You seem to be saying, "It looks like X isn't going to be high enough to justify (3), therefore we can't give them a choice." This is a bit like the father at the theme park who reasons, "My daughter wants to go on this ride, and if she goes on it she will probably enjoy it, so I can't let her go on it." This is reminiscent of the "paternalism" that schopenhauer1 claims to oppose. — Leontiskos

No, I'm not convinced that the majority of people end up preferring they had been born. On top of the people that already wish they had never been born you have those suffering at the end of life wishing they had never been born.

Considering my view that most people are likely to live net bad lives, it would be more like the daughter wanting to go on the ride (after eating lots of candyfloss), and if you let her go on it will make her sick.
It would actually be worse than this, you would be putting her on the ride and making her sick before she even had a preference on it.
@schopenhauer1 was the master of these thought experiments. Forcing people onto rides, Willy Wonka World etc :smile:

If you are talking about a poll like the one that showed 64% happy - 36% unhappy, ostensibly, the percentage of people that would rather they had never been born would be lower than the unhappy 36%, when considering things like unhappy people that prefer to have been born "otherwise they wouldn't have had their children" etc.

My same objection to the happiness poll would apply to the birth preference one though. I don't know how many of those suffering at end of life wish they had never been born.

Further, I would rather prevent a life of suffering in spite of a future person's preference. There are many people that hurt themselves, and society determines it just to thwart their preference.

Your second paragraph suggests you understand what I was getting at. Of those polled only a fraction would have been people experiencing the suffering at the end of life.

99.85% does seem rather high, but I don't think it unreasonable to determine the majority of people have net bad lives.

36% chance of creating an unhappy person then.

This average happiness is potentially overshadowed by life's inevitable suffering - "Nearly 1 in 2 people born in the UK in 1961 will be diagnosed with some form of cancer during their lifetime", "12.7% of all deaths registered in the UK in 2018 were from dementia and Alzheimer disease".

@AmadeusD may not be too far off:

I would say it is most likely the vast, vast, vast (perhaps 99.85%) of people born will, on balance, suffer more than they enjoy their life — AmadeusD

I don't think there is a right or wrong answer on how to identify an inanimate object (e.g. The Ship of Theseus), let alone a conscious being.

My preferred way of identifying an object is: the object goes where the parts go. If anything is changed on Theseus's Ship, it is not the same ship. The benefit of this is when all of the parts have been replaced and all of the original parts are put back together - you have reassembled Theseus's Ship.

While I don't think the brain and the mind are the same thing (so the cells are irrelevant to your identity), "your" mind changes over time - it doesn't have the same parts - so it is not the same person.

In which case, selling drugs would have to be judged on a case-by-case basis: which drug, to whom, under what circumstances; how did they use it, what affect it had. Doesn't that require a lot of usually unavailable information? How does the dealer justify it to a jury? — Vera Mont

Per consequentialism, we could be justified in acting on what is most likely to produce the best outcome. We don't have to KNOW it will produce the best outcome. Doing nothing has consequences too.

Yes, it would have to be judged case by case. Usually we say selling drugs is a bad thing due to the harm it does, but it is baked into my scenario that it would fund treatment to save a family member's life. The harm would have to outweigh that. Which unless sold over a long period, probably won't - especially if its soft drugs like marijuana.

I would use justification and excuse synonymously.
It depends on your moral foundation - if you are consequentialist you would say the action of selling drugs is good if it leads to a net good outcome. In consequentialism the goodness or badness or an action is judged wholly by its consequences.
Mitigation would be used if we accept the action is wrong. It would be arguments that the individual/s that done the wrong were not fully to blame, or that we should be more lenient on them.

Is justification the same as reason, apology, exculpation, defense, plea, rationale, rationalization, pretext, excuse - or something else? — Vera Mont

The word defence is what came to my mind.
A defence for doing something that would otherwise be wrong, or is alleged to be wrong. The justification would be valid if it gives sufficient reason for the wrong, or means no wrong occurred.

What criteria do you use when judging someone's justification for a policy or a course of action? Is it different from the criteria you apply to justifications for an isolated act? — Vera Mont

I think it is the same for an isolated act as for a course of action, policy etc. The criteria is that either the ends justify the means, or that the accusation that a wrong occurred is factually incorrect.

When justifying your own actions or statements, according to what factors do you formulate your argument?

On what grounds do you decide whether a justification is appropriate and valid?

Examples from any area of experience would be helpful. — Vera Mont

The selling of drugs. A valid justification could be that (a) Selling drugs does not harm anyone, or, (b) Selling drugs is a net good (whether an overriding principle of adults to make their own decision, or, because the pleasures they bring people outweigh the sufferings). A strong justification could be an individual selling drugs to fund medical care for a dying family member.

is it exclusively frequentism? Do they also layer on additional types of analysis that aren't as obviously frequentist? — flannel jesus

I can only think of patterns of behaviour being a basis for judging probability. Which I think the definition of frequentism fits.

Seems like frequentism is a bad fit for "What's the probability that Donald Trump wins the election?" for example.

It's not like there's a like-for-like set of comparable situations you can compare this future event to, like you would with coin flips for example - this next election will happen once and will be unique from all elections before and after it. — flannel jesus

I think we predict such probabilities almost exclusively from national and constituency polling, and projections based upon said national and constituency polling. At least here in the UK.
In any event, we judge probabilities based upon patterns of behaviour?

What scenarios doesn't frequentism work for? I had a quick skim through the Stanford entry and believe it said something to the effect that frequentism is a subset of Bayesianism. This seemed odd to me as aren't all probability methods subject to Bayesianism?

how can we still justify livestock farming? — LFranc

I created a similar discussion 4 years ago: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/9917/is-purchasing-factory-farmed-animal-products-ethical/p1

Justifications included:

1. Not being sure that factory farmed animals experience suffering

2. That people need to eat

3. That we cause suffering by driving vehicles but don't ban that

4. That if it wasn't for that outlet the workers would just take their frustrations out on society and their intimate partners

5. That it's no worse than exploitative third world factories that we also contribute to

6. Factory farming is not inherently cruel and abusive. Cruelty and abuse occur in human workplaces and shelters too

7. We are playing a game with each other. There are clear winners and losers.

8. It's more rational to be an egoist and prize our hedonic welfare over others

9. We shouldn't interfere with nature

10. Animals are an easy source of protein

11. Eating animals is responsible for our evolutionary success

Whatever we do to keep ourselves happy, are we doing it to mitigate the suffering that is life? — Arnie

I don't think so. Sex and love bring so much joy and happiness, they are more than mitigating; they hugely contribute to a wonderful life. I suspect the vast majority of people live happy lives.

A few percent of people on the planet (in the hundreds of millions) don't have these things in their life, and live a sad and tortured existence. Maybe 1% (80 million) have lives of unbearable suffering.

Buying meat contributes to suffering and death.

Are you arguing that, like other animals, we are too stupid to make moral decisions?

More redundant than nonsensical. The word Carnot cycle already summons the idea of efficient (100% efficiency to be exact), so "efficient Carnot cycle" is pleonastic, while perfect Carnot cycle is not. — Lionino

If a Carnot cycle is, by definition, 100% efficient, isn't saying "perfect Carnot cycle" redundant too?

For objects defined by their final cause (a lift is that which works as a lift), the goal is already implicit when you use the word. — Lionino

As you say, the word "lift" has its job in the name. Would any lift that can lift be a perfect lift?

I don't think most people would call a really slow, smelly, uncomfortable, ugly lift "perfect".

Isn't narrowing our judgment of perfection to the lift lifting, itself subjective?

But as Lionino explained in his Carnot cycle example there are certain operations that are produced which are perfect with little room for dispute so how do you account for that ? — kindred

While value judgments are ultimately subjective, including perfection, you can say something is objectively perfect for a specific goal. In the Carnot cycle example the goal is the most efficient cycle.

We have to define a goal for there to be any objectivity.

If Civilians are an important part of the war effort then to win the war you must eliminate all important means of the enemies war effort this includes civillians. — Vishagan

You could be facing an enemy with the same value for civilian life, that is only attacking your military targets, or beat an enemy that is willing to kill your civilians by attacking their military targets and having a larger, more powerful military.

Though ultimately people will pick government that promise to protect them by any means necessary.

I think the least problematic answer to these type of thought experiments is that the object goes where the parts go, and only where the parts go. However if consciousness is not an object, it is more difficult.

In reference to the last question I’d say no because I think animal exploitation is wrong and we can still have pleasure, convenience and entertainment without them. — Captain Homicide

Do you still contribute to the animal farming industry though, or have you walked away from Omelas?

Once citizens are old enough to know the truth, most, though initially shocked and disgusted, ultimately acquiesce to this one injustice that secures the happiness of the rest of the city. However, some citizens, young and old, walk away from the city after seeing the child — Down The Rabbit Hole

I think The Ones Who Walk Away from Omelas can be applied to many moral questions. "The city's constant state of serenity and splendor requires that a single unfortunate child be kept in perpetual filth, darkness, and misery. Once citizens are old enough to know the truth, most, though initially shocked and disgusted, ultimately acquiesce to this one injustice that secures the happiness of the rest of the city. However, some citizens, young and old, walk away from the city after seeing the child".

Is the life of suffering experienced by factory farmed animals permissible for the pleasure it brings us?

The problem is there being so many different definitions.

I searched "moral nihilism definition" on Microsoft's AI and it replied "Moral nihilism is a philosophical concept that posits that there is no objective morality, and that moral statements are neither true nor false". I searched "Non-cognitivism definition" and it replied "Non-cognitivism is a meta-ethical view that ethical sentences do not express propositions and thus cannot be true or false".

Both the moral nihilist and non-cognitivist believe that ethical sentences cannot be true or false. The non-cognitivist goes one step further by giving a reason for this (that they do not express propositions).

Isn't this right? And wouldn't this justify calling non-cognitivism a flavour of moral nihilism?

I enjoyed it. I'm a bit of a fanboy and have a copy of all the volumes of his autobiography too.

He wrote History of Western Philosophy in the last two years of the war '44 and '45, so it's a lot newer than Problems of Philosophy which wasn't published until 1912. I'm sure his views changed quite a bit over that more than 30 year difference.

Bertrand Russell "Problems of philosophy" is a nice short intro. It's old but philosophy doesn't change much so it doesn't matter. — bert1

I was going to say Russell's "History of Western Philosophy". I've been meaning to start it again.

No, moral non-cognitivism is a flavor of moral anti-realism, not moral nihilism. — Bob Ross

I would have said this:

the view that moral statements cannot be true or false and are just an emotional expression — Down The Rabbit Hole

Is a flavour of this:

the view that there is no right or wrong answers to moral questions — Down The Rabbit Hole

Maybe the literature considers them separate.

The main two arguments I have came across in favor of moral nihilism is that 1. moral thinking differs between cultures and people, so it is a subjective practice, and 2. that there is nothing tangible to attach moral facts too, therefore they do not exist. The main Idea between these two ideas is that morality was created by intelligent life, therefore it is a subjective practice that doesn't have any basis. — Lexa

Our moral values are just the result of our emotional state, which is no reason to believe anything - especially when we have competing values with others such as consequentialism versus deontology.

they could opt for a different flavor of moral anti-realism than moral nihilism (such as non-cognitivism or subjectivism). — Bob Ross

Non-cognitivism is under the umbrella of moral nihilism? The former is the view that moral statements cannot be true or false and are just an emotional expression. The latter is the view that there is no right or wrong answers to moral questions.

What is the fundamental difference between information processed by a mechanical computer and a brain? How can there be a fundamental difference in what is happening if all we are is mechanistic? — Restitutor

I wouldn't have thought that there is much difference. A self-aware machine would have to have a feedback mechanism. Experts are looking to create this:

"The final step of AI development is to build systems that can form representations about themselves. Ultimately, we AI researchers will have to not only understand consciousness, but build machines that have it. This is, in a sense, an extension of the “theory of mind” possessed by Type III artificial intelligences. Consciousness is also called “self-awareness” for a reason. (“I want that item” is a very different statement from “I know I want that item.”) Conscious beings are aware of themselves, know about their internal states, and are able to predict feelings of others".

Not only would you expect better of your own elected representatives that have been voted in by you and your peers, this is the most realistic thing you have control over. It's hard enough to effect change in your own country through campaigning for the attention of your fellow citizens that would most share your values. It's almost, if not, a waste of time to try and change the values of people living on foreign lands. It makes sense that people are most critical of their fellow citizens and representatives they elect.

But outside the mind, what connects atom A to atom B but not to atom C?

If there is nothing outside the mind that preferentially connects atom A to any other particular atom, then objects as we know them don't exist outside the mind.

Outside our minds, atoms exist but not objects (treating the "atom" as a figure of speech for something that does physically exist) — RussellA

Mereological nihilism? I've been meaning to look into it if you could recommend any books or resources.

Actually I didn't want to raise a tricky ethical question in that thread, because it is in the Politics and Current Affairs section. — Leontiskos

Fair enough.

I think it could make a difference. We distinguish combatants from civilians, but then there are murky areas such as civilians who are proximate to the war, producing arms or some such. Thus insofar as someone is associated with the war, they are not a mere civilian. So if a compatriot hostage is more closely associated with the war/fighting than a neutral or opposed hostage, then a relevant difference could arise. What is at stake is probably a form of collectivism, and it may be contingent on whether the compatriot hostage is in general agreement with their possessor's tactics (i.e. if they think to themselves, "I am not opposed to using compatriots as human shields, but don't use me!"). — Leontiskos

From a utilitarian point of view, you could say the sympathiser is worth less on the basis that they hold more negative utility, and from a deontological point of view, you could say that the sympathiser is less deserving. There will be a minority of people that hold the belief that everyone is equal no matter what.

so it goes both ways, "the wars you don't fight," become an issue as well. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Yes. It's complicated as you have to measure not only the likely consequence of each course of action (or lack thereof), but how certain you are of those consequences. Makes questions like the one posed in the OP and the Israel/Gaza question extremely difficult, if not impossible, to answer.

A related question with respect to the Israel-Palestine conflict is whether it is illicit to indirectly kill those whom the enemy has taken hostage as human shields; along with the secondary question of whether the fact that the human shield is the enemy's compatriot makes a difference. — Leontiskos

The second question is an interesting one - think the difference between it being a Palestinian hostage or an Israeli hostage. Would and should both hostages be treated equal?

Anyway, I'll try and stay on topic as there's another thread on Israel/Gaza.

The idea of bombing civilians with any kind of bomb would strike most sensitive people as immoral. — frank

What if bombing runs where civilians were going to be killed as a by-product, were necessary to win WW2? I don't see evidence that they were, but I think most people would still say they were justified.

I'm guessing the situation in Israel/Gaza is what you and @RogueAI were discussing, or the situation spurred you to this question? Another tough one. For me, I think you have to look at the consequences.

As long as we are all opposed to death and suffering, advocates of a course of action that causes it have to provide justification.

Is there justification for nuking? If so, is there justification for nuking twice? (Many say no to the second question) The answer would depend on whether the war would have ended without it or them, and if so how costly ending the war would be without using it or them.

As such, were (are) they successful? The USSR is kaput, but China is successful. The USSR was able to marshal its resources to turn back and defeat the Nazi invaders, no small accomplishment. — BC

The USSR's huge contribution to the war was one of things at the forefront of my mind, along with it beating the west to space.

The answer to why it failed looks quite complicated, but arguably it survived long enough for us to say it is an example of a non-capitalist country that is strong and powerful.

I don't count the USSR or PRC as communist or socialist, despite their names. Cuba gave it a go but did so in a particularly disadvantageous environment (enforced by the US). Venezuela? — BC

From the link provided by @Vera Mont it doesn't look like Venezuela was given a fair chance either.

The Scandinavian countries have elements of capitalism and socialism in a democratic political system. That might be as close as we get to socialism. — BC

That might be where we first see UBI. Even if a nation is not in favour of guaranteeing its citizens enough to stay alive, UBI may become the cheaper option as automation continues to accelerate.

Not so much, if you consider the amount of outside interference to make sure they failed. — Vera Mont

Yes, that's what complicates the question even more - all of the communist countries mentioned in my OP were being undermined by the western capitalist countries both overtly and covertly. I knew about Cuba, but reading your second link about Venezuela, it's almost unbelievable how cruel the west were.

As for the USSR, I have seen from interviews a lot of people in the poorer regions look back fondly on it.

What makes anyone think that there is a system that works? What even is the measure or criterion of 'working'? What constitutes failure? Are you and yours the measure of success? — unenlightened

While it's a matter of perspective, some examples are more explicit.

Considering the USSR ceased to exist, I think it is safe to say that it failed. The question is, did it fail because of its economic system.

Economic crises in countries such as Cuba and Venezuela hint to communism's failure, but these must be measured in degree and number against the crises experienced in countries with alternative systems (namely capitalism).

Even if The Chinese Communist Party is now only communist in name, The Chinese Communist Party proper survived for around 70 years, as did the USSR. Does this speak to communism being fiscally workable, or does their failures speak to it being fiscally unworkable?

So, maybe I do somehow continue to exist. — Art48

Given an infinite duration, if the same matter combines in the same pattern, maybe we keep being reborn.