Wittgenstein is deeply time-bound in a way that Plato is not. In my estimation no one will read Wittgenstein 50 years hence. Part of it is that Plato's method is better at pulling people in and appealing to a broad audience, but that is part of his magic. — Leontiskos

I agree that Plato’s writing is better and more engaging. Witt is abrasive and speaking only really to hardcore analytic philosophers. My hope is that philosophy learns what it should from Witt and can move forward, though I don’t see that happening for the most part currently, probably because the desire he finds, for certain generalized answers, has always (timelessly) been unavoidably seductive to philosophy (e.g., Plato’s abstraction).

Do you realize why both the Tractatus and the PI come off as infinitely arrogant? — schopenhauer1

Well you hit the nail on the head with this. Unapologetically arrogant. And, on the face of it, inexplicably so. It comes off as personality, but there is something to be said. In the Tract he had a desire and an imposed standard for every statement. He would only say what he could be sure of, certain about (a la Descartes)—so it has a dictatorial ring. What he learns through the PI is that this singular requirement (before starting; an imposed pre-requisite) of what he would allow himself to state, narrowed his topics and what he would see/could say. In the PI, instead of imposing a requirement, he is looking first (investigating) for the requirements (criteria) that already exist, each different, for each individual example (their grammar/transcendental conditions, e.g., of: following a rule, seeing, playing a game, guessing at thoughts, continuing a series…).

As I’ve said, in first starting with the workings of a practice, he is making claims about them (premises of a sort) that everyone is in a position to judge, and so he, in a sense, speaks for all of us (in Kant’s universal aesthetic voice from the 3rd critique of judgment), as if to say, before each, ‘We would all accept that…’, e.g., “When someone whom I am afraid of orders me to continue the series, I act quickly, with perfect certainty, and the lack of reasons does not trouble me.” (PI # 212) If they are controversial, they are not taken as evidence (PI #128). If you look past the pompous, didactic tone, you can see that you would be able to disagree in each case if you wanted, provide your own scenarios, etc.

They don't show evidence of philosophical insight — Leontiskos

And here Leontiskos is absolutely right. The goal at this point is acknowledgement. Thus why these claims are sometimes called obvious. The insight is the comparison between these claims and the traditional claims made by philosophy. Not that the ordinary grammar is “right”, or solves (or dismisses)
the philosopher’s problems, but the contrast brings to light traditional philosophy’s hidden desires (for “purity”).

Wittgenstein possesses no authority to try to change us — Leontiskos

Again, yes. Despite the look of it, his grammatical claims (premises) do not have any authority except that which you would grant them (accept in them). And these claims in and of themselves change nothing (PI #124).

Wittgenstein is nothing like Socrates. — Leontiskos

Yes, Socrates’ requirements put him in the category of the author of the Tractatus, but the method of the PI is basically the same; thus all the questions by Wittgenstein, the interlocutor, the examination of what anyone might say that we bump into on the street, etc. And Socrates does also ultimately want us to better ourselves through the process of philosophy (it’s not all about true knowledge).

@Sam26 @Leontiskos @Wayfarer @Tom Storm @Joshs

However, if I provide numerous details for a premise I do not make, that is not so much a bad argument, as a bad faith argument. For the adherent to demand then, that you really don't"know" what he's doing, it's "radically different" and "playing on a different turf", then we are already not playing the game. — schopenhauer1

emphasis added

His conclusion would be for you to see what is being pointed out, which in this case involves a shift in perspective, seeing something we may be blind to, avoiding. The difference in outcome though does not excuse Witt from being responsible for evidence (what we imply when we say what, when), in claiming premises that must be acknowledged (the mechanics of an activity), and coming to conclusions (as I discussed above, even about the human condition).

To move us forward, I think the actual problem here is not his lack of “saying something” but more his style of saying it, which, I grant you, comes off as not “saying” anything: being cryptic, cagey, etc. And, worse, that some nevertheless take the text as self-evident anyway, and then cannot provide, as you point out, anything else but the (impotent) words themselves (as if they were patently clear), rather than further elucidation. I would go so far as to grant that anyone is copping-out who refuses to answer (continue) any call for further intelligibility, though, importantly, not only in a required form, even an “answer”** (as if philosophy were only about problems to be solved).

I can only say that he is writing to a particular audience (certain philosophers), as embodied by the Tractatus’ (his previous) rigid, imposed requirement for judging whether we are saying anything. Given this fixated intransigence, he is now (in the PI) resorting to any means necessary to break that death-grip hold for knowledge (certainty) to take our place (the “picture that holds us captive” PI, #115). Thus the questions without answers, the foil of the interlocutor, the riddles, the… indirectness. He is doing this because he feels that philosophy needs to be radically revolutionized, and so his style, as Cavell puts it, “wishes to prevent understanding which is unaccompanied by inner change”, i.e., change from the position we are in (philosophy has been in), our “attitude” (see above), how we judge (our “method”).

…he's playing with different rules and it is somehow UP TO US, to understand his rules. Why?” — schopenhauer1

Again, I would argue he is not asking for, nor does he avoid, “the rules” (evidence, premise, conclusion), but, yes, it is up to us, as it is with any philosopher, to work to get through our assumptions, first impressions, etc., in order to understand the other from “within”, as, in other cases: the place of “forms” to the Good; what “God” is to Descartes; what imperative, categorical, and on-and-on are for Kant. These are not “rules” but grounds for understanding, agreement, shared vision and criteria for judgment. The import of philosophical expressions are much, much less self-evident than I think most take them to be, and, yes, I absolutely think it is up to US to do that work (you would grant that we are not asking to be spoon-fed); more, I would argue this intellectual empathy is the point of philosophy: to better ourselves in seeing the world as a larger place.

Wittgenstein's very point in PI is that we must understand the language of the game in order to understand how to use language. — schopenhauer1

I see here how you maybe take him to be dictating the terms of argument (“…why can't I make the rules, and you go to me?”). I would reframe your paraphrase that he is looking at the language of an activity (“game”), not for us to be allowed to “use language” (or to bar grounds for disagreement) but to understand an activities’ specific rationale. The point being not to normatively police our activities (though some use him this way) but to take the que first from our history (not our desires for knowledge). Thus why Wittgenstein is not outside the tradition as much as cutting across it in a new but rational way.

Which makes this critique so fascinating because the main realization of his investigation is that imposing a standard (the requirement for “crystalline purity”, PI #27), before looking at what matters to a particular activity, limits our ability to see the different yet rational (“truth value”) ways in which the world works—to our issue, including philosophical discourse.

**And, anyway, isn’t a claim to what is or is not a “legitimate form of discourse” to (ironically) guard the gate?

how are we to interpret [“Wittgenstein’s language” (terms)] without recourse to the categories of intention and knowing subjects? — Leontiskos

The same way we interpret other philosophical terms: context, distinction, implication, comparison to other senses of the words, and all our other time-tested practices.

Edit: I think the subject is important in the sense that I am the person that can be held responsible for explaining further (or may try to duck out).

I do think we are circling the gist of the grievance, but you frame it as: “Wittgenstein is either saying something or else he is not.” First, wanting him to just “say something” misses the reason that about half of PI is questions; as I said, questions for you to work out, to change you. But your dichotomy also overlooks the crucial part of who he might be saying it to. Do you mean to say that he is either saying something to you, or he is not saying anything? (Nietzsche felt his audience hadn’t been born yet.) But I do hear the desire to want Witt to, in a sense: just stand still already so one can punch him in the face. Why can’t Witt just take a stand?

Witt isn’t being coy when he confronts us with a riddle like “My attitude towards him is an attitude towards a soul. I am not of the opinion that he has a soul.” P. 178 (emphasis in the original). He is definitely making a claim about the way my position to others works (confronting the classical problem of other minds, for @Shawn and @kindred and @schopenhauer1 to see he actually is addressing history). But he is also forcing you through the wringer because (for some) it must be like an epiphany to see that although we, obviously, can not know (be certain) about another, we do not, because of that fact, fall back onto opinion, or other well-worn lessor ideas of knowledge, like: belief, or emotion, or “subjectivity”, or, with respect @Joshs, theoretical interpersonal gymnastics (perhaps including “knowing subjects” with “intentions”). We cannot know other minds because our relation to others is not knowledge, but how we treat them, our “attitude” in relation to them, in its sense of: position “towards”. I treat you as if you have a soul. His claim is that is how our relation to others works; that is the categorical transcendental mechanics of it.

Now that’s saying more than something; it’s a revolution in terms, perspective, and frameworks, going back to Plato. And of course he could be wrong. But the disagreement is between two (or more) totally different ways of picturing philosophy and the human condition. Someone just “saying” (stating, telling) something of that nature is going to sound incomprehensible to the other. So, if you want to fight from your own turf, you will feel like he isn’t playing fair. But with any philosopher (worth their salt), if you don’t try to understand them on their terms, your “disagreement” will just be a dismissal without hitting the actual target (thus perhaps the feeling of frustration).

can Witt be wrong, even just in principle? Because the way you describe it, he can’t be wrong, because he’s not making claims.. — schopenhauer1

I’m not sure if this is meant to mean my description (then, where) but I would not say he is not making claims, just claims about the implications of what we say in a situation, such as that with: “I believe it is raining”, that it is in the sense of a hypothesis. Now of course he could be wrong. As Austin could be wrong about the functioning of an excuse in connection with an action. But, given the acceptance of those claims, his conclusions (more, the import he draws from the example) are meant to have you realize something, see something in a new way, so claiming it is “wrong” might be missing the point. You might already admit it without seeing any importance, not be moved to change your attitude (perspective), deny that you (must) see it that way (despite the evidence, and even without providing any countering evidence), but “wrong” would imply he’s claiming he is “right”, when what he is doing is, “Hey, did you notice this?”

I guess the question needing answered here is: where does he say something that is wrong? (Perhaps you are right.)

many of the ‘analyticals’ are really pretty rigid in their concentration on ‘language games’ and the like and they often use the famous last words of the Tractatus to stifle discussion of what I consider significant philosophical questions. — Wayfarer

This is a shame. I do not find as important what he is telling us (nor what he might be “showing” us), but more the example he sets during his investigation. People tend to “use” Wittgenstein as if he solved skeptical doubt, or otherwise closed the issue, and thus as a normative tool to dictate behavior, which I think is the most egregious of what @schopenhauer1 is getting at.

Do you believe that Wittgenstein can only be refuted by better readings of Wittgenstein or could Wittgenstein just be wrong and refuted thus? — schopenhauer1

But if you’re not doing a thorough reading of a philosopher (pointing to textual evidence, taking into account their terms, etc.), how can you be sure you are refuting “them” and not just how you superficially take them (isolated, on your terms)? If you misinterpret the premise, what point is saying the conclusion is ”wrong”?

How can it be that an approach which claims to privilege the common use of language does not use language in a common way? — Leontiskos

This is off-topic, but yours is a common and understandable question. Witt isn’t “privileging” “common usage”, he is looking at examples of a time and a place when we say something, to see what would be the implied means of deciding about it, like connotations; in order to find the ordinary standards (and situations) for judging that sort of thing (rather than just T/F or justified, etc.). He himself has a bunch of “terms”, like: concept, criteria, grammar, etc.

@Wayfarer @Joshs
One more thing I think is happening sometimes is people take everything Witt writes as if it was a statement, like a claim to knowledge or an argument for the purpose of having a conclusion admitted. But I hear them like conjecture, or even more, like characterizations of remarks, that only lead to asking: “why would we say that?” Or: “look at it in this way”. But the only way to treat a picture like a conclusion is to accept it whole hog, without justification and without means of refuting it, when the picture is just meant to say: “do you see what I see in this (by/for yourself)?”

We do, however, find in the Tractatus a comment about two ways of seeing a cube. (5.5423) — Fooloso4

Interestingly, perhaps, though for another time, as we do in the PI (#139).

Getting someone to see something differently is harder than getting someone to admit something true, because the denial is a shutting out, rather than a disagreement, and apathy is just as sufficient as opposition. But I appreciate the kudos.

[pointless or trivial] is the reciprocal of how their interests are regarded by him. — Wayfarer

Witt can be very dismissive (calling things “nonsense”) and high-handed (unceremoniously judgey), but what he’s interested in is the motivation of the skeptic, not showing them to be wrong or silly, nor merely lost. He takes skepticism seriously, but in seeing its discoveries, not by accepting or refuting its conclusions. Changing someone’s mind, in the sense of an opinion or knowledge—and so a matter of “proof”—is different than turning their head (to look a different way). Goals are not always shared; why isn’t that acceptable?

What is it about SPECIFICALLY Wittgenstein that it elicits the worst forms of elitism and gatekeeping in this forum?… As if you cannot refute Wittgenstein, you can only have varying levels of understanding of Wittgenstein… why is it SPECIFICALLY Wittgenstein where I see this?? — schopenhauer1

I do think this is a thing, for a number of reasons. One is that he can come off as arrogant (Austin even more so). His basic claims are: what the implications are when we say or do a particular thing in a particular setting, such as, that “I believe (it is raining)” works as a hypothesis. Now, he is asserting them for all of us (Kant will call this speaking in a universal voice) but we could disagree by bringing up other examples, further contexts., etc. Now some take these claims as certainty (argued), and echo the claims righteously. But he is only relying on claims he takes as obvious and uncontroversial. What I mean is that we would all have to agree on those claims in order for them to be philosophically relevant. These (grammatical) claims are not everything he states however, and so his conclusions (in the same tone) are taken to be self-evident as well, or in need of no further explanation or possibility of refutation.

But he is not talking about language, as Rorty and @Wayfarer’s Kenneth Taylor take it, he is looking at how we talk, in certain examples (calling out, rule following, pointing, continuing a series, seeing, understanding, and, even, “meaning”/language, but only as another example), because it is a window, a method, in order to see how different things do what they do differently (our criteria for judging can be seen in the ways we talk).

His goal is not to tell us the way the world works, e.g., by way of rules, or that this is how rules work. Initially he is trying to figure out why he got stuck on one solution (in the Tract), when the world works in so many different ways. What he learns first is that our desire for certainty narrows our vision (dictates the form of answer), and so, yes, it is a book about self-knowledge. It aims to show us how our interests affect our thinking.

And although he does not directly address other philosophers (as brought up by @Shawn @Leontiskos @kindred), the big issues are in there; skepticism, essence, knowledge, other minds, determinism, the human condition, ethics, etc. He does not shy from those or dissolve them, nor is he tangential to the analytic tradition. I would put it that some people have particular interests in philosophy, and so take Wittgenstein as pointless or trivial, and some use Wittgenstein to attempt to dictate others’ interests, which is not the point either.

I think we might be assuming a lot without looking around a bit. We seem to be equating “socialism” to entitlement spending (non-discretionary social programs, which equal more than half the budget), but we also “spend” money with the tax code in an attempt to manipulate behavior and redress inequities. We also spend money on government institutions which arguably are socialist, as they defend the best interests of the nation as a whole against the individual or corporations (even, in a sense, education). And we fund utilities that are basically “publicly owned” as their ability to capitalize on shortage and demand is decided by the government. And I don’t know if anyone would consider our discretionary spending (food, transportation, veterans, foreign affairs, etc.) as “socialism” although it is a 1/4 of the budget, which, along with the military and other spending, is half the budget, and thus would need taxes to be paid for by everyone else not getting a UBI (as @BC and @Mikie point to).

Nevertheless, if we are just discussing social programs, really what we are talking about (what all the fuss is over usually) is entitlement spending, which is Medicare/Medicaid and Social Security Income. I assume the idea of a universal income is to equalize the bottom of the income bracket (and not to give everyone a certain amount of money), and so then isn’t SSI basically a kind of UBI already (except only for old people)? Which leaves us with Medicaid and the Affordable Care Act. But in becoming an aggregate supplier for insurance, we are attempting to strong-arm the market through collective bargaining. Now, aside from the argument that that might not be effective, just giving everyone money to pay for healthcare insurance is not being involved in the market at all and would basically amount to paying for universal healthcare insurance, which seems very “socialist”.

Thanks. Austin to the rescue.

@Banno

The answer to this question is not easy. — Sam26

Always a pleasure Sam. Maybe we sometimes project our doubts to create a framework that only accepts an “answer” (and one of a particular kind).

The practice of philosophy is to improve our thinking, ourselves, like: look at the existing practices and don’t generalize; use an example and examine the affects of changing context; “know your limitations” as @Sam26 says; describe the workings of how decisions are weighed; make explicit the criteria and distinctions imbedded implicitly in our practices.

So “trusting our mind” (@Benj96) is not a blind acceptance of ourselves—judging without examining the terms and requirements we bring or impose, or without considering the hidden implications of what we do in what we say (before it pours out of ours mouth immediately to everyone).

To “trust our mind” is to rely on our potential to think better, which is an active striving, not abandoning thinking because it doesn’t give us an "answer" of a certain form, like science; but doing the best investigation we can (not knowing in advance what that will mean in each case); to learn more about the world that does not respond to scientific “objectivity”, which is up to us, personally (not, “subjectively”) in being “willing to reject our beliefs” (@“Sam26") in order to allow the world to come to us, not just be a reflection of ourselves (even our desire that everything be “objective”). As it were:

…to live [analogously to “think”] deliberately,… learn what it [the object or practice of thought (in context)] had to teach…not to practice resignation …but to live deep and suck out all the marrow of [the issue]… rout all that was not [the issue; specifically: us, getting in the way) …to know it by experience …to give a true account of it [as in, true to it]. — Thoreau, Waldron, 1854, 7p. 62

We should be unwilling to accept ourselves and our culture as we stand. But not jump to a “strange uncertainty” id. (general skeptical distrust of us entirely), and judge before examining, to “hastily conclude”, before knowing the individual terms and criteria on which we measure each thing.

So we should look at ourselves to make sure we attend to the matter at hand in the way it demands, which is a way of conducting ourselves. As with science, which ensures it’s facts through its method (repeatability), philosophy has methods of acting/“thinking” in order to be more cognizant of the part we play in looking at our world, thus learning how to get (our "ego" as @Sam26 says) out of our way so we can learn what actually matters about a thing, what the "essence" of it is, as in what is essential to our culture about it (what are the criteria and mechanics of this practice, situation).

So then virtues, or our better conduct, are a part of our learning about something, our epistemology, like having courage, not being “afraid of being wrong” as @Sam26 says, and empathy, a view cognizant to what matters in each instance (perhaps “knowledge”, perhaps different criteria—and not just “lesser knowledge”, say, “belief”).

that process [being a human] has reached such complexity and sophistication that it seems to involve what we call intent, will, deliberation — ENOAH

And I agree with you here. Austin has a way of putting it that we project a self that has “intention” back into a situation, but only when it doesn’t meet our ordinary expectations (Why did you do that (in that situation)?) But it is not a question that always has an answer because I don’t have a “will” that causes my acts nor do I “mean” every word (I don’t “intend” my raised arm to be the act of signaling a taxi.)

Of course it is trustworthy; but it's not your mind. There's no your, no you. — ENOAH

And I take this to suggest we have no recourse other than to rely on (trust) the human (brain/body/responses, etc). However, with the acknowledgment of the human propensity to undermine ourselves, hide from ourselves, delude ourselves, etc., or, in other words: our inevitable limitation and failings, we are driven to want to escape the human; to have knowledge take our place—something certain we can count on (trust).

The question (which I won't take the time here) is more like, how can I ensure I am input with the coding which will yield the most functional results for that very system (which I share with all minds) and for my body and my species? — ENOAH

And this is a worthwhile question (and closer to part of @Benj96’s OP). If we realize that: to be human we must turn—as Socrates suggests in a cave, and Wittgenstein (PI #108) says around our “real need”—towards our humanity, per Nietszche (embracing what we actually can not nor should not escape) and attempt to perfect it, as rallied to by Emerson, what does that path look like? As humans? individually? (Which I believe we can take up with @Sam26 above)

there is no Mind and no Trusting… your mind moves autonomously — ENOAH

Well, yes, the brain/body does things on its own, or there are “empty code triggering reconditioned responses”. We may make a “snap judgment”, be unconscious of our reasons (even subconscious ones), even be responding to the body’s implicit biases (out of fear) (as in #5&6), or mindlessly adopting the judgments of others or society, but “our judgment” is more than a function or sense or instinct or conformity, because afterwards it is “our” decision (rather than a reaction, a prejudice, or “trigger”)—as I take you to say, “to be rash is a settlement arrived at following that dialectic” (emphasis added). But the outcome is ours; we are responsible for its failings and reasons. We can make explicit, or draw out, the evidence applied to the criteria for, say, trusting, even if it is to say, “I didn’t like the look of his face”. And we can say something was “poor judgment”, which is maybe more than it was wrong, but that it was hasty, not having considered everything, or perhaps not thought through it at all. This is not the (casual, choosing) “I” that you rightly remove from the equation, but, in a sense: me, as in: not you; not blaming something else for my claims and evaluations. It is the functioning of “judgment” that I must take ownership, with the alternative being that I try to slide out of it.

Ultimately, can I trust my mind? No, it's lying to you, it's not who you think you are. Yes, you have no choice. You are trusting your mind incessantly. — ENOAH

Yes, we are subject to our brain, our body, our culture. And to imagine we are fated to it seems a curse, but underneath that, we want it; it’s a relief. As I previously said, one way of wanting to avoid a decision being “our judgment”, is to wish to rely on knowledge. Thus “trusting your mind” turns our duty into an intellectual problem, such as: whether the outcomes are right or wrong, real or illusion, rational or emotional, etc. So if we can solve this manufactured problem—e.g., an outcome could be “known” to be right—then it would not be my judgment. Knowledge answers for it, not me. Thus our desire to “trust” in something (say, our mind) so that we can give up our continuing responsibility. Our disappointment with knowledge is because we are left holding the bag.

here is how you guys see it and here is how each of your views differs. — Benj96

Thank you for the understanding and appreciation. I should try to remember to phrase it that: “this is how I am taking what you are saying”, as what I am actually doing is a provisional paraphrase, which should be presented as the question “is this the sense in which you mean this”? but I find that most people are more than ready to respond that that’s not what they meant if clarification is needed. Unfortunately some times people don’t acknowledge any further implications of what they have said even when there is evidence and context to make the connection.

And of course I am not trying to hijack your thread to say there are not legitimate concerns about how we can anticipate ways in which our conclusions are untrustworthy or how to recognize when we are wrong. I only wanted to point out that we have recourses so the anxiety to find truth does not hinge solely on finding a way to never make a mistake.

It was, just not only in the way it wanted to be, so just be a little less judgey and bullying, yeah?

Oh… you just wanted to point out something clever? Well done you.

What point is there to it, if not to make your thoughts clear? — flannel jesus

You mean clear to you. Picture instructions are clear to everyone; do you want me to draw you a map? What words should I use? What dichotomies do you accept? Can I get you a beverage too?

yes — flannel jesus

Oh please. Get over yourself. I shouldn’t have wasted my time trying to explain philosophy to you; I’m gonna be able to convince you how you’re a jerk? Do you know what a troll is?

If you perceived me saying some post of yours read like a non sequitur to me, the point of me saying that is not rudeness or cruelty but to express that I don't understand how your reply to me makes sense given what I was saying. The correct response to that isn't for you to decide to start being cruel to me, the correct response is to either spell out why your reply does make sense, or to just disengage. — flannel jesus

Well, I guess I am (bait took!). This is exactly your problem in a nutshell. I did not “perceive” you saying that; you said it. Which is straight arrogant and rude. Still, if you don’t understand something you don’t judge it. The whole point of not understanding is not that you don’t grasp “how your reply to me makes sense given what I was saying”, but to imagine the possibility that you just do not understand what I am saying! which you skip over as if what others say is simple and easy to immediately understand, or, if it isn’t, that it should be! To be respectful, try (humbly) to make some sense of it on its own terms (not in relation to you). Ask a question to clarify a distinction, to understand terms, to develop implications; paraphrase; ask for an example; etc. My responsibility is to answer, not to make what I’m saying fit into your box. And definitely not to put up with something like this:

I really don't know what you're on about anymore. — flannel jesus

If you believe I was cruel to you first, please show me where — flannel jesus

Is cruelty the level of insult it would have to rise to? Really? Not just dismissive, mocking, superior, flippant… you’re gonna have to give me a minute. Oh wait, did you actually want to know?

just start saying rude things to me — flannel jesus

Not self-aware either! I think the start of that might be the dizzying part for you. It was me who started saying rude things? (Your miss-using “context” BTW).

why are you doing this? — flannel jesus

Because you think your way of looking at things is obvious and mine is nonsense, like the world revolves around you. Because I spent my valuable time trying to explain myself to you and you didn’t even try. Because you think I can just “tell” someone like you what it would take years of study for you to even start asking question that weren’t arrogant and mean, like: “what the hell are you talking about?”. You don’t care, go away. You’re in the deep end.

I have no idea how any of these words relate, at all, to anything I said — flannel jesus

Step away from the philosophy.

I have no idea what you're talking about at this point. — flannel jesus

You don’t have to admit it. I know.

If I may, I think he was referencing your position that we may be permitted stupidity if. . ., not you personally. — ENOAH

No, he nailed it. I made it able to be understood without needing to stretch one’s worldview.

Sorry, seemed pretty straightforward. I must have just made up that interpretation.

’instilling faith’ if achieved, is the (temporary and temporal) settlement of that dialectic, commonly called belief and confused for not being knowledge. — ENOAH

I made this confusing. When I said my determination of whether you are in earnest “instilled faith”, I did not mean faith, as in: belief, as if blindly (nor as if it were an opinion). When I am considering whether you are earnest, I am making a judgment, based on evidence (your acts and words), as to whether they meet the ordinary ways someone demonstrates earnestness (criteria, which are “autonomous”, if I understand how you meant that). So my conclusion is not “belief”, nor “a belief”—I am convinced. I do not have faith in my judgment; I have faith in you. I have now given you my trust; I treat you as genuine.

The word [earnest] has an evolved (in both each individual and History) function of triggering the movements/arrangements of other words which eventually trigger conditioned Feelings which eventually trigger actions (more mental/or physical) . — ENOAH

I would say that these “movements” and “feelings” and “actions” do not follow from the word (as if “I am earnest” were a report of something in me, and not just in the sense of a promise, though only believed as much as “I’m not lying”). Everything follows from my being convinced, my judging that you are earnest, which conclusion is “triggered” by the standards, or criteria, that we associate with earnestness—the actions and words that demonstrate you are in earnest.

All of this process seems to contain "intent" "deliberation" a "self". Hence these discussions etc. But there is no "trusting your own mind" directed by that "you". It is all just the movements of that mind — ENOAH

I would say that judging whether someone is earnest does take “deliberation”. And we are, in a sense, judging their “intent”, not as if to see in their mind, but (even stranger) to see into the future: whether they will trick us or fulfill the commitment that is made in claiming they are (will continue to be) earnest. To be taken as earnest is an expectation, and so does not involve the “self” in the sense of: a state, like dazed; or: a feeling, like sad. These are the version of “self” as in: my person. But a claim to be earnest does involve my “self” in the sense of: my character; who I am asking to be seen as, taken for, what I stake as collateral.

So we may even claim we are in earnest to ourselves, as we can make a promise to ourselves. It would seem we should know best if we intend to trick ourselves, or whether we are faking, but what is “being earnest”, or to “really mean it”, if not the further future demonstration of that commitment. It’s not never feeling like a fake or like giving up or like we were deluded at the outset, but that we continue on, try harder, follow through.

So then what is “trusting your own mind”? If it is “all just movements of [our] mind” then we are left with the fact @Benj96 started with: “Everyone can be rash, everyone can be stupid, misinformed or otherwise malpracticing adequate reason.” Which is to say, how can we trust our self? as in: our brain, our habits, our weakness, our limitations? And this is trust in the sense of: be certain of, as in: that we aren’t deluded, tricked, wrong. But perhaps all this talk of earnestness helps us to see that our relation to ourself is not one of certainty. Not that it is blind belief that everything we think is right, but a matter of loyalty, not entrusting our self—as in our character—to others, to apathy, to knowledge, abandoning our judgment, relinquishing our voice, letting our consent be assumed. We may be rash, stupid, ignorant, irrational (@flannel jesus), but it’s a start. If we are asking, as @Banno framed it, “What is true?”, in this sense, we are true to ourselves; our trust is our not giving up.

Antony Nickles yeah that just sounds like nonsense to me. — flannel jesus

Well, that might be because of the historical picture of belief as a lesser version of knowledge, but I take it as a lack of interest (not a lack of ability) as you appear to just be saying the same thing over and over (which is fine). But without anything more than that, it’s hard to know what or how to explain.

I have no idea how a guy saying he doesn't trust his own reasoning could be interpreted as "political" — flannel jesus

I’m not saying he doesn’t trust his own reasoning, I’m saying that there is more involved than “reasoning”. The “stories” he is talking about are things up for debate, and because of that, are political/moral, which are the types of things we may not be able to resolve. But we could say he is politicizing his doubt in making it a reason to hold the opinions he does, or avoid being responsible to answer for them. Basically, I’m calling this (his) BS, though I take it as a misunderstanding of the nature of fact compared to our political/moral lives. He is mixing up apples and oranges. Not being certain about our positions is not resolved by trust or doubt in science, or knowledge. It is a matter of bucking up and being responsible for what we decide to claim as our own, as these things are not a matter of certainty; they are not resolved as a claim of knowledge would be.

If he doubts his own ability to reason, and his own ability to reason leads him to think he should trust science, then OF COURSE he's going to doubt if he should trust science. Just read his words. He spells it out, I'm not speculating. He literally says he doesnt trust his own reasoning abilities. — flannel jesus

I’m not suggesting you are speculating, but this is a categorical issue—a matter of the type of reasons we use in different cases. Sometimes we “trust” an impersonal process, science; and sometimes we have to make our own way, as in a moral situation, and I am saying he is confusing the two here.

“that essentially means I have no ability to discern good science and conclusions from bad

Basically ive proven i can believe things with bad reasons and spin the story in my head.

My worry is that I’ll just keep reading things that confirm my current set of beliefs and keep taking them in as true or at least likely true and end up with a warped sense of reality.”
— quotation of 83franks by @flannel jesus

Starting with the first sentence: either they are simply wrong (I assume that we can agree that we can have/gain the skill to tell good science from bad), or they are calling that into question, which, yes, on the face of it, they attribute to an “inability to reason”. But I am claiming that they are avoiding that a political/moral decision is (despite accurate science) always about aligning ourselves with a story, a community (and here I do not mean with or against science, or the science; i.e., it is more than a matter of reason, knowledge). For example, we trust the democratic process, not because it is perfect, but because its nature is (it calls for) allegiance, or disloyalty. We either give ourselves (our country) to it, or are, as Dewey puts it, treacherous. Those are our choices in that world—“knowledge”, as in certainty, is not how it works (though the process can be corrupted and bettered). The political and moral fields are not simply a matter of knowledge (absolving us of our part in, say, the social contract), but what we are willing to be responsible for. To fixate on the possibility that we can have “bad reasons”, or “spin” or “warp” ourselves, is to desire to find something certain, impersonal, say, “reality”, that would ensure we are never bad, wrong, or lost. The desire for certainty in the moral/political realm is a fantasy that knowledge could take the place of me—the necessity of putting ourselves (trusting ourselves as I have put it) in the position of answering for our reasons and, if appropriate, for our reliance on a particular scientific finding. But he wants to “trust” science, not to be accurate, but to resolve our need to live the stories we choose to accept, which means we may be wrong (leaving us where I started, not with just belief compared to knowledge—epistemology—but with the processes of error, forgiveness, learning, etc.). But we have no recourse (other than avoidance) than to entrust ourselves with the responsibility for our opinions, stances, etc., and in this sense, to “trust” ourselves.

This thread is about trusting your own mind, trusting your own judgment, trusting your own ability to reason - the thread I linked is about a guy who says he can't trust his own ability to reason. It's entirely on point. — flannel jesus

If we aren’t going to call determining good science from bad a skill—say, that anyone competent could perform—and we take it as a matter of instilling “trust”, as in “belief”—which in philosophy is code for something we might be uncertain about, or that rests on uncertain grounds—then I would say that is politicizing epistemology. And so it is not that he doesn’t trust his (own) ability to reason, but he (secretly?) doubts the (all of our) ability to rationally be certain about our knowledge through science at all.

All I am claiming separately is that there is a distinction between the kinds of things we can be certain of, and those which may lead to an outcome that falls apart (politics, moral acts, etc.), and that philosophy sometimes wants to treat the second like the first (or relegate it to irrationality).

Ok, then is [earnestness], not in the speaker, but the receiver? The receiver interprets the committed "action" as earnest? Hence, speaker's intention is irrelevant? Where I'm currently settled is that (notwithstanding my previous "flippancy") "earnestness" is neither in the speaker (intent) nor in the receiver (interpretation) and (perhaps frustratingly to our conventional logic) it's in both. Why? Because it is imbued in the "word." — ENOAH

The other does not “interpret” earnestness, as if it were a matter of confusion or seeing correctly. Because of the way earnestness works, the other judges whether my words and actions are evidence that meet the ordinary (but usually implicit) criteria of what we count as being earnest (commitment, followthrough, not giving up, doing a “deep dive”, etc.) and acknowledges that I have made a showing of earnestness, or whether I am still faking, putting on a show, etc. So it is a rational determination, but towards instilling faith and trust. The act or word does not have an “air” of earnestness (it is not imbued in them); I make a demonstration of rising to the level that proves** (to you) that I am not inconstant, etc. (**Now of course when I say “rational”, I mean subject to discussion and settlement, but the outcome is uncertain, as it is a matter of our relationship—so perhaps I won’t be fooled again, that nothing you could do or say could make me see you as serious when you, say, still refuse to choose allegiances, etc.)

this guy's post is also an epistemological problem. — flannel jesus

Well, yes, it is a matter of knowledge, though I’m not sure it is a problem with knowledge. I wouldn’t say we have an issue with our criteria to tell good science from bad, though we might politicize its relevance. All I am claiming is that the OP is more a matter of recognizing (acknowledging) error than ensuring certainty because knowledge does fail us, and then we are left with the conduct of our discourse with each other.

Yes, I worded that poorly. Of course they are doubting their ability to decide whether the science is done well. This is different though than the kind of doubt and trust that philosophy has traditionally struggled with, and that I am claiming is a doubt of ourselves that is projected into an epistemological problem.

The guy who made the thread, somehow, came to distrust his own ability to reason and discern fact from fiction. — flannel jesus

But that is not a case of distrusting ourselves, but of not trusting science, specifically our ability to tell good science from bad. What makes a scientific conclusion a fact is not correspondence, but repeatability, that anyone could do the same experiment and reach the same answer. Science is contingent on: 1. that the experiment is done competently, and based on the scientific method, isolating the question, etc., and 2. that it is a matter that responds to such a method (science cannot answer every type of thing).

You should NOT trust your mind, but you can gain trust in certain beliefs by applying critical thinking: seek out contrary opinions, test your beliefs through discussion with others (like on this forum), attempt to mitigate confirmation bias by trying to identify objective reasons to support or deny some presumption you may have. Learn at least some basics of epistemology (including the limits of each technique). — Relativist

We of course have the ability to develop our skills of thinking things through, analyzing our opinions and assumptions, and considering other perspectives. But there is a difference between ensuring what you say is correct, and how you conduct yourself in and after saying it. So to say you should “not trust your mind” (yourself)—as I, and Emerson, argue against above—is perhaps different than saying you should not trust the opinions you have or inherited.