I don’t think this is right (even though I conceded to Michael earlier that it was). I find the sentence to be absurd whether the speaker is lying or not. Also, it’s not much of a lie. — Luke
One cannot believe it is raining when they do not believe it is raining. — creativesoul
"It's raining" is true, but "I believe it's raining " is not true
One cannot believe it is raining when they do not believe it is raining.
— creativesoul
Yes, but under traditional correspondence theory, that has no relevance. — Isaac
One cannot believe that "It's raining" is true when they do not believe it is raining. — creativesoul
Unfortunately we can only gather very little of Moore's meaning from that one letter which is why I quoted from PI. — Isaac
The paradox concerns the first-person present indicative use of the verb ‘to believe’. Moore observes that although it may, for example, be true that it is raining and I do not believe that it is raining, it is absurd for me to say ‘It is raining but I do not believe that it is’. For Moore, the paradox arises insofar as there may be truths about me which I cannot, without absurdity, assert. How is this to be explained? Moore’s own suggestion for how to resolve the paradox is to recognize that we need to distinguish between what someone asserts and what he implies in asserting it. Thus, someone who asserts ‘It is raining’ does not thereby assert that he believes that it is raining, but his asserting it does indeed imply that he believes it. It is, according to Moore, because someone who asserts that it is raining implies that he believes that it is, that it is absurd for him to go on and assert that he does not believe it. — Marie McGinn
Ramsey's solution is simple, it's because 'I believe that P', 'P is true' and 'P' all amount to the same thing in ordinary use, just asserting P. — Isaac
The statement “I believe it’s going to rain” has a meaning like, that is to say a use like, “It’s going to rain”, but the meaning of “I believed then that it was going to rain”, is not like that of “It did rain then”. (PI, p.190)
Wittgenstein believes [...] the central mistake of Moore’s approach [is] it treats ‘I believe …’ as a description of my own mental state [...] His aim is to show that this is not how the expression ‘I believe’ is used.
if we are inclined to hold that ‘I believe’ ascribes a mental state—the same state whether it is used in the first-person present indicative, in the past tense, or in the context ‘Suppose …’, or in the third-person—then we want to see ‘a different development of the verb’, one on which ‘I believe …’ is never equivalent to the assertion ‘It is the case that …’. [...]
On the ‘different development of the verb’, I am to be understood as ascribing a certain disposition to myself, the disposition which the state of belief is held to consist in. On this view, ‘I believe …’ is not equivalent to the assertion ‘It is the case that …’, although conclusions about my state of mind may be drawn on the basis of both. The expression ‘I believe that p’ is equivalent to the assertion that I am in a certain dispositional state. But now the question arises: ‘how do I myself recognize my own disposition?’ Surely, ‘it will have been necessary for me to take notice of myself as others do, to listen to myself talking, to be able to draw conclusions from what I say!’ (PI, p. 192). The absurdity of this suggestion—expressed through the presence of an exclamation mark—shows, Wittgenstein believes, that the words ‘I believe’ are not used to ascribe a disposition to myself. [...]
The idea that in using the words ‘I believe …’ I ascribe a disposition to myself misrepresents the way we are taught to operate with these words. It misrepresents what is an act of making or expressing a judgement about the world as a description of the state of a particular person. Wittgenstein acknowledges that there are circumstances in which it does make sense to say “Judging from what I say, this is what I believe”. These are circumstances in which I stand back from my normal state of engagement and try to take an objective view of myself: I try to see myself as others see me. In these circumstances, saying ‘I believe …’ is no longer equivalent to asserting ‘It is the case that …’ and, Wittgenstein observes, it would be possible for me to say “It seems to me that my ego believes this, but it isn’t true” (PI, p. 192). In these circumstances, it is as if two people—the one on whom I reflect and the one doing the reflecting—speak through my mouth. However, this is not the normal use of ‘I believe …’, and it is a use, Wittgenstein wants to insists, which presupposes the normal use.
Absolutely everyone agrees to all of this. — Srap Tasmaner
A statement is made regarding the weather by X. Then, X says he doesn't believe the statement he just made regarding the weather. When people say they don't believe what they just said is the case, that strikes me as indicative of a problem with the sentence, and possibly a much greater problem with the speaker. — Ciceronianus the White
If that's the case, then it seems to me that debating, or perhaps more properly discussing, this "paradox" at length is nothing more than an effort to explain what nobody would ask to be explained in the first place. — Ciceronianus the White
For Moore, the paradox arises insofar as there may be truths about me which I cannot, without absurdity, assert. — Marie McGinn
Like all paradoxes the solution was found in a re-wording of the issue. Resolving this paradox resulted fairly directly in the logic of speech acts, which was not a bad thing. — Banno
But what on earth is Marie McGinn speaking about? Surely (I know I shouldn't call you that) she means "there are truths about me which I cannot assert without appearing absurd"? — Ciceronianus the White
someone who asserts ‘It is raining’ does not thereby assert that he believes that it is raining, but his asserting it does indeed imply that he believes it. — Marie McGinn
The statement “I believe it’s going to rain” has a meaning like, that is to say a use like, “It’s going to rain”, but the meaning of “I believed then that it was going to rain”, is not like that of “It did rain then”. (PI, p.190)
If 'P' and 'I believe that P' "amount to" the same assertion, then their meanings should not change with tense. — Luke
Wittgenstein believes [...] the central mistake of Moore’s approach [is] it treats ‘I believe …’ as a description of my own mental state [...] His aim is to show that this is not how the expression ‘I believe’ is used. — Luke
...someone who asserts ‘It is raining’ does not thereby assert that he believes that it is raining, but his asserting it does indeed imply that he believes it.
— Marie McGinn
Is it anywhere explained why? I've read the article, but not with any great depth. I can't find an explanation for this assertion. — Isaac
someone who asserts ‘It is raining’ does not thereby assert that he believes that it is raining, but his asserting it does indeed imply that he believes it.
— Marie McGinn
Is it anywhere explained why? I've read the article, but not with any great depth. I can't find an explanation for this assertion. It seems on the face of it rather an odd thing to say. If the thing that someone asserts (the matter the sentence is about) can be about something which is outside of their mind, then why does saying it imply they believe it? — Isaac
The statement “I believe it’s going to rain” has a meaning like, that is to say a use like, “It’s going to rain”, but the meaning of “I believed then that it was going to rain”, is not like that of “It did rain then”. (PI, p.190)
If 'P' and 'I believe that P' "amount to" the same assertion, then their meanings should not change with tense.
— Luke
I don't think this is the case because beliefs change, — Isaac
"It did then rain" is a current belief (about the historical fact). — Isaac
But this 'psychological' issue is present as an assumption in all solutions so I don't see it as a blocking point to Ramsey's. This is pretty much what Wittgenstein says later, as you quote.
Wittgenstein believes [...] the central mistake of Moore’s approach [is] it treats ‘I believe …’ as a description of my own mental state [...] His aim is to show that this is not how the expression ‘I believe’ is used.
— Luke
...ie, we can't have a belief about our mental states. — Isaac
Consider, in this light though "I believed..." which is used exactly that way - a description of one's mental state. So either way we have the meaning changing with the tense. We don't seem to be able to escape that. — Isaac
If the words ‘I believe’ describe my internal, representational state, then, Wittgenstein suggests, it ought to make sense for me to ask whether my belief is a reliable guide to what the facts are. If I read off facts about the world from a photograph, I must also be in a position to say that the photograph is a good one, that it is a trustworthy representation of what is the case. And similarly, it ought to make sense to say: ‘ “I believe it’s raining and my belief is reliable, so I have confidence in it” ’ (PI, p. 190). ‘In that case,’ he remarks, ‘my belief would be a kind of sense impression’ (PI, p. 190). But this is not how the words ‘I believe’ are actually used, for ‘[o]ne can mistrust one’s own senses, but not one’s own belief ’ (PI, p. 190). Saying ‘I believe that p’ is equivalent to asserting that p is the case, and is not a means of telling that p is the case, which I might trust or mistrust. This is shown, Wittgenstein suggests, in the fact that if ‘there were a verb meaning ‘to believe falsely’, it would not have any significant first person present indicative’ (PI, p. 190). — Marie McGinn
...we can't have a belief about our mental states. — Isaac
"I believe" can be both, a description of one's mental state, and an assurance of subsequent sincerity about something completely different than one's own mental state.
"I believe that some philosophical positions are better than others" is of the latter variety. "I believe that that's correct, but I'm uncertain" is of the former. — creativesoul
Do you see it differently? — creativesoul
"I believe that that's correct, but I'm uncertain" is about the speaker's doubt.
— creativesoul
Aren't you the speaker? — Luke
Could you say more about how either statement is a description of one's mental state? — Luke
"I believe, but I'm not certain" is about one's own mental state nevertheless, in these situations, to be clear. — creativesoul
...it sounds like this description concerns the level of certainty/doubt that one has about a belief rather than the belief itself. — Luke
One's doubt about a belief is doubting the truth thereof. — creativesoul
One's doubt about a belief is doubting the truth thereof.
— creativesoul
But it's not the belief itself which is "a description of one's mental state" in that case; it's the doubt about the belief. — Luke
But it's not the belief itself which is "a description of one's mental state" in that case; it's the doubt about the belief.
— Luke
I've never claimed otherwise — creativesoul
"I believe" can be both, a description of one's mental state, and an assurance of subsequent sincerity about something completely different than one's own mental state. — creativesoul
But it's not the belief itself which is "a description of one's mental state" in that case; it's the doubt about the belief. — creativesoul
You state above: ""I believe" can be [...] a description of one's mental state". This is what I have been questioning — Luke
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