, past the Ayer/Carnap muck, we finally get to the truth. @Banno or others will be better at telling this story, but, traditionally, I would assert something (“The tree is green”) and the assertion is true if the fact is correct, thus all the worry about whether we can be sure that the tree is really green, that we see it (“perceive” it) correctly. Also, some will claim that only a certain type of sentence can be true or false, thus the “assertion” (or “proposition”).

Austin will claim that it is neither the form of the sentence that makes it capable of being true or false nor on what it is even claiming (its “meaning”) because the truth will “turn on… the circumstances in which it is uttered.”(p.111) If you and I are looking at a tree, and you say “The tree is green”, I could say “No [that’s false], Aspens are green, that’s a Maple, it’s brown.” But, if you say, “I meant the leaves.” I would admit “Okay, sure [that assertion is true (however banal).]” But now when you say “It just seemed too cold for leaves not to have turned yellow.” I might see what you describe, and say “Huh [that’s true].” And that is not a true fact, but an acknowledgement of the remark, and based only on a vague calculation of fall.

A tree falling

May I gently point out that there seems to be a typo here. There is a member called "LUDVIG" on this site, but that isn't me, but you were quoting me. I wouldn't want to miss something. — Ludwig V

I tried to tag everyone doing the reading when I wrote up my notes on a section; you have been spared all that. Not them.

@Banno @Ludvig @Corvus @javi2541997 @Ciceronianus @frank @Richard B @Janus @creativesoul

Just to loop back to Lec. VIII where Austin countered Ayer in saying an illusion was a case where we see something where something else is, in Lec. IX Austin directly addresses that we can choose which way to say what we “see” (p. 99), which doesn’t depend on “my” perception but on what needs to be pointed out given the situation—our “interest in this aspect or that of the total situation” (p. 100). This differs from philosophy’s fixation that there must be a universal chair for all particulars, rather than at times that we have different interests in how we judge a chair to be a chair. And so, “…there will sometimes be no one right way of saying what is seen…”, not a “surface” or a sense-data. Or, as @Ludvig puts it: “it isn't clear that there is any description that is truly neutral” perhaps forgetting that there is always a context for a case. I will only point out that at other times there will be a right way of saying what is seen.

I also find it fascinating that Austin recognizes Wittgenstein’s work on seeing an aspect of something, “see…as…” as Austin says, though only allowing it for “special cases”. Not as empathetic as Wittgenstein I think, for whom seeing an aspect is part of treating a person as if they have a soul (PI, p.178), or seeing (acknowledging) the aspect of them as a person writhing in pain p.223.

Last time, swear

So here's a question for anyone who cares to delve deeper. That [we can’t see material objects and so only see sense data] seems to me to be the argument in Foundations, found on pp 24-25. If not that argument, then which? — Banno

Well, you are right that he does try to make it a “linguistic issue” “because [ordinary language] is not so good an instrument as the sense-datum language for our special purposes” Foundations p. 25 (emphasis added) And so the “purpose” forces the argument, thus “it is useful [in looking at how our experiences relate to what we say about things to] refer to the contents of our experiences independently of the material things that they are taken to present.” P.26 So the “purpose” here is to remove our statements to be “independent” from judgment to particular cases. Having removed ourselves from the “empirical propositional” and only relying on different methods of “descriptions”, “we cannot properly claim that it is either true or false.” I think this is why Austin characterizes it as being able to say anything you want, but what I take Ayer to be doing is abstracting the discussion from a factual one so we are always correct, despite it only being about our description, with the actual goal that we are never wrong about what we see (sense-data).

We could just refer to color and shape as a thing’s color and shape (thus the reticence to “abstract” from them to anything else as unnecessary); our interest in them (what we judge them for) is how we identify, count, compare, etc., and so we could investigate the mechanics and criteria of those practices in various contexts. However, no thanks.

The Cambridge Dictionary definition is "existing as an idea, feeling, or quality, not as a material object". This, to me, fits with, for example, Austin's insistence that not everything is a material object. Numbers would be an prime example. The Cambridge Dictionary gives, truth, beauty, happiness, faith and confidence as examples of abstractions. I have always understood properties like colour and shape to be abstractions — Ludwig V

Well, we could play a little at ordinary language philosophy and see if there are any actual distinctions but don’t we see here at least a related problem because of the use of “material object” as a contrast, when that term is the unattainable maguffin that has left us with “appearance” and “indirect perception”?

I would take an “idea” as an abstraction solely because it is, or can be, removed as my expression “Hey, that was my idea!” This is tied perhaps to a sense of problem-solving.

I’m not sure a feeling counts. This sounds suspiciously like it is in contrast to reason, as “emotive” to the positivists; somehow turned into a value.

Again, quality makes me nervous of its philosophical sense (as “real” was to be a quality), but quality is of course a measure of attainment, and so the goal (refined metal) or standard (of a specimen of horse) is abstracted in order to be standardized, though metal has science, and husbandry has breeding.

Numbers are the ultimate example. If math and science weren’t so successful, philosophy would never have gotten dragged off course so much trying to be like it. So, of course, the most important thing missing from math is us.

Truth and beauty are measured by standards; I’m pretty sure we don’t measure happiness (except in being petty). I want to say faith is more like resolve than opinion so I don’t think that counts, along with confidence, which is more like knowing a skill, though I imagine it could affect one’s general demeanor (or head size).

I know too much to want to get into color and shape here (I take it back, can we call them qualities and be done with it?)

I think that abstraction and generalization (which, despite Berkeley, I do not think are the same thing) are also sources of truth. So let's not over-generalize about it. Pragmatism is probably the best policy here. — Ludwig V

Of course there are legitimate cases where applications of generalization are more useful than specificity. This comes from the sense applied to multiple objects: classification, inferences from particular observations, etc., which is what Austin is doing. But here I am talking about generalization from a single case or two (in the sense of without objects). Abstraction is a harder practice to justify. Not taking into consideration multiple examples (the practice in multiple situations, contexts), as it were, of how things "are" (as Dewey might say I believe), is to intellectually theorize separate from actual cases (an event with attendant circumstances). So I would need an example (or two) of when abstraction is actually a good or useful process.

What I think differentiates these practices in philosophy is that they come from the desire for absolute certainty or universal truth as Austin discusses in Lec. X. (p. 104). In order to be universal, we necessarily must abstract from the particulars. In order to have a standard of certainty like direct perception, we must generalize our perception of every object from a case which works that way (direct perception of at least sense-data).

@Banno @Ludvig @Corvus @javi2541997 @Ciceronianus @frank @Richard B @Janus @creativesoul

Lecture IX: The smack-down that Austin gives Ayer here seems almost uncanny (@Banno even feels Ayer might be misrepresented). And so how is Austin able to claim this kind of logical necessity? Take Ayer’s example when “I see a stick which looks crooked”. (P.87) Ayer wants to make this a special kind of “seeing”, but Austin says that what this ”shows” us is “that what looks crooked may not really be crooked.” almost as if it were a rule (P.88). He says this is something “we all know”, but then who are “we”? and what do we “know”? Isn’t it everyone who knows how “looks” works, in its sense of “seems”? Is there anyone who would deny the implication? Though perhaps there is a moment where it hasn’t yet dawned on you, but then you realize it (maybe with a slap to the head, as it seems obvious now), maybe if it were emphasized “I see a stick which looks crooked”, and then it is a given to accept the unspoken implication, as if it were simply a continuation of the sentence, “[but I don’t know that it is crooked or just seems that way]” and there might be other implications that we could acknowledge apply here, as “[until I get more evidence, look at it closer, differently].” So then ask yourself, say @Corvus, how these “just words” have now become, undeniable?

@Banno @Ludvig @Corvus @javi2541997 @Ciceronianus @frank @Richard B @Janus @creativesoul

Continuing from p.80 in Lecture VIII, Ayer admits that the criteria he values most is that of prediction. I have here and elsewhere asserted that the claim to objectivity or universality or purity or Ayer’s “directness” is based on the desire to have a reliable, predetermined, complete, independent standard, like math, that allows us to have outcomes that are predictable (thus the clamor for something like science, the facts of which are based on repeatability). For example, we want a moral rule or goal so that we don’t have to be good, we can just do what has been determined is good, and thus we are absolved because we can just claim, “I followed the rule!”

The desire to anticipate the implications of our actions is also a motivation for a general explanation. If there is anything Austin is good at, it is showing that abstraction is the death of truth. It seems clever to find one criteria to judge everything by (true or false? Real or not?) because it doesn’t change, which makes for predictable outcomes. But a general account also flattens out distinctions, which are exactly what will inform us of what might happen in a particular instance.

Shouldn’t type while biking

@Banno perhaps it could be said that the picture of a real world we would describe, merely mitigated by sense-data, limits itself only to a description of the difference of the relations between that data (p.80), and thus is just another version of the descriptive fallacy. Too early to tell as the “difference in relations” is so far unexplained and Austin does seem more concerned that the judgment is based on prediction.

Actually, if you are saying that perhaps in this context "real" and "unreal" are more important than "true" or "false", I think you may have a point. After all, part of the problem is that it seems that everything we want to describe can be equally well described in sense-datum language and in ordinary (natural) language. So truth/falsity is arguably not the issue. — Ludwig V

What I was trying to say is that Austin's goal here, as elsewhere, is to show that there are more considerations (criteria) and situations than philosophy takes into account. However, as he hints at earlier, which I mention here, I do think he is (or will be) concerned here also with truth, what Ayer refers to as "veridical", and, though I might grant we can describe things within the picture of sense-datum and on our ordinary terms (these are not a matter of "language"), I think Austin's point will be that there is a right and wrong, perhaps based on what doing those "well" consists of, or that we are not aware of, or do not get, "everything we want". This remains to be seen of course.

Fail #327

I've never even heard of her. Who is she? Is she a suitable life model for a ancient retired male WASP philosopher? — Ludwig V

Disregard entirely.

Get Plan B in place and then get on with it. — Ludwig V

You've been watching too much Amy Schumer.

I think I'll wait and see what happens in VIII — Ludwig V

Once you've read it, here's a link to my take so far. I haven't written up my notes past page 80.

@Banno @Ludvig @Corvus @javi2541997 @Ciceronianus @frank @Richard B

As a pedagogical point, are folk here mostly familiar with speech act theory? — Banno

I think this essay addresses the issue in its own way, though perhaps less directly. I think it is important to note that acts that perform something are merely an example of a way that something has the import ("value") to us that we want of truth (judgment, necessity, implications, etc.), without their being judged on the criteria we have for true or false, and so "speech acts" are not replacing that standard (answering the same need), nor are a generalized explanation of meaning.

Is Austin anywhere arguing against descriptivism in these lectures? — Banno

In this essay, he is also giving examples, but of how we address "real" without turning it into a metaphysical quality everything has (that we don't "perceive"). As I put this above, Austin is pointing out our sufficient ordinary criteria in order to normalize how we address the situations involving "real" vs. "appearance"; in the instance of the other essay, rather than addressing everything as subject to the question: true or false?

Can you re-assure me that nothing disastrous will happen — Ludwig V

Just assume that terrible things are going to happen at any time, and then when they do happen you won't be surprised. Does that help?

He wants (needs to) rule that distinction out [between appearance and reality], (i.e. show that the question "How do you mean?" cannot be answered in this context). But he doesn't quite get that far. — Ludwig V

I don't know what the standard would be to "rule... out" the distinction, but I don't think he wants to say our questions about the world cannot be addressed, and so does not need to show that the position has no meaning. The problem of our skepticism of the world and others is not going away here; Austin is only pointing out our sufficient ordinary criteria in order to normalize how we address these situations (rather than solving it for every case, forever).

What I take him to be doing in Lec VIII is showing there are other types of cases involved in the issue in order to break apart the forced dichotomy of appearance vs. reality, which dictates their definition and mechanics. This widening of cases allows for discussion of appearing and appearance, and reality and what's real, only with the requirements of a context and the ordinary criteria we use in those situations.

@Banno @Ludvig @Corvus @javi2541997 @Ciceronianus @frank @Richard B

Lecture VIII: I first realized here that Austin is very bent out of shape that someone can just "prefer to say" things one way or another, depending on their "preferences" (p.78); which made me look back at words being "invented ad hoc" (p.75), or "fooled around with" (p.62), and his guard against distinctions seeming "arbitrary" (p. 63), and particularly his insistence that some things can be "wrong" (p. 63), leading to:

...if Ayer were right here, then absolutely every dispute would be purely verbal. For if, when one person says whatever it may be, another person may simply 'prefer to say' something else, they will always be arguing only about words, about what terminology is to be preferred. How could anything be a question of truth or falsehood, if anyone can always say whatever he likes? — Austin p. 60

Which makes me consider that one of Austin's motivations, that I grant appear hidden, is to find (or defend) a truth between metaphysical certainty and radical skepticism (which would make his concerns less than trivial). This may come later.

What he does say is that Ayer is fixated on the case where we think something is there but nothing is, which sounds like when philosophy thought that ethics was possible, but determined there was nowhere from which to judge right and wrong (the way it wanted). Leaving that be, Austin counters with the case where we “see something where something else really is.” (Id.) This sounds similar to a case where one thing is limiting our ability to pick out another, say, seeing the cross-pieces of a window as a swastika (PI, #420). Austin also points out cases where “something is or might be taken to be what it isn’t really.” (P.80) This error comes from the possibility to focus/judge on parts of a thing ("aspects" Wittgenstein will say) for which there are criteria (thought of by philosophy as "particulars", or, here, "my perception"), and thus, as he points our here, the possibility to be fooled sometimes in the process. The fact there are certain public possibilities, is why “seeing” is not a mental process but is simply recognizing or identifying (“taking” says Austin) something as something, say, seeing a wing as a way for a bird to retain body heat, rather than seeing it as a means of flight. (One could almost say we “perceive” it that way, but this makes it sound like only we can, or know we have.) I’ll leave my thoughts on “general accounts” and “predictive value” for another time.

@Banno @Ludvig @Corvus @javi2541997 @Ciceronianus @frank @Richard B


A p.s. to the reference to ways of distinguishing between dreaming and awaking in Other Minds. I found the quote (p. 87). Based on the surrounding text, I take it that Austin feels that the situation is one that philosophy has removed from the attendant contexts of the two things.

The doubt or question 'But is it a real one?' has always (must have) a special basis, there must be some 'reason for suggesting' that it isn't real, in the sense of some specific way, or limited number of specific ways, in which it is suggested that this experience or item may be phoney. Sometimes (usually) the context makes it clear what the suggestion is... If the context doesn't make it clear, [only] then I am entitled to ask 'How do you mean? .... — Austin, Other Minds, p.87 (emphasis in bold added) this is a link to the text

The fallout here is that asking the question "Am I awake or dreaming?" assumes that we are asking how we "know" if our experience is "real" in situations where we are able to distinguish between the two solely on the difference in the situations (their separate contexts)--Austin puts it rather arrogantly that I am not "entitled" to ask, but he just means it would never come to whether dreaming was a phoney version of being awake. Now, how the situations are different is a matter we could discuss, as I think I have, but that can be elaborated as ordinary, recognized distinctions of the surrounding circumstances.

fail, again

Can you re-assure me that nothing disastrous will happen if I follow the link anyway? — Ludwig V

I am running Safari on an iPad 6 and nothing seems to have gone wrong, but, and here’s a question, how would one know they are hacked when the point is for the hacker not to reveal they are hacking someone?

Did you see this reply?

I take him in the current work only to be pointing out that words can have different import given a context of expectations and shared understandings, rather than assumed to be interchangeable wherever they are until proven otherwise.

I believe Austin may be thinking that we know the concept of dreaming from 'one's own case'. — Richard B

It doesn’t sound like anything I’ve read of his. Even in Other Minds he is debunking Moore’s argument from analogy (I would like to know the page of your quote, as I could not find it). I would say that “the recognized ways of distinguishing” (not “knowing”) dreaming from waking are the criteria for differentiation of the two, one of which I claimed would be that we only remember dreams; another would be we don’t have control over the events of our regular life in the same way. I also think it bears pointing out that “recognized” is meant: by society, and is not a conscious acknowledgement or reasoned application of criteria. Our lives ordinarily happen as a matter of course and our criteria are only applied when there is something unexpected, “phishy”, “phoney” as Austin says. I believe I gave some examples of those circumstances above as well.

The quote by Wittgenstein is very easy to take in multiple ways. But, if our “descriptions” are the outward criteria, then there doesn’t need to be anything “inner” in the sense of something I know. Wittgenstein calls them “expressions” because I am in no better position to “describe” (or know) something than you are (I may be blind to myself, or say something that reveals more about me than I realize). This may be, of course, off the topic of Austin, other than he is also discussing criteria, and it does have a fallout for what processes are “inner”.

mulligan

I don't think it's a dismissal of Austin to fail to see anything of metaphysical import — frank

We're getting off the rails. I thought you were dismissing my claim that Austin "is providing evidence of how the world works." Thus my bolded quote where he is making claims about how the world works. As far as metaphysics goes, I'm not sure what you mean by that term. He's dismantling metaphysics (in all its hydra-head of forms), not trying to substitute an answer to the same skepticism.

We're approaching a point of difference, perhaps, in that for me, there is a place, if not for certainty, then at the least for confidence in our understanding, a foundation found in the very actuality of these considerations. We are not utterly adrift. I'm not sure you will agree. — Banno

I do, but--and this is Cavell reading Wittgenstein, so I'll keep it short--there is knowledge, and then there is our relation to that knowledge, to our criteria. You may know the right thing to do, but not do it, but then you are responsible for doing so. We may have confidence in our criteria, but we still have to live our lives by them, or not. Pure (only) knowledge is the attempt to remove any doubt, thus the possibility of human failing, remove the need for "our bond".

"'Real or not?' does not always come up, can't always be raised. We do raise this question only when, to speak rather roughly, suspicion assails us--in some way or other things may be not what they seem; and we can raise this question only if there is a way, or ways, in which things may be not what they seem. — Austin p.69 (my emphasis in bold)

You'd have to give me some reason how this is not claiming evidence of how things are or are not done, or when they can be. — Antony Nickles

What metaphysical truth do you see in that? — frank

I was responding to what seemed like your dismissal that Austin:

"is providing evidence of how the world works, — Antony Nickles

I really didn't see him as doing that at all..."

Does it make sense now?

@Banno @Ludwig V (Below, I'm trying to capture that there is something to the sense that metaphysics (and skepticism) seem to follow the criteria that Austin sets out for real or not.)

Nevertheless, the truth about metaphysics is that it comes from philosophy's desire to generalize the question "Real or not?" onto everything, thus making "real" a quality of the entire world, as opposed to mediated; or objective as opposed to subjective, or appearance as opposed to universal, etc. In Austin's words, metaphysics was manufactured to answer the question whether the entire world "may not be what it seems", "raised" out of our fear ("suspicion", skepticism) that it is true. The remaining criteria (a must) of Austin's is "there is a way, or ways, in which things [the whole world] may be not what they seem [it seems]." p. 69 I'm not sure how that plays out.

@Banno @Ludvig @Corvus @javi2541997 @Ciceronianus @frank @wonderer1@Janus @Richard B

People do seem to have picked up the puzzle about why, if Austin wants to deny reality, he doesn't just come out with it. He seems to dance around the question with marginal and trivial comments on how the word "real" is used, and so forth. I think someone should at least try to explain why. — Ludwig V

I did try to explain here and here why Austin and Wittgenstein do not overtly argue for a certain case. What it comes down to is that the authority of their claims, about these examples, is only as much as you are willing to grant in seeing for yourself (finding your own reasons perhaps), say, about what Austin is claiming about how "real" works (and thus how "reality" does not**). This shift in perspective is so radical that it is possible to fight someone "too close in" where you are engaging on their terms, instead of continually leaving the door open that they might see the bigger picture, despite that we are "inclined" to just give up (PI, #217). What it takes to see the point is not adopting an opinion, understanding an argument, but changing your "attitude" (perspective, as position with respect to) or the "aspect" you see Wittgenstein will say, perhaps by even seeing what you thought you wanted in a new light (your "real need") and, in a sense, changing who you are.

One point, however, is that we all want to get at the truth, find (explicate) something illuminating about ourselves and the world. So we can say that a claim does not make sense; that we can't (yet, hopefully) figure out what sense it has, but to say it is "meaningless" is to imply that it shouldn't be meaningful to those who propose it (though I understand your point is logical Ludwig), which not only could be taken that we are dismissing "them", but that we are refusing to understand their reasons for making the argument they do (which I am guilty of). Austin crosses this line more cruelly than Wittgenstein, who is actually investigating why he wanted the kind of answers he sought in the Tractatus.

marginal and trivial comments on how the word "real" is used — Ludwig V

Again, we are trivializing the import of these claims in mistaking that they are about how "words" are "used". He is making claims about how we actually (in the world) judge whether things are real or not; he is using these examples to draw out the criteria for it and the mechanics of it. I'm not sure how I can explain this another way unless someone explains what there is not to understand. (Not turning spade... not turning spade...)

p.s.** Austin does not get into the cases of when we do want to address "reality", as in something someone is avoiding, what you encounter in being naive, in insulting someone's hope as just a fantasy, etc.

I really didn't see him as doing that at all. Interesting how differently two people can read the same paragraphs, huh? — frank

'Real or not?' does not always come up, can't always be raised. We do raise this question only when, to speak rather roughly, suspicion assails us--in some way or other things may be not what they seem; and we can raise this question only if there is a way, or ways, in which things may be not what they seem. — Austin p.69 (my emphasis in bold)

You'd have to give me some reason how this is not claiming evidence of how things are or are not done, or when they can be.

Do you mean if everyone believed in God, that would make him real? — frank

I'm not sure you've read Sec. VII, where Austin claims that we only ask "Real or not?" in the case of something in particular (p. 68-69). So the question "Is God real?" would be framed "Is that a real god?", and then we would apply the criteria for gods, such as, perhaps, do people believe in its power, its truth, or is it just an idol. Another way to come at it would be to question, when we ask "Is God real?", what criteria do we apply? what would be the basis for our judgment? in what situation are we asking this question? (to a priest? to ourselves?) Obviously you are thinking of specific criteria without considering, also, if "real" in this case is a different sense, and thus subject to different criteria.

I just disagree that there are metaphysical truths we can pull out of the way we speak. It's frequently difficult to even pin point how our speech refers, much less discover great truths in grammar. — frank

Maybe you are not taking seriously Austin's "cannot" and "wrong" and "facts" and the distinctions he points out. He comes off as arrogant, but he is providing evidence of how the world works, so, unless you can argue with his examples (by saying, "no that's not the way it works"), I don't see how, reasonably, you can categorically "just disagree" with his conclusions--this isn't about opinions. One "metaphysical truth" or implication from Austin's examples is that our speech does not "refer", in the same way there is nothing "direct" for us to "perceive" or not. But I'll leave you to feel however you'd like.

So if everyone says "God created the world in six days", would that reflect the mechanics of how the world actually works? — frank

You're thinking of "the world" as not including origin stories, mythology, religious belief, etc. That there is, for example, nothing meaningful to anyone about having the world be created. This is an example of judgment by one standard, e.g. what is "real".

re-thinking

I can't avoid the suspicion that... the arc expressed here is not as explicit as you make it seem. — Banno

Where Wittgenstein is enigmatic and full of questions, I think Austin takes too much for granted that we will see the implications of what he is doing, and so I do think part of the effort has to be making explicit why he is pointing out what he does (apart from just eviscerating Ayer's position). I find the offhand comments to be the most important almost.

My hope was not to bring Cavell's interests and conclusions into this reading of Austin, but I have let myself be goaded (with all this dismissive talk of "just language" and "quibbling") into expanding on the reasons why philosophy wants something like Ayer's "solution", which is how Cavell sees Wittgenstein going further than what seems like Austin simply refuting Ayer.

I should resolve myself to just doing my reading and responding to those doing the same, but I always hope there is some possibility of getting through to people if I could just say the right thing. But how do you help with this, where the whole picture and every word in it is either confused or wrong. It makes me think Austin is even more of a genius because he can make sense of Ayer.

Method, more specifically, I think (the method of "inquiry"). — Ciceronianus

My Dewey is rusty; "method" rings a bell now. I leave it to you to draw those distinctions at some point.

I don't think there are much in the way of metaphysical implications from Austin, do you? He's just pointing out the way we speak. — frank

This is a common misconception. I don't think Austin does himself any favors by saying he is just examining "sense perception" and not directly explaining the implications of what he is doing, and then just jumping into examples. For one, his critique of Ayer is an example of a larger philosophical issue, which includes metaphysics. "The case of 'universal' and 'particular', or 'individual', is similar in some respects though of course not in all." (p.4 fn1) And, also, Austin is denying there is "reality" (directly addressing the metaphysical), which Ayer is arguing we just don't have direct access to (p. 3 and Lec. VII -- I discuss that here).

I address the underestimation of Austin, as just "pointing out the way we speak", here above, but the gist of it is that the things we say (or could say) in situations reflect the criteria we use in judging a thing, and the mechanics of how the world actually works. What we say when talking about "real" are an expression of what matters to us about it, what we count as applicable, how mistakes are corrected, etc.

@Banno @Ludvig @Corvus @javi2541997 @Ciceronianus @frank @wonderer1@Janus @Richard B

There is an additional aspect to this desire for certainty. It is the tendency to universalize. Admittedly not everything is certain (sometimes our sense deceive us), but equally not everything is uncertain (sometimes our senses do not deceive us). — Ludwig V

Absolutely. Reacting to the fact that we can't know ahead of time when and how we will make mistakes, be deceived, be judged for not doing the right thing, come to an impasse with others, etc. pushes us towards the vision that we only see "our perception" or only "particular" parts of a chair, i.e., that our relation to the world is always mitigated. The desire for "purity" as Wittgenstein puts it, or "certainty" as Cavell terms it, results in the abstraction from individual cases, turning the state of our situation into an intellectual "problem" which we want to solve universally (beforehand), for any case, so we will never be wrong again, not have to be responsible for our errors and moral duty.

This is why Austin is giving us an overview** of the case-specific actions we can take to reconcile (after the fact) the issues that skepticism takes as simply a failure of knowledge, to show that the individual case is not a weakness, but a strength, as the mechanics work better given the details of the particular, rather than the abstraction to a universal.

**Wittgenstein also investigates examples of the universalization of philosophical issues (rules, others, mental processes, etc.) by showing us a "clear view" of specific "intermediate cases" (see quote below) so we might see how our ordinary criteria are sufficient, precise, etc. despite our disappointment that they can't keep us out of trouble. "A main source of our failure to understand is that we do not command a clear view of the use of our words.—Our grammar is lacking in this sort of perspicuity. A perspicuous representation produces just that understanding which consists in 'seeing connexions'. Hence the importance of finding and inventing intermediate cases. PI, #122.

phhfttt, fail