It will frequently turn out to be the case that our everyday conceptions are inadequate for understanding what we find, even misleading, but we can also come to understand why we have come to conceive of things as we ordinarily do. — Srap Tasmaner

And this is the story philosophy has told itself, that ordinary criteria for judgment are “inadequate” and/or “misleading”, thus the advent of “appearances” and that philosophy’s job was to understand objects directly or actually or completely. And now science has taken the bait to really tell us how things are, as if the answer was the missing part and not the first step of turning our human condition into an intellectual problem. Science here is trying to answer a rigged question that is not about knowledge. Philosophy does not have the success of science, with its sturdy, repeatable, dependable conclusions; it’s meant to transform people. A moral discussion can always end without agreement, but that is not a reason to retreat to only what we can know (say, about the brain).

Rather than denying our responsibility for what we do with these capabilities, it provides the ground we stand on when we have those discussions. — Srap Tasmaner

Abandoning our regular criteria for distinguishing an object in favor of a scientific explanation is the desire to have something we can know and which removes ourselves from the issue, rather than it being an ordinary act (distinguishing) that we do for ourselves or others, or fail to do, or make mistakes in doing. And when I distinguish an object to someone, and they ask how I am distinguishing that object (in what way am I distinguishing it, by what features or attributes), no one ever explains a process of the brain. It is not the ground of any discussion, a scientific explanation is the end of (reasonable) discussion (other than scientific correction).

My version… just shows them why they were so puzzled… — Srap Tasmaner

And this is the hope for science (for some)—that it will solve philosophy—but philosophy is puzzled because it doesn’t recognize the part that our fantasies play in requiring certainty as an answer. Simply believing that, yes, we can have an answer! is not the way out of the bottle, it is fuel to the fire.

science is a dogma-free zone — Srap Tasmaner

When I say certainty I only mean predictable, repeatable, knowable, etc., which are the criteria for the conclusions of the scientific method. EDIT: most importantly here is that it does not matter which (competent) person does the experiment to reach the same conclusion.

There are well-known ways -- various optical illusions, in particular -- in which if you think that's what you're getting, what you actually get will be awfully confusing. — Srap Tasmaner

That the brain can make errors does not account for all the errors that can be made (and its errors can be understood in advance). And the exact point is that if we are talking about brain processes, we’re not talking about mistakes and excuses and responsibility because of the desire to make our interplay with objects pure instead of muddled with those considerations and our relation to others.

And what is “given” is our lives over the span of human history, all the practices and expectations and implications and shared judgments and interests and failings. Reason and knowledge are not our only relation to the world but that doesn’t mean the relation is hidden from us, only that at times it is a matter of living through it; a matter of, say, me identifying to you which object or part of an object is of interest to me, which is making you “aware” of it (or failing to).

If by training you had in mind some kind of social convention, that's just not it. — Srap Tasmaner

Not sure you’ve specified what it isn’t, but focusing on our biological relationship to objects is fine (it’s not wrong), but only, it’s trying to answer a question that philosophy has misconstrued out of fear and desire (how do we know the back side of the object exists?, etc.)

Hume wanted causality and “real” objects, but his desire overlooked the unexamined ordinary ways we handle our world, and the mistakes we make in it, which created his fantasy of things that could be known, only somehow we’re just out of our reach (see Plato and “virtue”).

And it looks like we are not aware of how some of the basic building blocks of the world are put together for us because we cannot be. The connections aren't there. It may present a bit like a habitual activity that you can perform "on automatic", without thinking, but there are things that you were never thinking, not consciously. — Srap Tasmaner

Yet science can find these magical processes, though the cart is before the horse, as somehow we know what we should be explaining, but have only just not yet explained it.

it does appear that objects are by and large constructed within the brain, without our awareness, — Srap Tasmaner

What we want with this picture is to understand seeing and identification of objects without our participation in the process. The chance of error previously led philosophy to create the idea of “appearances” (compared to something more “real” or certain). The current fascination with brain processes comes from the same desire. The fact of the brain’s development of object permanence, etc. does nothing to help us understand “seeing” “recognizing” “differentiating” “mistaking” “changing aspects” etc., all of which are activities, not hidden brain processes. Our usual “unawareness” of these acts are because we are so trained in them we handle everything effortlessly, until everything falls apart or we turn to reflect on them in doing philosophy. For example: I point out an object you had no awareness of and you “construct” it into your world in learning to identify and differentiate it, learn where to find it, etc. In an actual sense, your unawareness of it as a separate distinct object means it does not exist (for you), as you have no reasons for it to matter, no criteria of our reasons to be interested in it. Basically, the brain’s activity during all this is not critical to, nor does it illuminate, the philosophical issues involved.

"Human"?

Dogs don't bury bones? Beavers don't build dams? Owls don't catch field mice? — Srap Tasmaner

Of course. I only meant to say activities, as: different and more than brain processes; ones we are responsible for, judge the adequacy of. We could say other animals share or can share some with us, even regarding objects, but, of course, we have our own relations to objects; say, our (human alone) relation to our understanding of our relation to objects.

(1) where do we get the criteria for what counts as an object? — NotAristotle

It’s a function of how objects have mattered to us over the course of human life; the different ways we are interested in them compared to, say, theories, or colors, or apologies. When we deal with objects, what do we count as a correct or appropriate judgment or approach or point in their identity, use, differentiation, mistakes, clarity, etc., such as: recognizing it as distinct, being made aware of a part (that you see and I didn’t), presuming a complete picture although we only see a part, etc.

And we come by these criteria in getting raised in our culture through training, watching, mistakes, etc., (unconsciously as it were, not using them overtly), and as philosophers (explicating them) because we can all propose criteria and agree with others’ claims. Wittgenstein and ordinary language theory get these criteria, or “grammar” as he terms it, by looking at what we normally say when, in this example, when we are dealing with objects. What happens is philosophy wants to abandon these ordinary criteria and impose a requirement for certainty first, which creates a fantasy picture of something mental from a desire to have something we can find out for sure.

(2) I think the issue is a "how does our brain do that" mystery. Light enters the brain through the retina, it is parsed as images (lines, shapes, colors, and so on). At what point does that assemblage of lines shapes, colors, etc. become an object? If it's the brain that does that, how does it do so? — NotAristotle

Sure, the brain is doing stuff (vision, attention, focus, etc.) but it does not determine why we are interested in objects, the ways in which they matter to us; our turning our attention to one, our pointing one out from another, identifying one, etc. One way to put this is that physical science can’t do the work of philosophy, can’t solve our concerns and confusions with our human condition. We want it to take us (our failings) out of the picture, but the process of working with objects is a human activity.

Philosophy has been getting mixed up about this for a long time. It starts with error (in recognizing or identifying) and then tries to gain certainty (wanting to see an object “distinctly” as you say). The current manifestation to ensure our control is knowledge of the brain (cause then it will be science! and not us, subject to making mistakes). Your question is both easy and hard. How do we see an object as an object?

“See that object over there.
The grass?
No, I said, the object, dummy.
You mean the cat?
Oh, that’s a cat?”
Or
“You mean the cat?
No, I see the cat. The weird object with the lights above it.
Oh, yeah. Huh.”

We have criteria for what counts as an object, and can judge between cases. We have expectations in “pointing something out” and for seeing it, even for seeing it distinctly (from say, from the objects around it). It is a bit of a mystery because we (unreflectively) don’t usually parse out our lives that much (seems like an inherent ability), but it is not a “how does our brain do that” mystery. You grew up with objects: asking for them, pointing to them, naming them, etc. We aren’t confused about objects, we’re unsure about our future with them, because sometimes the magic doesn’t happen.

…most of the time, mathematical results are of little to no significance — Manuel

But it is the type of certainty that math has that matters: predictable, dependable, extendable to all applications, abstract from context, separate from human fallibility, rule-bound, complete, universal—in a word, perfect. Math is significant because it can find a solution for a future occurrence; it is the power behind technology, and, to an extent, the method of science.

it just seems obvious to me that intellect is far broader than will in scope. Of course, we use the will all the time (arguably), but its scope is somewhat reduced to do this or do that or don't do, more or less. — Manuel

His use of “has a wider scope” is not helping him here, but I take him to mean that we can act without thinking, that we can follow our will whether our knowledge is clear and distinct or not; for example, without being aware of the implications of an act. Part of what makes this interesting is that the force that math has to constrain us (because it is true, independent of who is doing it) is not the same as the shame, confusion, or unintelligibility that may persuade us to take a certain action, but does not have the same force upon us, on our will.

I really do find the whole "remembering" and "from within me" to be quite accurate in my experience and surprising. We need not follow its religious aspects, but it's a powerful thought. — Manuel

I would call it imagery or a mythical description of the feeling you have when you consider and realize how, for example, doing something mistakenly is different than doing it accidentally. That actions you have been doing all along can suddenly have distinctions and rationale that you had not considered, but that, when you do, causes you to acknowledge the truth of it; part awe in its being there already, and part uncanny that it is not always apparent.

certainty in one [ math ], is not translatable to certainty on another [ the existence of God ]. — Manuel

I am just getting through the next section, but I believe he is trying to claim that math and God have the same kind of certainty. As I said above, the force of math to require acceptance, but also its independence from people, their limitations, but I am still working on that.

@Manuel @frank @Janus @Paine

I was surprised, at the 11th paragraph of the Fourth Meditation, to find Descartes’ discussion of truth centered on ethics, and not epistemology or ontology. He, of course, has not let go of his desire for certainty. “when I understand something I undoubtedly understand it correctly.” But the takeaway here is that I do not usually “understand” things (reach that level of clarity and distinction), at least not immediately; to come to where we understand something takes time.

“Well, then, where do my mistakes come from? Their source is the fact that my will has a wider scope than my intellect has, so that I am free to form beliefs on topics that I don’t understand… That is the source of my error and sin.”

So Descartes’ will and judgment is falible, indirect. We must not assume we have immediate access to the truth by some internal calculation or connection to something outside us; it takes time to get clear about what makes this situation or practice distinct from others.

When he turns himself to the particular facts about the world, ordinary criteria are there that we all have access to in order to judge and act; as Plato would say, before our birth. They lie “forgotten” (implicit) embedded in our culture.

"The truths about all these matters are so open to me, and so much in harmony with my nature, that when I first discover any of them it feels less like learning something new than like remembering something I had known before, or noticing for the first time something that was already in my mind without my having turned my mental gaze onto it."

And our practices and their criteria fit his standard to a point. They are "not under [his] control" and when he thinks of them "[he is] constrained in how [he does] this". Unfortunately, for Descartes they must be "eternal, unchanging, and independent…."

So he retreats to mathematics as his example, and the properties it has are repeatable, predictable, thus proveable and so contain the certainty he needs to extrapolate that, if he understands something, it’s properties must be true as well, which is his justification that the property of existence must be true about God.

we are inclined to do or say such and such in a specific situation X, but we are not compelled to do so. — Manuel

Yes, we of course can act however we like—the only thing “compelling” us would be our customary responses. We don’t even “decide” to agree or act appropriately most of the time. An inappropriate action may not even register as a response (unless a form of rejection); it may not do anything in light of the situation (just an engine idling Wittgenstein will say PI#132); it may not even be considered an act. Something out of place does bring up the question, “Did you intend to…?” And here the workings of “intention” are now clear without being metaphysical. We have ordinary criteria to judge whether something is or is not a certain practice, we don’t make it one with our “will”.

Thank you for your continued interest.

@Manuel @frank @Janus @Paine@wonderer1

The picture of a metaphysical “will” (largely uncontested still) is that intention is a human process or ability to create meaning in language or take a certain action. That we internally choose what we mean and decide our actions.

Descartes, in paragraph 10 of the 4th Meditation, puts it as “The will is simply one’s ability to do or not do something.” I read in this that we don’t just do “anything”, but that, in a real situation, there is an expected act (“acceptance or denial, or for pursuit or avoidance”), and we can do the expected thing (the “something”), or not do it: excuse ourselves, beg off, take a stand. The options of what action to take are not inside us, only the decision of which of those available to us do we decide to do (or to do nothing). This why “intention” is not inside us as well.

So our “free will” is not: doing anything we “intend”. We are “determined” in the sense that “anything” is not (usually) open to us. What makes a movement an “act” is its place in a situation. You call a ball or a strike. Descartes calls this being “present[ed] with a candidate”. Our freedom is that, when we are presented with the possibilities in a context, “we have no sense that we are pushed one way or the other by any external force.” So our will may very well be impinged, and our freedom is not about unfettered internal agency; as Descartes puts it, “I can be free without being inclined both ways.” The will is not having every option open (being “indifferent” he says), but having a will, an inclination, passion, desire, wish; Descartes focuses on acting on principle or knowledge, but the picture is that we are partial (made whole in the act Emerson says), personal, not simply intellectual, rational.

Thank you for taking the time to read through those notes. Rather than having an alternative “answer” to Descartes’ metaphysics, I’m finding it more meaningful in seeing that the structure of his argument mirrors that of others concerning the perfection of the self.

I would prefer to say that he strives for certainty, as far as human understanding goes… But by now we know this is not possible, it's asking for way too much. — Manuel

I’m finding that the “striving” is the important part. The goal of certainty I take as self-imposed, so I wouldn’t say we don’t have the ability to understand or that we should just settle for an approximation, but that knowledge (certainty or not) is not our entire relationship to the world, that we must complete ourselves and posture ourselves towards others beyond knowing for sure the outcome or correctness or right.

@Manuel @frank @Janus @Srap Tasmaner @Paine

The third meditation, beginning at paragraph 34, is not an argument for the existence of God; it’s trying to imagine how we could exist without God. “…if God didn’t exist, from what would I derive my existence?”

Having interpreted the text to provide that we enact ourselves (or can), I will have to account for our derivation despite our imperfection. Descartes does stand by the conclusion that we are not metaphysical, that we may not exist (or continue to), though if we do exist it is without direct, conscious control over our selves.

"I experience no such power [to continue myself into the future], and this shows me quite clearly that I depend for my continued existence on some being other than myself."

Emerson and Thoreau and Nietszche at least, not to mention Freud, picture the self as divided in two, a part of which we may only allow to guide us, passively; that our conscious self is not our “cause”, as Descartes frames it. Emerson will talk about the exemplar that brings us to our next self; Nietzsche refers to this as the humanity above us. I take Descartes to be describing the same in saying the cause of us is in a "higher form". Thoreau will say we are at times in ecstasy, beside ourselves; in other words, “outside” our (conscious) selves, where Descartes only allows perfection to remain.

Descartes' case that we cannot be our own cause is partly based on our lack of knowledge of perfection. But our further self is unable to be "grasped by the finite", as Descartes puts it, because we are not a matter of knowledge. As I described above, our self is brought about in action, choice, reaction, interaction, into the future, held to our past, etc. We perfect our selves in “aspir[ing] without limit to ever greater and better things”. The self is not known or consciously chosen, but we strive and reach for what we “can’t grasp but can somehow touch with… thought.” We are not God, but our further self is “made in [God’s] image”, “gaz[ing] with wonder… contemplating… [its] majesty”.

The question is not the existence of God, but of us. “Once, on being asked… when the kingdom of God would come, Jesus replied, ‘The coming of the kingdom of God is not something that can be observed [known], nor will people say, ‘Here it is,’ or ‘There it is,’ because the kingdom of God is in your midst’”. Luke 17:21, New International Ver. (or “within you” in the King James Ver.)

@Manuel @frank @Paine @Janus @Srap Tasmaner

By the 28th paragraph of meditation 3, there only remains the possibility that the idea of the “infinite, eternal, unchangeable, independent” (etc.) is beyond his ability to doubt.

“my perception of the infinite, i.e. God, is in some way prior to my perception of the finite, i.e. myself. Whenever I know that I doubt something or want something, I understand that I lack something and am therefore not wholly perfect.” (Emphasis added)

I find the crux here in the throwaway feeling of “lacking” something, as he was shaken at the beginning to find himself capable of being wrong when he thought he was fine; misinformed, or betrayed by society’s habitual opinions and practices. He takes this “lack” as a problem to be solved completely before proceeding, rather than part of our human condition to be addressed going forward in each case.

The “some way” in which the infinite (perfect) is “prior to” the perception of the finite (let’s say, human fallibility) is our desire for certainty. We set it as a pre-requisite and impose that criteria over our ordinary standards and workings of our practices. We want perfection to bridge our finite, limited knowledge and condition (apart from others) rather than be personally responsible for responding to the other and trusting the shared history of our lives together into our unknown future.

@Manuel @frank @Paine @Janus @Srap Tasmaner

In the 13th paragraph of the third meditation, Descartes now moves on to question the impulse that there are others and other things than himself, and stumbles first on being unsure whether the things he judges are correct. Instead of accepting the fact that sometimes we are wrong or are interested in different aspects of the world, his desire to maintain the possibility of certainty forces him to turn our human condition into a theoretical problem and metaphysically split the uncertainty of our “idea” from a perfect “reality”.

To maintain control, he inserts between them that the world is (more) perfect because it is the “cause” of our (limited) idea, and thus why our idea may or may not “resemble” or represent the perfect external world.

“If I find that some idea of mine has so much representative reality that I am sure the same reality doesn’t reside in me, either straightforwardly or in a higher form, and hence that I myself can’t be the cause of the idea, then, because everything must have some cause, it will necessarily follow that I am not alone in the world: there exists some other thing that is the cause of that idea.”

I take it he is arguing that there cannot be anything in the world unless he is certain he is not the cause because it is “so much” or of a “higher form”. This “cause” could just be the unexamined criteria and conditions of our culture for our ordinary practices, which are our interests in the world coalesced as the different aspects, versions, or “senses” (“uses” Wittgenstein will also say) of our practices (as in his example of the sun). And the necessity of Descartes’ “cause” (its “must”) could be that there is a certain “must” to meet these criteria for a practice to be judged to be what it is, but he is fixated again on certainty and so “eventually one must come back to an idea whose cause isn’t an idea, and this cause must be a kind of archetype containing intrinsically all the reality or perfection that the idea contains only representatively.” He not only attributes this perfection outside his self but outside the world, to avoid accepting its failings, errors, mistakes, limitations, confusions, etc.

@frank @Paine @Janus @Srap Tasmaner

“Nature has apparently taught me to think that [ I can imagine an object correctly ]... When I say ‘Nature taught me to think this’, all I mean is that I have a spontaneous impulse to believe it, not that I am shown its truth by some natural light. There is a great difference between those.”

I agree with him on the innateness claim, as I just don't see an alternative, unless we attribute cognition to the world. — Manuel

Consider that our “spontaneous impulse” is to believe our judgments, which are based on the criteria and conditions that we are inculcated with, which are natural for us, as if part of our “nature” (they are how our world functions, its “cognition”), but we are not normally conscious of the workings of our judgments, not until we shine some light on them, say, by reflection.

“Things that are revealed by the natural light – for example, that if I am doubting then I exist – are not open to any doubt, because no other faculty that might show them to be false could be as trustworthy as the natural light. My natural impulses, however, have no such privilege: I have often come to think that they had pushed me the wrong way on moral questions, and I don’t see any reason to trust them in other things.”

And here we are back at the beginning, where he felt betrayed that he was wrong about something (now—as in most cases with philosophy—with a moral question) and feels he cannot rely on our “natural impulses”, our unexamined judgements, which is where philosophy starts, when we don’t know our way about and turn to reflect. Except in Descartes’ abstraction, there is no particular situation, no point of disagreement or loss as to what to do about a particular case, in a context, at a time. So he just takes his disappointment with the moral realm (where we may or may not agree) and doubts everything. So far that has actually led to uncover by reflection the criteria and conditions which are “trustworthy as the natural light”, but there remains his anxiety that God may still be deceiving us. “I can never be quite certain.”

I’ve only gotten to the 10th paragraph of the 3rd meditation. I’ll keep going and see if I find it.

@Janus @Srap Tasmaner @Manuel @frank

I don't understand how reference to "the activities, practices, judgments, etc. which are ingrained into us, unreflected upon" relates to the use of the "I" in Descartes' speech. — Paine

You’d have to show me where in the Descartes. My quote you are commenting after is in response to Descartes paragraph starting “Among my ideas, some seem to be innate”, but I do not see him making the point about our self (“I”) as above.

—Edit: I see now what you might be getting at. When I say “society” or “cultural” or “conformity” they are a catch-all which includes our lives over thousands of years which have attuned into what I am describing as “the activities, practices, judgments, etc. which are ingrained into us, unreflected upon", which I am reading Descartes to echo. But I will leave my original response below.—

If you are responding to my interpretation of his assertion of his self, I would not say it is connected to my interpretation of Descartes describing thought as a list of activities (in the 2nd Med.) other than I take thought, not as a given, continually-occurring brain activity (like talking to yourself, or, as you say “something that is always there”) which some take that he then notices and concludes that, because of our self-awareness, he must be something, but that, as he says, “while” he is asserting something—which I take as a sense of what “thinking” is, as an activity, in this case, asserting (what I argue is in relation to our culture)—then he is manifesting his self, thus: “I think. I am.”, to be understood as “[[b]while[/b]] I think [i.e., assert myself], I am [me].” I realize now that asserting yourself is not just in aversion to society or culture but can also be to be with society, as an act of, say, accepting expectations as your own duty, to define one’s self. Thank you for the opportunity to clarify.

I have the same doubts about how this relates to Wittgenstein in the comment that I raised before and encounter a new one when you mention 'Theology as Grammer" — Paine

I don’t think it is appropriate here to get into a side argument about what Wittgenstein is doing, instead of just focusing on what I take Descartes to be doing in the spirit of a non-metaphysical inquiry as Wittgenstein did. That said, I take this reference to be to this comment:

By speaking of an ‘indescribable part of myself which cannot be pictured by the imagination', it seems to me that Descartes is pointing at something that is always there but is not understood. In the Third Meditation, Descartes says he needs the existence of God to find grounds for its relation to all of his activities. That seems the opposite approach of Wittgenstein, who describes our use of language to show what it is for us. — Paine

It would be easier if you spelled a few things out for me. I’m not sure where/if Descartes does make the claim about needing God; I do take Wittgenstein as going through examples to show something, but I take that as, partly, that there is different grammar for each example so not just one way the world (thus language) works, so I don’t know what you mean that he is showing “what it is for us”—is “it” language? Language is different for us than God?—And then how is what you take as Descartes’ need for God related to what you are taking Wittgenstein to show us? That Descartes needs certainty (perfection) to communicate where “for us”, i.e., “our use of language” is different? And, as I don’t understand Wittgenstein’s theology as grammar quote, I don’t know what you are saying about that.

Consider the different way thinking is being observed by the two philosophers. At the very least, would you not acknowledge a difference between the "I" that observes the thinking activity as an immediate event by Descartes and something like this from Wittgenstein?: — Paine

Again, it would be much easier if you told me what you take the difference to be, or at least what the “something like this” illustrates about the way Wittgenstein views thinking (though only to illuminate the Descartes). From what I think I understand, I take “the thinking activity as an immediate event” just to be self-awareness, and not “thinking”, and that Descartes’ description of thinking as an activity is more like Wittgenstein’s understanding of thinking (thus why animals can do it, PI #25, in the sense of, e.g., problem-solving; or that we can do it, in the sense of considering (getting a new pen), without talking to ourselves #327-332).

@Paine @Janus @Srap Tasmaner @Manuel

I continue, into the 2nd meditation, to assert that “perceiving” and “perception” is not a natural brain process that needs to be explained, but the activity of coming to consciously understand the ordinary criteria and conditions that something “consists of”, thus, when Descartes says “whatever I perceive very clearly and distinctly is true” I take it that, when we are able to clearly and distinctly uncover the criteria and conditions of something, we understand how something is deemed to be “true”; what set of characteristics (criteria) it is logically necessary to conform or align with or be consistent or faithful to; what “truth” is (consists of) in this instance.

Edit: “my understanding of what a thing is, what truth is, and what thought is, derive purely from my own nature, which means that it is innate”

To say that: how something will be deemed true, such as a royal succession or an apology; what makes up a “thought”—thoughtful, thought out; or tells what is essential to us about a “thing”—what kind of object anything is, Wittgenstein will say, PI #373, which is revealed by what he terms “grammar”: the terms of the possibilities of something, Id. #90. (As an aside, he just after characterizes this connection as “Theology as Grammar”, which I have never been able to figure out.)—to say that these “understandings” are innate, arise from my own nature, is to point to something within us, that we are born with, or into, as are Plato’s forms. My answer to this are the activities, practices, judgments, etc. which are ingrained into us, unreflected upon—what we would consider “natural”—as a member of a culture.

I am not making claims about what you are calling our “ordinary perception”, which I take as our habitual unexamined lives. I disagree that science or “philosophy” (as you see it) are “more reflexive and considerate” than the examination of our regular criteria for judgment about identity, completion, exemptions, etc. Drawing out the standards and conditions of what something “consists in”, as Descartes says, examines and describes what we do rather than creating explanations (and abilities or processes) that fit our desire for certainty (which I argue is the birth of the metaphysical).

When I claim that Descartes’ “perceiving” is not a natural ability or brain process but is more like an activity, I mean like an analysis, an effort that we are in the habit of doing but that we can, nevertheless, reflect upon, be “puzzled by”. When I say like pointing or negotiating, I mean in the sense of a learned behavior, like “seeing” (which is like recognizing, identifying) compared to the faculty of vision. The “tremendous amount of stuff… going on behind the most trivial acts” is the history of human life and our growing up and being indoctrinated into these cultural activities. You learn (even if simply following others’ lead) how to “point”, how to “see”, how to “perceive”, as you learn how to apologize, thank, and promise, all together as the habits that Descartes is trying to pick apart, because we can reflect on our behavior and uncover the conditions and criteria that make up our practices.

@frank @Paine @Janus @Srap Tasmaner

You can attempt to do an epistemological take, without the metaphysics and argue, that in "vulgar" (or ordinary) life, many of these objects are confused and unclear, but when we go into a scientific/philosophical perspective, our ideas of these objects become clearer and more distinct. — Manuel

I’m using “ordinary” in its sense of: not special, not as: unexamined; it is in contrast to creating clarity by abstraction from any context or regular criteria and requiring only the certainty of logic or science. But we are just as capable of precision and rigorous analysis of our ordinary criteria as a “philosophical” perspective. The wish for philosophy to have science-like conclusions is to cover for, or hide from, our messy, vulgar lives and so sets aside “people” and creates the metaphysical, whether it’s the mind or “advanced brain processes”. Descartes is actually saying that our first impression from our senses, say vision, is not as clear as when we uncover the criteria and conditions for, say, the activity of seeing—the inferences we make, the reasons that matter to us for doing it.

without a mind, perception alone amounts for very little. — Manuel

I am claiming that—although it seems natural to assume—perceiving here is not a natural ability or brain function, but an activity like pointing, or negotiating (which is a critical differentiation, not terminological), and that “perception” is seeing what something “consists” of, it’s conditions and criteria, as Descartes did with the wax.

the mind/brain is the organ we use to judge and identify things, while adding the qualifier that it is people that judge and think, and not minds, — Manuel

The brain allows for vision, which gives us information; but we are trained (or pick up how) to identify objects ( say, apart from identifying colors)—to use criteria to judge a goldfinch from a robin, a rock from a turtle. Think of making an error in identifying an object; now did you judge wrong, or did your “brain” make a mistake? And what really is it to “identify things”? We don’t always identify things. We don’t need to. So there are certain conditions, contexts, where we only can be “identifying things”. Looking for the right cereal box? Trying to determine the genus of a new species? Do I take an apple as an apple? Every time?

giving an epistemological reading of his account can be fruitful” — Manuel

I’m not limiting my claims to epistemology; Descartes is discussing ontology (what is and is not, and how), existentialism (the creation of a self), ethics (creation of a better self). I’m just reading him as not giving metaphysical answers.

@Manuel@Janus@frank@Paine@Srap Tasmaner

“But although my perception of [the ball of wax] seemed to be a case of vision and touch and imagination, it isn’t so and it never was. Rather, it is purely a perception by the mind alone – formerly an imperfect and confused one, but now clear and distinct because I am now concentrating carefully on what the wax consists in…”

Well, attempting a non-metaphysical reading here will require some imagination and leniency. Some might say I am inserting what I want into the text, or stretching what is obviously not the case. But if there is the possibility that Descartes’ terms need not necessarily be read as metaphysical, then isn’t that the imposition of a framework (even by Descartes), and in the face of textual evidence of an alternative?

I take Descartes as recognizing that the history of identifying objects, finding characteristics, following the extension of possibilities, etc., in short, our whole lives of interwoven activities, are the conditions for “perceiving” this as a ball of wax; that the wax does not “consist“ as a body (object) but in these non-sensory, non-physical criteria and conditions.

Yes, he calls it “perception by the mind alone”, however, we can still say in a sense we only realize and “see”—as an activity apart from the brain’s sensory vision—this as a ball of wax by the ordinary criteria we judge “makes up” or matter to us about a ball of wax, or a thing to throw at someone, or an adhesive for a poster to a wall, etc. and not “perception” as a mental process like vision or requiring “mind” to be an object, rather than our (and our shared) means of judgment and identification.

“When the wax is in front of us, we say that we see it, not that we judge it to be there from its colour or shape; and this might make me think that knowledge of the wax comes from what the eye sees rather than from the perception of the mind alone. But this is clearly wrong, as the following example shows. If I look out of the window and see men crossing the square, as I have just done, I say that I see the men themselves, just as I say that I see the wax; yet do I see any more than hats and coats that could conceal robots? I judge that they are men.” Emphasis added.

And here is the example that makes it clear that “seeing” and “judging” are activities and not sensations or another faculty wherein we recognize an “object” or an essence or thing-in-itself (the “themselves”). As in the Theatetus, having something be visible to us does not equate to our knowledge of “it”. Austin cleverly makes this point by showing the ordinary ways in which we could be mistaken in applying our criteria to judge a case from seeing hats and coats.

And the fear of not being certain crops up again in the precipice he imagines in not having any metaphysical “themselves” (itself) taking it as far as the fantasy that we judge that the other is not human, or, less cataclysmically, not to be considered, not worth empathy for their pain (rather than certain knowledge). But he is realizing that our ordinary criteria for judgment are enough without metaphysical abstraction, thus that we can conclude these are people from only hats and coats.

Is that line [between asking and pressuring] particularly clear? Isn't this exactly the sort of thing people very often disagree about? — Srap Tasmaner

We are, of course far afield here, but, that people can disagree about it, does not mean that they ordinarily (“very often”) do, nor that the conditions and criteria are not there to make explicit (the grounds for inteligibility, rationality) in relation to the context of this particular case we draw out as necessary to show the confusion or what makes this an exception.

([the conditions] "Allowing"??? [for requesting]) — Srap Tasmaner

Allowing is here in the sense of the opportunity for. To ask for something meaningfully, the situation has to be appropriate. The conditions would be like the Kantian categorical requirements (except for each activity).

And sure we can use language lazily if we like, but beating a nail in with a screwdriver doesn’t make it a hammer. — Antony Nickles

But this is odd. It takes considerable effort for Descartes to achieve the degree of abstraction he does in his reasoning, to extract himself from everyday ways of thinking. Doesn't look like laziness. — Srap Tasmaner

My point was not to define the motivation, but to carry the point that generalizing can be useful, or thoughtless, etc. In Descartes case, as I have discussed, it is the result of his desire for certainty.

Recognizing that the screwdriver will do is not laziness, here, but insight, achieved by abstracting, and by flouting the rules about how tools ought to be used. — Srap Tasmaner

The insight is not “achieved by abstracting”—which is the removal from context and the associated ordinary criteria in place of a generalization, to which we then can impose our desire for certainty projecting an “ought” that we can achieve if we just follow predetermined “rules”—but from the “possibilities” of tools, including their open-endedness to solve problems, which comes from familiarity, thus why carpentry is an apprenticeship and not mostly explicit knowledge.

To attempt to get back on track, my claim here is that Descartes’ focus on the possibilities of thinking as various activities tells us more, and creates a clearer framework, than the abstraction of “thinking” as a process of a metaphysical self (brain, mind), which he avoids in—among other evidence I have discussed—acknowledging that he only “exists” as apart from the pull of society, while thinking. If that is unclear, I have walked through the text above in multiple posts.

Affirming or doubting are acts with very specific criteria done in particular situations, just like asking, or thanking.
— Antony Nickles

How specific? Is there not more than one way of asking? Of thanking? Of affirming or doubting? Are there not specific sorts of specificity? How finely must we chop experience before the spectre of generality has been sufficiently warded off? — Srap Tasmaner

If generalizing haunts us, it’s in connection with removing anything specific to something’s ordinary context, such as “experience”. Used without there being anything extraordinary, it looses its ability to differentiate that is a hallmark of its being brought up. Your history may give you a different perspective, as might undergoing something distinctive (no one will ask about your experience of breakfast, unless you, say, went to a new Dim Sum restaurant), but general experience is categorically unremarkable, unless you have your head in a book.

And, as any lawyer knows, speaking generally may be more appropriate than detailing every instance, but just because I can plead, cajole, call in a favor, etc. and call them all “asking” doesn’t make the conditions allowing for a request to be any less specific nor the criteria for judging the line where it becomes pressuring any less clear. And sure we can use language lazily if we like, but beating a nail in with a screwdriver doesn’t make it a hammer.

@frank @Manuel @Janus

The "always there" I pointed to refers to the "thinking thing" being there when we pay attention to it. — Paine

What I should have said was that it is not an ordinary “thing” (given, constant, observable), and that the characteristics (criteria) of this “thinking” type of thing are not those of an object. It only exists “while” we are thinking, and is feared to go away if we stop. “I exist—that is certain. But for how long? For as long as I am thinking. For it could be that were I totally to cease from thinking, I should totally cease to exist.”

I think Descartes is asking us to accept that the self is a thing despite not being imaginable or described the way other things are. — Paine

I don’t see evidence of that request and interpreting what I do see that way is jumping to a conclusion. Descartes wants to have a certain constant self, but is honest enough to stop short of assuming that.

Seeing the act of thinking as a list of activities does not reflect the problem of description that I commented upon upthread. By speaking of an 'indescribable part of myself which cannot be pictured by the imagination', it seems to me that Descartes is pointing at something that is always there but is not understood. — Paine

Or we could take what he says on its face as stating a fact. Cottingham’s translation is “But I still can’t help thinking that bodies – of which I form mental images and which the senses investigate – are much more clearly known to me than is this puzzling ‘I’ that can’t be pictured in the imagination.” The self cannot be pictured because it is not a body. He is saying it is “indescribable” and “puzzling” not to spur us to try harder to, say, solve the puzzle of describing it, but to say categorically it is not a thing to be described because it is not a thing (“that is always there”). It is not conversely a thing that is not here, something incorporeal. We could say the self is mythical. We are a work in progress (or not), but not a given constant. We are an open question. It is puzzling because it is not how we would reflexively picture it (want to have it be in order for it to be known, and with certainty), that we are still on the way to a new way of thinking of ourselves.

So Descartes has identified himself as “a thinking thing”. But @Paine’s concern is legitimate; if I am to say thinking is not our inner dialogue nor awareness, then what is it? Descartes will ask the same thing:

“A thing that thinks. What is that? A thing that…
doubts almost everything,
understands some things,
affirms this one thing – namely, that I exist and think,
denies everything else,
wants to know more,
refuses to be deceived,
imagines many things involuntarily, and
is aware of others that seem to come from the senses?
…These activities are all aspects of my thinking, and are all inseparable from myself.
…what is called ‘sensing’ is strictly just this seeming, and when ‘sensing’ is understood in this restricted sense of the word it too is simply thinking.” 2nd Meditation (bold added)

I have broken the text to line up the “activities” to show the similarity to Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations:

“… the speaking of language is part of an activity…
Review the multiplicity… in the following examples, and in others:
Giving orders, and obeying them—
Describing the appearance of an object, or giving its measurements-
Constructing an object from a description (a drawing)—
Reporting an event—
Speculating about an event—…
Forming and testing a hypothesis—
Presenting the results of an experiment in tables and diagrams—
Making up a story; and reading it—
Play-acting—
Singing catches—
Guessing riddles—
Making a joke; telling it—
Solving a problem in practical arithmetic—
Translating from one language into another—
Asking, thanking, cursing, greeting, praying.” Philosophical Investigations, #23 (bold added)

Wittgenstein will show that whether these activities are being done or not is not equated with an intention or other “mental process” but that we simply judge if the movement or action has met the criteria or standards for each thing and then we would say it is that activity.

So, for Descartes, thinking consists of the activities “doubts, understands, affirms, denies, wants, refuses, and also imagines and senses.” These are not metaphysical processes in our head that we picture like our inner dialogue or our attention to this or the other, or some brain function. Affirming or doubting are acts with very specific criteria done in particular situations, just like asking, or thanking.

That continuity of thinking [that “thinking” is our internal dialogue and/or awareness] is clearly central to the meditation and a source of concern. I don't understand what you mean by saying it is "separate from his internal dialogue or awareness." I think Descartes is linking those activities together. — Paine

Yes, that is the assumption of the bulk of the interpretation of the Meditations, but Descartes has not clearly parsed out exactly what he is referring to (lumping it all together in a sense). Also, in looking at it as categorically open, the characteristics he is attributing to it allow for what I am suggesting, and there is clearly evidence in the text. As well as what I’ve mentioned so far, he is concerned that “what he is calling thinking” might stop and then he would cease to “exist”, not the other way around (that he would, what, die? (or whatever the opposite of metaphysically “existing” is) and thus stop talking to himself; not very profound of him).

I think I am attempting to claim that it is unnecessary to restrict Descartes to simply painting a metaphysical world of “existence”, “mind”, and “thinking” (despite his lack of care not to appear so). I believe he is more relevant than to be saddled with that legacy. We could take him to be describing the criteria for what we would judge as “thinking” as individuation from society or investigating rigorously or the like, as Wittgenstein or the later Heidegger will see it as (which may or may not interest @Banno). This possibility, of course, remains to be seen, but I have at least found it fruitful and justified so far.

“[ T ]hought! This is the one thing that can’t be separated from me. I am, I exist – that is certain. But for how long? For as long as I am thinking. But perhaps no longer than that; for it might be that if I stopped thinking I would stop existing; …Still, I am a real, existing thing. What kind of a thing? I have answered that: a thinking thing.”

It is noteworthy that one of his criteria is trying to “separate” things from himself, and so not just about doubt and certainty, but wanting a kind of inseparableness, as if it wouldn’t be taken away, or lost. And so he has shunned the world (and his own body), as it were, first, before it fails him.

But he is afraid he will only exist for now, while he is thinking; as if he is not always thinking, that it is a particular act, separate from his internal dialogue or awareness. And, if he stops, he will slide back into the pull of habit and conformity and fail to exist apart from everyone else.

Imagining that his internal dialogue is caused by something (certain), and being assured of the certainty of his self by his ability to convince himself that nothing is certain, he continues:

“let [the Deceiver] deceive me all he can, he will never bring it about that I am nothing while I think I am something. So… I conclude that this proposition, I am, I exist, must be true whenever I assert it or think it.”

I think it is important to ask what the role is of “the deceiver”. Such a specific choice of words; when I am “deceived” it is because I was going along thinking I was fine (right in my knowledge of the truth), sure and certain of myself, when the rug is pulled out from under me and it turns out I was mistaken, but more than that, that I was wrong all along, had been asleep, thus I am angry enough to point a finger outward, not that I had simply failed to examine what I “assent” to with sufficient deliberateness, but that I was told I was right, as if the wool was pulled over my eyes, trained into our culture and its common criteria and opinions. And I feel betrayed, that what I believed in was nothing, that I was gaslit and feel a little insane as if someone stole something important from me, because my opinions are my identity, so maybe I am nothing.

But Descartes claims “I am something”; he “asserts” his existence. Without any standard, or basis, or justification; in the face of the betrayal of society, in defiance to it. Later, alluding to this, Emerson in Self Reliance will say “Man is timid and apologetic; he is no longer upright; he dares not say 'I think,' 'I am'” (After saying, “Whence, then, this worship of the past? The centuries are conspirators against the sanity and authority of the soul.”) He will call “conformity” what Descartes says is “the habit of confidently assenting”. Descartes continues “My old familiar opinions keep coming back, and against my will they capture my belief. It is as though they had a right to a place in my belief-system as a result of long occupation and the law of custom.” His “assertion” is not a statement that can be (true or) false; it is “true” whenever he asserts it (“while I think I am”). It is not true because it conforms to a state of affairs or is right; it is the act of the legitimate authority, the one with the right that was “as though they had”, but which is his. Thus the self is not a given continuous thing, but an act.

…you cannot be incorrect that you seem to sense something… is really what Descartes means when he says that we can doubt, but that we cannot doubt that we are doubting (or think or feel, but not doubt that we are thinking or feeling). — Janus

I don’t think I’ve got to the part where he says that yet.

Pain and other sensations such as pleasure are unique in this context. If I feel pain or pleasure, it makes no sense to say that I doubt that I am feeling pain or pleasure; what could it even mean to say I doubt that I am feeling some sensation that I am feeling? — Janus

Touché; you have me there (I take this as similar to Wittgenstein’s remarks). But there is also not a context where it is meaningful to say that I am “certain” that I am in pain (unless someone else thought I was making more of something), and it is for this certainty that Descartes is searching (math-like knowledge, not just, resolved or really sure).

I am not really saying that our sensations are certain; since they are not propositional, they are neither certain nor uncertain, they are merely sensations, although what we infer on the basis of them can be certain or uncertain. — Janus

Well this distinction seems to matter. So we can be unaware of our sensations, but, if aware, not doubt them, yet be wrong about sensing something (or in denial), but not certain (other than that we do sense something), then it is our judgment which could be correct or certain. But I see or feel something but I don’t know what it is; sometimes we call this being tricked by our senses, other times because of inexperience.

Well, I’ll continue on (if there is nothing else @frank?) As discussed previously, in Para. 2 of the Second Meditations Descartes accepts that nothing is certain, not our sensations. nor being awake; that everything is “fiction” and “illusion” (rather than accept how we ordinarily judge the correctness of our senses, or the different criteria for the judgments involving our sensations). Though some will continue to try to find a way in which our sensations or bodies are certain (@Janus), that could not avail us anyway, as there is no connection between how our senses (or any of science) could be the basis for true or certain customs and opinions anyway, which is the point of the Meditations. Descartes pushes forward in search of something that cannot be doubted, that is perfectly certain.

Taking Descartes’ advice that it is a placeholder—that we should “call [it] what [we] will”—I’ll skip over bringing up God and phrase what he says as a MacGuffin (as if it doesn’t matter what it is): “Isn’t there [something that] gives me the thoughts I am now having? But why do I think this, since I might myself be the author of these thoughts?” (@Paine might have an answer for this why.)

Setting aside for the moment his assumption (premise), taken generally, that there is a cause for my internal dialogue (outside or inside), he says “But then doesn’t it follow that I am, at least, something?” (interestingly, on par with that “something”—the cause—as it were: created in the “image” of God). When he says “doesn’t it follow” it makes me think of the necessity of a logical argument; this “follow” is a must with the force of certainty he is looking for: there is a cause; it can be internal; the thing that I am is that cause.

There is not only that logical necessity, but he takes his ability to secure doubt about everything as something certain. “So what remains true? Perhaps just the one fact that nothing is certain!” And his skeptical conviction becomes another basis of the self. ”if I convinced myself of something then I certainly existed.” And the conclusion is usually taken to be that I exist, but the point is clearly the “certainty” which I can have about this; put differently, he does not start to prove the existence of the self, but to “prove” anything, to be certain in any regard. He has merely retreated to here.

I don't think this [ that Descartes is demonizing the inherent fallibility of our human condition ] captures the significance of Descartes using the motif of an evil demon during his experiment upon himself. In a time when people were executed for witchcraft, demanding that a 'good' god would not deliberately deceive us separates the realm of the created from the problem of sin. — Paine

I take you as saying that Descartes is creating the role of the deceiver so that it won’t be thought he is speaking ill of God (if God was claimed to be the deceiver). And so, perhaps, our sin (doubt, uncertainty) does not blemish the perfection of God’s creation. I would add that the original sin is not deception but knowledge, it being thought to make us aware of, and able to address, everything in the world. But I also see the political point you are making about skirting the line between analyzing the theological-philosophical history without being accused of heresy.

We cannot be wrong about consciously feeling pain. — Janus

And you say I must be right if I am conscious, which I take as not just conscious in the sense that I am awake, but “conscious of”, in that I am aware of the pain, which is a kind of knowing. But we can be suffering and not know it (be unaware), such as when we are in denial, but it is clear to our friends, or when I am cold but I focus on something else.

But it is exactly the feeling that we cannot be wrong—here importantly in the sense that I must know, and know with certainty (the version of know as: correctly)—that is why sensation was picked first by Descartes as foundational. And pain is the traditional example because of its stark, vibrant, seeming self-evidence; as: if I don’t know my pain, what do I know?

People tie themselves in knots with theories about the science of sensation and the brain, but, here, for Descartes, the actual mechanics and logic of sensation do not matter because it does not meet his requirement for certainty. I can either be incorrect that I sense something (“You’re not shot this time!” Or “It’s just a mirage!”) or mistaken in my judgment of what I sense (“You’re not angry, you’re jealous.” or “Whew, that felt like a spider!”), but, ultimately, I can deceive myself, be mistaken, or uncertain, and that will not do for Descartes as a foundation for our opinions. And, regardless, the doubt of our connection to the outside world (in the example of dreaming) eclipses what we feel or don’t or whether we are correct about it.

The issue I am highlighting is that it's not clear senses alone give us any knowledge, without an intellectual component… the problem is in the way we judge what the senses "say"… provide "data", which is only such because of the intellect, otherwise, senses seem to lack mind.

It is in this specific context that senses are "sparks", as we will see when we get to Descartes observation about what literally hits the eye, as opposed to what we immediately interpret. — Manuel

Ah, I see. Or, I am unfamiliar enough with all that to retract characterizing your use of the word, nor to offer much help on what happens between sensation and anything else (although Wittgenstein does say we go too far in trying to get between our sensations and our expression of them, PI #245). I can only say that Descartes at this point appears to believe they do not fulfill the requirement he has set: to preclude doubt. If I would predict his next step, it would be that the separation of sensation from that-which-could-be-deceived (“intellect”) would only be to maintain the integrity of our senses while controlling the framework by which we are deceived, to structure our failing.

In other words, in the Theatetus Socrates first postulated that our senses gave us the criteria (measure) for knowledge, but abandoned that picture simply because our senses can be wrong, or not generalizable from person to person. Of course it remains to be seen how and thus why we need to posit an “intellect” rather than training our expression of, say, being cold, to language.

He is looking for a foundation in order to have the certainty he needs to conquer doubt. — Antony Nickles

I don't think so. — Fooloso4

Well you seem to think you understand what I’m trying to say and just flatly disagree. I’d leave it at that, however,

Descartes is a careful writer. He is a central figure in Western philosophy. He did not gain that reputation by getting lost. If someone is lost it is not him. — Fooloso4

this is uncalled for in this kind of forum. If you want to believe Descartes or Plato or Kant never made a mistake, feel free, but there is no cause to mock me. I will accept an apology if you care to discuss any other subject.

Is anything found that does not come, ultimately, from the senses? — Janus

Descartes skips over all our practices to ask whether we can trust our senses not because they are the birth (spark @Manuel says) of everything—imagine apologizing, or justice—but because we imagine we can’t be wrong about them. We think: If I am in pain, I must know it, and know it without a doubt. But we can repress it, and even to where it doesn’t register (now imagine anger, remorse, prurient curiosity—will we say we can’t be unaware now?) But the point is not that we can doubt it, but that he is looking around for something to hold that place.

You seem to be arguing that we should not take what he says literally, but you go on to object to the idea that there is a rhetorical aspect. — Fooloso4

Literally was the wrong word. When I said we should not read him simply at face-value, I meant we should not just take him to be making explicit everything we can learn.

Why does he need certainty? Because, as I also said, he is looking to established a foundation. — Fooloso4

He is looking for a foundation in order to have the certainty he needs to conquer doubt. You’re assuming he’s a reliable narrator. What he’s telling you he’s doing is not the whole picture.

we are to understand him, we should not begin by rejecting what he sets out to do. — Fooloso4

But surely to understand a philosopher is not just to get to the point where we understand the words and the sentences and can follow along with what they say? I am not rejecting what he sets out to do; I’m analyzing how he gets lost along the way because of what he wants from it.

I’ll let you move the discussion forward at your leisure Frank, as it is your thread. It does appear we
may have not worked out all the issues brought up in the first part.

It is a meditation, not a crisis of doubt. He has waited to do this meditation until he was able to set aside the time to withdraw from the practical concerns of daily life. It is in that sense a practice of abstraction. — Fooloso4

If we take philosophy literally and at face value, we are not putting it in contrast to the rest of the tradition, nor questioning why he has chosen this method, why he needs certainty.

The fact that Descartes “withdraws from the practical concerns of daily life” is not only the cause of the abstraction, it is motivated by the desire for abstraction, to be apart from our human life, its uncertainty. However, in doing so, we no longer have our ordinary concerns, so we can impose the criteria for whatever concerns us most, which is to be certain.

We seem to be bound by habits of belief, so that even if you decided to doubt everything you know, you'd find yourself "pulled back into the old ways." — frank

Descartes tendency is to “slide back into my old opinions” just as Hume’s doubt would recede when he went to the bar, because we do have a “memory” (as Socrates would say) of our shard lives and judgments. I would argue that without those there is no action, no meaning, no concerns, no way to have a self, at all.

I think you have mistaken a rhetorical device for something existential. — Fooloso4

What we are told is not the only important part of philosophy. Philosophy is not about undeveloped summaries or condensed conclusions. We, like Descartes, must ask more of the text. So I do not take anything as “rhetorical” but take it seriously enough to attribute reasons for everything, implications, assumptions, motivations, blind spots, frameworks, analogies, etc. But these are not my guesses or just reading more (putting more) into a text; I supply evidence for these lines of implication. I offer you to see for yourself, or offer other answers to these open questions, other reasons for why he said this or that, said it this way or that.