...it is generally impossible for us to have a belief about a belief — Isaac

If that were the case, then there could be no such thing as what many classify as reflective thought, a change in one's own sense of self worth, belonging, identity, self-examination, superego, self policing, or any other sort of metacognition aimed at deliberate improvement by virtue of aiming to avoid forming, having, and/or otherwise holding false belief. There could be no understanding of our own pre-existing belief, if we cannot form, have, and/or hold subsequent belief about them. There could be no such thing as identifying, isolating, and subsequently removing false belief from our worldview.

Yet, all these things exist and/or happen regularly.

A current lack of confidence, reliability, trustworthiness in some statement or other that we once believed with nearly unshakable conviction comes from exactly such a metacognitive endeavor.

They are virtually innumerable such true statements(if that's what you mean by "truths") about one that they cannot assert about themselves without sounding 'absurd'.
— creativesoul

Speak for yourself. — Ciceronianus the White

Surprising answer, given that I thought that you and I shared quite a bit of overlap(agreement) in our respective views in this thread.

Do you not agree that there are a large group of true statements about an individual that the individual cannot assert about themselves without sounding absurd?

Do you object to the following paragraph?

Assuming linguistic competency, each and every time an individual observes another being surprised by rainfall, the observer has the ability to talk about the observations in terms of another individual's lack of true belief. We can watch another from the beginning to the end, so to speak, have no clue that it is raining outside before being suddenly surprised. We can do a live report.

In times like these, we can most certainly say something true about another in terms of their lack of true belief about the weather.

We cannot say the same of ourselves, while it's happening to us, because it's happening to us; which means that we are the one lacking true belief about the weather. Moore wonders why we cannot same the same about ourselves. Had he kept in mind that we are not aware of our mistakes while we're making them, he would better understand why it sounds so absurd to say the same of ourselves.

"I am confused" is both a belief statement about one's own mental state, and describes and/or refers to one's own mental state...

Come to think of it.

:wink:

You're not saying that "I believe" is a description of one's mental state; you're saying that the certainty/doubt associated with a belief is a description of one's mental state. — Luke

No. I'm saying exactly what you claimed I'm not. I'm not saying exactly what you said I was.

:brow:

The certainty/doubt is the mental state.

"I believe, but I'm not sure..." refers to(is all about) one's own mental state. "I believe, but I'm not sure that X" is about one's own doubt concerning the truth of X.

...the belief itself... is "a description of one's mental state"

That's what I've never claimed. So when you said it "was not the belief itself which is a description of one's mental state", I would agree.

I said "I believe" can be a description of one's mental state, or part of one anyway. I adopted that terminological choice from others here. I wouldn't necessarily choose it. There are much better ways to untangle the knots here.

You state above: ""I believe" can be [...] a description of one's mental state". This is what I have been questioning — Luke

I've offered numerous examples of such usage.

"I believe" is not the belief.

I stand by everything I've written. I'm actually glad you resurrected that bit. The deletion was accidental.

"I believe" can be a description(part of one anyway) of one's confidence level. I never said "I believe" is always used that way. Hence, sometimes it is not. The example(sentence) we were discussing at the time you said this...

But it's not the belief itself which is "a description of one's mental state" in that case; it's the doubt about the belief. — creativesoul

...did not qualify as one of the uses of "I believe" that can, and does, refer to one's own certainty and/or confidence level(state of mind). So, when you said what you said, about that particular example, I answered accordingly...

I never said otherwise... about that particular example/candidate under our consideration.

Hopefully that helps to clear up any misunderstanding about that particular part of our conversation.

One's doubt about a belief is doubting the truth thereof.
— creativesoul

But it's not the belief itself which is "a description of one's mental state" in that case; it's the doubt about the belief. — Luke

I've never claimed otherwise. Sometimes "I believe" indicates doubt, particularly when someone says "I believe, but I'm not certain". Those uses are about one's own uncertainty/confidence level concerning the belief statement(s) in question(X or that).

"I believe X, but I'm not certain" expresses doubt and/or uncertainty concerning the truth of the belief(X).

One's doubt about a belief is doubting the truth thereof.

...it sounds like this description concerns the level of certainty/doubt that one has about a belief rather than the belief itself. — Luke

I'm not following. Which description?

One is about philosophical positions and there is no uncertainty and/or hesitation involved regarding the truth of the statement(that), while the other is about both that(whatever that may be) and one's own low confidence level(doubt, uncertainty) that that is so, is true, is the case. etc.

"I believe that some philosophical positions are better than others, but I'm not certain as to why or how" is about grading philosophical positions, and one's own uncertainty and/or doubt about what makes some better than others.

"I believe that that's correct, but I'm uncertain" is about the speaker's doubt.
— creativesoul

Aren't you the speaker? — Luke

Well, here and now... not strictly speaking. It's better to note that I'm reporting upon some common language uses, as are we all...

However, I could be and have been the speaker saying such a thing, when I'm uncertain and/or doubt that(whatever that may be). I'm sure the same could be said of most anyone who regularly uses "I believe" as a means to express uncertainty about that(whatever that may be). Such use is amenable to interchangeability of "believe" and "think". Not all are.

Could you say more about how either statement is a description of one's mental state? — Luke

"I believe" can be used to indicate both uncertainty and certainty. Strictly speaking, I wouldn't call either a "description". I've borrowed that word from others here. "I believe, but I'm not certain" is about one's own mental state nevertheless, in these situations, to be clear.

"I believe that that's correct, but I'm uncertain" is about the speaker's doubt or uncertainty regarding that(whatever that may be).

Do you see it differently?

...

...we can't have a belief about our mental states. — Isaac

Yes, we can have belief about our own belief, and they not only can be, but must be true belief. The alternative is confusion, lunacy, and/or insanity(not knowing what to believe or why). What we cannot have is false belief about what we believe.

...someone who asserts ‘It is raining’ does not thereby assert that he believes that it is raining, but his asserting it does indeed imply that he believes it.
— Marie McGinn

Is it anywhere explained why? I've read the article, but not with any great depth. I can't find an explanation for this assertion. — Isaac

My take...

Why is it the case that someone who asserts "It is raining" does not thereby assert that they believe it is raining? Well, because "I believe it is raining" contains different words than "It is raining".

Why does asserting "X" imply that one believes "X'? Well, because that's what happens when a listener does not doubt the sincerity of the speaker.

Not that the comparison is particularly interesting to me, because it's not at all, but since you asked...

Both are philosophical positions. All philosophical positions have some things in common with one another. However, I would think that any simulation would also require a plurality. The simulation, and what was being simulated...

So...

...all four of whom are ardent capitalists. — StreetlightX

Getting things back to normal...

You're talking to yourself.

There are no solipsists...

Solipsism is a symptom of a gross misunderstanding of thought and belief hard at work. Solipsism is the name of a philosophical position/argument which outright denies the existence of anything other than the mind of the one forwarding the argument/position...

One finger cannot point at itself. All philosophical positions/arguments are existentially dependent upon common language use. There are no private languages. Language is existentially dependent upon shared meaning. Shared meaning requires a plurality.

Solipsism is false. Rubbish.

But what on earth is Marie McGinn speaking about? Surely (I know I shouldn't call you that) she means "there are truths about me which I cannot assert without appearing absurd"? — Ciceronianus the White

If she means that, then she's absolutely correct. They are virtually innumerable such true statements(if that's what you mean by "truths") about one that they cannot assert about themselves without sounding 'absurd'.

There's all sorts of statements that are both true about us, and yet sound utterly absurd if we are the ones saying so. That fact ought not be a surprise to anyone.

Each and every time we hold some false belief or another; each and every time we are in the process of being mistaken about the way things are, someone else could state something true about our being mistaken, about our holding false belief, and there would be no issue whatsoever.

However...

Because we cannot recognize our own mistakes; because we cannot make a mistake on purpose; because we cannot knowingly believe a falsehood; we cannot say some things that are true about ourselves despite the fact that others have no problem at all stating such things.

No need for some elaborate explanations. Isn't that exactly what peer review is all about? The fact that we cannot recognize our own mistakes?

Moore's example describes a person who knowingly holds false belief.

:brow:

"I do not believe it's raining outside, but I'm wrong" describes the exact same situation as "It's raining outside, but I do not believe it".

Bewitchment... indeed.

One cannot believe it is raining when they do not believe it is raining.
— creativesoul


Yes, but under traditional correspondence theory, that has no relevance. — Isaac

I've no idea what relevance that has to what I've offered here. From what I remember, I'm no traditional correspondence theorist. There's much to argue with concerning the rest of that post, but it is all equally beside the point. I'm just showing that Moore's 'puzzle' is a result of not having a clue of what belief is and how it works.

This is a better rendering... the nail in the coffin, as it were...

One cannot believe that "It's raining" is true when they do not believe it is raining.

We all know that much.

I don’t think this is right (even though I conceded to Michael earlier that it was). I find the sentence to be absurd whether the speaker is lying or not. Also, it’s not much of a lie. — Luke

I would concur, and add the following...

To lie is to deliberately misrepresent one's own thought and belief. All lies share this common feature/trait/denominator. When one lies about whether or not it is raining, they do not say both, that it is raining, and that they do not believe it is raining.

"It's raining, but I do not believe it" is not a lie. It's just plain old textbook self-contradiction.

We would say “It’s raining” when we do not believe it is raining whenever we would intend to lie to another about what the given state of affairs is. But since acknowledging one is lying while actively lying defeats the very intention of lying which one is engaged in, and since we in practice cannot experience intending to lie while simultaneously intending not to lie (this being a contradiction), saying “It’s raining, but I don’t believe it’s raining” is something no one would ever say in earnest.

But, then, in so arguing I find that the statement, “It’s raining, but I don’t believe it is,” is contradictory in terms of the intentions it implies on the part of the speaker who so affirms. — javra

Yup...

Regardless of sincerity... one cannot believe both statements at the same time.

If we want to see if the nature of this artificial problem gives us a frame we didn't already have, a map we weren't already making use of, then we'd be foolish to judge the results by whether things look the same as they do through the frame we're already using. — Isaac

What makes it puzzling is when and if it cannot be effectively de-mystified(solved) by using one's framework...

If one's framework takes adequate account of the sentence and why/how it seems puzzling, if one can explain away the puzzle, untie the linguistic knots, dissolve the issue, then there is no need for a new framework.

If I were to make some claim or another that human thought and belief could exist in their entirety without a complex brain with certain structures, you would immediately dismiss such claims... and rightfully so, because you(and I) both already know better...

Now I'm the one rather puzzled here... I do not understand why this 'puzzle' remains interesting to anyone...

Moore's hypothetical speaker makes two separate claims in the same sentence at the same time. That much is clear and uncontentious. They cannot both be believed at the same time. That much is also clear and uncontentious. That's it. That's exactly why it "sounds absurd".

What else is needed here?

Moore described a situation of an individual speaker making two statements - at the same time - that cannot both be believed the same time.

What remains puzzling?

A different but equally effective de-mystification would be to just realize that Moore's 'puzzle' describes what would be taking place IF one were able to see themselves as they see another while in the midst of being mistaken about the weather. That's precisely what's going on in the first example. One person is watching another be mistaken about the weather as it's happening. That example is not a problem at all. However, one who is in that situation cannot recognize that they are mistaken. In such a situation, one IS NOT capable of watching themselves but that's what's being described - as is clearly shown by talking in the third person about oneself using present verb tense.

Yet again... that's it. What on earth remains so puzzling? Moore's 'puzzle' describes what would be taking place IF one were able to see themselves being mistaken about the weather as the mistake is happening. We cannot do that.

Moore set out a hypothetical scenario that does not - cannot - happen. We all know this, even if we cannot quite explain it to our own satisfaction. That's exactly why it "sounds absurd". If anyone has trouble de-mystifying Moore's 'puzzle', I would suggest taking a long hard look at your notion of human thought and belief, because that's precisely what is being misunderstood within the 'puzzle' itself.

The process goes

state of reality>sensory responses>belief that it's raining>belief that I'd be best off telling someone>speech act "it's raining"

That much is pretty much indisputable. — Isaac

Well, no, it's actually not. You see where you've placed a division between reality, sensory responses, and belief that it's raining, I reject those divisions based upon the fact that all belief consists - in large part - of the first two. There can be no removal of reality(rainfall) or physiological sensory perception. What's left would not have what it takes for belief that it's raining.

The problem I see with the model you're proposing is that it leads us to say that we're not talking about rainfall, or that we do not have direct access to the world. But we are, and we do. Therefore, the model is wrong somewhere along the line. It's also untenable. If held to strictly, you would be forced to admit, on pains of coherency, that 'state of reality' is just another thing you've arrived at via the second and third steps of the process... or end in self contradiction.

none of us are idealists, we all agree that the external world exists and affects us via our senses. At issue is only where along that chain it is sensible to say the object of the utterance at the end of it is.

The process goes

state of reality>sensory responses>belief that it's raining>belief that I'd be best off telling someone>speech act "it's raining"

That much is pretty much indisputable.

Correspondence theory would have the truth of the final stage measured by the first, but since no one can contemplate, feel or talk about the first without it having passed through at least stages 2 and 3 it seems an unnecessary conceit to pretend it's stage 1 we're talking about. Especially as we cannot, no matter how hard we try, disentangle those stages from our embeddedness in the world (both social and physical). — Isaac

So, because we use sensory responses to detect rainfall, we cannot talk about that which we're detecting?

Moore's first example is of an individual recognizing and describing another individual's mistake. He then moves on to wonder why one cannot say the same thing about oneself. Moore is neglecting to consider some things about all human thought and belief that would otherwise allow him to see where he has went wrong in his comparison. He was not - and is not - alone.

Listen...

Moore's second example is someone recognizing their own mistake, while it's happening, and that - my friends - is humanly impossible.

While we can see someone else's mistake while it's being made, as in the first example, we cannot 'see' that we are making a mistake while in the process of doing so. That is the crucial consideration that needs to be immediately moved and kept in the forefront of this discussion.

It is humanly impossible to knowingly make a mistake; to make a mistake on purpose. It is likewise humanly impossible to knowingly believe a falsehood. We do not realize that we're making a mistake while we're in the process of making them. Moore's present tense verb usage in his second example renders exactly such an impossibility.

We cannot believe both statements at the same time because we cannot recognize that we're mistaken while we are. The only way we can believe both statements at the same time is if we misuse verb tense while accounting and/or describing our own past mistakes.

Isaac's earlier example illustrated this. One could say "Look it's raining, but I do not believe it's raining" while viewing a video of themselves being mistaken. However, and this is key too...

Such talk is the recognition of one's own mistakes, while being made, and even in the cases of viewing a past recording of our own mistakes while they were happening(watching a video of ourselves being surprised by rainfall)... the time sensitive grammatically correct rendering - a true account/self-report - would be "Look, it was raining, but I did not believe it."

...there's nothing wrong with the sentence "it is raining and I don't believe that it is raining". The only problem is when you infer from this that the speaker believes the sentence to be true, — Michael

So...

The problem, according to you, is trusting a speaker. And someone mentioned irony earlier...

I can totally believe that X is true but that you don't believe X. — Pfhorrest

Yes. That's been established and is not at issue as far as I'm concerned. Those do not directly contradict one another. That basically is Moore's first example. He compared that to another though, and that is where the problems show themselves. A report of another's thought and belief, and a report of one's own thought and belief are drastically different.

You cannot believe both, that "X" is true, and that you don't believe it.

That's the difference.

You can totally believe X is true and that another doesn't. You do. They do not. The same cannot be said about ourselves, unless we're talking about past events. Then, if one follows the rules of grammar, the verb tense changes to past tense. Moore's example used present tense. That's suspect language use(misuse) and that also adds to the oddity.

We cannot believe both at the same time.

Done.

Some people.

The domain of logical possibility...

Suppose you are sitting in a windowless room. It begins to rain outside. You have not heard a weather report, so you don’t know that it’s raining. So you don’t believe that it’s raining. Thus your friend McGillicuddy, who knows your situation, can say truly of you, “It’s raining, but MacIntosh doesn’t believe it is.” But if you, MacIntosh, were to say exactly the same thing to McGillicuddy—“It’s raining, but I don’t believe it is”—your friend would rightly think you’d lost your mind. Why, then, is the second sentence absurd? As G.E. Moore put it, “Why is it absurd for me to say something true about myself?” — Wheatley

As common language users, we automatically presume sincerity and/or honesty in another's speech. This happens autonomously, early on, and it is necessary for language acquisition. It's a default not of our own choosing. But later on, when we come to realize that some folk are insincere, we temper our certainty/trust in another's sincerity accordingly. The tendency, the need, to assume sincerity most of the time remains.

The second sentence in question above is 'absurd'(I much prefer self-contradictory/incoherent) as a result of violating what's possible for us to believe, and as a result of our recognizing that the speaker themselves cannot believe both statements at the same time despite being quite able to assert both simulataneously.

Furthermore, the speaker is not saying something true about themselves, as Moore suggests, they are clearly contradicting themselves from one belief statement to the next.

All with have are two propositions... — Isaac

No. It is a long standing historical mistake to treat belief statements as though they are equivalent to statements and/or propositions.

Hence...

Talk of P, when discussing belief begins on the wrong footing.

...If the truth of "It is raining" is determined by whether it's raining, not by whether I believe it's raining, then I can say it is truthfully raining, but I don't believe it is. — Isaac

Equivocating the term "truth" doesn't help.

What you cannot do is believe it is raining, and not believe that it is raining at the same time.

The problem here is caused by the contradiction between a philosophical commitment to correspondence theory, and the actual psychological reality that the truth of a statement is always a judgment and always based on the belief of the person doing the judging.

Nah.

The problem, as I've expressed clearly enough, is that some people are treating the two belief statements as though they are not belief statements at all, but rather just - at face value - some statement/proposition or another... in general. The problem is of historical origins, and it amounts to a conflation of belief and statements, and/or belief and propositions. There's a remarkable actual difference between the two...

Hence...

Both statements can be true at the same time, without contradiction, but both cannot be believed at the same time without self-contradiction.

All you have done so far is respond to my critique of white privilege by reiterating that black people have been/are unfairly treated and asking me whether black lives matter. — Judaka

The post that followed this opening is the first critique of white privilege, from you, that I've seen. I'm still struggling to understand why you are replying with such underlying discontent about me personally. I'm not attacking you. I recognize that the notion of "white privilege" is used, quite unjustly, as an attack. I do not condone such use.

That said, the post deserves more of my attention. I appreciate it, because it seems that there's much to work with, and you may be surprised to know that there remains much agreement. Some of the issues ought be further unpacked. As you well know, the topic is nuanced... quite so.

I'm working on a more appropriate and in depth reply, because I think you've offered a good start...

:wink:

The person who says "it is raining and I don't believe that it is raining" isn't being sincere. — Michael

Even in that case, the speaker cannot believe both at the same time.

There are two belief statements in question here. "It is raining outside" and "I do not believe it is raining outside". They cannot both be believed at the same time.

We're discussing the sentence, not the speaker. — Michael

I'm discussing the belief statements, because that's how the self-contradiction and/or incoherency is found and understood.