The sound of the plastic is meaningful to her as a result of her connecting it to getting treats. When she hears the plastic, she expects treats. She thinks about the sound and it is significant to her as a result of a pattern of past events.
— creativesoul

OK, but how does 'expect' and 'think' add to what is already happening? Don't get me wrong. It's plausible and intuitive. But how is it explanatory? Maybe it is in some way, but this detour to hidden consciousness is curious. — path

I've not used the terms "hidden consciousness", nor would I.

Expectation is belief about what will take place, or in this case belief about what is about to happen. Her thinking about the sound is nothing more than drawing correlations between the same things... the sound and receiving treats.

Animals show belief by displaying expectation.

Pavlov's dog involuntarily slobbering after hearing the bell shows us, along with his path towards the food bowl, that he thinks, believes, and/or expects to be fed. All as a result of drawing correlations between the sound of the bell and eating food. We can change the sound of the bell, to any sound we arbitrarily choose so long as it is audible to the dog. The same results will happen because the same thing is happening... correlations are being drawn.

How is it explanatory, regarding basic rudimentary bedrock belief?

What's it missing?

We're actually in the process of demonstrating exactly what I've been advocating. We're each drawing correlations between different things in an attempt to build a bridge of mutual understanding... shared meaning.

So, I'm curious...

How do you account for the belief of language less creatures?

...I suggest that even worrying about thought at all might muddy the water here. — path

That's an odd suggestion given that bedrock belief is the topic.

Well in everyday terms I do think that my cat thinks. Some of this is just empathy. Conceptually it seems to be an extension of the usual hypothetical entities, thoughts which can never be measured or touched. In some sense attributing thoughts might be a fancy way of describing tangible behaviors. — path

There are many things that can never be measured or touched. The odd thing however is that I have painstakingly given you the tools to 'measure' all thought or belief. The increments are not mathematical. They are elemental. They consist of correlations between things. In the language less creatures' case, the correlations are always drawn between directly perceptible things.

Fire and pain. The sound of the bell and food. The sound of rustling plastic and treats. The cheep and a cat.

We can set it up and watch it happen - from the outside. No need to get in their head or our own. Behaviour is not thought. Behaviour is a result thereof. Roughly, of course.

You're right though, attributing thought is one way that folk explain/describe certain behaviours.

My issue is whether 'thinking' has some deep meaning beyond patterns in behavior. What does it add? That's the beetle, as I see it. At the same time, we obviously know how to use words like 'think' with the usual blind skill. So there's no doing away with that. We can only question the mentalistic paradigm from within that paradigm. Does it lead us down dead ends philosophically? — path

"Thinking" - in quotes - refers to terminological use of that term. Not all use of "thinking" is on equal footing. That's been a problem throughout the history of philosophy. You pointed towards some of those issues earlier regarding humans using the idea to draw a clear distinct line between dumb animals and humans... purportedly. Animals do not think, reason, etc.

However, you then claim that there is no doing away with common usage of "think", and I assume the use of "believe" and "belief" as well. While you're correct in that there may be no doing away with it, we can show where it fails.

Are you asking if thinking is distinct from behavioural patterns?

Become correlated/related is becoming part of a correlation. To be related is to be in relationship. — path

There is a causal relationship between touching fire and the sudden onset of pain. That relationship need not be thought about. When a creature draws a correlation between the behaviour(touching fire) and the subsequent pain it has attributed meaning to both. It has recognized and/or attributed causality. Causality is a relationship. Drawing a correlation between touching fire and the onset of pain is not... that is belief formation about(the content of which is) the fire and the pain.

I agree. There is no ground, in some sense, for saying that the creature thinks at all. — path

I would not agree.

Everyday events count as more than adequate ground. We just have to know what to look for.

A sign is related or correlated to a response — path

I did not say that though.

A sign becomes such as a result of being part of the correlation. — creativesoul

I don't understand the difference.. — path

It's the difference in becoming meaningful and being meaningful. All signs are already meaningful. The clouds were clouds prior to becoming a sign of impending rain. They were part of a causal relationship. They were not meaningful.

Let's imagine some species that sometimes responds to a sign, maybe half of the time. Some other sign (which we would then not call a sign) never elicits a response. Other signs always elicit a response. At least from our perspective it's tempting to talk of probability as a measure of their response. — path

Saying that we know, as a result of enough testing results/data, that some creature or another will probably act this or that way when presented with the same scenario, is all fine and good.

There is no ground for claiming that the creature thinks in probabilistic terms... at least not language less ones.

Can we explore this without peering inside the 'mind' of the creature? And can we do this when talking about humans, also? — path

Well, I've not been using such language. However, the language I've been using effectively exhausts all 'mind' talk I am aware of. Human thought and belief make for good subject matter(s).

A sign is related or correlated to a response — path

I did not say that though.

A sign becomes such as a result of being part of the correlation.

Truth, meaning, thought, and belief all exist in their entirety prior to our ability to become aware of them.

When my cat expects treats and gets them, her belief becomes true. The sound of the plastic is meaningful to her as a result of her connecting it to getting treats. When she hears the plastic, she expects treats. She thinks about the sound and it is significant to her as a result of a pattern of past events. One could say that the sound symbolizes the treats. One could say that the sound is a sign of things to come. One could describe what happened over and over again in a number of different ways.

We must be very judicious regarding what sort of belief we attribute to that cat.

Correlations are the basic building block of thought and belief... at every level.
— creativesoul

I like to read this in terms of the world as a system of relationships (correlations as relationships.) Any comments? — path

Too broad a brushstroke.

Some relationships exist in their entirety prior to our naming and descriptive practices. Some of those, yet still... exist in their entirety prior to us altogether. So... not all relationships require a creature capable of drawing correlations between different things. All correlations do.

That's a distinction lost when treating correlations as relationships.

For the most part, the marks are arbitrary maybe. Some are not. A sign is always meaningful. Clouds are signs of rain when, and only when, a creature connects them.
— creativesoul

Right. So the issue for me is: how is this connection manifested?

I think (?) you'll agree that they act differently. — path

What does they refer to?

Clouds affect the probability that they'll do this or that. In the human case, clouds might increase the probability of speech acts invoking 'rain.' Or of carrying along an umbrella. — path

Seeing the clouds may influence subsequent behaviour. The notion of probability does not play a role in all belief. I agree though, humans often do something specific after seeing rain clouds. What does that have to do with basic rudimentary non linguistic belief?

Bedrock belief is not always linguistic. The connection between the clouds and rain could be bedrock to all subsequent behaviours influenced by that belief. That includes language less creatures too!

That's a prerequisite for an acceptable notion of belief amenable to evolutionary progression.

I guess I'm trying to figure out how you think of correlations. If I 'warn you about the flooded bridge' by making sounds...and you turn your car around...then the sounds I made only work because I chose the right sounds. And those sounds are the right ones because we were both trained to react that way to such sounds (ignoring the extra complexity of trust and so on for the moment.) Any sounds would do. The sign is arbitrary. We just happen to use those sounds. — path

For the most part, the marks are arbitrary maybe. Some are not. A sign is always meaningful. Clouds are signs of rain when, and only when, a creature connects them.

Correlations are the basic building block of thought and belief... at every level.

The probability just is the confidence — Isaac

The above is prima facie evidence that there is a conflation of two completely distinct things hard at work. Uncertainty is not equivalent to probability. Certainty is not not equivalent to probability. A lack of confidence is the cause of being uncertain. A lack of doubt is certainty.

One can render one's own belief in probabilistic terminology only by playing that particular language game. After doing so, some will temper their own confidence level and/or certainty. Here, in these situations, it is appropriate to talk in terms of the certainty of one's own belief being on a continuum, of sorts, with unshakable certainty on the one end and insanity on the other.

So...

Rendering one's own belief in probabilistic terms creates the belief that one is confident to a certain degree. I'm not denying that people believe such stuff. I'm not saying that they are wrong for doing so.

I am saying that having the very ability to render one's own belief in mathematical probabilistic terms requires language.

With that bit of magic in mind...

Can a creature that has no such ability have such belief?

Not on your life.

Can a language less creature be very uncertain about what's going on?

Of course.

If a species uses noises and responds to noises as part of a social strategy and behaves in a self-preserving way, isn't that enough? — path

Enough for what?

Can we not also see humans in this way? Can we think of human language as conventions for the making of marks and noises that help a community thrive? — path

Sure. I would not argue against that notion at all, aside from pointing out that our language is much more than noises and marks, but I suspect we're in agreement here as well.

Clearly mentalistic talk is already part of our human conventions, and it's not going anywhere. So what interests me is just approaching the situation as a philosopher exploring what happens when we don't found or refer everything back to the by-definition subjective.

What does the phrase "by-definition subjective" refer to? It might be worth saying that I also reject the objective/subjective dichotomy...

Noises and marks are inadequate for belief, whether it be linguistic or not. All belief is meaningful. Not all noises and marks are.
— creativesoul

Ah, but that's just the idea I'm challenging! Meeting you half-way, I'd say that marks and noises become 'meaningful' as they are caught up in social conventions. — path

I suspect that we're in agreement here on some basic level anyway...

I do not understand which idea is being challenged. I'm hesitant to talk in terms of 'caught up in' social conventions. When marks become one part of a correlation between the marks and something else, they become meaningful. Social convention is simply an agreement upon what else those particular marks ought be and/or will be correlated, associated, and/or otherwise connected to.

I was applying the 'beetle' because I imagined that you were thinking of correlations as essentially mental. I apologize if I've misunderstood that. I wonder if my use of 'conventions' is after all close to your use of 'correlations.' — path

Could be a number of similarities... I dunno.

The ability of drawing correlations between different things has a few necessary prerequisites, so t speak. It requires a plurality of things and a creature capable of associating, connecting, and/or otherwise drawing correlations between those distinct things. That is where I suspect there is much overlap between Isaac's leaning on the brain and my own position regarding what certain belief content requires as far as brain structures go...

Perhaps I've misunderstood you. Help me see where I have gone wrong. — path

Ok.

How do we know whether a group of creatures has drawn correlations? — path

It becomes clear sometimes when and if we know what to look for. We can determine, for instance, at least one of the things being connected by the candidate under examination. Pavlov's dog and the sound of bell, for example.

What's the difference between adaptive social conventions and drawing correlations? — path

The difference is that not all belief formation(drawing correlations) involves social convention. However, it is the commonality that is key to understanding. All social conventions consist - in large part - of common belief... shared meaning. Shared meaning is nothing more and nothing less than a plurality of creatures drawing correlations between the same things...

This fundamental belief that there is 'meaning' in a 'mind' is like the belief of philosophy — path

Not mine.

But my issue is this: what does the mentalistic talk of correlations add to the situation? If a species uses noises and responds to noises as part of a social strategy and behaves in a self-preserving way, isn't that enough? — path

What 'mentalistic talk'? We can drop the "mental" qualifier if you like. I reject the mental/physical dichotomy anyway. It's not a problem.

Talk of correlations adds a framework inherently capable of taking proper account of non linguistic belief in so far as it's ability to set out the contents.

Talking of cheeps as though it is a strategy assumes what's in question.

Witt's beetle does not apply to what I'm claiming here. Not sure why you keep attempting to apply it.

There is no consensus..

Earlier you described a group of professionals that were open to suggestions... I suspect it is as a result of the lack of consensus. My stance is novel.

The rhetorical personal attacks seem to come from a place of feeling disrespected. The last set of experiments we discussed also contained a wee bit of that. Don't take it too personal. I've been called "confidently wrong" about stuff that I'm not. I've been confidently wrong when no one else noticed or felt like they could reach me. Anyway...

Thanks for the post. I'll read it immediately upon my return.

I know that the behaviour of children less than one year old does not have what it takes to be able to draw the conclusion that that child demonstrates - to us - that he/she/they understand probability. I'm taking a very strong stance here. I would take the exact same stance regarding monkey behaviour.
— creativesoul

Well then what's the point in me discussing the contents of any experiments with you? — Isaac

You value my input.

I see why you would say that, but I also think that the stuff we take for granted that is most constraining is the stuff we didn't know that we believed. — path

That is based upon the idea that it is possible to take something for granted that is otherwise completely unknown.

Makes no sense whatsoever to me.

Be that as it may...



Some belief is held prior to our becoming aware of that.

Some belief is held only after metacognitive endeavors have begun in earnest.

Regarding the former, "constraining" seems to have quite a bit more negative connotation than is warranted. "Influencing", "guiding", or some other apt description devoid of the notions and/or implications of "good" and "bad" seems to cover the good, the bad, and the in-between.

:wink:

What is left of linguistic belief as opposed to prelinguistic belief if we think of noises and marks on the same plane with other behaviors? — path

An odd question, because the answer has been right in front of you all along.

What is left is exactly what was already there.

Think about that for a minute...

Both linguistic and non linguistic belief exist in their entirety prior to our talking about them as a subject matter in their own right. That is prior to metacognitive endeavors. That is exactly what we're doing here and now. I'm sure you'll agree. To reiterate...

Our current thinking has no effect/affect whatsoever upon what counts as non linguistic or linguistic belief, because those things existed in their entirety prior to our talking about them.



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A relevant aside on the noises and marks...


Thinking about noises and marks as behaviour is very misguided. Noises and marks are products(the result) of behavior, not equivalent to. Besides that, not all noises and marks are meaningful. Those which are count as language use if more than one creature has drawn correlations between the noises/marks and other things(whatever they may be).

That's how it works.

Noises and marks are inadequate for belief, whether it be linguistic or not. All belief is meaningful. Not all noises and marks are.



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If a bird 'warns his friend' of a predator with a cheep, is that linguistic belief? — path

Warnings consisting of particular sounds are language use. It may be of the very very simple variety... but counts as an example of language use nonetheless.

When one warns a friend with a distinct vocalization, and the warning is heeded/understood, then that shows us that both individuals have drawn correlations between the same things. The warning and the thing being warned of. That is basic rudimentary shared belief. If that shared belief consists of correlations drawn between language use and other things, then it is linguistic belief. Warnings are intentional alerts sounded for the very purpose of informing another of danger.

However...

What grounds the assumption that that bird is offering a warning to his friend to begin with? The birds that cheep when approached by a predator are much less often surprised by it's arrival - as a group anyway. That behaviour certainly has it's benefits. Mimicry is profoundly abundant in 'lesser' animals.

To be perfectly clear...

I would not deny that those particular circumstances seem to include the basic elements necessary in order for shared meaning to occur, in order for shared belief to emerge as a result, and as a result of all that, it's not at all a leap to conclude that a very rudimentary version of language use was on display. Very basic correlations being drawn by a plurality of individuals between the sound and a predator.

The sound and the sudden onset of discontent that can only come via past experiences involving that sound are more than enough to conclude that the birds shared some meaningful belief as a result of the vocalization. The sound becomes significant(meaningful) via just being a part of just such correlations.

Underlying point being that intention and purpose are always part and parcel to warnings. The bird cheeping at the sight of danger has no such need. Both explanations adequately explain the scenario. One is much more elegant.

If I warn you that the bridge is flooded, is it linguistic belief only because a human made the sounds? — path

No, it's linguistic belief if it consists of correlations that include language use.

Yep. Demonstrable understanding of probabilities without being able to use the terms correctly or mathematically in indigenous tribes, in children less than 1 year old, and monkeys. I recently read (though I can't find the paper) that it's been demonstrated even in Pigeons. — Isaac

Hopefully you'll be ok with the idea that I do not have the time to go through those studies as I've done in recent past. I've seen a number of documentaries over the past ten years or so that said much the same things you've been advocating in our discourse. I strongly disagreed with the conclusions of Bayesian reasoning at that time as well. This current objection is based upon the same knowledge base.

I know that the behaviour of children less than one year old does not have what it takes to be able to draw the conclusion that that child demonstrates - to us - that he/she/they understand probability. I'm taking a very strong stance here. I would take the exact same stance regarding monkey behaviour.


However...

I'm much less certain about objecting to an indigenous tribe. I would definitely say that it would come of no real surprise to me if such a people had - via oral tradition alone - been able to hand down some belief about how often something(choose an appropriate event) takes place. If they have a favorite spot to go for the explicit purpose of gathering some highly prized items(pick your favorite), but they also already know that those items are not always there to be found, and they thought nothing much else about it, then it would seem that they would have no choice but to be uncertain any time they were on the way.

The uncertainty does not - cannot - evolve into thinking in terms of percentages/probability until that particular language game is learned. Being uncertain does not require drawing such correlations. I mean, understanding probability and/or percentages requires correlations drawn between the number of possible outcomes and the number of actual outcomes. Percentages/probability of something happening are only accounted for - and hence rightly understood - in mathematical terms by using them.

Being uncertain does not.

Anyway...

Could you offer a brief accurate description of the purpose of the experiment and any relevant details thereof? An outline would be great.

Some nice stuff in this thread.

Is that gulf you mention not connected in some way to the divine spark? Is meaning not functioning for us these days as the divine spark? — path

I have no clue whatsoever what you're talking about.

"The divine spark" is a name. To what does it refer? Make that connection for me, and we'll arrive at and/or have some shared meaning.

Describe this divine spark you talk about.

There's a gulf between the belief of non linguistic creatures and the belief of language users.

How does what you say here bridge that divide?
— creativesoul

I think we take that gulf too much for granted. — path

I would say that in order to take something for granted we must already have become familiar with it.

I do not see that that's the case here.

Belief is not binomial, one does not think of propositions as either true or false, but one believes them each to a degree. I believe your house has a front door to a certain degree. — Isaac

Some belief is either true or false. Your belief is well tempered as a result of your knowing that not all houses have front doors, and Banno's could possibly be one of those.

Again though...

I cannot make sense of this talk of "to a certain degree". To what degree, and how did you arrive at that particular percentage of confidence?

To know what the probability of some event is, one must know all the possible outcomes as well as all of the influencing factors. Otherwise, it's just rhetorical guesswork all 'gussied up' in fancy language.

:smile:

I've always wanted to use that particular colloquialism. Been quite a while since I was part of such a game...

I think we take that gulf too much for granted. That gulf seems to depend on opposing some 'conscious' 'mental-stuff' to simple bodily movement. We invest the language we can perform 'in our heads' (interior monologue) with a sort of non-physical something called 'meaning.' For this reason, we think saying that the bridge is flooded is something more than just acting appropriately. — path

What makes you say that meaning is non-physical?

When I play hide-and-seek with my nephew, the first place is comes to look is behind the curtain. Does he believe the proposition "My uncle is behind the curtain"? If he does he's very sorely misunderstood the nature of the game, it's entirely predicated on the fact fact that I might be behind the curtain, but I might not. So does he believe the proposition "My uncle might be behind the curtain"? Well, that wouldn't quite capture the situation either. He often looks behind the curtain first, it's his best guess, maybe 50% of the time. So does he believe the proposition "My uncle is behind the curtain 50% of the time", well, he's a smart lad, but he doesn't understand either probability or percentages yet, so he can't believe a proposition he can't understand.

Ramsey's solution is that he believes the proposition "My uncle is behind the curtain" with a probability of 50%. Belief is not binomial, one does not think of propositions as either true or false, but one believes them each to a degree. I believe your house has a front door to a certain degree. — Isaac

So, are you claiming that someone can hold belief to one degree or another, to some specifically quantifiable percentage despite the fact that that individual does not understand probability or percentages, and thus cannot think about his own belief in such terms?

:brow:

Some not only think of propositions as either true or false, but they can also readily argue that that's the case for many as well as knowing exactly what it takes for such statements to be so. Because that's the case, there's a bit of what you've said above that is false on it's face.

The nephew report caught my attention earlier because as it's written, it's untenable. Nonetheless, it's worth more explanation...

When the nephew believes that his uncle is behind the curtain he is thinking about the spatiotemporal location of someone he knows. He is playing a game of hide and seek. He does not look behind the curtain unless he believes that the uncle is there. Or, alternatively, if he has looked in past situations and not found his uncle, the nephew may be uncertain as a result. Of this there can be little to no doubt, but to then render that nephew's belief in terms of percentages and/or probability(as though his belief included them) is to talk about something other than that nephew's belief. If it is the case that he is incapable of understanding probability and/or percentages then it is only as a result of not learning how to play that particular language game. The important point is that the nephew can be uncertain about the whereabouts of the uncle while being completely incapable of talking about how uncertain. If one cannot talk about how uncertain one is, then it makes no sense to report upon their belief as if there is some quantifiable degree of certainty for that individual regarding how confidently they hold some belief or other.

All belief are meaningful.
Some belief are formed prior to language.
Some meaning is prior to language.

Describe those belief for me. This post is not meant to be rude... it's meant to guide the focus to the shrubbery or tree or whatever else you'de like to name that which exists in it's entirety prior to our naming and descriptive practices...

Non linguistic belief is one such thing.

If you don't mind, perhaps you could look at some of the conversation you missed. It would be easier to respond to this or that link in the chain. I guess the big idea is that bedrock beliefs are enacted and social, including speech acts. Isaac and I talked about the necessary fuzziness of meaning (my suggestion) and the non-existence of meaning (his suggestion) but seem to mean pretty much the same thing.

Our talk of 'meaning' is one more piece of habitual behavior, a pattern absorbed from the community. The prejudice is that we have some kind of direct access to meaning-stuff. Something like this is what AI is never supposed to have. Qualia are beetles in the box, one might say. But the box metaphor itself is subverted by the tale of the beetle in the box. The more AI can perform as we do, the more we can see that we too are more like statistics than we might want to be. (Remember our theoretical synthetic conversation partner? That's where all this came from.) — path

We're supposed to be discussing what counts a bedrock belief.

I am strongly asserting that we form, have, and hold beliefs long before language acquisition begins in earnest. If "bedrock belief" refers to the most rudimentary, simple, and basic beliefs possible to have then your aiming at the wrong target. That said...

Earlier I mentioned that there are some things called "bedrock belief" that are enacted and social, as a result of language use. Many of you have further discussed these things, and wandered off into AI, math, and religious musings/connections/associations/correlations.

So...

The social influence on individual belief is being discussed. Self-image and/or similar notions have been discussed. There can be no doubt about the social interdependent aspect of one's belief system, including but not limited to rudimentary and/or foundational beliefs that arise as a result. We're taught what connections to make with language use(we adopt belief) while amidst the practice thereof. Self identity is one consequence. How one takes account of themselves and the world is just a part of what results in one's own identity. How others take account of us plays a role as well.

We are all too familiar with notions of brainwashing, indoctrination, inculcation, etc. We know these things happen. These things happen with different individuals. Many times these social influences result in a notion of self(self worth, self-identity, etc.) that is unsettling to the individual. These are important things to report upon and focus on, but they do not count as non linguistic belief.

More importantly, I cannot see how anyone here can use the position they're advocating for to coherently account for the most bedrock of all beliefs... the non linguistic and/or pre linguistic variety. We all know that language is not necessary in order for a creature to form, have, and/or hold some belief or other.

On the other hand...

Language use IS how one is 'thrown' into the world. The problem, as I see it, is that discussion has nothing to do with the non linguistic belief that gives rise to the very ability for belief adoption via language acquisition to even happen.

So...

Connect some dots for me...

What does any of that have to do with bedrock belief? Moreover, what does all belief consist of such that that combination results in belief formation? All knowledge is accrued. Thus, we can confidently say that belief is accrued as well. Evolutionary amenability demands it in some way.

There's a gulf between the belief of non linguistic creatures and the belief of language users.

How does what you say here bridge that divide?

Is that an official academic criterion/standard/definition from an otherwise reputable institution of knowledge?
— creativesoul

Yes, it's standard stuff. — path

Ok. Granted. What does it have to do with bedrock belief?

Recall that a statistic is any function of the data, — path

Is that an official academic criterion/standard/definition for what counts as a statistic, of what it takes to be a statistic, from an otherwise reputable institution of knowledge?

Not all cops.

There are cops all over the country standing in solidarity with the protestors... check your sources my friend. I'm impressed by the overall population this time around. Hopefully something more is done to correct the issue...

The world is already meaningful.
— creativesoul

Could you elaborate? — path

Sure...

Language acquisition is learning how to use the naming and descriptive practices that have long since already been in use prior to becoming a user. We all learn the names of different things in the world prior to further describing those things. All that language was/is already meaningful and in the world(as a part thereof). Thus...

Nice pic trick!!!