:ok:

We're working from different notions of what counts as a basic or rudimentary belief. Our exchange led us into the notion of whether or not a language less creature's belief could possible count as being well grounded. If it requires being based upon other beliefs, then we arrive at the notion of infinite regress... Somewhere along the line, some belief or other is not based upon prior belief.

Can those be identified and/or isolated, and can they count as being well grounded true ones?
— creativesoul

I think so, at least in principle. — Andrew M

Ok. My aim is to do it in practice.

But... when we're offering an account of Bob's belief, they must be Bob's beliefs... right?
— creativesoul

We're asking whether Bob's belief that it is 3pm counts as knowledge (and why or why not). It doesn't really matter if Bob simply believes that space aliens implanted his mind with the correct time. We only care that Bob believed the time that the clock showed and that the clock was working correctly. — Andrew M

I think that I overlooked the importance that "at that time" had in what you were saying and misunderstood you as a result. It seems we agree that our report of Bob's belief must include what Bob's beliefs are/were. If you're aiming to hone the focus upon the immediately relevant beliefs... then I'm pretty sure that we're in agreement, with the important one being about the broken clock.

The only thing still sticking in my side between our respective views is the notion that all beliefs are premiss based, which I do not agree with. However, when we're talking about candidates for knowledge claims per JTB, that seems to hold good.

I'm saying that I've the beginnings of one.

Both...

Not exactly... I'm putting forth an outline(methodological approach) that is best suited to render one.

Bob looks at the clock and forms the belief that it is 3pm. That's a basic or rudimentary belief with no implication that he needed another belief prior to forming that belief, which would just result in an infinite regress. — Andrew M

We're working from different notions of what counts as a basic or rudimentary belief. Our exchange led us into the notion of whether or not a language less creature's belief could possible count as being well grounded. If it requires being based upon other beliefs, then we arrive at the notion of infinite regress... Somewhere along the line, some belief or other is not based upon prior belief.

Can those be identified and/or isolated, and can they count as being well grounded true ones?

It also seems clear to me that there are a plethora of pre-existing belief underwriting the very ability to participate in time telling practices such as looking at clocks, so... To say that there is no implication that he needed another belief prior to forming that belief is most certainly wrong.

However we can nonetheless investigate the premises of Bob's belief. Those premises emerge as part of our analysis, not something we need to suppose were Bob's beliefs at that time.

But... when we're offering an account of Bob's belief, they must be Bob's beliefs... right?

pretty much that whole quote is full of lofty, impractical requirements for whats “proper”. — DingoJones

We must be working from different ideas of what's impractical... I use them, and have been since I began serious interest in philosophy twenty or so years ago.

Universally applicable is not equivalent to infallible.

With regard to an acceptable theory of human thought and belief, it must be able to take account of thought and belief that is prior to language, ad well as thought and belief that is informed by and/or mediated with language use. It must be able to bridge the divide between thought and belief that is existentially dependent upon language use, and that which is not.

Working from the premiss that at the moment of a capable creature's biological conception, there is no thought and belief, we arrive at the requirement to hold that thought and belief begin simply and grow in their complexity. Taking proper account of how that happens will be amenable to evolutionary progression.

Hence... the criterion put forth.

Right. Heidegger, indeed. But (and I hope you'll agree) not on his authority but rather on his successful unconcealment of the phenomenon. Since I've been exposed to Heidegger, I find myself discovering his insights in less explicit form in Hegel and Feuerbach. How does language exist? The basic insight seems to be that we are social on a deeper level than we are individual. So analyses that start from an isolated subject gazing at pure meanings, while possibly illuminating, are also trapped within a tradition obsessed with an epistemological problem while neglecting an ontological one.

What say you? — softwhere

I would agree that there are deep-seated issues with JTB particularly regarding the belief aspect... and it's an ontological problem.

I find that Heiddy's notions of being in the world, ready at hand, and others all seem to make a valiant attempt at further discriminating between kinds of thought and belief, particularly those which are informed and/or mediated by language use.

I also find his method far too complicated.

Well which bits do you find impossible?

Well if all you mean to say that all knowledge must be true... we are in complete agreement.

I mean, someone already point it out, but doesn't the fact that you're attributing to him a self-contradictory belief give you pause? — fiveredapples

It would if I were. I'm not.

The content of his belief included a particular broken clock. He believed that that particular broken clock was working, and hence used it to form the subsequent belief that it was 3PM.
— creativesoul

No, the content of his belief didn't include a broken clock. The content of his belief is capture by what he thought... — fiveredapples

This serves to further drive the point home that I made earlier about the significant difference between our notions of belief. Given that the topic is all about belief... what counts as JTB... it seems that getting belief right is crucial to getting JTB right...

The first thing that needs to happen though is to clarify what I'm saying, as compared/contrasted to what you're attributing to me as if I'm saying, or as if it follows from what I'm saying. This may be a tough road. I hope not.

For the sake of getting clear on this point, I'll just pretend he actually had this thought, but I don't concede that he actually thought this: "This clock is working." How you can you object to this analysis? He looked at the clock and thought, "This clock is working." The clock's not working is a fact about the clock. You can't include this fact as part of his belief, because he never thought that the clock wasn't working. So, you can't say that his thought was "This broken clock is working." — fiveredapples

I did not say that though, nor would I.

What I said was that he believed a broken clock was working, and he clearly did. His belief was about that particular clock, and that particular clock was a broken one. The content of his belief most certainly included that particular broken clock.

He did not know it was broken. He did not believe it was broken. He believed it was working. He believed a broken clock was working.

I note, and earlier mentioned, that the belief that approach is underwriting your position on this. While that is a perfectly acceptable method for examining belief statements, which treats belief the same as propositions/statements, it fails miserably to take proper account of operative unspoken belief such as the ones we're dealing with here.

I'm not saying that he believed that "a broken clock is working" is a true statement. I'm not saying that those words went through his head. I'm not saying that that statement is a belief of his. The content of his belief regarding the clock is not equivalent to a statement.

That's where we are at odds...

What counts as the content of belief.

Time zone problems in the settings???

Are you claiming to have achieved this standard with your own philosophy then?

Your philosophy is all this:

“One that is rendered in evolutionarily amenable terms. One built upon universal criterion. One built upon knowledge of all thought and belief.

One without exception. One that is capable of taking account of that which exists in it's entirety prior to our awareness. One that is capable of taking account of that which is prior to our language. One that is capable of setting out a coherent account of all thought and belief.” — DingoJones

Achieved?

:brow:

Those are criterion I use. A few here are redundant, but I was trying to emphasize the important bits of an acceptable theory of belief(mind).

When I said "to know our minds" I meant no margin of error — god must be atheist

Well, that's demanding perfection and/or omniscience.

He believes that it's 3 PM. And he came to believe that it's 3 PM by looking at a particular clock, a particular broken clock. — fiveredapples

Yes.

The content of his belief included a particular broken clock. He believed that that particular broken clock was working, and hence used it to form the subsequent belief that it was 3PM.

3. If we want to know how the mind works, we have to make a mental image of the mind. But to make a mental image of the mind, we need a storage capacity that equals the mental image, and then some more storage capacity to manipulate the thoughts that explain the mind. Therefore to explain the mind, we need a larger, better, more intelligent thing than our mind. Which is not achievable because you can't have something bigger than itself. — god must be atheist

This seems fraught throughout. The universe is bigger than us with much greater storage capacity, yet we know to some extent how it works, so clearly the above is wrong somewhere along the line.

You didnt answer the question sir. What are some things that you have this kind of account for? — DingoJones

But I did answer. Those criterion are at work in my own philosophy which is based upon human thought and belief(mind).

Well at least you've granted that the person has some belief or other about the clock.

That's a start.

Would you further concur that the belief is about a particular clock; the one he used as a means to tell time?

Trusting clocks is not always automatic, to be as clear as possible.
— creativesoul

I agree. It's an intermediate phenomenon. But trusting language (as you did when you wrote the sentence above) is usually at least as automatic as trusting a clock usually is.

Being-in-a-world and being-with-others is (in an important sense) prior to the subject that examines her mind and questions her beliefs. We live in a world with others of spoons, stairs, books, and clocks. They don't exist primarily as objects for ratiocination but as 'transparent' tools-in-use through which we see our thousand worldly purposes. Language, I'm claiming, has this tool-in-use kind or mode of being.

Along these lines, our 'blind' know-how concerning words like 'know' is prior to our retrospective attempt to define 'knowledge' so that the definition fits our intuition. — softwhere

Yes. And that's a way to show Heiddy's relevance...

I'll leave this for while...

:smile:

That seems like an incredibly high standard of whats “proper”. What are some things you have this kind of account of? — DingoJones

Indeed. It's a universal standard. One without exception.

The questioning was about what counts as a proper account of all thought and belief, and hence "mind"...

The answers were about what an acceptable theory of mind needed to include in order to be a proper account of all thought and belief, and thus... of all mind.

The belief that approach fails to take proper account of his belief, because he does not know and/or believe that it's broken. But it is. I suspect such lines of thought(belief that) are underwriting your approach here, with all the talk about propositional attitudes ans such.

As I said, we're working from significantly different notions of belief.

I'm appreciative of the thought provoking nature of this exchange.

:smile:

Neither of which properly accounts for his belief that a broken clock is working.
— creativesoul

First of all, he doesn't believe that a broken clock is working. He believes falsely that the clock is working. Those two statements are different. But nevermind the difference. Why think he has a belief? — fiveredapples

The clock is broken. He believes it's working. He believes that a broken clock is working.

Of course, we should be clear about the difference between (A) "He doesn't have a belief about the clock's working or not" and (B) "He believes the clock is not working." Sometimes (B) is stated as "He doesn't believe the clock is working," which sounds like (A) -- but it's not. — fiveredapples

Neither of which properly accounts for his belief that a broken clock is working. He looks at a clock. He believes that working clocks are reliable. He believes he knows what time it is, but he does not...

Because he mistakenly believes that that broken clock is working(which is clearly shown by his trust in using it), and false belief does not count as acceptable ground upon which to infer knowledge.

We also know that broken clocks are not acceptable justificatory ground for claiming to know what time it is.

...what philosophical work is the belief you're attributing to him doing to explain the epistemic failure? — fiveredapples

His belief IS the focus. Focusing upon the fact that the clock is broken neglects to consider that he had false belief to begin with.

Denying that he believes a broken clock is working neglects both, the fact that the clock is broken, and the fact that reading clocks is a traditional practice that is steeped in belief. It consists of belief. If he did not believe that a broken clock was working he would not have looked at one as a means to know what time it was. But, that's exactly what he did.

That's seems to me to be a common denominator in both Gettier cases as well.

What I don't understand about your position is that after you say that the broken clock can't lend epistemic justification, why the need to say more? I mean, doesn't that fully explain the justification failure? — fiveredapples

I don't think it does when the failure was a result of false belief that goes unaccounted for.

We're working from significantly different notions of belief. That alone could be the culprit in much of the possible confusion and/or misunderstanding.

I'm still struggling to understand how you ground the claim that the person does not believe that a broken clock is working.

Why are you using math if you reject its rules?

Its like you are fishing, and your friend catches a fish and says “i caught the biggest fish, 3 feet!”
And you say “no mines bigger”, but your friend protests after seeing your fish “its only 2 feet!” To which you reply “I dont use feet when measuring my fish, its way bigger”

Thats what you are doing here, propping up your argument using math but not using math when it shows your basis to be incorrect.
Is there another way of framing things not using math? If not, might be time to reevaluate. — DingoJones

That seems apt.

Ok, and what is meant by “properly”? — DingoJones

One that is rendered in evolutionarily amenable terms. One built upon universal criterion. One built upon knowledge of all thought and belief.

One without exception. One that is capable of taking account of that which exists in it's entirety prior to our awareness. One that is capable of taking account of that which is prior to our language. One that is capable of setting out a coherent account of all thought and belief.

What I don't understand about your position is that after you say that the broken clock can't lend epistemic justification, why the need to say more? — fiveredapples

Psychological I suppose.

:wink:

My apologies for any confusion.

Hmmm...

It seems we're even closer than I thought earlier. We're both rejecting the JTB criterion for what counts as being justified. It just seems that we've different reasoning for doing so...

In addition, I'm attempting to show and/or explain why the case offends our intuitions... because it forgets to keep in mind that the clock is broken.

Can you elaborate on what you think this broad consensus is? — DingoJones

That we cannot take proper account of our own thought and belief. That we cannot know what thought and belief is. Broad-based belief of that 'nature'(for lack of a better term).

So, I find that claiming the person could be skeptical and not believe that the clock is reliable to be quite a stretch, and an unnecessary one at that.

I'm not sure I follow this. Who claimed that the man is skeptical that the clock is reliable and that he does not believe it is reliable? And isn't this consistent? — fiveredapples

It was a carry over from your example about the new girlfriend. I think we can leave this aspect be. We seem to be making headway elsewhere. I want to give the middle portion of the post that the quote above was copied from subsequent due attention...

Yes, where well-grounded means that the belief as well as all the premises that the belief depends on are true...
— Andrew M

Hmmm....

Would that exclude language less creatures' belief from being well grounded? That would be at odds with my current leanings. — creativesoul

I don't think so. You, as a language user, could in principle identify the premises of any belief and check if they're true (and thus whether the belief holder could be said to have knowledge). But those premises are true (or not) independently of whether anyone does identify them. — Andrew M

This seems to arrive at a problem regarding the origen and/or content of belief. It presupposes that all belief is premiss based. I've an issue with that as a result of the fact that premisses themselves are belief.

Seems to me that it would have to be the case that some rudimentary belief are not premiss based. If they need to be in order to qualify as being well grounded then such belief cannot count... by definition alone... for if the definition is good... they do not have what it takes.

Our considerations are about whether or not looking at a broken clock is a justified means to know what time it is.
That's not what I've been considering. — fiveredapples

Perhaps you should, because that's what happened, and you granted that that knowledge claim was justified.

I have flatly rejected the view that a broken clock can lend epistemic justification for knowledge. — fiveredapples

Yes.

I think that we are largely in agreement here aside from granting that the belief was justified.

You grant JTB to the person in the scenario, whereas I do not. That is puzzling to me.

There are times when we are thinking about thought and belief. In such situations, we can say something like... "for the sake of argument, let's assume X", where that means we are going to assume that X is true(grant the truth of X), solely as a means to follow the consequences.
— creativesoul

That's not the only type of assumption — fiveredapples

I didn't say it was. What's at stake right now is the difference between assuming the clock is working and believing it is.

I said it was the only situation in which there is a definite difference between a person's assumption and that same person's belief, which is what's at issue here. You want to say that the person in Russell's clock scenario assumes the clock is working, as if that is somehow definitely different from the person believing that the clock is reliable(working).