Nothing to do with Dennett's "Quining Qualia" The "snow is white" example almost makes the point that not all belief is regarding a statement; that not all belief has propositional content; that not all belief is an attitude towards a statement/proposition. The problem with the example is that it is not a belief that can be had by a language less creature.
Some belief is about what happened, is happening, or what will happen. Some belief about that does not consist of language, nor is it existentially dependent upon language. The fire example serves to make the point better.
A language less creature can learn that touching fire causes pain. The belief that touching the fire caused the subsequent pain is not an attitude towards the proposition "touching fire caused pain". It's a belief about what just happened. The proposition/statement is a part of our report, not a part of the creature's belief. All belief is meaningful to the creature having it. This crucial point gets glossed over and/or outright neglected far too often. We always attribute meaning, and form meaningful thought and belief(conscious experience as a result) by virtue of drawing correlations between different things. In the fire example, the creature draw correlations between the fire, the touching, and the pain. It has conscious experience of being burnt by fire. It learns, and subsequently believes that touching fire caused(causes) pain.
There is no language necessary in order for this to actually happen. No propositions. No statements. There is meaningful conscious experience, thought, belief, the attribution and/or recognition of causality. And... the belief is true(corresponds to what happened). Touching the fire did cause the pain. We know that, as does the creature, despite the creature's inability to say it. It formed meaningful, well-grounded, and true belief about what happened.