Spectra and colors...

What's the difference? — creativesoul

Spectra is shorthand for "spectral distributions", and refers to the distributions of intensities of light as a function of frequency across a band of frequencies. Color refers to a component of vision. Colors are distinct from spectra in that vision is not capable of measuring spectra in any animal's vision; for any animal capable of color vision, there will always be "metamers"... distinct spectra that map to the same color.

You've inundated me with previously unfamiliar jargon and processes here. That's not a problem, but you'll have to bear with me as I read your replies, do some cross referencing and research in order to gain a bit of confidence that I understand what you're saying. Critically speaking, you're committing a few fallacies, but I do not want to focus upon that.

Rather, I'm wondering - still - how you've arrived at the notion that no other animals can distinguish the spectra that we call "red" regardless of the vagueness and/or lack of precision that that term carries along with it. The term does have a corresponding range of frequencies that it picks out. In order for no other animal to be able to see red would require that no other animals were capable of perceiving that particular range.

It seems to me that you're wanting to say that no other animals have the same sensitivity to the exact same range(spectra?) and thus they would not see the same range that we've named "red". They would see either a narrower or broader range depending upon their own photoreceptors, which are different than ours. What they see would not correspond to what we call "red".

Is this close to being in line with what you're saying?

Critically speaking, you're committing a few fallacies, but I do not want to focus upon that. — creativesoul

Then why tell me?

Is this close to being in line with what you're saying?

Sorry, but no.

how you've arrived at the notion that no other animals can distinguish the spectra that we call "red" regardless of the vagueness and/or lack of precision that that term carries along with it. The term does have a corresponding range of frequencies that it picks out.

No, the term does not have a "range of frequencies" that it picks out; it has a "set of spectra" (an "equivalence class of spectra" if you will). Suppose your monitor's RGB components were monochromatic... and R emitted at 700nm, G at 545nm, and B at 435nm. Suppose also that you have a 570nm LED; when lit, that LED would emit light that you would see as yellow. You could also produce that same color (close enough) using your RGB monitor. But when you look at at your RGB monitor, you are not seeing 570nm light; you are seeing light composed of 700nm photons and 545nm photons. Photon frequencies never blend; a photon at a frequency is a photon at that frequency from the time it's emitted to the time it's absorbed, regardless of what other photons are present (for the same reason, you don't get an AM radio station at 570 kHz by putting up a tower at 545kHz and another at 700kHz).

So the combination of light coming from your monitor... that mix of 545nm photons and 700nm photons... is one spectral distribution (call this RG light). The light coming from the 570nm LED is another spectral distribution (call this Y light). From the physics of photons, there's nothing about RG light that "makes" it the same color as Y light. What makes RG light and Y light the same color is how your human eyes react to these two spectra. RG light and Y light are metamers for the color we call "yellow".

Ok. No need for apologies. I appreciate your patience.

So the term "red" has a set(or sets?) of spectra(metamers?) that it picks out. Are you saying that no other animal perceives any of the metamers that we call "red"?

Critically speaking, you're committing a few fallacies, but I do not want to focus upon that.
— creativesoul
Then why tell me? — InPitzotl

It may become relevant. I want to make sure that I understand what you're saying. That is primary.

...for any animal capable of color vision, there will always be "metamers"... distinct spectra that map to the same color. — InPitzotl

This bit above I'm having trouble squaring with your position/argument in general.

It may become relevant. — creativesoul

You're explicitly being evasive; okay.

Are you saying that no other animal perceives any of the sets of spectra that we call "red"?

No. I'm saying that no other animal perceives the set spectra that we call "red" as the same color.

I'm saying that no other animal perceives the equivalance class of spectra that we call "red" as the same color. — InPitzotl

Can they perceive the class of spectra that we call "red"?

It may become relevant.
— creativesoul
You're explicitly being evasive; okay. — InPitzotl

No. I'm not at all being evasive. As I said, it may become relevant. It also may not. Prior to even being sure of either possibility, I must first understand what you're doing with these new words(new to me).

Can they perceive the class of spectra? — creativesoul

I have no clue what you're asking here. The class of spectra that I can see is the same class of spectra that a deuteranope can see. I suspect you're trying to ask some question but don't know how, but I honestly can't figure out what you're trying to ask.

...no other animal perceives the set spectra that we call "red" as the same color. — InPitzotl

The above is your (edited)reply. I'm wondering if it makes any sense to drop off the "as the same color" portion. So, I asked if any other animal perceives the set spectra that we call "red".

It's fascinating, although I expected a story about visual cortex area V1.

I'm wondering if it makes any sense to drop off the "as the same color" portion. — creativesoul

Why would it? Aren't we supposed to be talking about what colors are? If RG and Y are both yellow, they're both yellow.

It's fascinating, although I expected a story about visual cortex area V1. — Zelebg

I'm not as well versed in the visual cortex, but I am aware that certain areas of the visual cortex analyze images at different resolutions, making this even messier.

Can other animals perceive the class of spectra that we call "red"?

The above makes perfect sense if it makes sense to say that they cannot perceive it as the same color.

Can they perceive it at all?

Can other animals perceive the class of spectra that we call "red"? — creativesoul

You need not go to other animals; deuteranopes (that mode of red/green colorblind) can see the class of spectra that we call red. They can't distinguish that color from the color we call green, but they can see the same class of spectra.

The question of whether an animal can see the same class of spectra that we can is simply a question of whether the animal's visual bandwidth (by which I mean the range of light frequencies that is visible to it) is the same or broader than ours.

Can other animals perceive the class of spectra that we call "red"?
— creativesoul
You need not go to other animals... — InPitzotl

You mentioned other animals in the bit I was responding to.

I asked, and I think you've just answered.

Yes. Right?

Other animals can perceive the class of spectra that we call "red". <------Is that statement true?

Yes. Right? — creativesoul

Yes, but, this is getting ridiculous. You're treating this like a chat forum. Why don't you just go think about things, and come back in a bit? Or suggest an actual chat forum to talk on?

...this is getting ridiculous. — InPitzotl

I'm beginning to be inclined to agree.

Other animals can perceive the kinds of plants that we've named "trees". "Trees" is the name we've bestowed upon certain kinds of plants. The name of a thing is not the thing. "Trees" are not trees. Trees are certain kinds of plants. Other animals can perceive those certain kinds of plants. Other animals can perceive trees.

Other animals can perceive the class of spectra that we've named "red". "Red" is the name we've bestowed upon a certain class of spectra. The name of a thing is not the thing. "Red" is not red. Red is a certain class of spectra. Other animals can perceive that certain class of spectra. Other animals can perceive red.

...

Other animals can perceive the class of spectra that we've named "red". "Red" is the name we've bestowed upon a certain class of spectra. The name of a thing is not the thing. "Red" is not red. Red is a certain class of spectra. Other animals can perceive that certain class of spectra. Other animals can perceive red. — creativesoul

There's a box of 96 crayons here. I can not only see every crayon in this box; I see every crayon in this box as a color. A deuteranope (red/green colorblind person) can also see every crayon in this box; not only that, he sees every crayon in this box as a color. By your argument, a red/green colorblind person should be seeing red and green. Is that what you want to say, or do you want to rethink that?

There's a box of 96 crayons here. I can not only see every crayon in this box; I see every crayon in this box as a color. A deuteranope (red/green colorblind person) can also see every crayon in this box; not only that, he sees every crayon in this box as a color. By your argument, a red/green colorblind person should be seeing red and green. Is that what you want to say, or do you want to rethink that? — InPitzotl

That is not by my argument. That is not what I want to say, nor do I want or need to rethink what I've said or what I want to say. The fallacies are becoming more and more numerous.

Seeing a spectra "as a color" is to have already named that spectra, and to have already categorized that name as a color. One can see a class of spectra without ever having given it a name. So, seeing a spectra and seeing a spectra as a color are not equivalent processes. You're conflating the two. I suspect you know this, and you also realized where I was heading earlier with my questioning regarding the phrasing. Hence, the sudden increase in fallacious argument.

You're equivocating the terms "seeing" and "perceiving" in exactly the way I just explained.

One can see red and green without using the names "red" and "green". One cannot see red or green as colors however, unless one has used the names "red" and "green" as a means for distinguishing between the two spectra bearing the namesakes. One who cannot distinguish between the spectra we've named "red" and "green" can still see the spectra. Seeing the spectra we've named "red" and "green" does not require being able to distinguish between them. Seeing the spectra as red and as green does.

Seeing red does not require seeing red "as red". Seeing green does not require seeing green "as green". Seeing a tree does not require seeing a tree "as a tree".

That is what follows from my argument.

That is not what I want to say, nor do I want or need to rethink what I've said — creativesoul

...okay, then you need to learn what these words mean, so that when when you read what I write you're interpreting it correctly, and so that when you write something using those words it means what you say... so that when you write something, I know what you mean.

Seeing a spectra "as a color" is to have already named that spectra, and to have already categorized that name as a color. — creativesoul

"Spectra" is plural, first off. We're talking about particular spectral distributions; since we're using "spectra" as a shorthand for the plural, you can call each of these a "spectrum". So take this box of 96 crayons here. There is a red crayon; it reflects a spectral distribution, which means that there's light from wavelengths (say) 360nm to 830nm being reflected with particular intensities at particular wavelengths.

One can see a class of spectra without ever having given it a name.

But that phrase doesn't mean anything useful. The term class refers to just a grouping; taking spectral distributions and putting it into a box (label not needed; just boxing). This isn't just a nit pick; we need to be able to talk about classes like this if we want to talk about whether other entities see the same colors we do, because the thing we are talking about has to allow us to transport one "class" to what another entity sees.

There is a spectral distribution that the crayon with "red" written on it reflects. There's another that the crayon with "green" written on it reflects; another that the crayon with "yellow" on it reflects; and still another that this banana on a shelf reflects. There's a class of spectra that has all four spectral distributions in it; one that has just the banana in it. Yellow is an equivalence class of spectra we can distinguish. We cannot distinguish the spectral distribution the banana reflects from the one that the crayon labeled "yellow" reflects; therefore, they are in the same equivalence class.

But when you talk about a different entity; say, some creature called a "snapper", seeing "a class of spectra", then it doesn't really mean anything useful. That means snappers can see things in the class, which means snappers can see crayons with "yellow" written on them, and they can also see bananas. Well, okay then; but in that sense, deuteranopes can see all 96 crayons... so when you tell me snappers can see the class, I'm not sure you're telling me anything about colors.

So, seeing a spectra and seeing a spectra as a color are not equivalent processes.

Of course they aren't. That's the point. Talking about "seeing spectra" underspecifies what it means to say they are seeing colors. The colors the snapper sees is defined not by what spectra it can see, but by what spectra the snapper can distinguish versus what it cannot distinguish. Non-distinguishability is same-coloredness; distinguishability is different-coloredness. The banana and the crayon are to us the same color because they are in the same equivalence class of spectra based on what colors we distinguish.

One cannot see red or green as colors however, unless one has used the names "red" and "green" as a means for distinguishing between the two spectra bearing the namesakes.

No, if it were about assigning words to the spectra, we can't talk about snappers seeing color, because snappers don't use words. And they don't use words to distinguish spectra either... they use their snapper eyes. Furthermore, they don't use their snapper eyes "to distinguish spectra", because that's not the "purpose" of what they're doing. They're just using their snapper eyes to see what things look like... snappers couldn't care less about spectra, they just care that things look the same or different. It's just that their snapper eyes in and of themselves distinguish or not spectra of particular types.

The words are just labels; "yellow" literally is just a thing we use to label the color. The color per se is an equivalence class... that we have labeled with the word "yellow". That equivalence class consists of spectra such as that that the crayon with "yellow" written on it reflects, and that that the banana on the shelf reflects.

We are trapped in this simulation by the elements, pain is a deep cut in space.

Colors are this pain at a sustainable level, converted through matter to pleasure.

Glad you can overlook my grammatical errors with this foreign jargon. I'll simplify in the hopes of making this as simple as possible...

Seeing red is the exact same thing as seeing the spectra we've named "red". Seeing green is the exact same thing as seeing the spectra we've named "green". Distinguishing between the two spectra is not necessary for seeing both. It is necessary for seeing them as distinct to each other. Seeing them as distinct to each other is not equal to seeing them "as the colors we've named 'red' and 'green'". Seeing them as the colors we've named "red" and "green" requires seeing them as distinct to each other, having similar biological structures as us, and having already used the terms "red" and "green" to pick them out to the exclusion of all else. Seeing them as distinct is not equal to seeing them as colors.

I'm pointing out the equivocation problems with seeing/perceiving and seeing/perceiving "as a color", "as red", "as green", etc. They are not the same thing/process. Thus, using the terms "seeing" and "perceiving" to represent both cases is an equivocation of the terms "seeing" and "perceiving".

Seeing a tree is not the same thing as seeing a tree "as a tree".

Seeing red is the exact same thing as seeing the spectra we've named "red". — creativesoul

That's like saying that if I take a black and white photo of this box of crayons, then it's a color photo, because "taking a color photo is the exact same thing as taking a photo of things we call colored".

Seeing red requires seeing the color red, because red is a color. Seeing a thing we've named red only requires seeing a thing that we have named red, not seeing its color.

Distinguishing between the two spectra is not necessary for seeing both. — creativesoul

What do you mean "the two spectra"? There are many spectra that are red, and many spectra that are green.

Seeing them as the colors we've named "red" and "green" requires (a) seeing them as distinct to each other, (b) having similar biological structures as us, and (c) having already used the terms "red" and "green" to pick them out to the exclusion of all else. — creativesoul

Yes to (a). Not really to (b); that helps, but it's unnecessary. No to (c); it doesn't matter if you call the color "red", "rojo", "vermelho", or "aka"; what matters is that whatever label you're applying to it, it is the particular equivalence class of spectra that we have labeled red.

But you're missing a key requirement: (d) the ability to identify things that are the same color as the same color. In other words, if that crayon with "yellow" written on it is the same color as that banana on the shelf, then to "see yellow", you need to be able to see that that crayon is the same color as that banana.

Seeing them as distinct is not equal to seeing them as colors. — creativesoul

Correct; (d) is also a key requirement.

I'm pointing out the equivocation problems with seeing/perceiving and seeing/perceiving "as a color" — creativesoul

Actually, that's what I'm doing. You're confusing seeing a color with seeing a thing that has a color. Just because I call something red, and Joe sees it, doesn't mean Joe is seeing the color red. It just means Joe is seeing something and I see that it's red. We can't say that Joe sees the color until he sees the color, not just the thing that has the color.

Seeing red is the exact same thing as seeing the spectra we've named "red".
— creativesoul
That's like saying that if I take a black and white photo of this box of crayons, then it's a color photo, because "taking a color photo is the exact same thing as taking a photo of things we call colored". — InPitzotl

Only to people who do not understand that spectra exist in their entirety prior to our naming and describing them.

:brow:

Only to people who do not understand that spectra exist in their entirety prior to our naming and describing them. — creativesoul

We're not naming spectra; we're naming equivalence classes of spectra. We're "color blind" to spectra; we can't even tell RG light from Y light.

Maybe that's your confusion. Dichromats, like red/green colorblind people, are "colorblind" because there are "colors" they cannot distinguish. We are trichromats, but physically speaking, that's just slightly more capable than dichromats. If we wanted to see spectra to approximately the same resolution as say the CIE 1931 spectral data... which has values from the wavelengths 360nm to 830nm in 5nm intervals... then we would need a hypothetical creature with 95 different photoreceptors.

Mantis shrimp have the most impressive visual gamut I'm aware of; with up to about 16 photoreceptor types.

"Spectra"(capitalized for grammatical reasons only) IS a name.

:meh:

It is used to pick out "the distributions of intensities of light as a function of frequency across a band of frequencies". You said so yourself. That is your definition. Verbatim. Those distributions of intensities of light existed in their entirety prior to our naming and describing them. Those distributions are discovered. Distributions of light do not require being perceived, attended to, and subsequently named and talked about by us in order to be a distribution of light.

But... "spectra" is a human word, and according to you... as a result it picks out a human group.



If all of the stuff that you've been saying about spectra is true, then spectra must exist in their entirety prior to our naming and describing them. All such things are existentially independent of us. If we ever acquire knowledge of these existentially independent things, then they are discovered. We can get such things(that which exists in it's entirety prior to naming and descriptive practices wrong, both by definition and subsequent description... ...if and when we get the elemental constituency wrong.

Color refers to a component of vision. Colors are distinct from spectra in that vision is not capable of measuring spectra in any animal's vision; for any animal capable of color vision, there will always be "metamers"... distinct spectra that map to the same color.

Colors are distinct from spectra. Spectra map to the same color. Metamers are the name given to distinct spectra that map to the same color. So, metamers are specific spectra that map to the same color. That's not about our language use. It's about color vision capability, which does not require our reporting upon it. It exists in it's entirety regardless of whether or not we ever acquire knowledge of what it always takes in order to happen. It most certainly does not require our account of it. It requires colors and spectra that map to them because it requires metamers. It does not require any of the language used by us as a means to account for color vision capability.

Color vision capabilities include distinct spectra that map to the same color. That is to say that there is a direct correlation between spectra and colors, in that certain spectra in certain conditions, are perceived as the same color. Because an animal's color vision capability does not require our naming and talking about it, but it does require spectra mapping to the same color... then color, spectra, and metamers do not require our naming and talking about them.

"Spectra" is a name. Spectra does not require being named. In this case, and all others like it, any name will do. What's being named doesn't change one iota by what we say about it... if we have it right, that is. The same is true with colors.

Seeing red requires seeing the color red, because red is a color. Seeing a thing we've named red only requires seeing a thing that we have named red, not seeing its color. — InPitzotl

It seems you're having a bit of trouble following along. I've not talked about seeing a thing we've named red, as though that is the same as seing it's color as red. You have. The earlier bits about seeing the crayons with the name on them and all that...

Keep up. I'm not going to point out each and every time you misattribute meaning to my words and then put it on display with such non sequiturs. Not being nit picky or anything. I just want to focus more upon what you've been claiming, and the consequences thereof, especially when holding different statements next to one another for meaningful comparison.

Analysis.

Seeing red things is seeing things that are reflecting at least one of the distributions of intensities of light as a function of frequency across a band of frequencies(spectra and/or metamers) that we've since named "red".

"Red" is a human word, so it refers to a human group. — InPitzotl

Surely you are not asserting this. What are you doing with the word "so" here? So because "red" is a human word, it refers to a human group???

:brow:

Sorry, but I have to call "bullshit" here...

Using the term "red" in normal parlance is to pick out all things we've given the namesake to... including, but not limited to, certain spectra that map to the same color in certain animals with color vision capability. Spectra are not a human grouping. Color vision capability is not a human group. "Spectra" is a human word. "Color" is a human word. "Mt. Everest" is a human word. None of the referents of those words - which act as names - are human groupings. Human groupings are existentially dependent upon human language use. Spectra, colors, and Mt. Everest are most certainly... not.

All human groups are existentially dependent upon humans. Colors are not.

"Red" is a human word referring to that which existed in it's entirety prior to our naming and descriptive practices involving the term.

What do you mean "the two spectra"? There are many spectra that are red, and many spectra that are green. — InPitzotl

But, but, but...

If many spectra are green then spectra are green...

Some spectra are green.

Some spectra are green.

But, but, but...

You said spectra are not colors, and also that green is a color...

So...

I've had enough fun for now.

:roll: