I just want to know if the links I give prove it or not — Darkneos

What I’m telling you is, yes, what leads to the conclusion of solipsism is true about our human condition. But having certainty that others exist, knowing that, is not the only consequence of the truth of the skepticism that leads to solipsism, as knowledge of the other and the world is not our only connection.

And you will not forget about this because your isolation and doubt and disconnection are based on something true. The danger of philosophy is why Socrates was killed, why Descartes’ Meditations was not taught to young adults, and why Wittgenstein kept telling people to give up on philosophy after his conclusions in the Tractatus. It is too late for you , however, so I would use your mind to overcome your mind.

Every thing I’ve read just seems to erode my mind a little more each day — Darkneos

You’re just reading the wrong works. I appreciate the effort in reading the Cavell. Where did you stop understanding it? If you can work to formulate questions, I can probably answer them (no one understands meaningful philosophy at first glance; its process requires your becoming someone different). The most important part is the end where he finds the truth of skepticism (that solipsism is real and an ongoing threat) and then analyzing the uses of knowledge to find the route of acknowledgement as our human relation towards others (apart from insisting on knowledge of them that is certain). I stand ready to help if you are willing to put in the work, but, yes, stop reading anything that is attempting to dismiss or disprove solipsism (and ignore @Judaka and @green flag tell you you’re crazy or that the position is ridiculous) as it is a important part of the human condition.

I know I exist because I have a first person point of view in my world
Other things have a third person point of view in my world
Things are not both first person and third person point of view at the same time in my world — Darkneos

In saying the skeptic and the other are not in the skeptic's world together, is to say that the skeptic does not know whether the other is them (the skeptic), or whether the other's point of view is the same, say, their pain is just like the skeptic's, so that they would exist, based on the ground that the skeptic takes themselves to.

Given that doubt, that lack of certain knowledge about the other, "there is only one 'me' in my world." From that requirement for the existence of the other, there is no stopping the conclusion that follows.

the first person point of view is not in other worlds
Hence, other worlds don’t have a “me” — Darkneos

The converse of not having knowledge of the other, is that I cannot explain myself to anyone either. I am inexpressible; no one can know me--no world has whatever is unique to me fully out of me, in it.

If there is a subjective world, there can only be one such subjective world — Darkneos

Thus, if there is to be a me, a me that I am certain of, then no one can have the ability to see me, to know me in the same way I want to be sure of myself. So the other cannot exist, as they threaten the grounds of my existence because they may know me better than I know myself, and then what do I know if not even myself?

The only way out is through. If you read that one and don't get anything meaningful from it, I'll eat my hat. Plus, you haven't commented on any of my posts I worked very hard on for your benefit, so you owe me that much.

I would suggest the Cavell essay on other minds that I attached above, but I will review the post, thank you.

The thread with the argument for solipsism is broken for me. Just copy the text here.

If you take needing certainty for knowledge then you really have nothing. — Darkneos

Yes but that desire is what allows the skeptic to see the truth that we do not have foundational, unreproachable knowledge of others and the world—that the impetus to solipsism is true. Isn’t that what you were looking for, one way or the other?

I think this other fellow is more on target. — green flag

I would tell you that reality is an illusion, that everything exists from the perspective of the individual, the individual holds a privileged position to dictate what is and isn't true, and to legitimatise their way of interpreting and characterising all concepts and things — Judaka

Not to drag @Judaka into this, but solipsism is not a better, more powerful position; it is seen as the the only available position, but a powerless one. I cannot know that you exist, or, in a less dramatic example, know your pain. And the idea of "reality", as a quality everything has or that we compare things against, is the measure that makes the world illusory to us.

You only need to sufficiently doubt the idea [ solipsism ] — Judaka

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And although many of the conclusions of solipsism can be doubted, the truth of it is that knowledge fails to provide us with certainty of others and our world.

I am convinced or sure that I cannot have absolute irrefutable knowledge. — Antony Nickles

Who would refute it though ? And what would refutation mean ? If the self is all there is, there is nothing the self can be wrong or right about.

What I was doing with the statement above was re-wording your comment that: "I am certain that I cannot be certain". The skeptic is not "right" that the self is all there is. His truth is that there is no fact to make us certain of others or the external world. We can be all alone in the world; it can be that the world does not meaningfully exist for us.
— green flag

How could logical norms be binding? — green flag

They aren't.

Unless there is something I can be wrong about, what can uncertainty mean? — green flag

Lack of justification by knowledge; not being sure--having doubt. Now if we want to say "unless there is something to doubt..." it is not that the skeptic doubts the world exists; they doubt we can be certain it exists.

This is not a mathematical proof but an attempt to make visible the basic unintelligibility of solipsism. — green flag

I agree this is not math, but, again, your resorting to calling it unintelligible does not refute it--it's giving up.

it's not clear as it stands why desire is not a personal feeling. — green flag

It would maybe be clearer to say, their argument has a logical prerequisite.

I can answer any questions about the posts I have made, but probably the most helpful might be reading the attached essay of Cavell's where he dissects the truth of solipsism from what we feel compelled to make it mean.

"I am certain that I cannot be certain." — green flag

These are two different senses of certain. I am convinced or sure that I can not have absolute irrefutable knowledge. More to the point though, it is the skeptical conclusion of the solipsist, not their salvation or any kind of refutation of skepticism.

If you are making something like a psychological point, then maybe I agree." — green flag

Part of the history of analytical philosophy is that Plato and Descartes and Kant and the Tractatus, wanted something particular from philosophy, that is a desire, but not a personal "psychological" feeling. It is a logical prerequisite, which leads to an oversight.

In the case of this thread, my hypothesis is that the fear of solipsism is actually a fantasy of solipsism. — green flag

Cavell will say there is both. The desire to remove the faulty human from knowledge is also the wish to be unknowable, special, not responsible.

When entertained as a philosophical thesis, subject to rational norms, it's absurd — green flag

If we dictate the terms on which we accept anything, it's easy to dismiss everything. But at the basis of skepticism (leading to solipsism) is the truth that there is no fact to give us a foundation of certainty in knowledge; that if we require that threshold criteria, the world does fall apart in our hands, our moral realm becomes unnavigable, others are unknown to us--not as a fantasy, but actually--that these outcomes can be true. There is no refuting this without calling it absurd or illogical or just a theoretical issue, or having god or the Forms save us, or cutting off the need for anything meaningful (abandoning what is essential about anything in barring the thing-in-itself).

What is the minimal concept (in an epistemological/metaphysical context) of a world ? Of a self ? The world is something that I can be wrong about. — green flag

The skeptic would say that acceptance that we can be wrong does not provide any foundation for our knowledge of the world--they can always fall back on the irrefutable position that everything can be uncertain, wrong. What I am suggesting is that there is a way not to refute skepticism, or dismiss it, without taking the bait that it is necessary to prove our knowledge of the world, because knowledge is not our only relationship to the world and others (see above).

solipsism has basically been proven wrong (or absurd or confused. — green flag

true - but irrelevant. — Manuel

foolish and impractical it is for one to believe something while knowing it makes them miserable. — Judaka

...someone ended up proving solipsism true." — Darkneos

Solipsism, born from skepticism, is not ridiculous, or just illogical, or wrong.

Cavell (through Wittgenstein) shows that there is something that the skeptic is getting at that is true. If we want only to rely on justification, proof, certainty, than we see nothing else, and so are only left with their lack, sliding right through the cracks of the world into a void--there is no fact to solve this. But knowledge is not the only way we relate to the world. The truth of Skepticism is that part of being human is our part, to step forward with courage, to treat the other as if they are a human (as if they have a soul Wittgenstein would say), meaning not as if they were real, because I don't know your pain, I react to it (or ignore it).

I can understand as someone whom philosophy changed dramatically. I was searching for what had or made meaning, and ran straight into Plato and Descartes, only coming out through realizing, in Wittgenstein, and Emerson through Cavell, and Nietzsche analyzing Kant, that it is not "appearance" vs "reality", because that whole picture is created by our desire to have certainty; the criteria we create and require. So if nothing satisfies that need, you live only in that skepticism until nothing has meaning.

The thing is, the world does have solidity. The criteria for a thing being what it is, for its "existing", have developed through our whole history. The difference between what is a plea and what is a claim, is actual, ordinary, common. You know what an excuse is, different than a reason. These are the bounds and points of flex of our culture, not by fragile agreement, but through the thrust of our ancient lives carried on by what we claim as our future duties. All of this: is outside you. Yet still, rather than accept it, its uncertainty, you can kill the whole world. Up again old heart, as Emerson says, and, also, that patience and hope are needed for insight, more than thought.

This made me think of one of my favorite quotes from Stephen Jay Gould, a great science writer—In science, ‘fact’ can only mean ‘confirmed to such a degree that it would be perverse to withhold provisional assent.' — T Clark

Gould spoke where I went to school at Willamette about rapid evolutionary changes. When someone asked about creationism, he started yelling at them (as if they were perverse). The point about science is that it does not need assent. The method could be done by anyone and the results are the same. Your moral claim on me needs to be acknowledged by me (or rejected). You swear allegiance to a country. But we do not agree about science (disagreeing with someone's science is to say it was done poorly). Now you can ignore science's facts or exagerate their significance, but those are political moves, not scientific ones. Gould is right in saying science is confirmed; and this just means we've done the same experiment enough times to be sure it wasn't a fluke, not that we are confirming our hypothesis against anything--"the world" or "reality".

So, again, to say my belief (opinion, theory, etc.) is justified (say by the facts of science) does not make it a higher order of belief, now deemed "knowledge". It's just a statement of fact; the only relationship to belief which it has is the kind of belief that is a guess, to which the fact is an answer with certainty--"I believe it's raining out" "Well, let's go and look and we will know". But there are other senses of belief that are not just uncertain guesses, such as "I believe in my son".

Humans have knowledge when they demonstrate the application. — Richard B

I would go one further and say that we have knowledge when we meet the criteria for someone to say we have the knowledge (criteria as the term is used by Wittgenstein in the Investigations). One difference being that there are different kinds of "knowledge" and so different criteria. One overlooked use is as acknowledgement. "I know you are in pain" being a recognition of your pain, your plight, your claim on me morally to react to your situation, etc.

Calling all knowledge belief justified to be true is an imposed (made up) criteria, desiring certainty before looking at how various kinds of knowledge actually work. Science is not justifying beliefs; it is a method. A fact is something you or I or anyone can replicate through a competent experiment. We know that oxygen has a weight of X because when anyone yada yadas it, it always comes to X. The reason for the desire for something certain and the invention of abstact criteria are more complicated, but one reason is that we create "justification of truth" as a way to avoid our responsibility for offering ordinary reasons and standing behind them.

So maybe, is there some core thing to which all of these various areas of interest contribute mutually, whether individually or in concert? Time and again the answer seems to be the self or... the sefl-in-sociey — Pantagruel

I agree. Though philosophy obviously has made contributions in: say, starting science, creating the model for psychotherapy, etc., I would argue that searching for certainty (scientific knowledge) is not really doing the core of what philosophy is anymore (con-tra-visy!!), which is the betterment of me, and my relationship with the other.

A lot of philosophy is simply analogous to the human condition. The Republic is not just about society and politics. We are the Republic; we are rulers over the domain that is our self--it is about how the human self works, as is The Prince, The Bhagavad Vita, Zarathustra, etc. Wittgenstein's Investigations is not about language, as most take it. He is looking at the things we say about the world as evidence of our desires and what matters to us about it--seeing the ordinary things we say as a reflection and/or projection of our self (analogously, in a sense).

Logic, modern "ethics" courses, and how the brain works don't make you a better person the same way as struggling to really understand philosophy through the process of reading it (allowing yourself to be read by/through it), rather than just getting the gist of it off wikipedia or imagining you understand it (or other's posts) at first glance, say, thinking we can summarize it, label it, dismiss it.

And not everything is philosophy. Its peripheral tasks have been peeled off into science, sociology, anthropology, behavioral psychology, etc. So to say it is a matter of interest just means you have other interests than the central domain of philosophy, or just have an end game for "philososphy"--say, fixing skepticism with science or logical theories.

I think this is the basis for a kind of meliorism.... — Pantagruel

I take philosophy as a process, more akin to psychotherapy than science or pragmatism or teleology--examining hidden implications, uncovering frameworks created by our desires or judgments, making our ordinary overlooked lives explicit--basically, reflecting on ourselves (even through investigating the world, e.g., Socrates, Hegel, Wittgenstein, etc.) Emerson and Nietzsche and Cavell call this perfectionism, but it is a journey of personal growth, not the establishment of a theoretical attitude.

When I say (perhaps too flippantly) that Kant "erased us", I was referring to his pre-requirement for logical necessity and predetermination which forced him to remove, in a sense, the individual--say, as in science, where it does not matter who is doing the experiment correctly, the answer will be the same. Nietzsche is reacting to that move in reintroducing "the human", along with history, cultural context, and our continuing responsibility.

Real human individuals, in the form of “finite human beings” never are alone sufficient for that which exemplifies philosophical thought — Mww

Wittgenstein would point out that the requirement to be considered "sufficient" to be philosophy is imposed by our desire for certainty, or, as Kant would say:

[ the ] transcendental unity of apperception is established as the absolute requirement of experience — Jamal

So “us” may have referred to philosophers — Jamal

I was referring to "us" as the condition of human uncertainty faced (or ignored) by each person, making philosophy our ticket to seeing our part (and with others), thus bettering our response, ourselves.

So would it be fair to say you see philosophy itself as kind of enlightened humanism? — Pantagruel

I think philosophy is about texts, or discussions, and so not limited to a position or theory or topic, but I think I see what you are wondering about. And I would say that there is a tendency to avoid our failings and vagaries in hope of something certain and determined, etc., and, to the extent philosophy is tempted to remove our responsibility to ourself, is one way we end up no longer doing the work of philosophy.

I'm interested in what people think best exemplifies philosophical thought. — Pantagruel

The fundamental example that philosophy provides is the betterment of the self. Socrates' questions were to learn about, say, the good, but the reason was to become more, grow, change, and expand our understanding of who we are. In the modern era, Nietszche was creating the space for this after Kant erased us from the picture, Hegel showed us a method to loosen our rigidity, and Wittgenstein took up Socrates reflection on our concepts to find that our desires and interests are within them. Stanley Cavll is my favorite current practitioner, most explicitely in the introduction to Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome, which are essays on what he calls moral perfectionism. Most other philosophical areas are just specialized interests on this theme, or attempts to ignore or circumvent the process entirely.

How can it be said the meaning is a property of the expression—its use, its context, its syntax, its content, its whatever—if Y could not derive from it its meaning, and if Z has not expressed anything? — NOS4A2

Without getting clear about any antithetical claim (or what criteria are being used to judge), let's take the definite position: meaning is a property of the expression. One corollary is that, X has something more than Y does, than Y ever could. One imagining is that this is an object--as @Banno was trying to point out--that the explanation would be based on the picture of how we treat "things" (say, here the word, there the thing). However, the claim is true if we shift the "thing" which X "has", to be: the responsibility. The "property" of the expression is not imbued by X and not Y (X's "meaning"). It is simply that Y cannot be held to account for speaking X's words (or could, only unjustly). Y will point to X (unless Y is quoting, etc.) The extent X "means" them is the extent X will stand up for them. X does not "use" them any more than Y does. That they are X's "expression", and not Y's, is only that X is the individual who owns (up to) them (or disowns them). The "meaning" is also not "in the expression" (taken as: the words); the question of meaning does not come up unless Z has to ask, and then Z asks X. Without any X, Z may conjecture from evidence (context, etc.), but Y cannot help; in fact, X may know less than Z can confidently piece together. We could even say this interpretation is an expression of Z.

some people look past the text’s attempt to analyze consciousness and the meaning of geist there are harsh criticisms that the book has inspired fascism, communism, and overall totalitarianism. I — Dermot Griffin

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In reading the Phenomonolgy of Spirit, I understood his discussions of topical situations to be created as examples, to illustrate our tendency to want to think in dichotomies, and not a claim about the state of the world. I find this use of examples like Wittgenstein's--though not as self-aware, open to acknowledging his limitations, less humble--in Witt's investigation of our tendency to desire certainty. My understanding of the terms is that this focus is analytical (about us, our desire for simplicity) rather than continental (a comment on society, e.g., Arendt or Foucalt), but to discuss our concpts is to discuss the world, so maybe it's a matter of interest.

Can you provide an example of this [understanding another’s speech on their terms, treating it as expressions of their interests, as possibilities of a human life] in action in one of the purported democracies? — Tom Storm

In the essay of Dewey's that I attached to the original post, he claims, more even than not purporting a explicit version, that democracy is not maintained in institutions at all (separation of powers, voting, protesting, etc.), but personally by us and interpersonally in how we treat others. It might not look like it, but this is analytical philosophy; he is describing the limits of the category of democracy as Kant uses that word--the necessary conditions and threshold criteria to judge whether what is happening can be categorized as democracy (at all).

That being said, an example is always a good idea, but it would be an example of a political dispute (different than a moral dispute or a factual dispute). What makes a dispute political is that no one is in an authoritative (better) place to make an assertion (say, to claim what is right); it is in that way that we are all equal (this is the same position each person is in when doing Ordinary Language Philosophy--like Wittgenstein--it is in finding for yourself grounds for my claim that it has validity as evidence).

So we are using a democratic method to approach a dispute. The Dewey essay is actually quoted in a book I just read on philosophy of education, The Gleam of Light (a bit repetitive and explaining to the inside of a bubble of understanding already, but); the claim is that education should not be held to a scientific standard but to the measures of a child becoming their future selves. Now, democratically, Dewey wants us to learn what desires and needs are attached to conditions as they are, in this case, let's say: how a child learns to come into themselves. My interests are not something I would tell you, only in this case in some way different than opinions and argument. My desires and needs are able to be investigated and described without me--though also through what I say. (To clarify, learning about my interests has been interpreted as my self-interest, which is taken as only what benefits me; for Dewey, what I am interested in is more like: what I am focused on.) I would say that Dewey is interested in allowing a child freedom and the ability to express themselves, including questioning the status quo, so that they learn about themselves and develop their interests and fulfill their needs; not necessarily in conflict with the State, yet possibly apart from it. The interests of using a quantitive measure of outcomes could be said to be to allow for a standard that is certain--comparable, calculable, able to measure the effects of change, etc. Not a very personal claim, nor a dispute over the administration of such educations, but I hope that shows the methodology and difference of Dewey's approach to someone's claim in a political dispute.

Well, democracy is not our participation in a process (say, voting), it is not the granting of power or authority, it is a way we live. It is not codified in law; what is right is not determined, it is entered into together (not as an agreement, but as a life together, a union, a government, etc.). Also, it is not in allowing others the right to speak; it is in understanding their speech on their terms, treating it as expressions of their interests, as possibilities of a human life.

Just that Dewey is not talking about "the process" of democracy, but the conditions of its existence, what makes it what it is (not how it works, but how it is at all, say, compared to other forms of government). Democracy is based on our personal treatment of others:

living... as an example of human partiality... as the human individual... open to the further self, in oneself and in others, which means... making oneself intelligible to each other as an inhabitant now also of a further realm ["of the human"]... prepared to recognize others as belonging there... [and] not to... depress, and cynicize and ironize. — "

Cavell echoes Dewey's call for the act (not "idea") of the creation of democracy through our treatment of others and their expressions. We are not asked to trust the other: that they will join, reciprocate, or end together with us (say, at "well being", even). Dewey talks of faith in my and the other's (equal) "possibility". We are not trusting (naively hoping) that they will be rational like us, our duty is to grant that their judgment and actions have intelligibility, even if we do not yet understand how. Our trust is that there is a future world where all our interests are understood.

there has to be at least one argument for democracy — Agent Smith

What I wanted to convey is that for Dewey democracy is not come to through argument. The way in which we come to democracy is through pledging our allegiance (much as you do not get married by making a decision, you make vows)--this does not mean you can not have reasons for your allegiance (nor that you can't make a decision to get married). Dewey focuses on conditions as they are because democracy lacks the grounds to assert right or an ideal--we are compromised by default and our consent does not allow us leverage against the individual ills of the state. It is our mutual trust and friendship (being an example to each other to see a different way) that allows for greater intelligibility and further contexts.

From what I've read the only thing I would say about happiness is that philosophically it is set against despairing of the truth (as Nietzsche puts it) and letting the inevitable failures of democracy disappoint us. This is why Emerson tries to "cheer" us and both speak of "joy" in the face of skepticism, finding a peace Wittgenstein will say.

no type of government is wholly good or wholly bad — Agent Smith

To tie this back in, there is not an argument for democracy; Dewey is describing democracy without advocating for it because equality and freedom are principals born from the human condition for the perfection of the self. Democracy by nature is free, so there is no set end goal (teleologically) thus effectiveness is not its ordinary criteria (this is different for our institutions, including our government). We either have democracy or it teeters into tyranny (Plato says). Its the kind of thing to which we pledge ourselves; we subject ourselves to its terms of judgment, which is why Dewey speaks in terms of treason and treachery. This is a realm like the moral that Nietszche puts beyond (the terms of) good and evil.

So we can put ourselves in the shoes of some other that calls this 'Commie indoctrination'. They are not letting us in the house to discuss.To them, we are undermining the foundations. They are claiming the virtue word 'democracy' for themselves and excluding us from it. Now you can say oh that's politics and this is democracy, and I can agree, but what are we to do about the Republican Party? — unenlightened

I understand you feel the lack of power here, and you are not wrong. When Dewey reacts to those chiding his call for democracy as a "utopia", it is in the same vein as, "yeah, but what about the real world?" The truth is there is no fact that matters enough to have any effect. There is no convincing; there is no "but don't you see"; knowledge is not power. In the face of that, it would seem that whatever is the most powerful will rule; that justice is simply the interests of the stronger, or--more pertinent here--that we decide or agree what is right, and that (institutionalized) will rule by judgement. But Dewey's call for understanding is not wishful thinking; it is a different playing field. We do not regularly look at the conditions and criteria of our concepts (apologizing, judging, thinking, following a rule, etc.); likewise, we do not normally consider our interests and needs. To investigate the others' is to enlighten both of you. There may be no changing their opinion, but it may be that we change them, or at least change their awareness of themselves, say, that their needs and our needs differ less than our opinions, or our encampments. Now, they may still call names, refuse engagement, moralize, etc., however, if it is not an argument, there is less antagonism and maybe less defensiveness. In the end, however, your duty is your own, but this is not how Dewey wishes democracy could be--if we ignore that these are the conditions for the betterment of our political realm, then we are blind also (treacherously Dewey says) to the structure of the perfection of ourselves.

Plato thought that knowledge was greater than or equal to virtue; that, if we knew what the good was, we'd do it. But I side with Emerson, who says "character is higher than intellect", or, i.e., what we do matters more than what we know. Cavell takes from Wittgenstein that there is more to the world beyond knowledge: I don't know your pain, I accept it, react to it. Here, Dewey is saying democracy is up to how we treat each other, not whether we are free to tell each other our opinions.

Tyranny? What about Socrates' philosopher kings and Buddhism's wisdom kings? Mythical, like dragons? — Agent Smith

I need more. Are we asking why tyranny? as if, what does tyranny have to do with democracy? say, when we are off searching for the right and good in order to rule justly? (the answer in the face of, simply: might makes right) And, if that's close to the case, I would conjecture that Dewey would say the philosopher king is one more tyrant; that the good and right oppress us because they take the conversation of justice away from our interests (abstract it), removing the human, in order to create some certainty (knowing the right, we know what we ought to do, and we can avoid failing to do so).

This does not deny rationality, it makes rational agreement a local and imperfect achievement. — Joshs

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We do not need to agree on or share interests or needs; and the means for discussing those are just the conditions of the world as they are. Yes, Gadamar is correct that there is no guarantee our dispute will be resolved; we may not be able to find or maintain any kind of union, but the fact of this does not make the means for it any less workable, nor does it relinquish our duty to try. All of the limits and qualifications described are not the barrier here—Wittgenstein shows that we share enough of our lives to get at our essential desires and needs (there is nothing special about you).

We are actually what gets in the way: the ideas of universality and certainty are the standards we--along with Plato, Kant, Descartes, etc--fantasize about which cause us to overlook our existing conditions (Wittgenstein will call them “our ordinary criteria”). Since we can’t have knowledge with certainty in politics, we think we can only settle for opinion (people condescend to call Dewey “optimistic” or his democracy a “utopia” because it sidesteps the criteria of certainty). This is how we feel that we cannot even get started (our "anterior" preconditions have not been met). And Dewey is not calling for us to agree in our opinions (nor contract for a knowledge of the right or good), or even to “agree” (say, to decide on the means, or the conditions). His measures of our political structure (its requirements for being democracy; its "grammar" Wittgenstein will call ito) are actions, not agreements or answers or endings.

Additionally, people would rather state an opinion, and judge others on theirs, because then they do not need to be responsible for bridging the gap between us, standing for the other (taking their stance, seeing from their position), which would also mean being known, answering for our own desires and needs.

Lyotard is correct that our community (he calls it the "we") is "always in question". For quoting, here's Stanley Cavell: "we are separate, but not necessarily separated (by something).... "there is no assignable end to the depth of us to which language reaches; ...nevertheless there is no end to our separateness. We are endlessly separate [bodies], for no reason. But then we are answerable for everything that comes between us." The Claim of Reason, p. 369.

But Dewey is reacting to tyranny, just as the founders did, even mentioning a simpler time when it was strictly physical tyranny rather than the tyranny over ours and others’ selves (the self; he calls it “moral”). And he even discusses the institution of our democracy, structured in the hope of curbing tyranny, which, he says, lulls us into the thought that that structure will perpetuate democracy without me, without my being responsible personally other than in participating externally (even, say, in protesting).

He does talk of the importance of “attitudes”, and I tied that to our position in relation to others, but Dewey also talks of “faith” in others, as the kind of trust we must have in ourselves in reaching for a greater, as yet unknown, self. And I think it is selective to think of the formation of our country as coming only from mistrust. Our democratic hope for all people is one of attainment of a happy founding of our self in freedom (this is not “optimistic”; it’s claimed as part of the structure of our human condition). To stop at cynicism is, in Dewey’s words, “treachery”; I have said above that the possibility of failure in an ethical conversation does not equate to its irrationality.

are there necessarily situations where we cannot even agree to disagree? This is what Lyotard refers to as the paralogical situation, where the very terms of the conversation exclude participants, so that neither agreement not disagreement is possible. — Joshs

It seems obvious to say yes; sometimes when we are intransigent, others where we do not have common-enough interests to make disagreement possible. But both of these seem peripheral. To say that it is possible to talk past each other, even probable, appears to be a social observation and perhaps critique and not evidence for a structural philosophical insight. It seems to come back to the old panic that, because we may not come to agreement in an ethical discussion, there must not be any rationality. It remains the claim that democracy is the duty to put yourself in the others' shoes and investigate the desires and needs involved in the dispute at hand.

Unfortunately, there is no escape from the politics — unenlightened

To the extent we allow ourselves to fall into what Dewey calls cliques, sects, and antagonistic factions (which I take as what you mean by “politics”), we are not practicing democracy. We could call it the tyranny of others' opinions (even those we agree with). To say we care about your interests but not your opinions is to admit that politics is not disinterested, but that our interests are not isolated but expressed in our institutions. This is not that I tell you what my interests are, but that what is (the conditions as they are) gives away our interest in it, it contains what matters to us about it.

I make much of the use of the word 'indoctrination' because it is used as a term of abuse projected by those who would abuse onto those who want to prevent that abuse. This practice, which has infected the US and the world, destroys the language and society with it. — unenlightened

I'm not sure I understand exactly what you're saying, but a less charged word would be "training", though it implies conscious effort, which is usually not the case. We are trained in the ways of our lives: apologizing, pointing, obeying rules, etc. We pick these up as we go along by a kind of osmosis: watching others, following examples, being corrected, explicitly told some things, etc. Language is picked up the same way; there is no meaning for every word such that I teach you each one and that covers all applications--most of the time its a kind of thing where we know to use this phrase in that type of situation. Now you are talking about the occurrence of someone with one culture being forced into the ways of another; but there is no habitable place outside of every culture, and so Dewey, as you say, starts in the house we have, but his fight is not between progress and stasis, but between the cultural and the personal.

the idea that need and desire can be separated from knowledge of things as they are has been questioned. — Joshs

I'd be interested to know where that ties in to the tradition, but I don't take Dewey as wanting to separate the two; only for us to see that knowledge contains our interests. As he says: institutions are our expressions; they are projections and extensions of us. Importantly also though, we are not talking about knowledge of “things” but of our “conditions”—Wittgenstein will call this "grammar", their "possibilities" (#90)—which are the particulars of a thing's context: the options and the criteria of how we differentiate between them, count something as something; this is how they contain our desires and needs (what is essential to us about them--PI #371) and how they are the means of sharing our interests with each other.

If desire co-constitutes things as they seem to be , then things as they ‘are’ cannot be a basis of consensus without also being the basis of marginalization and repression. There will always be those left out of the conversation of mankind. — Joshs

In saying our desires and needs are satisfied by the “knowledge of conditions as they are”, Dewey is not contrasting this with how things "seem to be". He is alluding to, but rejecting, the traditional framework that our political conversation is about what “ought” to be, thus our goal is not to come to consensus, say, in our opinions or to Plato’s “knowledge” (as addressed by Wittgenstein in #241). And so there is no "basis" that need be fixed (not even from Rawls' original position), including and thus excluding, though I find your bringing up marginalization intriguing. I would agree there is no guarantee that my interests and needs will be manifest: our times may be degenerate Thoreau would say; or, despite it not being due to inhabited hatred, oppression can be institutionalized; or, because it is the responsibility of each to find and follow their own voice, we may fail in hating ourselves.

As a postscript, Wittgenstein will also find our need to "go beyond knowledge" (e.g., in the face of another's pain, PI 3rd, p. 225), and this brings up that the political realm (like the moral realm) has its time and place as an event, when we disagree. As with most philosophy, we do not usually reflect to see ourselves in our institutions, to make conscious the implications of our acts, to remember the criteria we use to judge. Our duty is to find our actual disagreement, if any truly exists, by learning about the other's interests and needs (as Wittgenstein searches for our "real need" in #108). Instead of arguing about an abstract right, we are learning about what matters to each other. In doing so, we have the possibility to truly understand each other, and, if we do still disagree, we at least do so rationally, having preserved our community, our union.

The victims of bigotry and coercion should remember insights such as these, especially when terms such as “democracy” leak from the other side of a hater’s mouth.[/quote]

To understand, what would the victims remember? And to what gain?

I'm also interested in your bringing up the forces against democracy. Dewey is defining freedom of speech not as our being free to say whatever we want, but as a duty to bring each other together. Your allegiance is not to the state, but to your fellow citizen. Acceptance is the "essential condition of the democratic way of living", not just the opportunity to say something, to tell us your beliefs. It is not the content of our speech, nor is it agreement—as if convinced to esteem something true or right or fact—it is allowing the others' words to be an expression, which is to say that we read a full person into them. The goal is not to judge them (bad, or even good, say, because they share our opinions) but to enlarge and deepen that reading to get through to a place where we can appreciate and respect the other, learn their desires and needs, their history and context, to acknowledge the self of the other as a moral not an empirical claim. Our treason then, is failing in what Emerson calls the "upbuilding" of people as part of his similar call for the perfection of the individual, here in American Scholar (but, most directly, in Self-Reliance). Our work is the opposite of hate, and so, love. If not to suppress the individual voice, then to listen in a new way, as if to a friend, as if to our own self.

Despite the title of this discussion (being provocative simply to draw attention), I wouldn’t say Dewey is against institutions or truth or science or culture, even as something that must become fixed, an end. Democracy is “experience as end and as means” which generates the authority for our further direction. But that experience is ours: we are democracy; the way we come to ourselves and treat others, which is always becoming enlarged and enriched. And so the enemy is not these things in themselves except maybe their use against our greater selves, and the necessary freedom and support from us.

So I take the framing as the personal rather than the public (process, abstraction, institution, constitution, theory, etc.) as hate comes in all forms and for all reasons: maybe not just defense of a fixed state, but as me against you, even treating you only as what you say in abstraction, in violence of its life “in your shoes” (as “expression” of what matters or revealing your interests—a key term of Wittgenstein’s as well)—looked at as merely opinion or beliefs in argument of what is true or false.

And so conservative vs progressive are too loaded, not only as associated with beliefs, but because defense and provocation do not capture Dewey’s non-partisan indictment of suppression, silencing, dismissal, etc. as these can come from any encampment, and Dewey is trying to avoid stratification itself. As an example, an argument against perfectionism (say against Nietszche’s will or Emerson’s whim) is that it is selfish or solipsistic or “subjective”, but there is nothing stopping someone’s duty and expression to be aligned with the state, to others, or in congruence with culture (not, however, in “sacrifice”, or suppression or abandonment, of our self they will admonish).

And yes education for Dewey is a term for something special, so something merely additional to the necessary and inevitable indoctrination with the ways of our lives (their criteria and judgments Wittgenstein will call it). Encouraging all of us to reach for our higher self is in the same spirit as our duty to “learn” from those with whom we disagree (quoted from the essay) to be broadened to a larger world, a more complete vision of how things are (a fuller perspective on the grammar of the criteria of a practice as Wittgenstein puts it).

His interest in the use of concepts helps to dispel the myth that the words "pain", "understanding", "meaning", etc., are used to refer only (or at all) to mental processes. That is what I consider the PI to be about — Luke

I'm not arguing against this; the picture of mental processes is of the kind of "hidden" thing under discussion here (one example among others like rules, meaning, essence, knowledge, etc.) I am merely claiming that Wittgenstein goes further to find out why we project these myths and that that cause is not dispelled in a generalized way for all time.