You keep reminding me of Dewey. That's a good thing for me, but perhaps not for others. See his The Quest for Certainty. Analytic and OLP philosophers weren't the only ones seeking to cure philosophy of its various ills. — Ciceronianus

I do think it is important at some point (once we have the complete reading under our belt) to differentiate Austin from Dewey from Wittgenstein, etc. Preliminarily, I think Dewey and Austin don't take into consideration the continuing fear of skepticism (given the powerlessness of our ordinary criteria) in the same way as Wittgenstein, who sympathizes with, and tries to understand, the skeptic's desire (as he fell into that trap with the Tractatus), rather than the, say, condescension that Austin gives off, or Dewey's belief in procedure (or something like that).

That's what I disagreed with, that math is regarded by philosophers as the ultimate paradigm — Metaphysician Undercover

Well, it’s not the answer that matters, it’s the desire for an “answer”: something universal, generalized, predetermined, predictable, perfectly logical, etc., e.g., God, the forms, the thing-in-itself, consciousness, reality, sense data, qualia, etc. Austin is saying the whole enterprise is wrong from the get-go.

@Banno @Ludvig @Corvus @javi2541997 @Ciceronianus @frank @wonderer1@Janus @Richard B

As an additional note on Lecture VII: Part of philosophy’s problem (exemplified by Ayer) is that the desire for a perfect knowledge, and the subsequent resignation to an imperfect knowledge, both only allow for a fixed outcome (of knowledge, or a “perception”, or “appearance”, or “mental process”, or “meaning”). In this lecture about “reality” Austin is also explaining how our relationship with the world is more than just information, such as would correspond to (equate with) an “objective” world.

As I discussed earlier, one point is that you can’t “fool around” (p.62) with words because of the way they work—the distinctions they make, what they count as doing or being something—is taken from how the world works (their criteria are: what has mattered to our society, what is “really important” (p.77))—I mean, you can fool around, but you look like a madman, or a poet.

Another point, again, is that the situation that we find ourselves in matters, so it is always a discussion of an event (as Ricouer would call it)—a moment in time with a past and you and another with things a certain way, even expectations, etc. To call this just a context though might miss the fact that it also has a future. We do not just see something and either get it (“really” know it) or do not (as an immediate “perception”, just indirect now). We make mistakes, but we correct ourselves; we jump to conclusions, but we can dig deeper and learn more; we apologize, make excuses; but we carry on--despite not having perfect knowledge--without cutting ourselves off from the world.

Another difference with fixed knowledge is that it does not do well with ambiguity, and when we don’t know how to "proceed" (Wittgenstein discusses this as "being able to continue", e.g. a series). As Austin says, there may not be “any right answer” (p.66) and, that, in certain cases, “there is no right answer… no rules according to which, no procedure by which, answers are to be determined.” (P.67) These are the kinds of situations that create the fear of radical skepticism, which philosophy believes can only be resolved by definite knowledge (but then it can’t get it). Austin shows that, despite our not knowing what is “right”, or having a “rule” or a “procedure” or determined “answer”, we still manage to move forward in situations where there is no “tidy, straightforward style” (p.72). His example is that “like” allows us to “adjust” (p.73) our language to adapt to something new, not simple. And being able to account for outliers is not a strong suit for objective criteria; for example, when “pig” has a “meaning” that is a universal amongst particulars. Austin is pointing out that in not demanding a universal “pig”, or a “new world” (i.e. “reality”), but in having "flexibility" (p. 74), we are actually "more precise" (Id.) and can better handle the "unforeseen" (p.75), which is to say, we proceed with the ability to readdress the situation; we can live through it without figuring it all out ahead of time (deontologically, teleologically (what is “right”? A rule, a value?) Thus Austin says, the criteria we employ at a given time can’t be taken as "final, not liable to change.” (p. 76) And that openendedness allows our understandings to adapt as our lives change.

The idea that it is just a matter of just looking, or collecting data, is far too simple. — Ludwig V

As this is important to Austin as well—though I don’t know exactly what you are referring to when you say “that it is just a matter”—Wittgenstein keeps insisting we “look” not because he can’t speak about something (as some carry over from the Tractatus). It’s that ordinary criteria have no power of argument (logical, necessity). So what they are doing is drawing out examples of when you would say such-and-such about something. All they can do is create those examples (“show” you them); you have to accept for yourself the validity of the implications on what matters to a thing being that thing, how distinctions are made, what judgments, etc. They make claims about the mechanics of that thing (the grammar Wittgenstein says; Austin will point out “salient features” on p.68) but you must come to it on your own—prove it to yourself (or provide another description, expand the context to incorporate other considerations, etc.) And then we can debate the impact those have on philosophical issues.

P.s. - this is why Wittgenstein is so enigmatic, why he leaves us with so many questions; because, as you say, we have to do the work for ourselves. I believe this to be in part because they are asking you to take a totally different perspective on an old philosophical issue. That it’s not a new opinion, but a new way of seeing, a changed self.

How does the fact that you and I agree that the answer to 2+2 is 4 say anything about reality. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, math doesn’t tell us about the world. But it has qualities similar to the standard by which philosophy wishes it could judge the world, and, when it finds that doesn’t work, instead of seeing the ordinary criteria that already exist, it projects its standard onto the qualities of an imagined Reality.

I think maybe I worded something about math that triggered your response; I don’t claim anything in particular about it other than as an example of the standard, which Plato in the Theatetus and Descartes set out better than me.

If math is just a different way of using language, how does it possibly obtain this status of "objective"? — Metaphysician Undercover

If you do math, and I do math (competently), we come up with the same answer. It doesn’t matter who does it. It is universal, rule-driven, predictable, repeatable, logical, a fact, etc. (that’s all I mean be “certain”). Imagine everything Socrates wanted for knowledge; that’s why he used math as the ultimate example in the Theatetus.

But Malcolm is saying that this idea that dreaming is an experience where we question, reason, perceive, imagine is an incoherent one, so there is no sense to say we are comparing experiences to determine they are qualitatively similar or not. — Richard B

I’m not sure were Austin put forward “this idea” of what we do in dreams. I was trying to show that there actually are, as he says, “recognized ways of distinguishing between dreaming and waking”. Why does this have to mean: while we are dreaming? It seems perhaps Malcolm is creating his own opponent, but I don’t think it is Austin.

@Banno @J @Ludvig @Corvus @javi2541997 @Ciceronianus @frank @wonderer1@Janus

Lecture VII is not a theory about what the word “real” means. It’s showing how the actual world works compared to the imagined idea of Reality itself, the theory of an “objective” world. In this case, compared to the picture that we do or do not “perceive” “Reality”, something immutable, infallible, and generalized to every object and abstracted from any circumstance and any responsibility we might have.

However, despite this need for—let’s call it a pure knowledge (as Wittgenstein does) or perfect knowledge (as Descartes does)—everything but math is not “objective” in the way philosophy imposes on “Reality”. But instead of looking, as Austin does, at how we actually manage our uncertain world, Ayer internalizes the world’s failings by making it our failing: that we can only “perceive” a world that is “real”, which forces us to only be able to ask confused questions like: do we perceive “reality” directly? Or is our perception of “reality” indirect/mediated? Maybe through some “real” process of the (perfect) brain? or because it is “my” “perception” of “Reality”? (and you have yours—instead of just our varying personal interests).

The dismissal of Austin is done for many reasons, but it boils down to an inability to accept anything but an “answer” to the world’s uncertainty (like a perfect knowledge) or nothing at all (falling back only on a mediated “perception”), and not taking seriously that the ordinary ways we handle problems in each case are sufficient and our only recourse. Austin is (as is Wittgenstein) only seen either as setting out just a different answer to these cobwebs of misunderstandings—that he is some version of a “realist”—or that the mechanics he uncovers about the world are trivial in response to these issues (he’s just relying on words or “common sense”).

Lecture VII: Once again, Austin is not talking about words (explaining words), he is looking at the words we say when we do something to illuminate our practices. That words are “used in a particular way” is a “fact” (p.62) because our lives have been “firmly established” (Id.) There is a correct way (as in, appropriate) to address a subject, its mechanics, which is how you can be “wrong” p. 63. This is not being nit-picky and pedantic about word usage—because it is our lives that are normative (influence the conformity of our acts). Note here when Austin says: “‘Real or not?’… can’t always be raised. We… raise this question only when… suspicion assails us…” (p.69) (emphasis added)

In saying that the “distinctions [are] embodied” (Id.), Austin is saying we live them, in them, by them. Distinctions are how we judge, and, in judging along those lines, we reinvest ourselves in the criteria for that practice. There is nothing “arbitrary” (p.63) about the way our practices work. They have import because they reflect our interests in our lives.

So “Reality” is a prefabricated (a priori) standard of judgment measuring everything against perfection. (P.64) What philosophy did is take the ordinary question: is that a real duck? (or a decoy?) and turn “real” into a quality of everything. However, there are many different ways (criteria for how) things count as real, and one of the most important being because there is an antecedent (expected) alternative, like: fake, a variant context, deception, artifice, etc. So, it is untenable for everything to be real (or not), unless… you remove the question and abstract the (unnatural) quality onto the whole world—ta da: Reality!

happy for others to move on, if you want to do VII. — Banno

I don’t mind someone else taking the lead either, as I tire of beating my head against the wall and talking to myself.

It also looks to me that you might have been reading Cavell? — Ludwig V

Oh yeah that’s probably a straight ripoff. I wouldn’t normally bring in these kinds of larger implications/conclusions except I don’t seem to be getting any headway in understanding by keeping my cards covered as Austin does (to the point people only think it matters to words).

@Banno @J @Ludvig @Corvus @javi2541997 @Ciceronianus @frank @wonderer1@Janus

That people have made up their mind, or had made it up before we began), without even understanding what Austin is saying, much less why he is saying it, is proof of the point he is trying to make. Ayer (Plato) makes it look like he is investigating our relation to the world, but before starting had a standard already decided for the answer, thus the need for the wacky picture.

Is anyone going to do a reading of VII? Or are we not done with VI.

I'm only gesturing at the point that what's in question is not "ordinary", contingent falsity, but something more radical, in that Ayer uses "direct" and "indirect" in an incoherent way. — Ludwig V

I agree here, but the radical nature of it is not that Ayer is incoherent; he was chosen because of his putting the case as well as one can. Austin is going after the desire for classic analytical philosophy to need a certain standard or “certain” knowledge, without context. The wish for that is a fear of any chance of error, instead of seeing that our practices are rational and any errors have means of resolution, even when that is only rational disagreement (in the moral or political realm). Our fears and desires are isolating us as the only way to maintain something certain (by pulling back from the world); but we don’t need everything to meet the criteria of certainty.

To attempt to clear up the direct/indirect issue,
— Antony Nickles

I'm thinking that there is an argument in the background that is confusing people. It relates to Corvus' question

You still have not answered whether Austin was a direct realist or not.
— Corvus — Ludwig V

It is a fantasy-world question, dreamed up by Ayer’s desire to have fixed, certain (direct) access to the world, even if he has to make up the terms, like “sense-data”, so something can be “real” (which is the singular standard which sets up this whole kind of answer from the start—old as Plato).

If you accept Austin's ordinary language definition of direct and indirect perception, then he does accept that some perceptions are direct and others are not. — Ludwig V

He is not talking about perception, he is discussing indirect and direct (here as they relate to seeing, reflecting, etc.); he accepts none of that. I must be a terrible writer.

The understanding of Ayer's position that I've come to in this discussion is that there is such a thing as direct perception - perception of sense-data - and the objects of this kind of perception are always real, in the sense that they are what they seem to be, but always unreal in that they are not what we would like to think they are - perceptions of "external" "objective" reality. Austin rejects that idea, not on the ground that it is false, but on the ground that it is incoherent. — Ludwig V

We want so desperately to have something certain (“objective”) that we even set it off the table (“in that they are not what we would like to think”) but go through somersaults to keep it as the standard. (Kant anyone?) I haven’t seen anything that would make me think Austin would concede that it was not false. His use of it should be qualified with “I’m just using this term to try to figure out what Ayer might mean by it. No luck so far.”

Of course, there needs to be evidence under the scrutiny of judgment. I mean, it’s not like we can just make up anything.
— Antony Nickles

"Evidence" needs to be interpreted here. — Ludwig V

The point is that there is not one kind of evidence (direct or not; real or not). There are different kinds of evidence for each thing, for what counts as evidence of dreaming, or being awake, or seeing something. Now it is true that these will be different kinds of evidence, but just depending on the thing. Evidence does not need to be shoe-horned into the standard of “objective” too. Part of what Ayers has done is imagine the world as unintelligible, a scene of competing wills, with nothing true, because of his prerequisite.

”There are recognized ways of distinguishing between dreaming and waking… deciding whether a thing is stuffed or live” — Richard B, quoting Austin

Austin is not talking about the words awake, and dreaming: what their explanations or definitions are, how to use them in a sentence (or gather the science of sleep). Austin is pointing out that we, our society, have ways of distinguishing between dreaming and waking (and, let’s presume, being awake). They come with their own means of judgment—their criteria, that are reflected in what we say at those times (in examples of the type of things we say when we are trying to differentiate between the two).

He is not saying that our judgment in this leads to the same “level” of knowledge—with foundation and certainty—as Descartes wants for the self. However, we do distinguish between the two, say, when we experience something surprising and someone comes in the room and, when told, they ask “were you dreaming?” Or, when I go to tell someone about a surprising thing and they tell me I was just asleep and must have dreamt it, and I say, “But it was sooo real!”. One insight is that we only report dreams past tense, afterwards (most of us). These are evidence (examples) only of the rational ways these cases (events) can be decided—you are the judge of them yourself: are these rational criteria for the use of distinguishing between dreaming and being awake in these particular situations? No? well if you wanted you could probably come up with some expressions that might satisfy your reservations, which would prove their rationality, and maybe teach me something important about the world (the rationality of say, seeing, or thinking). The fact that ways to distinguish are possible is proof of Austin’s claim. Descartes was trying to pull the same stunt in setting the goal before investigating the field. In Other Minds, here, it is that whether something is real or not, always has to have a suspicion it is a phony, abnormal.

However, this thread is about Austin's answer to Ayer's and thus it is about that notion of perception. That would be the correct one in this situation. "Correct" in the sense that that is the one under consideration, so the others are irrelevant here. — creativesoul

I actually second the notion that it is important to understand Ayer’s idea of “perception” and not bring a preconceived notion to our reading, which is a good practice with any terms (or even various senses of words, like believe). Even if, as here, when we have been given no definitions or direct explanation, there is its place in the argument, what role the term plays in relation to others, and the criteria that might be used in making judgments on its identity, application, and mechanics. We can use our imagination to create rational inferences, even with a placeholder, like here, with “perception”. Of course, there needs to be evidence under the scrutiny of judgment. I mean, it’s not like we can just make up anything.

It could be argued that we cannot expect "ordinary language" to be adapted to cater for this (relatively) new kind of knowledge - yet — Ludwig V

Just want to clear this up (if I can). The method of "Ordinary Language" Philosophy is not to reduce philosophy to ordinary words (Wittgenstein uses "ordinary" words as his own technical terms all the time: criteria, grammar, sense, use, etc.). It is also not to reduce philosophy to the understanding of the person-on-the-street. Like Socrates, what Austin and Wittgenstein do (which I tried to set out once here) is to look at what people say (sort of like, the phrases they use) in certain situations, like when we say, "I know..." This evidence, or data, allows for a number of things. One is that we see that there are multiple different things going on ("knowing" is not only one thing--Wittgenstein calls these senses, or uses), and in different situations (paying attention to context, and how we expand context to clarify sometimes), but we also see how we judge differently (by criteria that show what matters about it to us), and also depending on the situation. What they sometimes do (Wittgenstein more than Austin) is take a philosophical statement and imagine one or more (even fantasy) situations to reveal what standard philosophy is using for judgment (compared to which, the criteria of their examples are termed "ordinary"--which is not really: ordinary, like the reasons we might use), and what context (if any) could the philosophical statements be placed in for them to be more intelligible (or less, as Austin is more prone to).

@Banno @J @Ludvig @Corvus @javi2541997 @Ciceronianus @frank @wonderer1@Janus

To attempt to clear up the direct/indirect issue, Austin's method, as I said previously, is to look at the opposite part of a dichotomy because how something fails shows us more about how it works (On Excuses is actually about action, and through that, morality.) So when he takes up "indirectly" he is looking at examples of what we say in a situation (his method), here, involving "indirect perception" (though these are not claims nor proposed alternate explanations). Those examples show that any opposite of indirectly does not have the implications (sense) or criteria (rules of judgment) that Ayer wants his "directly" to have, which are that we perceive infallibly, indisputably. Since we do not "directly" perceive, we cannot "not directly" (or "indirectly") perceive in a way that would be opposite to Ayer's fantasy of perceiving directly, say, always personal or flimsy, so ever needing justification, argument, or mutual agreement. This of course is to overlook that perception is not a thing (thus, as shown in Sec. VI that "my perception" is not a thing). True, false, right, wrong, correct, mistake, me, us, do not work this way.

I'm inclined to attribute Ayer's approach to Cartesian scepticism, rather than to any ethical question. — Ludwig V

Austin does not dwell on or spell out the implications as much as Wittgenstein, so Austin is not very well understood because he is assuming he is talking to people who have read philosophy and will see the connections and understand the magnitude of what he is taking on (with Ayers as just a good example), which is basically every philosophy that has addressed skepticism (mind/body, moral, object) and come up with an answer (or accepted it), like metaphysics, or Kant, or positivism, etc. He is not for or against it, but is taking the whole thing apart (Wittgenstein will go to a deeper place).

Ayer seems to back off the radical implications of his theory by denying them — Ludwig V

Now this I either have not gotten to (I am at Sec VI) or don't understand.

@Banno @J @Ludvig @Corvus @javi2541997 @Ciceronianus @frank @wonderer1@Janus

In Sec. VI Austin is full of so much vitriol and sarcasm it’s hard to gather what the argument is. I had to go back to Ayer, who says "having described the [ empirical ] nature of the evidence that is ordinarily thought to be sufficient to establish [mirrors, bent sticks, and mirages]... I wish to consider what would be the position of one who, though he acknowledged the particular facts about our experiences that constitute this evidence, still chose to deny the propositions about material things that these facts are supposed to prove." (Ayer p. 17 emphasis added) And here I can imagine is where Austin goes ballistic, and rightly so. Why would anyone imagine someone who ignores evidence?

Nevertheless, Ayer postulates someone (I'll call them the philosopher) who says that, although there are facts they do not dispute, say, that we are seeing the same coin, that that "does not prove that he really is seeing the same object" (Id. Emphasis added) One reason why the philosopher might say they "really" don't see the same object is because they want to claim that each of us has our own "perception", as in: "Where we say that two observers are seeing the same material thing, he prefers to say that they are seeing different things which have, however, some structural properties in common." Even worse, Ayer here does not even try to reconcile the two positions, but simply chalks them up to "a choice of language". (Ayer p. 18) Instead of attributing that the philosopher is wrong, Ayer chooses that "it is to be inferred that he is assigning to the words a different meaning from that which we have given them." Id. This is why Austin keeps saying that Ayer’s philosopher can agree to the facts, but then say "whatever [they] like" Austin p. 59

I finally realized what is going on. This is Plato’s (projected straw-man) problem with the Sophists; he thought they believed there was nothing like knowledge except persuasion by rhetoric (of beliefs, as he framed it). Here it is the fear of that skeptical moral world transferred to our best case scenario, a physical object. Our failure even to come up with a standard for (all of) the physical world leads to the assumption that the resolution must be metaphysical, like sense-data (and not that our desire for one standard and one context is wrong). From Ayer we could say one reason is that we would like to maintain our own perspective as a fixed, given of human nature (that you and I (always) see our each coin, even though we agree they are the same). Ayer resigns himself to only be able to be sure of facts about sense-data (to thus be certain by one, fixed standard because only one type of object, without the need of any talk of context).

Not a bump, swear.

Hard to make an argument without the text but I would say my reading here of Chapter IV is a start—basically Austin is saying philosophy made up the idea of perception (as an assumption to fill a place in an argument based on our errors and mistakes), and we have other ways of judging everything that is supposed to do.

As I see it, the problem is only "manufactured" if we buy into the idea that there is only one correct way to think about it. Otherwise, you just have different ways of thinking and talking about perception. — Janus

I'm saying, along with Austin, that there is no correct way to consider "perception" because philosophy did not think about it, as in look into how it would work and whether anything else was actually resolving those issues. Philosophy created a boogyman to slide in the only kind of answer it would accept, certain knowledge. The book is attached above in one of my posts if you care to discuss.

@Banno @J @Ludvig @Corvus @javi2541997 @Ciceronianus @frank @wonderer1@Janus

Sec V: I’m going to point out again the importance here to Austin of context and standards.

[With a blue imagine and blue wall, or bent pencil in water or just a bent pencil] we may say the same things ('It looks blue', 'It looks bent', &c.), but this is no reason at all for denying the obvious fact that the 'experiences' are different. — Austin, p. 50

This is going to be confusing for some of you maybe as he is not using “experience” as something only we have (thus putting it in quotes, as if Ayer would say this is some process of the mind), but these are two different situations (the "context" is different), and that we would judge them separately based on the different associated standards, and not simply by “direct or not”. Philosophy wants to treat everything the same without regard for the surroundings, or, as Austin puts it, the “extraneous” and “attendant” “concomitants” (accompaniments).

Next Ayer and Price try to argue that, if we are deluded, two things must be indistinguishable (that we have no way of judging between direct or indirect, thus why they claim we can only see sense data). But this is to ignore that we might not be using, or aware of, criteria to differentiate, as with tea experts, art critics, or eloquence.

Perhaps I should have noticed the difference if I had been more careful or attentive; perhaps I am just bad at things of this sort (e.g. vintages); perhaps, again, I have never learned to discriminate between them, or haven't had much practice at it. — Austin, p. 51

And so philosophy is jumping to conclusions without even investigating our various standards and not taking into account any kind of context. “[The] conclusion [we always see sense-datum] is practically assumed from the very first sentence of the statement of the argument itself.” p.47 “[We are asked to] concede the essential point [‘perceptions’ are always present] from the beginning.” Id.

Why would philosophy want an answer that only fits two standards and is abstracted from any context? Why would it want "perception" and "sense data" to come between us and the world? (These are rhetorical questions.)

Can't typ...

Is he dismantling anything or merely presenting a different way of thinking about it. — Janus

He is not presenting a different way of thinking (another answer or theory) about this (manufactured) problem of direct or indirect access (and all the related philosophical manifestations). He is showing us how things work to make it clear that the philosopher created this distinction (with pre-defined reasons for a certain answer). So, yes, he is dismantling, and not only the entire framework, but showing how errors in these related activities are normally resolved in different ways (showing that skepticism is not an issue for philosophy with just one face). He does also have important things to say, about: our variety of activities, the role of context, the different criteria for judgment of each thing, etc.

...I still feel the classic account of indirect perception which has been around from the time of Plato is more reasonable. — Corvus

...where he discusses difference in usage of the words "looks" "seems" and "appears" ...was more like English semantic chapter rather than Philosophy... — Corvus

Well I'll leave you to it, only to say that taking these points as a matter of "semantics" is due to underestimating that he is dismantling the "classic account of indirect perception" from Plato through Descartes and as it remains these days, with Ayer as only one proponent but with the same reasons and same means.

It is not a different interest. It was just part of the explanation why perceptions are indirect. Austin's first page of the book is about direct and indirect perceptions. — Corvus

Philosophy created the idea of "perception" and the idea that they are "indirect" (as with Hume's appearance, Plato's shadows, etc.). That people imagine science can explain these particular phantasms is just where science is barking up the wrong tree in trying to solve the mistakes of philosophy. Again, that is not to say there are not things to learn about the brain, just not these things to solve a problem philosophy mistakenly created.

Austin is simply investigating Ayer's creation of the distinction in dismantling the whole framework of direct/indirect as well as "perception". I can go over any of the text you take to lead to that conclusion.

@Banno @J @Ludvig @Corvus @javi2541997 @Ciceronianus @frank

We need to get past the picture of a process called "perception". If nothing else, Austin has shown that this is a figment that is simply manufactured by philosophy.

Anyway, pointing out the eyes as a medium for visual perception is not such a nonsensical statement. — Corvus

(emphasis added)

"Perception" is just a catch-all for: seeing, looking, identifying, grouping, judging, etc. (as well as, elsewhere: thinking, understanding, intending, etc.) in order for philosophy to frame the issue as a specific type of singular problem. But all these other things are not internal processes, but are each separate activities (like actions) that are done by public mechanics (standards) that allow for rectifying errors and debate (see Sec. IV).

I think he accepts that perception involves a fair amount of interpretation. — frank

He would say that we do not each have "our perception" and then we debate those, but that the things we interpret are publicly judged by standards that we share. And so "interpretation" is a public process of argument taking into consideration that we have to apply those standards. By Austin's method, we would understand "interpretation" by looking at the kinds of things we say about what we "interpret", as in commenting about a painting (which is a thing we are interpreting), or making explicit the implications of a text (which is a skill, again, involving some thing, say, like a rule, or a someone's hand gestures),

[Eyes as a medium for visual perception] could be actually a legitimate scientific statement. — Corvus

Now to say we have brains and they allow us to have senses, like vision, smell, touch, and we can study those, is an entirely different matter than our public practices. In doing philosophy we are not doing science, although as much as science imagines a mysterious process of "perception" that it can know, it is taking a fantasy of philosophy and treating it like a biological conundrum.

But also, whatever science learns about the brain is not going to resolve the issues of philosophy like skepticism of our relation to the world and each other (which creates the need for something to solve that "problem", here, by "direct perception". Or, when finding philosophy can't have the immediate or certain "knowledge" it desired (as a prerequisite), it does not admit the whole framework was wrong, but makes it about an imagined failing of our nature and creates "indirect perception" (appearances, etc.).

obviously there are objects and the perceiver in this issue — Corvus

But, having taken all that down a peg, this is just to say that you are not me, and I am not the world (because the world is not in my head, however "indirect", causing yours to be a different world). I do have personal tastes, interests, desires, commitments, guilt, motivations, etc. These are not wrapped up in a single theoretical conceptualization of "my perception".

When you are asked how a car works, could you explain the workings of cars without going into the explanations on how the engine, steering and gear works? — Corvus

Austin is explaining how looking, seeing, etc. work. If science wants to study what happens to the brain when these things are going on, then that is just a different interest, but these practices are not discrete functions or processes of the brain (though the brain does do other stuff).

@Banno @J @Ludvig @Corvus @javi2541997 @Ciceronianus @frank

Part of the difficulty is understanding the significance of what he says. It is too easy to trivialize "ordinary language". — Ludwig V

I tried to take a stab at this confusion above in saying Austin is not taking the views of the common person to address the concerns of philosophy (to say they conflict). He is employing a new (old) method that by looking at what we ordinarily say (in the course of business) shows (is evidence, but not “empirical” @javi2541997) that we have way more standards then philosophy’s singular standard (direct or not). It is not that our ordinary activities solve philosophy’s problems, but only show that philosophy turned our concerns into a problem it created only able to be solved by a particular (direct, objective, scientific) solution, however mysterious (and so Austin is deconstructing metaphysics @javi2541997).

But I think that is a reaction to the difficulty of seeing what one might do next in philosophy. So much is being dismantled that the landscape can seem to be a desert. Bringing the nonsense in philosophy to an end is one thing. But bringing philosophy to an end is something else. Whatever motivates philosophy has certainly not gone away. — Ludwig V

This method is to draw out our ways of judging (which we rarely examine), in the same way Socrates did, but without jumping to (starting with really) the standard that we must end up with a type of knowledge that fixes the precipitous conclusions that philosophy imagines (skepticism, relativism) because it does not take into account the ordinary ways we have of resolving our errors and conflicting cases. This doesn’t finish philosophy but only shows that we can disagree on rational terms where philosophy did not think it was capable only because it set the standard for rationality up front.

Wittgenstein will echo that this method “seems only to destroy everything interesting, that is, all that is great and important? (As it were all the buildings, leaving behind only bits of stone and rubble.)” #118 But he will focus on the outcome that we now have a clear view, that there is a value in the discovery. The work on morality, other minds, etc. are each different, and continue.

Goof2

Goofup

Is that consistent with me using a cup to trap a spider?

People surely have the ability to see ways of using things, in ways no one has before. So surely what we 'see' is more than just previously recognized linguistic and usage associations? — wonderer1

But “creative” problem solving and “imaginative” ways of using things are based on the fact that we have had practices like holding in cups, trapping things, pacifism, etc. and not a matter of “seeing” as if it were attached to vision. But, yes, our practices are not closed off from innovation.

@Banno @J @Ludvig @Corvus @javi2541997 @Ciceronianus @frank

I wanted to point out that part of the confusion here is that we (and most everyone in philosophy in general) do not take what Austin is doing as revolutionary and radical as it is. He is not offering another theory to explain “perceiving” or something to replace it. He is claiming that the problem that everyone is arguing about how to solve is made up; that the whole picture that we somehow interpret or experience remotely (through something else--sense perception, language, etc.) or individually (each of us) is a false premise and forced framework.

It might appear that Austin is just being snobby about words or is only making a claim that language is the right filter for the world, etc. But his method (as with Wittgenstein) is to set out what we say and do about a topic as evidence of how that thing actually works. That is to say, he is learning about the world. For example, in examining what we say and do about looking, he is making a claim about how "looking" works, the mechanics of it. “Seeing” something is not biological—which would simply be vision—and neither is judging, identifying, categorizing, etc. (“perception” is a made up thing, never defined nor explained p. 47). . Austin is showing us that “seeing” is a learned, public process (of focus and identification). “Do you see that? What, that dog? That’s not a dog, it’s a giant rabbit; see the ears.”

So, again, he is not saying we experience the world directly or indirectly--he is throwing out the entire picture of us (here) and the world (there) that leads to that distinction. This, for some, is very hard to wrap their heads around because it means letting go of a fixed, certain world, even, as is the case here (and with Kant), when we can’t or don’t know it.

As examples:

"It’s a shame Austin doesn’t wade into any of these problems …and is content to split-hairs on rather trivial matters, like an entire lecture on the word 'real'."

"there is not much significance in delving into the differentiation of direct and indirect perception because from my point of view, all perceptions are somehow indirect from the minimal perspective that for any human perception, it will happen via proper and relevant sense organs"

“sense organs are not the final perception location in the process, then they have to be the medium passing the sensed contents into the final location i.e. the brain”

“I think perspective - subject and object - is based on two main categories: the external, which essentially treats all things as objects and ignores the subject”

@Banno @J @Ludvig @Corvus @javi2541997 @Ciceronianus

Having gotten through Lecture IV: this is an example of where Austin takes a deep-dive into the differences between ordinary "uses" of words that philosophy takes as terms for a special purpose, but I think Austin somethings buries the point of all this. ("uses" here are the different "ways in which 'looks like' may be meant and may be taken p.40)

I'm going to take a stab at putting the dots together, but I do think the way he talks about it (below) needs to be accounted for. I take him to be showing how different uses (of like or seems) each have different things that matter to us about them, different ways we judge them, including: whether they are analogous or divergent 36 whether evidence is used 37 that there are different kinds of evidence 39 sometimes only needing a "general impression" 39 what "complications are attributable" 39 what they "well might be mistaken for" 42

I take these various standards and features to show that there are many different means of judging, rather than only whether we see it (directly) or do not see it; which is the point at which philosophy adds something in-between, like "sense-data", because then the standard can be unqualified across instances, locations, and everything sensed. But just because we can make a mistake does not mean we have to interpret sensations as always open to explanation by faulty sensors, as errors can be corrected because there is "nothing in principle final, conclusive, irrefutable about anyone's statement" and that I can "retract my statement or at least amend." 43

There is also, again, that judging these cases is different in different contexts, or that there needs to be a correct context, such as: "particular" and "special circumstances" and "suitable contexts" 39 that we need to look at the "full circumstances of particular cases" 39 or that how it is used will "depend on further facts about the occasion of utterance;"

I also want to note that these means of judgment are "our normal interests" 38 in these things, because it opens the question of what philosophy's interests are in its one standard (directness) without regard to instance or context which I take as the desire to "rule out uncertainty altogether, or every possibility of being challenged and perhaps proved wrong."

And to internalize our possibility of failure makes it a problem with me ("my" perception), or with humanity (some faculty or process), but Austin is claiming that our standards and circumstances that frame how these issue play out means that "I am not disclosing a fact about myself" because "the way things look is, in general, just as much a fact about the world, just as open to public confirmation or challenge, as the way things are. p 43 (emphasis added). How can it be only your perception when what you see incorrectly can be pointed out by me?

“Pure sensation” or “qualia” or whatever term you prefer is what we call the unabstracted perception, the unconceptualized sensation specific to one setting and one time. We then go on to “see X” based on what we’ve learned about how to see. I think Austin considers this issue of “seeing as . . .” later in the book. — J

The point about abstraction is a note on Austin's method. If we ignore all the uses of a term in all its various contexts (as Austin brings back), then we narrow our understanding of, say, "direct" and "material objects", etc. and our picture becomes unconnected from our lives.

But I may not be understanding you. How does any of this problematize sensing? — J

The fact that we make mistakes, mis-identify, are tricked, and all the other things Austin explores, should point (as Austin does) to the ordinary ways by which we resolve those issues. Philosophy turns these instances into a intellectualized "problem" which underlies all cases, thus unconnected from our procedures and familiarity, because it can then have one solution, here "direct perception", or "qualia".

I was just responding to the other members queries on the points. You got to give out your points as clearly as possible, if you had one, when asked, don't you? :) — Corvus

I was not intending to suppress discussion. It just helps me to respond to the text and how we are interpreting that, which is what I am trying to focus on discussing--not "my" points, but Austin's--which I see as different than just expressing our views on this issue. But, feel free.

He quibbles throughout, but then says that, according to the argument from illusion, sense-data is perceived directly. — NOS4A2

the argument from illusion is intended primarily to persuade us that, in certain exceptional, abnormal situations, what we perceive—directly anyway—is a sense-datum

This is confusing, but if we break it down: they are trying (but fail) to persuade us that we only can "directly" perceive sense datum, because of the problems brought up in certain circumstances which they want to say creates a problem with perception. This is not an admission by Austin that we perceive things directly, but simply stating the argument they are making in creating the indirect/direct distinction.

So I presume he means that there are both direct and indirect perceptions depending on what they are. I look forward to hearing what they are, and verify if it is a true claim, or not. — Corvus

It might be best to simply follow along, as the book is attached to my post here.

Austin intimates somewhere, all perception is direct. — NOS4A2

Austin is specifically tearing down philosophy's framing of the issue as both direct or indirect. As he says:

"It is essential, here as elsewhere, to abandon old habits of Gleichschaltung, the deeply ingrained worship of tidy-looking dichotomies. I am not, then-and this is a point to be clear about from the beginning-going to maintain that we ought to be 'realists', to embrace, that is, the doctrine that we do perceive material things (or objects)." p.3

My problem is that I can't imagine what direct perception would be. Isn't this part of what we need to recognize here? If nothing could count as direct perception, then the idea that perception is actually indirect doesn't make sense. The problem is the move from "some perception is indirect" to "all perception is indirect". — Ludwig V

But I agree that setting this issue aside enables us to understand what is going on here better, even though I'm not entirely sure that the last word has been said here. (I have in mind Cavell's idea that the idea of a last word on scepticism is a mistake.) — Ludwig V

He’s not done yet, for sure. But the argument is that discussions about indirect perception make sense, but not as thought of in contrast to direct perception. Which means we don’t need the idea of sense data at all. It would just be “perceiving” but I believe the next move is that we don’t even understand what “perception” is (if we talk about sense perception, what is direct touch? direct smell? etc.)

Does such a position [with qualia] involve believing in sense-data? — J

The argument for sense perceptions, or data, and qualia (and appearances, and particulars) have in common that we are problematizing sensing in a particular way—by abstraction from any setting—and creating one answer because we believe there is always a problem (and that we want to buffer ourselves from the possibility of any). However, Austin has just shown that the problems we have with sensing are ordinary and resolvable at the ground level, so both the abstraction from any case, and the generalization to all cases is unnecessary. There is more.

@Banno @“J” @Ludvig @Corvus @javi2541997

Having finished Lecture III, I noticed that Austin continues to bring up normal cases. This is part of his method, but he only hints at it. At p. 31 though, he says that “we must remember what sort of situation we are dealing with.” (Emphasis added) Wittgenstein will insist on the importance to philosophy of “command[ing] a clear view” PI #122 and of the need for a “particular” p.188, “wider” #539 “great variety of” p. 181, or even “imagined” context and will remind us to “Remember that…” #33, 88, 161, 167, 217, 269, p. 191, p. 207, or to “remember actual cases…”; #147 and #591, as “In what sort of context does it occur?” P. 188.

The situation we are to put these claims into, and what we are remembering about the context of those situations, are the “public” “standard procedures” p. 24 and “normal occurrences” or “normal find[ings]” with which we are “familiar” p. 26. I think he gets at why when he says we see “exactly what we expect” (emphasis added) because our common expectations are what we see, only to have them disappointed. It is philosophy that makes it a disappointment with (our) “perception”. (Do we bring the disappointment inside of us to have control? As then we might be able to make sure we don’t fail again?).

As he showed in the case of deception, we only recognize the odd case against normal ones. P. 11. You are only able to be surprised by an illusion because you were normally expecting something else. Thus why it is important to put these claims into a situation and context to see what the normal procedures, standards, expectations, implications, and findings are for that kind of thing (delusion, mis-identification, deception, etc.). Wittgenstein will call these ordinary criteria.

One question could be: what about this method is important? (other than having someone set out an example and I actual say.. “oh yeah, he’s right”), but the more interesting question is why philosophy wants to abstract from any context and our ordinary means of judgment? but that is not under discussion here.

But my biggest puzzle is what would count as direct perception. — Ludwig V

Austin’s point of showing how “indirect” perception actually works is to show that in no instance is it the opposite of what we imagine direct perception would be the perfect case of. So if we set aside the problem of direct or indirect, we can look and identify the actual mistakes we make in seeing something, identifying something, or whatever else is supposed to fall under the imagined process of “perceiving” something (more than just simply vision). “…it seems that what we are to be said to perceive indirectly is never—is not the kind of thing which ever could be—perceived directly. P. 19.