I see why you would say that, but I also think that the stuff we take for granted that is most constraining is the stuff we didn't know that we believed. — path
That is based upon the idea that it is possible to take something for granted that is otherwise completely unknown.
Makes no sense whatsoever to me.
Be that as it may...
Some belief is held prior to our becoming aware of that.
Some belief is held only after metacognitive endeavors have begun in earnest.
Regarding the former, "constraining" seems to have quite a bit more negative connotation than is warranted. "Influencing", "guiding", or some other apt description devoid of the notions and/or implications of "good" and "bad" seems to cover the good, the bad, and the in-between.
:wink:
What is left of linguistic belief as opposed to prelinguistic belief if we think of noises and marks on the same plane with other behaviors? — path
An odd question, because the answer has been right in front of you all along.
What is left is exactly what was already there.
Think about that for a minute...
Both linguistic and non linguistic belief exist in their entirety prior to our talking about them as a subject matter in their own right. That is prior to metacognitive endeavors. That is exactly what we're doing here and now. I'm sure you'll agree. To reiterate...
Our current thinking has no effect/affect whatsoever upon what counts as non linguistic or linguistic belief, because those things existed in their entirety prior to our talking about them.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
A relevant aside on the noises and marks...
Thinking about noises and marks
as behaviour is very misguided. Noises and marks are products(the result) of behavior, not equivalent to. Besides that, not all noises and marks are meaningful. Those which are count as language use if more than one creature has drawn correlations between the noises/marks and other things(whatever they may be).
That's how it works.
Noises and marks are inadequate for belief, whether it be linguistic or not. All belief is meaningful. Not all noises and marks are.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
If a bird 'warns his friend' of a predator with a cheep, is that linguistic belief? — path
Warnings consisting of particular sounds are language use. It may be of the very very simple variety... but counts as an example of language use nonetheless.
When one warns a friend with a distinct vocalization, and the warning is heeded/understood, then that shows us that both individuals have drawn correlations between the same things. The warning and the thing being warned of. That is basic rudimentary shared belief. If that shared belief consists of correlations drawn between language use and other things, then it is linguistic belief. Warnings are intentional alerts sounded for the very purpose of informing another of danger.
However...
What grounds the assumption that that bird is offering a warning to his friend to begin with? The birds that cheep when approached by a predator are much less often surprised by it's arrival - as a group anyway. That behaviour certainly has it's benefits. Mimicry is profoundly abundant in 'lesser' animals.
To be perfectly clear...
I would not deny that those particular circumstances seem to include the basic elements necessary in order for shared meaning to occur, in order for shared belief to emerge as a result, and as a result of all that, it's not at all a leap to conclude that a very rudimentary version of language use was on display. Very basic correlations being drawn by a plurality of individuals between the sound and a predator.
The sound and the sudden onset of discontent that can only come via past experiences involving that sound are more than enough to conclude that the birds shared some meaningful belief as a result of the vocalization. The sound becomes significant(meaningful) via just being a part of just such correlations.
Underlying point being that intention and purpose are always part and parcel to warnings. The bird cheeping at the sight of danger has no such need. Both explanations adequately explain the scenario. One is much more elegant.
If I warn you that the bridge is flooded, is it linguistic belief only because a human made the sounds? — path
No, it's linguistic belief if it consists of correlations that include language use.