Okay. Well at first blush it seems like you may be willing to balance suffering and other considerations in a way that schopenhauer1 is not. — Leontiskos
There must be more suffering before the arguments in favor of antinatalism become plausible. Is that right?
But if it is right then it seems like suffering does not always trump any other consideration, for the suffering of the pinprick does not trump the consideration of other pleasures. — Leontiskos
If suffering always trumps any other consideration — Leontiskos
you may be willing to balance suffering and other considerations in a way that schopenhauer1 is not. — Leontiskos
Being an AN is a result of running the calc, and never coming out with 'life' as the winner. Not that its pre-decided. — AmadeusD
It only does so once the calc is run. The statement is not meant to be a position of it's own. It's more "I've run this calc 60,000 times and zero came up on the side of procreation". — AmadeusD
My way of interpreting the balancing is more deontological I think than your approach which is more perhaps consequential — schopenhauer1
And I see this as substantially different from schopenhauer1. This is something like consequentialist antinatalism as opposed to deontological antinatalism, and it does seem more rational and plausible to me. It certainly does not fall victim to the two counterarguments I formulated for schopenhauer1's position. — Leontiskos
I would say that it is also undisputed that in the pinprick world there will be suffering, at least until you give an actual explanation for why a pinprick does not count as suffering. The prima facie answer is that it does count as suffering. — Leontiskos
And I see this as substantially different from schopenhauer1. This is something like consequentialist antinatalism as opposed to deontological antinatalism, and it does seem more rational and plausible to me. It certainly does not fall victim to the two counterarguments I formulated for schopenhauer1's position. — Leontiskos
This would I would think fall more into those objections... — schopenhauer1
You'd have to qualify "foundation" but there are MANY foundational ethical frameworks for which AN conclusions have been drawn or at least "fit into", such as deontological ones (which I hold). Many fall under a negative utilitarian variety. Others are vaguely consequential (environmental ones, probably ones least like the ones I hold). One can even argue for a virtue theory version, that can correspond with Schopenhauer's notion of compassion being THE only real moral sentiment (because it sees everyone as what they truly are.. fellow-sufferers). In this theory, anti-procreation would be a natural course of a virtuous (i.e. compassionate) person. They see what befalls man, and wants to prevent it. In this sense, AN can also be philosophical pessimistic in its foundation. That is to say, there is something INHERENTLY negative about existence that makes it fundamentally never redeemable through social, personal, or political actions. This goes to a vaguely existential understanding of the situation. — schopenhauer1
So deontology generally puts the locus of ethics at the individual level (not all the time, but most.. things like rights/duties). To me, the outcome doesn't matter. That is to say, we don't have a duty towards the outcome of "preserving humanity". Humanity isn't a subject for ethical concern. Rather, we have ethical considerations of individuals and their suffering, or right thereof not to be unnecessarily and non-consentingly caused the situations/conditions wherewith (ALL!) suffering takes place. That is not your right to confer for someone else. And there is no symmetrical duties/obligations for creating happiness, especially with understanding that there is no one who exists to be deprived of happiness you would not be thus conferring. — schopenhauer1
Well, not sure of your point. If, say, one has no economical problems, would you still think that 'giving birth' is morally wrong? — boundless
Nah. Note, for example, that the reductio objection that we have been considering recently simply has no force at all against Amadeus' position. Amadeus' position does not support the conclusion (3) as Benatar's does. — Leontiskos
I would say it is most likely the vast, vast, vast (perhaps 99.85%) of people born will, on balance, suffer more than they enjoy their life. — AmadeusD
Two thirds of adults globally (64%) report being happy: 14% very much so and 50% rather so. Countries with the highest proportion of adults considering themselves as very happy are Canada (29%), Australia, Saudi Arabia and India (28% each), Great Britain and the United States (27% each).
I would say it is most likely the vast, vast, vast (perhaps 99.85%) of people born will, on balance, suffer more than they enjoy their life — AmadeusD
What are you talking about? It’s either effectively the same (a threshold needs to be met... — schopenhauer1
Being an AN is a result of running the calc, and never coming out with 'life' as the winner. Not that its pre-decided. Obviously, that would be stupid. — AmadeusD
This average happiness is potentially overshadowed by life's inevitable suffering - "Nearly 1 in 2 people born in the UK in 1961 will be diagnosed with some form of cancer during their lifetime" — Down The Rabbit Hole
I don't think it unreasonable to determine the majority of people have net bad lives. — Down The Rabbit Hole
Amadeus rightly notes that any position which assumes antinatalism before considering the balance between suffering and other considerations "would be stupid": — Leontiskos
The deontological antinatalist is committed to the former, which Amadeus disagrees with. — Leontiskos
99.85% does seem rather high, but I don't think it unreasonable to determine the majority of people have net bad lives. — Down The Rabbit Hole
"Nearly 1 in 2 people born in the UK in 1961 will be diagnosed with some form of cancer during their lifetime", "12.7% of all deaths registered in the UK in 2018 were from dementia and Alzheimer disease". — Down The Rabbit Hole
Ethical agency doens't seem to me to make sense without a community. In other words, if, say, 'I act in order to bring the good to myself and to others', then I cannot 'ignore' the presently existent human beings and the human community in general. — boundless
To me, the outcome doesn't matter. That is to say, we don't have a duty towards the outcome of "preserving humanity". Humanity isn't a subject for ethical concern. — schopenhauer1
I agree with that. Ethics is born, or created, in between, or out of, two or more people. — Fire Ologist
Further, I would rather prevent a life of suffering in spite of a future person's preference. There are many people that hurt themselves, and society determines it just to thwart their preference. — Down The Rabbit Hole
My same objection to the happiness poll would apply to the birth preference one though. I don't know how many of those suffering at end of life wish they had never been born. — Down The Rabbit Hole
The consequentialist antinatalist apparently thinks that if we polled everyone on their deathbed and asked them if life was worth living or they wished they had never been born, the vast majority* would wish they had never been born. — Leontiskos
I am fine with that. But I gave my thoughts on pinprick world. — schopenhauer1
It’s either not suffering as we normally define it — schopenhauer1
It certainly opens the can of worms as to which sorts of suffering need to be prevented and which sorts don't, and that is a can of worms that antinatalists take many precautions to keep closed. — Leontiskos
since no one is obligated to bring happiness only prevent suffering in this instance, it can be defended. — schopenhauer1
Put differently, "If we omit the pinprick from (1) then (3) does not follow from (2)." I agree and I have not said otherwise. — Leontiskos
The problem is using Benatar as if he’s purely doing hedonic calculus — schopenhauer1
Either way, Benatar goes out of the way tgat even if you don’t bite the bullet in pinprick scenario, THIS world is not that world... — schopenhauer1
What would you say to Benatar in that scenario? Why trust an argument in our world that you would not trust in that world? The argument by its very nature cannot be invalidated by the minimization of suffering, and yet this is what you are committed to. — Leontiskos
he has a litany of follow-up empirical evidence of how we are often mistaken psychologically and empirically just how bad it is in regards to present pain and pain reflected or projected. — schopenhauer1
Pain isn't suffering? This is ad hoc, and it brings with it more problems:
It certainly opens the can of worms as to which sorts of suffering need to be prevented and which sorts don't, and that is a can of worms that antinatalists take many precautions to keep closed. — Leontiskos
The point can be rephrased in any number of ways. "The woman learns that any children she has will inherit her extremely painful disease. Should she bear children?" "The antinatalist learns that any child she has will experience a pinprick of pain. Is this sufficient to exclude children?" To be blunt, the idea here is that your argument is stupid because it justifies stupid decisions. It makes no sense to say, "Ah well the advice does justify stupid decisions, but it is still good and reasonable advice." — Leontiskos
...and paternalistic gaslighting is the icing on the cake. "Humans think life is good even in spite of the pain, but they're wrong so we're going to exterminate the race through lack of births." What is the difference between this and genocidal insanity? — Leontiskos
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