There's a gulf between the belief of non linguistic creatures and the belief of language users.
How does what you say here bridge that divide? — creativesoul
When I play hide-and-seek with my nephew, the first place is comes to look is behind the curtain. Does he believe the proposition "My uncle is behind the curtain"? If he does he's very sorely misunderstood the nature of the game, it's entirely predicated on the fact fact that I might be behind the curtain, but I might not. So does he believe the proposition "My uncle might be behind the curtain"? Well, that wouldn't quite capture the situation either. He often looks behind the curtain first, it's his best guess, maybe 50% of the time. So does he believe the proposition "My uncle is behind the curtain 50% of the time", well, he's a smart lad, but he doesn't understand either probability or percentages yet, so he can't believe a proposition he can't understand.
Ramsey's solution is that he believes the proposition "My uncle is behind the curtain" with a probability of 50%. Belief is not binomial, one does not think of propositions as either true or false, but one believes them each to a degree. I believe your house has a front door to a certain degree. — Isaac
I think we take that gulf too much for granted. That gulf seems to depend on opposing some 'conscious' 'mental-stuff' to simple bodily movement. We invest the language we can perform 'in our heads' (interior monologue) with a sort of non-physical something called 'meaning.' For this reason, we think saying that the bridge is flooded is something more than just acting appropriately. — path
Belief is not binomial, one does not think of propositions as either true or false, but one believes them each to a degree. I believe your house has a front door to a certain degree. — Isaac
There's a gulf between the belief of non linguistic creatures and the belief of language users.
How does what you say here bridge that divide?
— creativesoul
I think we take that gulf too much for granted. — path
Is that gulf you mention not connected in some way to the divine spark? Is meaning not functioning for us these days as the divine spark? — path
I speculate that a kind of pre-rational investment in this or that version of the 'hero' or 'target self' quietly drives or controls a rationality that is never 'pure.' — path
I think there's a link there to why we love stories so much - they infuse our culture completely and seem to be almost entirely universal and cross-cultural. The 'Hero', the 'Villain', the 'Quest', from aboriginal Australians to Hollywood screenwriters. I think we've brought into being, or formalised, one of the mechanisms of social cohesion. Create a hero and villain (be this, don't be that), describe the quest (act like this). It's much more powerful a guide when embedded in a narrative than any dry set of moral rules could be - 'love thy neighbour' vs. 'be like Han Solo' - I know which was more powerful a guide in my playground. — Isaac
I have no clue whatsoever what you're talking about.
"The divine spark" is a name. To what does it refer? Make that connection for me, and we'll arrive at and/or have some shared meaning.
Describe this divine spark you talk about. — creativesoul
I would say that in order to take something for granted we must already have become familiar with it. — creativesoul
What makes you say that meaning is non-physical? — creativesoul
I am strongly asserting that we form, have, and hold beliefs long before language acquisition begins in earnest. — creativesoul
Yeah, I misspoke. The cat believes it has four feet, not that "I have four feet" is true. — Banno
Ramsey. Worth a whole thread. — Banno
My gut says that neurone don't represent stuff as percentages - amy more than gasses do - but that we can describe what they are doing in terms of percentages - like we do with the temperature of a gas — Banno
https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/feuerbach/works/future/future0.htmThe proof of the proposition that the divine essence is the essence of reason or intelligence lies in the fact that the determinations or qualities of God, in so far as they are rational or intelligible and not determinations of sensuousness or imagination, are, in fact, qualities of reason.
...
Man distinguishes himself from Nature. This distinction of his is his God: the distinguishing of God from Nature is nothing else than the distinguishing of man from Nature. — Feuerbach
[To be a naturalist] is to be the kind of antiessentialist who, like Dewey, sees no breaks in the hierarchy of increasingly complex adjustments to novel stimulation—the hierarchy which has amoeba adjusting themselves to changed water temperature at the bottom, bees dancing and chess players check-mating in the middle, and people fomenting scientific, artistic, and political revolutions at the top. — Rorty
So, are you claiming that someone can hold belief to one degree or another, to some specifically quantifiable percentage despite the fact that that individual does not understand probability or percentages, and thus cannot think about his own belief in such terms? — creativesoul
If one cannot talk about how uncertain one is, then it makes no sense to report upon their belief as if there is some quantifiable degree of certainty for that individual regarding how confidently they hold some belief or other. — creativesoul
- my bold.To know what the probability of some event is, one must know all the possible outcomes as well as all of the influencing factors. — creativesoul
Yep. Demonstrable understanding of probabilities without being able to use the terms correctly or mathematically in indigenous tribes, in children less than 1 year old, and monkeys. I recently read (though I can't find the paper) that it's been demonstrated even in Pigeons. — Isaac
I see why you would say that, but I also think that the stuff we take for granted that is most constraining is the stuff we didn't know that we believed. — path
What is left of linguistic belief as opposed to prelinguistic belief if we think of noises and marks on the same plane with other behaviors? — path
If a bird 'warns his friend' of a predator with a cheep, is that linguistic belief? — path
If I warn you that the bridge is flooded, is it linguistic belief only because a human made the sounds? — path
I know that the behaviour of children less than one year old does not have what it takes to be able to draw the conclusion that that child demonstrates - to us - that he/she/they understand probability. I'm taking a very strong stance here. I would take the exact same stance regarding monkey behaviour. — creativesoul
There is no consensus about the proper interpretation of the probability calculus (2, 3). Regardless of interpretations, however, the basic laws of probability rest on the same extensional considerations, notably, the principle that the probability of an event equals the sum of the probabilities of the various ways in which it can occur.
They were presented with a set of four chips of two different colors, and had to bet on the color of a randomly drawn chip (Fig. 2A). The odds were 3:1 in favor of the prevalent color. In each task, we considered as correct the bet on the more likely color. The Mayan groups did not differ reliably from each other (bilingual correct: 19 of 20; monolingual correct: 14 of 20), χ2(1 n = 40) = 2.8, P = 0.10. Accordingly, in the following analyses, we collapsed their answers into one group. All groups of participants performed better than chance: Mayan adults (correct: 33 of 40), χ2(1 n = 40) = 16.9, P = 0.0004; Mayan school children (correct: 16 of 20), χ2(1 n = 20) = 7.2, P = 0.007; Italian controls (correct: 18 of 20), χ2(1 n = 20) = 12.8, P = 0.0003. These responses seem to reflect a trend due to experience or maturation: Mayan children performed worse than Mayan adults who, in turn, performed worse than Italian controls. A Jonckheere’s test, however, did not reveal a reliable trend in the data, P = 0.39.
In principle, participants might solve the previous tasks by applying some superficial heuristic, rather than a proper chance evaluation. For example, they might bet on the more favorable outcome by considering the absolute number rather than the proportion of possibilities in its favor. To test whether preliterate participants succeed because they apply this “numerosity” heuristic (13), and extend our results, we used a second task [similar to 11] that would show more directly the use of probabilistic reasoning. In each trial, participants had to bet on which of two sets was more likely to yield a winning chip. The simplest trials did not ask for any estimation of proportions, given that one or both sets contained just winning chips (Fig. 3 A and B). Two other trials did ask for this estimation because both sets contained some winning chips (Fig. 3C). In one case, the favorable set contained a larger proportion as well as a greater number of winning chips. In the other case, it contained a larger proportion but not a greater number of winning chips. If preliterate Maya are able to compare the ratio of winning to nonwinning chips across sets, they should succeed in this crucial trial. Indeed, in each trial, all groups performed above chance level (as shown by binomial tests). Task A: all participants performed correctly, P = 0.0009. Task B-left panel: Mayan adults (correct: 33 of 40), P = 0.0002, Mayan school children (correct: 18 of 20), P = 0.0002, Italian adults (correct: 20 of 20), P = 0.0009. Task B-right panel: Mayan adults (correct: 32 of 40), and Mayan school children (correct: 16 of 20), P = 0.006, Italian adults (correct: 18 of 20), P = 0.0002. Task C-left panel: Mayan adults (correct: 37 of 40), P = 0.0009, Mayan school children (correct: 18 of 20), P = 0.0002, Italian adults (correct: 19 of 20), P = 0.0002. Task C-right panel: Mayan adults (correct: 35 of 40), P = 0.0004, Mayan school children (correct: 17 of 20), P = 0.002, Italian adults (correct: 18 of 20), P = 0.0002).
In three tasks, there were k chips of the same color and one chip of a different color. Thus, when k > 3, participants could notice that each chip having the predominant color neighbored k − 1 same-colored chips and only 1 differently-colored chip. Accordingly, they could bet on the “same color” outcome. In three other tasks, there were k pairs of same-colored chips. Thus, participants could notice that each chip had just another chip of the same color and several [actually, 2(k − 1)] chips of different colors. Accordingly, they could bet on the “different color” outcome. As shown in Fig. 4, the rate of Maya’s bets on the same color relation follows the same tendency as the probability of such an outcome.‡ For each participant, we computed an index Q of the quality of their prediction pattern, by normalizing the expected value of the number of correct bets (ref. 15; see also SI Study 3. Probability and Combinatorics). Q ranges from −1 (worse quality) to +1 (best quality). All groups performed above chance level: Monolingual Maya, mean Q = 0.37, SD = 0.53, t(19) = 3.07, P = 0.003, d = 0.69; Bilingual Maya, mean Q = 0.85, SD = 0.25, t(19) = 14.89, P < 0.0001, d = 3.33; Mayan school children, mean Q = 0.58, SD = 0.42, t(19) = 6.20, P < 0.0001, d = 1.39; Italian controls, mean Q = 0.81, SD = 0.38, t(19) = 9.56, P < 0.0001, d = 2.14. A reliable trend (Maya children < Maya adults < Italians, P = 0.03) indicated that performance increased with age and experience, suggesting that some probabilistic intuitions develop into adulthood (24). Unlike in Studies 1 and 2, adult bilingual Maya outperformed monolingual ones, t(38) = 3.67, P = 0.0007, d = 1.16. It is difficult to attribute this result to cultural factors, given that our bilingual and monolingual participants were equally preliterate, and lived in similar socio-economic conditions. Because Study 3 tasks involve mental manipulation of multiple possibilities, this result seems to support evidence for bilingual advantages in reasoning tasks of this sort (16). Despite differences in absolute performance levels, however, the above-chance performance of all groups points to a shared ability to treat possibilities in a combinatorial way.
I know that the behaviour of children less than one year old does not have what it takes to be able to draw the conclusion that that child demonstrates - to us - that he/she/they understand probability. I'm taking a very strong stance here. I would take the exact same stance regarding monkey behaviour.
— creativesoul
Well then what's the point in me discussing the contents of any experiments with you? — Isaac
There is no consensus..
When one warns a friend with a distinct vocalization, and the warning is heeded/understood, then that shows us that both individuals have drawn correlations between the same things. — creativesoul
I would not deny that those particular circumstances seem to include the basic elements necessary in order for shared meaning to occur, in order for shared belief to emerge as a result, and as a result of all that, it's not at all a leap to conclude that a very rudimentary version of language use was on display. Very basic correlations being drawn by a plurality of individuals between the sound and a predator. — creativesoul
Thinking about noises and marks as behaviour is very misguided. Noises and marks are products(the result) of behavior, not equivalent to. Besides that, not all noises and marks are meaningful. Those which are count as language use if more than one creature has drawn correlations between the noises/marks and other things(whatever they may be).
That's how it works.
Noises and marks are inadequate for belief, whether it be linguistic or not. All belief is meaningful. Not all noises and marks are. — creativesoul
That is based upon the idea that it is possible to take something for granted that is otherwise completely unknown.
Makes no sense whatsoever to me. — creativesoul
If I say of myself that it is only from my own case that I know what the word "pain" means - must I not say the same of other people too? And how can I generalize the one case so irresponsibly?
Now someone tells me that he knows what pain is only from his own case! --Suppose everyone had a box with something in it: we call it a "beetle". No one can look into anyone else's box, and everyone says he knows what a beetle is only by looking at his beetle. --Here it would be quite possible for everyone to have something different in his box. One might even imagine such a thing constantly changing. --But suppose the word "beetle" had a use in these people's language? --If so it would not be used as the name of a thing. The thing in the box has no place in the language-game at all; not even as a something: for the box might even be empty. --No, one can 'divide through' by the thing in the box; it cancels out, whatever it is.
That is to say: if we construe the grammar of the expression of sensation on the model of 'object and designation' the object drops out of consideration as irrelevant. — Wittgenstein
But my issue is this: what does the mentalistic talk of correlations add to the situation? If a species uses noises and responds to noises as part of a social strategy and behaves in a self-preserving way, isn't that enough? — path
This fundamental belief that there is 'meaning' in a 'mind' is like the belief of philosophy — path
What 'mentalistic talk'? We can drop the "mental" qualifier if you like. I reject the mental/physical dichotomy anyway. It's not a problem.
Talk of correlations adds a framework inherently capable of taking proper account of non linguistic belief in so far as it's ability to set out the contents.
Talking of cheeps as though it is a strategy assumes what's in question.
Witt's beetle does not apply to what I'm claiming here. Not sure why you keep attempting to apply it. — creativesoul
Besides that, not all noises and marks are meaningful. Those which are count as language use if more than one creature has drawn correlations between the noises/marks and other things(whatever they may be).
That's how it works.
Noises and marks are inadequate for belief, whether it be linguistic or not. All belief is meaningful. Not all noises and marks are. — creativesoul
Perhaps I've misunderstood you. Help me see where I have gone wrong. — path
How do we know whether a group of creatures has drawn correlations? — path
What's the difference between adaptive social conventions and drawing correlations? — path
I was applying the 'beetle' because I imagined that you were thinking of correlations as essentially mental. I apologize if I've misunderstood that. I wonder if my use of 'conventions' is after all close to your use of 'correlations.' — path
Noises and marks are inadequate for belief, whether it be linguistic or not. All belief is meaningful. Not all noises and marks are.
— creativesoul
Ah, but that's just the idea I'm challenging! Meeting you half-way, I'd say that marks and noises become 'meaningful' as they are caught up in social conventions. — path
If a species uses noises and responds to noises as part of a social strategy and behaves in a self-preserving way, isn't that enough? — path
Can we not also see humans in this way? Can we think of human language as conventions for the making of marks and noises that help a community thrive? — path
Clearly mentalistic talk is already part of our human conventions, and it's not going anywhere. So what interests me is just approaching the situation as a philosopher exploring what happens when we don't found or refer everything back to the by-definition subjective.
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