But street, that all depends upon how we define/use the term "fact".

Right?

"Fact" is a term that has several different acceptable uses. On pains of coherence, one's manner of talking will be helped or hindered, depending upon the way they use the term.

It's interesting to see the changes necessary to subsequent talk depending upon the way one uses "fact".

A popular notion is that facts must be true. So, facts must be truth-apt. What makes them true?

Another is that facts are something like states of affairs, events, what has happened and/or is happening. In that case facts are not truth apt at all.

How "facts", "truth", and "reality" intermingle in language use is interesting in and of itself, or at least it has been for me.

If Trump is the president of choice for Russia, and thus they meddle in order to get what they want, then why on earth would the same country meddle to get Bernie nominated?

Makes no sense. Bernie will crush Trump in national debates. Trump will lose the most reasonable of his supporters that hold putting American workers first.

This news today about Russian meddling in favor of Bernie just makes no sense whatsoever if Russia wants Trump to win. Unless the move is being made to offer plausible deniability. That's a stretch though... I mean... quite the stretch.

no other animal perceives the crayons that we call 'yellow' as the same color. Again, we call crayons A and B yellow; and we call crayon C orange. Both the mantis shrimp and Spot see crayons A, B, and C (they see all of these spectra). But the mantis shrimp sees A and B as different colors. Spot sees A, B, and C as the same color. — InPitzotl

Spectra are the light emitted from the crayon. Different animals perceive different spectral distributions - out of the spectra - than us. Some perceive more, some less, presumably some almost the same. Some spectral distributions cannot be distinguished between, although they are perceived. A and B for us. A, B, and C for Spot.

What color is seen depends upon both, the spectra emitted by the crayon and the creature's color vision capabilities.

We agree there.

If A=B and A=C then B=C.

If crayons are spectral distribution and spectra, then spectra are equal to spectral distribution. That can't be right.

Spectral distributions consist of a plurality of particular frequencies or a single one.

The spectra emanating from an object consists of virtually countless possible combinations thereof(spectral distributions).

Thus... the two are not equal.

There is no such trinity of equivalency to be had here. Strict adherence leads rather quickly to meaningless nonsense and the inherent incapability to draw and maintain the actual distinctions that those terms are best utilized for.

Crayons are certainly not equal to either. Colors consist of different sets of spectral distributions that we've attributed the same namesake to. I'm granting that based upon granting the earlier bits about "yellow" being more than one spectral distribution. There are a plurality of different spectral distributions that we've named "yellow".

The light reflected by each and every crayon is not equal to the color we see when viewing them. The color we see is - in part - the result of our perceiving particular spectral distributions within the overall spectra being emitted from the crayons.

We do not see the entire spectra. We see parts of it.

The spectra emanating from an object changes along with light conditions. Along with that change comes a change in the colors we see when viewing it.

I am hoping that most or all of this is agreeable for you. I'll check back later. Sorry I could not further consider the example until this bit is at least tentatively agreed upon.

Let's go back to this box of crayons. There are 96 crayons here; each is a distinct spectral distribution, and we see them as different colors. But that's kind of cheating, because these crayons were made for humans. — InPitzotl

Stating the case - no matter how simply it may be stated - is never cheating.

I'll take the time to actually address what you've said here.

Imagine our mantis shrimp has a box of crayons. There's 960 crayons in his box. When we open it up, we see one row in one compartment has crayons that all look like the same color yellow to us. — InPitzotl

"The same color yellow to us"...

That's seems unnecessarily complex terminological use. I want to entertain the scenario of the mantis shrimp and the box of crayons, because I do believe that you know the names of all sorts of things, and as a result I've a certain amount of confidence that there's something to be gained by me individually as a result. I also entertain and still believe that there's something that others could gain as well, including but not limited to yourself.

Do you have any issue whatsoever agreeing that mantis shrimp have visual capabilities different to ours, as well as quite similar? They can distinguish between a greater number of spectral distributions than we can, and as a result, it makes perfect sense to say that they can see more colors than we can. Your earlier bit about all the different reds seems to be commensurate with all this as well. So...

I think we agree there. So... continuing on mantis shrimp, us, color vision capability and a box of crayons... Are you ok with the following, as it is stated?

We see one row in one compartment has yellow crayons. Not all of these crayons reflect the same spectra. We cannot distinguish between those spectra. And yet again... I think that we agree there. I want to see if our agreements can lead somewhere a bit more useful than our disagreements have led thus far.

Suppose one of these reflects only 700nm and 545nm light; call that crayon A; another reflects 570nm light only; call that crayon B. On the next row, however, we see orange crayons. Call one of these C.

So here's the key. Since each crayon reflects a single spectral distribution, then the two terms are pretty much analogous. So crayon=spectral distribution; crayons=spectra. — InPitzotl

Counting seems off.

"Crayon", "spectral distribution", and "spectra" are the terms in use. I count three. You use three and further talk as if you'd only used two.

This needs reconciliation.

Let's talk about what we've both agreed is the problem. I quoted it once. You've mentioned it more than once.

Let's talk about it.

Rhetoric does not impress me.

This is still the problem.
— creativesoul
Thought you weren't interested? — InPitzotl

I'm interested in what's true. Not everything you've said is bullshit.

Nice. The cavalry has shown up.

:meh:

The more the merrier.

Are you saying that no other animal perceives any of the sets of spectra that we call "red"?
No. I'm saying that no other animal perceives the set spectra that we call "red" as the same color. — InPitzotl

This is still the problem.

I think you're full of shit and you know it. Hence, you're all over the place, and now you've shown a pattern of feigning ignorance when I point out any of the problems with what you've been arguing here.

No longer interested in what you have to say here. Shame too, because it seems that you may be using current convention. If you're using it correctly... it's wrong.

What makes RG light and Y light the same color is how your human eyes react to these two spectra. RG light and Y light are metamers for the color we call "yellow". — InPitzotl

We're "color blind" to spectra; we can't even tell RG light from Y light. — InPitzotl

Yeah...

:roll:

I've certainly had enough discourse with you...

Discussing the affects/effects of religious discussion does.

:wink:

What do you mean "the two spectra"? There are many spectra that are red, and many spectra that are green. — InPitzotl

But, but, but...

If many spectra are green then spectra are green...

Some spectra are green.

Some spectra are green.

But, but, but...

You said spectra are not colors, and also that green is a color...

So...

I've had enough fun for now.

:roll:

"Spectra"(capitalized for grammatical reasons only) IS a name.

:meh:

It is used to pick out "the distributions of intensities of light as a function of frequency across a band of frequencies". You said so yourself. That is your definition. Verbatim. Those distributions of intensities of light existed in their entirety prior to our naming and describing them. Those distributions are discovered. Distributions of light do not require being perceived, attended to, and subsequently named and talked about by us in order to be a distribution of light.

But... "spectra" is a human word, and according to you... as a result it picks out a human group.



If all of the stuff that you've been saying about spectra is true, then spectra must exist in their entirety prior to our naming and describing them. All such things are existentially independent of us. If we ever acquire knowledge of these existentially independent things, then they are discovered. We can get such things(that which exists in it's entirety prior to naming and descriptive practices wrong, both by definition and subsequent description... ...if and when we get the elemental constituency wrong.

Color refers to a component of vision. Colors are distinct from spectra in that vision is not capable of measuring spectra in any animal's vision; for any animal capable of color vision, there will always be "metamers"... distinct spectra that map to the same color.

Colors are distinct from spectra. Spectra map to the same color. Metamers are the name given to distinct spectra that map to the same color. So, metamers are specific spectra that map to the same color. That's not about our language use. It's about color vision capability, which does not require our reporting upon it. It exists in it's entirety regardless of whether or not we ever acquire knowledge of what it always takes in order to happen. It most certainly does not require our account of it. It requires colors and spectra that map to them because it requires metamers. It does not require any of the language used by us as a means to account for color vision capability.

Color vision capabilities include distinct spectra that map to the same color. That is to say that there is a direct correlation between spectra and colors, in that certain spectra in certain conditions, are perceived as the same color. Because an animal's color vision capability does not require our naming and talking about it, but it does require spectra mapping to the same color... then color, spectra, and metamers do not require our naming and talking about them.

"Spectra" is a name. Spectra does not require being named. In this case, and all others like it, any name will do. What's being named doesn't change one iota by what we say about it... if we have it right, that is. The same is true with colors.

Seeing red requires seeing the color red, because red is a color. Seeing a thing we've named red only requires seeing a thing that we have named red, not seeing its color. — InPitzotl

It seems you're having a bit of trouble following along. I've not talked about seeing a thing we've named red, as though that is the same as seing it's color as red. You have. The earlier bits about seeing the crayons with the name on them and all that...

Keep up. I'm not going to point out each and every time you misattribute meaning to my words and then put it on display with such non sequiturs. Not being nit picky or anything. I just want to focus more upon what you've been claiming, and the consequences thereof, especially when holding different statements next to one another for meaningful comparison.

Analysis.

Seeing red things is seeing things that are reflecting at least one of the distributions of intensities of light as a function of frequency across a band of frequencies(spectra and/or metamers) that we've since named "red".

"Red" is a human word, so it refers to a human group. — InPitzotl

Surely you are not asserting this. What are you doing with the word "so" here? So because "red" is a human word, it refers to a human group???

:brow:

Sorry, but I have to call "bullshit" here...

Using the term "red" in normal parlance is to pick out all things we've given the namesake to... including, but not limited to, certain spectra that map to the same color in certain animals with color vision capability. Spectra are not a human grouping. Color vision capability is not a human group. "Spectra" is a human word. "Color" is a human word. "Mt. Everest" is a human word. None of the referents of those words - which act as names - are human groupings. Human groupings are existentially dependent upon human language use. Spectra, colors, and Mt. Everest are most certainly... not.

All human groups are existentially dependent upon humans. Colors are not.

"Red" is a human word referring to that which existed in it's entirety prior to our naming and descriptive practices involving the term.

Seeing red is the exact same thing as seeing the spectra we've named "red".
— creativesoul
That's like saying that if I take a black and white photo of this box of crayons, then it's a color photo, because "taking a color photo is the exact same thing as taking a photo of things we call colored". — InPitzotl

Only to people who do not understand that spectra exist in their entirety prior to our naming and describing them.

:brow:

Glad you can overlook my grammatical errors with this foreign jargon. I'll simplify in the hopes of making this as simple as possible...

Seeing red is the exact same thing as seeing the spectra we've named "red". Seeing green is the exact same thing as seeing the spectra we've named "green". Distinguishing between the two spectra is not necessary for seeing both. It is necessary for seeing them as distinct to each other. Seeing them as distinct to each other is not equal to seeing them "as the colors we've named 'red' and 'green'". Seeing them as the colors we've named "red" and "green" requires seeing them as distinct to each other, having similar biological structures as us, and having already used the terms "red" and "green" to pick them out to the exclusion of all else. Seeing them as distinct is not equal to seeing them as colors.

I'm pointing out the equivocation problems with seeing/perceiving and seeing/perceiving "as a color", "as red", "as green", etc. They are not the same thing/process. Thus, using the terms "seeing" and "perceiving" to represent both cases is an equivocation of the terms "seeing" and "perceiving".

Seeing a tree is not the same thing as seeing a tree "as a tree".

There's a box of 96 crayons here. I can not only see every crayon in this box; I see every crayon in this box as a color. A deuteranope (red/green colorblind person) can also see every crayon in this box; not only that, he sees every crayon in this box as a color. By your argument, a red/green colorblind person should be seeing red and green. Is that what you want to say, or do you want to rethink that? — InPitzotl

That is not by my argument. That is not what I want to say, nor do I want or need to rethink what I've said or what I want to say. The fallacies are becoming more and more numerous.

Seeing a spectra "as a color" is to have already named that spectra, and to have already categorized that name as a color. One can see a class of spectra without ever having given it a name. So, seeing a spectra and seeing a spectra as a color are not equivalent processes. You're conflating the two. I suspect you know this, and you also realized where I was heading earlier with my questioning regarding the phrasing. Hence, the sudden increase in fallacious argument.

You're equivocating the terms "seeing" and "perceiving" in exactly the way I just explained.

One can see red and green without using the names "red" and "green". One cannot see red or green as colors however, unless one has used the names "red" and "green" as a means for distinguishing between the two spectra bearing the namesakes. One who cannot distinguish between the spectra we've named "red" and "green" can still see the spectra. Seeing the spectra we've named "red" and "green" does not require being able to distinguish between them. Seeing the spectra as red and as green does.

Seeing red does not require seeing red "as red". Seeing green does not require seeing green "as green". Seeing a tree does not require seeing a tree "as a tree".

That is what follows from my argument.

...

...this is getting ridiculous. — InPitzotl

I'm beginning to be inclined to agree.

Other animals can perceive the kinds of plants that we've named "trees". "Trees" is the name we've bestowed upon certain kinds of plants. The name of a thing is not the thing. "Trees" are not trees. Trees are certain kinds of plants. Other animals can perceive those certain kinds of plants. Other animals can perceive trees.

Other animals can perceive the class of spectra that we've named "red". "Red" is the name we've bestowed upon a certain class of spectra. The name of a thing is not the thing. "Red" is not red. Red is a certain class of spectra. Other animals can perceive that certain class of spectra. Other animals can perceive red.

Can other animals perceive the class of spectra that we call "red"?
— creativesoul
You need not go to other animals... — InPitzotl

You mentioned other animals in the bit I was responding to.

I asked, and I think you've just answered.

Yes. Right?

Other animals can perceive the class of spectra that we call "red". <------Is that statement true?

Can other animals perceive the class of spectra that we call "red"?

The above makes perfect sense if it makes sense to say that they cannot perceive it as the same color.

Can they perceive it at all?

...no other animal perceives the set spectra that we call "red" as the same color. — InPitzotl

The above is your (edited)reply. I'm wondering if it makes any sense to drop off the "as the same color" portion. So, I asked if any other animal perceives the set spectra that we call "red".

It may become relevant.
— creativesoul
You're explicitly being evasive; okay. — InPitzotl

No. I'm not at all being evasive. As I said, it may become relevant. It also may not. Prior to even being sure of either possibility, I must first understand what you're doing with these new words(new to me).

I'm saying that no other animal perceives the equivalance class of spectra that we call "red" as the same color. — InPitzotl

Can they perceive the class of spectra that we call "red"?

...for any animal capable of color vision, there will always be "metamers"... distinct spectra that map to the same color. — InPitzotl

This bit above I'm having trouble squaring with your position/argument in general.

Critically speaking, you're committing a few fallacies, but I do not want to focus upon that.
— creativesoul
Then why tell me? — InPitzotl

It may become relevant. I want to make sure that I understand what you're saying. That is primary.

Ok. No need for apologies. I appreciate your patience.

So the term "red" has a set(or sets?) of spectra(metamers?) that it picks out. Are you saying that no other animal perceives any of the metamers that we call "red"?

You've inundated me with previously unfamiliar jargon and processes here. That's not a problem, but you'll have to bear with me as I read your replies, do some cross referencing and research in order to gain a bit of confidence that I understand what you're saying. Critically speaking, you're committing a few fallacies, but I do not want to focus upon that.

Rather, I'm wondering - still - how you've arrived at the notion that no other animals can distinguish the spectra that we call "red" regardless of the vagueness and/or lack of precision that that term carries along with it. The term does have a corresponding range of frequencies that it picks out. In order for no other animal to be able to see red would require that no other animals were capable of perceiving that particular range.

It seems to me that you're wanting to say that no other animals have the same sensitivity to the exact same range(spectra?) and thus they would not see the same range that we've named "red". They would see either a narrower or broader range depending upon their own photoreceptors, which are different than ours. What they see would not correspond to what we call "red".

Is this close to being in line with what you're saying?

Spectra and colors...

What's the difference?

If touch was processed locally and existed within the affected body part, — Samuele

Again. Not my claim.

a body part can't FEEL anything by itself. — Samuele

I've never claimed that it could.

It's the oddest thing. If you do not believe that foot pain in is your foot simply because the rest of the nervous system is not, then there's not much more I can do. I appealed to your common sense.

What hurts when you kick something hard with your foot?

Not your brain. Your foot. I do not understand how anyone could believe otherwise.

The big picture, I'm figuring, is human perception...

Yes?

I've already addressed problems with the language you've used to discuss it. You've yet to have given those replies their just due.

What do you think that I'm making up?

That when you kick something hard with your foot that the pain is in your foot?

I think that you're arguing with your own imagination in some respects. For instance, I've never denied the need for a central nervous system, or a brain, in order to feel pain in your foot... or, if you prefer... at the damage site.

Ok.

Then what's at stake between your position and my own is a matter of degree and not kind, so to speak.

Some animals are red/green color blind. Dogs... I think?

Others are not. Some can sense/detect infrared, others ultraviolet.

What makes you so confident that no other animals can see red?

Curious. Are you saying that colors do not exist?

Let me know when you're capable of not taking everything personally.

Sigh.

Stick out your foot. I'll hit it with a hammer, and bet you whatever amount you like that you will not grab your brain as a means for soothing the pain in your foot.

It's absurd. Why on earth would you agree that it makes sense to talk like that? All I'm getting at here is that many of the problems you're talking about result from the way you're talking... the terminological choices; the framework; the conceptual scheme; etc.

It's not about you... personally. Don't take it that way.