why are we talking “Jack does not believe ‘a broken clock is working’” instead of “Jack believes that a clock is working”?! — neomac

You presented "a broken clock is working" as a contradiction. Going on to then say that I am attributing a contradictory belief to Jack by saying Jack believes that a broken clock is working at time t1.

I did not say that Jack believed "a broken clock is working".

Evidently you do not see the difference between believing "a broken clock is working" and believing a broken clock is working. The former is belief about language use, and the latter is belief about broken clocks. The former has propositional content. The latter has broken clocks as content.

Full circle.

Seriously?! I don't get the structure of this argument at all — neomac

That was not an argument. It was an explanation of Jack's belief in the terms I defined "belief" in earlier.

I'm beginning to seriously question your honesty here given the sheer amount of strawmen, red herrings, and other such non sequiturs that you've provided with your interpretations of my claims. There's a bit of irony in that too, given the subject matter is belief, and your objections are based upon what you deem to be unacceptable accounting of another's belief. Seems if you knew what you were talking about, you could at least get what I'm saying right. It is as easy as quoting and asking if you are unsure.

I think that the underlying differences between our views are finally becoming apparent. A question for you...

Do you agree that it is humanly impossible to knowingly believe a falsehood?

It is humanly impossible to knowingly believe a falsehood. When Jack is in the process of believing that a broken clock is working he is totally unaware of it. The proposition, assertion, claim, sentence, statement, thought, belief, and/or utterance - a broken clock is working - is always false. Broken clocks do not work. This is all just a matter of how we use the words everyday. We cannot knowingly believe that broken clocks are working, but we can and do believe that they are nonetheless.

Not one iteration I've offered here, despite the overall quantity of slightly different offerings, is ever even capable of being true. They all pass Leibniz's muster. They can all be interchanged and attributed to Jack without any unacceptable change in meaning. Jack's belief is false. As such, it is his belief that determines the truth value of any and all ascriptions thereof. Therefore, any and all ascriptions to Jack must be of false belief. That is to say, that any and all true attribution of belief to Jack at time t1 will be of some belief that it is humanly impossible to knowingly believe. — creativesoul

Despite your previous muddling claims [1] (to be patched with some additional but pointless terminological/formatting style acrobatics) and in addition to your failure to show how this argument rigorously follows from your definition of belief as “meaningful correlations drawn between directly and/or indirectly perceptible things” (as I did with my definition), it looks now evident that you are definitely embracing the catastrophic line of reasoning that I already spotted a while ago: equating false beliefs with contradictory beliefs (or if you prefer, equating occasionally false beliefs with always false beliefs), and confusing belief ascriptions with knowledge ascriptions. I was right all along. So here I rest my case. — neomac

Is that what counts as a valid objection on your view?

:yikes:

Jack draws correlations between a man in a sheep suit and his wondering how many sheep are in the field when he believes that a man in a sheep suit is a sheep, and thus concludes that there is at least one sheep in the field. Jack does not believe that "a man in a sheep suit is a sheep". He believes that a man in a sheep suit is a sheep.

Etc.

Jack draws correlations between a broken clock and the time of day while believing a broken clock is working. Jack does not believe "a broken clock is working". Jack believes a broken clock is working.

You've ascribed a belief to Jack that is true. I have not. Jack's belief is false. — creativesoul

Correct — neomac

Yes, it is correct! The practice I've used is not guilty of the same offense that you've been using wrt Jack's belief at time t1. Jack's belief is false. The belief you've ascribed to Jack is true.

...but I don’t get what is supposed to prove... — neomac

It proves that you've attributed a belief to Jack that Jack does not - dare I insist cannot - have at time t1. False beliefs are not true beliefs. You've admittedly attributed a belief to Jack that is true. Jack's belief is false. You've admitted that Jack's belief was false. What's stopping you from realizing that you've misattributed belief to Jack as a result of employing the standard practices?

Gettier did the same with Smith in both cases, and he was able to do so as a result of the inherent flaws in the conventional accounting practices.

...it’s not troubling at all for our common understanding of belief ascriptions nor my claims. Here is why:
By our common understanding of belief ascriptions, “Jack believes that a clock is working” may be true or false, but... — neomac

Jack's belief cannot be true for it is false. You've attributed a belief to Jack that could be rendered as true, in the exact same way that Gettier showed all while following the standard conventional practices. I've already hinted at how it could be rendered as true, by elaborating on the truth conditions of the belief, as you've written it. It is as a result of this that you ought outright reject that particular ascription to Jack. Jack's belief cannot be true!

“Jack believes that a broken clock is working” is attributing to Jack a false belief b/c it is attributing to him a contradictory belief... — neomac

No, it's not! It is not contradictory at all, not in least little bit, to believe that broken clocks are working while doing so. The reason why is simple:when believing such things we do not knowingly do so! We are unaware of the fact that we believe what a broken clock says when we do. We cannot knowingly do so. We cannot knowingly believe that...

that broken clock is working
that man in a sheep suit is a sheep
that barn facade is a barn
that sheet hanging from a limb is a sheep
a free and fair election was not free and fair

...and yet these sorts of beliefs can be had nonetheless! The issues arise as an inevitable consequence stemming from the historical practice of rendering beliefs as propositions and/or attitudes towards them, all of which amount to belief ascription that one would readily admit to having at the time! We cannot readily admit to having belief that we are unaware of having! Those sorts of beliefs break the mold, because the conventional practices do not keep in mind that we cannot knowingly believe a falsehood. They are also a death knell to the common understanding of belief ascriptons.

All right, so for you “believing” is an activity with no truth-value while belief is the representational result of the activity “believing”, representational b/c it can be true or false. Is that it? — neomac

No. I did not say all that either. How many strikes do we get before we're counted out?

What is the difference between a proposition and a belief as a “meaningful correlations drawn between directly and/or indirectly perceptible things”?

All sorts of differences. I'll set out a one worth delving into...

Propositions are existentially dependent upon naming and descriptive practices. The same is not true of all belief.

It is humanly impossible to knowingly believe a falsehood. When Jack is in the process of believing that a broken clock is working he is totally unaware of it. The proposition, assertion, claim, sentence, statement, thought, belief, and/or utterance - a broken clock is working - is always false. Broken clocks do not work. This is all just a matter of how we use the words everyday. We cannot knowingly believe that broken clocks are working, but we can and do believe that they are nonetheless.

Not one iteration I've offered here, despite the overall quantity of slightly different offerings, is ever even capable of being true. They all pass Leibniz's muster. They can all be interchanged and attributed to Jack without any unacceptable change in meaning. Jack's belief is false. As such, it is his belief that determines the truth value of any and all ascriptions thereof. Therefore, any and all ascriptions to Jack must be of false belief. That is to say, that any and all true attribution of belief to Jack at time t1 will be of some belief that it is humanly impossible to knowingly believe.

:flower:

The claim that “Jack believes that a broken clock is working” is not accurate, is not directly linked to my specific understanding of belief. — neomac

My friend. Despite your objections, it is. Your rejection of the very idea that we can and often do believe that broken clocks are working is directly linked to what you conceive of being a belief.

The claim is about the accuracy of the belief being attributed to Jack by the speaker. An accurate ascription claim will be true. If Jack does not believe that a broken clock is working, then "Jack believes that a broken clock is working" would be false. If Jack does believe that a broken clock is working, then "Jack believes that a broken clock is working" would be true.

If you do not have a general understanding of what sorts of things beliefs are, then there could be no possible way for you to know what sorts of ascriptions are accurate, if being so requires being true.

the same objection you are making to me can be retorted to you. "Jack believes that a broken clock is working" would be true for any broken clock at time t1. — neomac

You could charge me with the same, but that doesn't make our respective practices guilty of the same offense.

You've ascribed a belief to Jack that is true. I have not. Jack's belief is false. False beliefs cannot be true. Jack's belief cannot be the one you've ascribed to him.

You're not alone in misattributing true belief to another when their belief is false. It's a common occurrence with the accounting malpractices you've been citing for reasons I began to offer earlier.

Gettier and the cottage industry following from Gettier's infamous paper all do exactly the same thing. Do you understand that much about the conventional practices you've insisted on following?

Belief is not equivalent to propositions. Belief is not equivalent to propositional attitudes, such that the believer takes the proposition to be the case or to be true. You keep insisting upon attempting to use conventional accounting practices to take proper account of something that they cannot.

Believing a clock is working is something that happens as a result of knowing how to read a clock and looking towards one as a means to know what time it is. Things such as these are not the sort of things that we say have truth conditions. Rather, they are the truth conditions of statements about what's happened, and/or is happening. — creativesoul

OK, so you are contrasting statements and things happening outside statements, and claim that truth values can be attributed only to statements and not to things that happen. Since beliefs are something that happens in the world, they do not have truth values. Is that it? — neomac

No. Believing is not equivalent to belief.

The former is an activity. Activities are not the sort of things that have truth conditions. Activities are not capable of being true or false. Whereas at the core, the latter are compositions of meaningful correlations manifesting in varying complexities drawn between directly and/or indirectly perceptible things by a creature capable of doing so.


Regarding the earlier intuitive offense...

I would agree that not all meaningful correlations constitute belief. I mean, all sorts of meaningful things aren't belief. All meaningful things become so as a result of being a part of some creature's correlation(s). All belief consists of correlations, nonetheless. There's still a bit of honing to go on this basic level, for sure. For now though, it's proving to have immense explanatory power.

...since the thread focus is on your & Banno’s positions, not mine, I prefer to keep it that way. — neomac

An interesting response to offer in lieu of a yes or no answer to a simple question. A baffling one when held in light of the subsequent extensive efforts to convince me to adopt your accounting practices.

When we say things like let's "keep it that way", we're presupposing that things have been that way. Your position has been the ground of your objections throughout!

If you want to critique my contributions here, by all means be my guest! The more well considered appropriately placed scrutiny the merrier. I mean, given that one cannot see the flaws in their own work, one cannot recognize their own mistakes should there be any. So, I welcome any and all valid criticism. I am most certainly not beyond reproach.

A good deal of objections I made to your position are not directly linked to my specific understanding of belief, but more on the way we intuitively use belief ascriptions (so on linguistic facts), on what I take to be common knowledge about the debate on belief as propositional attitudes, or propositional calculus, or the internal logic of your claims as far as I understood/misunderstood them.

Knowing what sorts of beliefs that which sorts of creatures can and do have in which sorts of situations and/or circumstances requires knowing what belief is and how it emerges and evolves over time. I am now quite confident that you're working from a gross misunderstanding and/or misconception of belief. As a result, the practice of ascribing belief to another suffers. This holds good regardless of whether or not you hold one of the conventional views/positions.

Since you've been advising that I adopt what I find to be dubious methods based upon specious notions, I've a bit of advice for you.

The notion of a point of view is fraught. Dispense of it. It's nothing more than an aggregate of thought and belief. One's point of view is thought and belief-based. Belief systems emerge and grow in their complexity. Point of views are the result. If you do not have belief right, you'll never have a point of view right either.




Depending upon the complexity, reports of another's belief can be true or false; partly true and partly false; mostly true or mostly false. Surely you get the picture. Our reports of Jack's belief at time t1 are no exception. Any and all reports of what another believes at time t1 must correspond to what the other creature believes at time t1 in order to be true. Our reports of Jack's belief can be true, even when Jack's mistaken and/or false belief cannot be.

To answer your earlier objection regarding my earlier mention of my rendering being more accurate than yours...

"Jack believed that a clock was working at time t1" is the way you've insisted is more acceptable for all the reasons you've been offering, ad nauseum. Here's the glaring problem...

Your report ascribes a belief to Jack that would be true when any clock is working at time t1. Jack's belief cannot be true! Yet you've attributed one to him that is because somewhere there was a clock working at time t1! Jack's belief is false. We all agree there! The disagreement is regarding which accounting practice offers the best rendering of Jack's belief. I'm showing you exactly how your ascription practices fail in the attempts to accurately depict and/or portray Jack's belief at time t1.

So, to reiterate, when it comes to what it would take for Jack's belief to be true, if we adopted your ascription practice, any working clock would suffice to meet the truth conditions of the belief you've insisted on attributing to Jack.

Jack was not just believing that any clock was working. He believed that one particular clock was working. The particular clock that Jack believed to be working was a broken one. At time t1, Jack most certainly believed that that particular broken clock was working.

His belief that that particular clock was working could not have been true! If his belief were rendered as "a clock is working", it would be true if and when any clock was working! So...

No thanks, but I'll stick to my own position on such matters...

Thanks for all the fun, but I gotta run. Toodles!

:flower:

Now it’s your turn to clarify what belief is — neomac

Reduced to the point of near breaking...

Belief consists entirely of meaningful correlations drawn between directly and/or indirectly perceptible things by a creature with the biological machinery capable of doing so.

Does believing a clock is working (without quotation marks) have the same truth conditions of believing “a clock is working” (with quotation marks)? If they differ, what is the difference? — neomac

Believing a clock is working is something that happens as a result of knowing how to read a clock and looking towards one as a means to know what time it is. Things such as these are not the sort of things that we say have truth conditions. Rather, they are the truth conditions of statements about what's happened, and/or is happening.

It makes no sense to me to talk about the truth conditions of (believing "a clock is working"). That does not at all seem to be a truth apt set of meaningful marks contained within the parentheses. The truth conditions of the statement are another matter altogether...

"A clock is working" is true when and only when a clock is working.

If “a clock is working” is true, does this imply that “Jack’s believes that a clock is working” is true? If not, why not? — neomac

No. Why would it? The statement about the clock is true when and only when a clock is working. The statement about Jack's belief is true when and only when it corresponds to Jack's belief.

Take the statement “Jack believes that a broken clock is working” and the statement “a broken clock is working”, do they share the same content? — neomac

They both consist of meaningful words, some of the same ones in the same sense. One's about Jack's belief, and the other is about the working condition of a clock.

If they differ, what is the difference?

See above.

Now it’s your turn to clarify what belief is. However, I would still like to hear at least your answers to my 3 questions b/c it helps clarify your ideas about belief. — neomac

I plan on it. They are good questions.

So from whom did you get the idea that beliefs as propositional attitudes are by definition attitudes toward sentences to be reported in quotation marks (as in “S believes that ‘p’” instead of “S believes that p”)? Until I don’t have a convincing answer to that, your claim is another unacceptable example of framing the issue in a way that presupposes your understanding as correct. — neomac

That's a very odd phrasing at the end. There were others earlier, but they all seem inconsequential. I think you meant to write "Until I do..." rather than "Until I don't...". Clarify please if my interpretation is incorrect. If it's correct, no need to spend time verifying.

That's a fair and relevant question given the discussion. The near equation of statements and propositions amounts to combinatory vestiges from earlier discussions, including but not limited to the belief that approach which I've always taken to be about belief statements and the presupposition of truth inherently embedded within them such that suffixing them with "is true" amounts to redundancy.

It's good to know that that's not what you're doing with those words. Duly noted! Seeing that I've no issue with using them however you wish here, I'll follow your lead. I'm not at all married to the idea of propositions or attitudes towards them such that one takes them to be true(in the sense of propositions as statements) or such that one takes them to be the case(in the sense of propositions as states of affairs/events).

To your point, I would concur that I certainly cannot offer a valid objection, should I have an issue, regarding the practice of rendering belief as propositional attitudes if I've not understood what is meant by your use of the term propositional attitude; or better yet, if I've not rightly understood the practice.

I now understand, perhaps moreso than at the time, why you opened with the questionaire that you did. So, this serves as a reminder to me that there's often very good reasons why some want to begin by defining one's key terms.

What exactly are you attributing/ascribing to another when you say that they believe something?
— creativesoul

I'm attributing a belief: beliefs are intentional cognitive states/events with intrinsic mind-to-world (cognitive) fitness conditions expressed through behavioral attitudes in a given context. These intrinsic fitness conditions constitute - broadly speaking - the p.o.v of the believer... — neomac

In the spirit of building a bridge of mutual understanding, I must say that that's considerably more confusing to me than it is clarifying. It seems theory laden, and quite heavily so. This is not meant as an insult or necessarily a negative thing(to be theory laden). However, I now more than ever want to be sure that I understand what you're saying.

You're drawing a distinction between one's point of view and one's belief. Could you unpack them both individually please, so as to be able to compare and contrast the two?

I must say that it seems odd to me to say something like "beliefs are intentional cognitive states/events with intrinsic mind-to-world (cognitive) fitness conditions..." The double use of the term "cognitive" is throwing me.

On your view, does cognition include things not contained inside the skull?

The last post of mine seems the most promising for attaining a mutual understanding of one another's position. The entire discussion has skirted around the underlying issue, which is - as mentioned heretofore - mutually exclusive notions of belief at work. Setting our notions out here in the public square will go a very long way to establishing where the pivotal key differences are.

We can set all the other stuff aside for now and focus upon what counts as belief.

Then, we will see how much sense it makes to ascribe belief to another, because we will have some standard of belief for comparing our ascriptions/attribution to.

I mean, we are both clearly dug in regarding our own respective reasoning for accepting and/or rejecting saying that we can and sometimes do believe that a broken clock is working. So, in line with your own suggestion of looking towards assumptions, etc., this is a perfect place to start!

> What are you attributing(ascribing) to another prior to having a standard for what exactly counts as belief?

I don't get the sense of this question. — neomac

What is your criterion for belief?

You've based your arguments here on your understanding of belief ascription. What exactly are you ascribing to another when you say that they believe something?

Pls focus: “a broken clock is working” is a contradiction (!!!). — neomac

While believing that a broken clock is working is not.

It's the difference between understanding that believing a broken clock is working is not the same as believing "a broken clock is working".

The latter is how those who hold all belief as propositional attitude would render Jack's belief that a broken clock is working. Not all belief can be successfully rendered as such.

My problem is only with the claim that this belief report “P (mistakenly) believed that a broken clock was working” is not only accurate, but even more accurate than “P (mistakenly) believed that a clock was working”. — neomac

It has to do with the content of Jack's belief...

My position can admit and accept all three of the renditions we've been discussing. You're the one who has issue with the fact that we do sometimes believe that broken clocks are working.

Jack believed that a broken clock was working” can be explained also by our common understanding of belief ascriptions, — neomac

Show me again, because thus far you've changed Jack's belief in your translation.

... it seems you are distinguishing 2 cases (belief ascription by Q at t1, and belief ascription by P at t2) even though there is no such difference with respect to what is ascribed to P at time t1 in both 2 cases, according to your belief ascription report (at t1, P believes that a broken clock is working, for both Q at t1 and P at t2). — neomac

You state this as though it is a problem. My report about Jack's belief at time t1 matches Jack's own report at time t2 of his belief at time t1. If that does not count as matching Jack's point of view then nothing will.

Secondly, since for me there is no difference in belief ascription failure between Q at t1 and P at t2, then you are not satisfying my standard, b/c at least in case of Q at t1 - you claim - there is no need for matching. Not to mention the fact that even the belief ascription by P at t2 is not satisfying my standard either, as I intend it: P at t2 is not offering any accurate report of P at t1 if she used your belief ascription report.

At time t2, Jack's own report of his own belief at time t1 matches mine. Somehow, you find this to be a problem. According to the above, we're both wrong. That's an incredible claim!

Now, just to be clear, I agree that there are times that we can know another's belief better than they do, but this is not one of those times(you do not know Jack's belief at time t1 better than Jack at time t2).

If the position you hold forbids you to admit that we can do both, believe that a broken clock is working, and admit of having held that belief at a later time, then I suggest you seriously consider incorporating the fact that we can and do hold belief that we are unaware of holding at the time.

Do you also deny that it is possible for us to believe that a man in a sheep suit is a sheep, or that a barn facade is a barn?

The philosophical task, as I understand it, consists precisely in looking for what justifies one’s intuitive assumptions and not giving them for granted, all the more if they are not shared (like in your case). — neomac

Have you never believed a clock that was not telling the right time?

:worry:

Well, if you do not wish to continue, there's not much more I can do. I am very short on time for doing this stuff, for having this discussion, but I am making time just to be able to do so. You've levied a fair amount of serious charges here, and evidently you do not feel the obligation to allow the accused to provide a defense.

Due to the depth and breadth of the charges, I was planning on going through your objections one at a time. So, I began with your objection that my report of Jack's belief at time t1 did not match Jack's point of view at time t1. That objection was based upon your own proposed standard that our report of another's belief at time t1 match the point of view and/or perspective of the believer at time t1. You further supported this idea of matching the believer's own viewpoint.

So, I raised the valid objection that, at time t2, the believer's own report of their belief at time t1 does not meet the standard you've set. Do you not find that problematic? Are we to say that, at time t2, Jack is wrong about what they believed at time t1? What ground is there for us to accept his point of view at time t1(while mistaken) and reject it at time t2 after he's become aware of and subsequently corrected the mistake?

That's absurd. Special pleading at best.

There is nothing at all wrong with our saying that they held a belief that they were unaware of at time t1, but later when they became aware of the relevant facts concerning the clock along with their belief about it, they would readily admit that they had indeed believed that that broken clock was working.

The problem of our doing so is that it goes against the conventional notions.



You also seem to want to say that I am somehow attributing a self-contradictory belief to Jack, but I've yet to see you explain how I have done so. Thus far it's been gratuitously asserted along with other charges as well. That said, granted, going by the standards you're working from and one absolute presupposition they rest upon, it would be contradictory to say that anyone believed that broken clock was working. However, if we acknowledge the fact that we can and do hold belief that we are unaware of holding at the time of holding it, it is not at all contradictory to believe that a broken clock is working.

The standard you've presented presupposes that a believer is always aware of their own belief at the time it is influencing their behaviour. That is a false presupposition.



You've also complained several times about the fact that I've been using a thought experiment and/or hypothetical scenario, as if that is a problem? Surely, you do not want me to show you how absurd that is... do you? Here's the thing, it's not just a thought experiment...

It's something that happens! It is also something that can be tested in a controlled environment. Now, I would agree that the subjects would agree to both reports; that they believed that that clock was working, and that they believed that a broken clock was working. They could do so without any self-contradiction whatsoever.

Lastly, it has become more and more apparent to me that we have mutually exclusive notions of belief at work. I'm still wondering about something you said earlier regarding whether or not our notion of belief ought match our standard for belief ascription or the other way around. I'll ask you again...

What are you attributing(ascribing) to another prior to having a standard for what exactly counts as belief?

Ah shit! That's true! At time t1, I did believe that that particular broken clock was working!

There are a few things I'd like to talk about here. First, we are discussing our differing standards regarding exactly what counts as an acceptable rendition of another's belief. You've suggested that our report must match their perspective and/or their point of view at that time(time t1). You've placed emphasis upon our keeping their point of view and/or perspective in mind. You've subsequently charged that my proposal of what they believe at time t1 does not match their point of view and/or perspective at time t1. You're perfectly well within the bounds of saying so. I've said so myself. So...

I agree. That is not a problem, for I am talking about a belief that they are unaware of having at time t1. Thus, my proposal ought not match their point of view at time t1. My proposal of what they believe ought match what they believe. Sometimes we believe things that we are totally unaware of.

At time t1, if we should ask, "Hey!... Jack!... Do you realize that you believe that that broken clock is working?" they would be quite surprised that they had just believed that that particular broken clock was working.

In my comment, I contrasted P’s belief prospective at t1 with both Q’s belief prospective at t1 and P’s belief prospective at t2 (when she understood her belief at t1 to be wrong). And I said our report is accurate when it matches P’s belief prospective at time t1. — neomac

According to the standard you've put forth for what counts as an acceptable report of Jack's belief at time t1, Jack's own reporting at time t2 would not meet that standard.

Indeed I reported that premise (there was a typo: I wrote “intenTional” instead of “intenSional”), b/c if you want to make a philosophical proposal that is appealing to me, or those holding the conventional view of belief ascription, you should feel intellectually compelled to show understanding toward what we are concerned about (de dicto report are necessary for rendering believers' p.o.v.), and prove by that that we are not talking past each other. The burden is on you, b/c it’s you who wants to challenge the conventional view, not the other way around.
Otherwise our exchange will just end up in butting heads against the wall of our diverging intuition pumps. It’s pointless. So we can work out our different views better if we start from common grounds or at least reciprocal concessions. — neomac

Very well put. I'm fairly certain that we are not talking past each other. I'll give your objections due attention as soon as time permits. There's quite a bit wrapped up in there, and again... I appreciate the due attention. You've presented what seems to be a cogent well considered reply and as such it deserves the same in response.

Yet one can wonder if all intensional belief ascriptions can be in principle replaced by extensional belief ascriptions without omitting the believer’s perspective. How? By rendering the believer’s perspective in terms of metalinguistic belief ascriptions (belief about the truth-value of some propositions).
This is why one can claim as valid both <Jack believes a broken clock is working> (extensional belief ascription) and <Jack believes the proposition “a broken clock is working” false> (extensional belief ascription rendering the believer’s perspective in metalinguistic terms).
Where is the benefit? At least, in preserving truth-value through substitution of co-referent terms, even for belief ascriptions, and without giving up on the believer’s perspective. — neomac

The above is not half bad. That's supposed to be a compliment.

We commonly take a believer’s perspective on a given situation as a fundamental accuracy condition for belief ascriptions about him, and intensional belief ascriptions are designed for expressing this understanding — neomac

Is the practice of using "intensional" to ensure that our ascriptions are somehow congruent and/or otherwise amenable to the believer's perspective at the time? Given what I've quoted below, it would seem so.

All I can say is that the most accurate report of someone’s belief at time t1 is the one that best matches the point of view of the believer at time t1. Why would I pick the point of view of some person P at time t2 (or some other person Q at time t1) as a criterium of accuracy for reporting P's belief at time t1? — neomac

One great reason to deny the need for a match between our report and the person's own perspective and/or point of view at that time is when they believe that a man in a sheep suit is a sheep, but they've no idea that they believe that. That man in that suit is a very large part of the meaningful content of any belief that he is a sheep. That man in that suit is both, unknown and influential to the believer.

The believer does not know at the time that they believe a man in a sheep suit is a sheep.

One great reason to pick the same person at another time is when we find ourselves discussing another's belief that they themselves do not know that they have. We can ask them later after they become aware of the relevant facts. It seems to me that that part of what I'm saying here honors and satisfies your standard of matching the individual's perspective concerning what exactly they believed at time t1. Moreso even than the alternative.

In your rendering of my contentions here, you've placed far too much importance on the notions of intentional, intensional, and extensional. One in my position could be easily flattered by such misattribution. I mean, it looks like a very intelligent viewpoint is being described.

That is a barn, therefore there is at least one barn on that land.
That is a sheep, therefore there is at least one sheep in that field.
That clock is working, therefore what it says about the time is accurate.

That barn facade is a barn, therefore there is at least one barn on that land.
That sheet hanging from a clothesline is a sheep, therefore there is at least one sheep in that field.
That man dressed in a sheep suit is a sheep, therefore there is at least one sheep in that field.
That stopped clock is working, therefore what it says about the time is accurate.

So, above are two different ways to describe some of the beliefs under consideration. It seems that I am the only one around here who finds the bottom set to be more accurate and/or acceptable than the first. Most of the objections are based upon the idea that the believer needs to assent to their belief when put into propositional form. That the scope of one's belief needs to be limited to only what they would say of themselves at that time.

That barn facade is a barn, therefore there is at least one barn on that land.
That sheet hanging from a clothesline is a sheep, therefore there is at least one sheep in that field.
That man dressed in a sheep suit is a sheep, therefore there is at least one sheep in that field.
That stopped clock is working, therefore what it says about the time is accurate.
Jones owns a Ford and disjunctions are true if either disjunct is. Therefore, 'either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona' is true because Jones owns a Ford.

SO now I am wondering if you have a clear grasp of what a proposition is. — Banno

There's a certain bit of irony here. I could say "pots and kettles" too...

Need I remind you of the absolute mess you made of the notion during the debate? There is more than one accepted use of that term. On my view, all propositions are proposed. It follows that having an attitude towards some proposition such that one believes it to be the case requires an individual capable of proposing and an individual capable of understanding that proposal and subsequently taking it to be true.

I understand what you are arguing. You're just wrong. — frank

That's not at all convincing to an astute audience. Gratuitous assertions such as these may convince some, but not I. We'll see if I'm wrong. That has yet to have been determined and/or established. I'm not even finished yet. Time constraints.

I just don't see anything here that supports your contention. — Banno

To which contention are you referring?

You're moving goal posts. — Harry Hindu

(That broken clock is working) has been proposed as the belief from the beginning. Any change was for elucidation only, not as a way to avoid valid objection. Evidently you do not understand what's being argued. That reply was meant more for others anyway...

I think that it would be helpful to show how the objection is inapplicable to what I'm arguing here. Your example is one of switching referents. Mine is not.

He never held an attitude towards the proposition (that broken clock is working) such that he believed it true. — creativesoul

Belief that that barn facade was a barn. Belief that that sheet hanging from a clothesline was a sheep. Belief that that man dressed in a sheep suit was a sheep. Etc.

Belief that does not permit itself to be rendered as a propositional attitude.

Seems to me that this is clearly a belief that does not allow itself to be rendered in propositional form such that the believer would hold it to be true, or as true. — creativesoul

Here I'm extending this to barn facades and sheets in fields that resemble sheep...