Ok.

I suppose I'm struggling to understand the difference between being skeptical about the reliability of the clock and not believing that it is reliable.

If one believes a clock is working then they are not skeptical about whether or not it is a reliable means to know what time it is.

If one is skeptical about whether or not a clock is working, then they do not believe it is a reliable means to know what time it is. Such people would perhaps check to see, but that doesn't happen in Russell's case. So, I find that claiming the person could be skeptical and not believe that the clock is reliable to be quite a stretch, and an unnecessary one at that.

An acceptable theory of mind is beyond the scope the philosophy and even science in my opinion. — Wittgenstein

Could you explain why and/or better yet how an acceptable theory of mind is beyond the scope of both science and philosophy?

A workable, acceptable, or even just merely descriptive theory of mind is beyond the human mind to construct. — god must be atheist

Do you have an argument and/or reasoning process... some intelligible coherent line of thought that has led you to such a conclusion?

Honestly, per my comment on metacognition, I think it is trivially evident that one can critically evaluate one's own critical thought processes. Why would you not be able to? It is simply a tool, like any other? — Pantagruel

In different words... I agree with this sentiment.

I'm always confounded at what seems to be a rather broad-based general consensus across the philosophical spectrum that we cannot take proper account of our own thought and belief.

Upon what basis does this consensus rest?

I maintain the belief that you and I will make headway... somehow... somewhere... not here!

:wink:

Until next time, be well! Know the show of respect is mutual and very much appreciated!

Cheers!

So, in this example, Johnny seems to believe that you have a new girlfriend, while I remain skeptical enough to not assent, but of course I recognize that there's some evidence in favor of this opinion.

In the Russell scenario, the man might assume that the clock is working without believing that the clock is working.

Hmmm...I think this is a somewhat unsatisfying answer because then we'd be committed to the view that you can form beliefs based off assumption — fiveredapples

I agree that it is rather unsatisfying. It looks like a performative contradiction of sorts...

I do not believe that this clock is a reliable means of telling time, but I'm going to look at it anyway in order to know what time it is.

The only difference between assumption and belief that makes sense to me involves metacognitive endeavors.

There are times when we are thinking about thought and belief. In such situations, we can say something like... "for the sake of argument, let's assume X", where that means we are going to assume that X is true(grant the truth of X), solely as a means to follow the consequences. Here, there is a definite difference between granting the assumption and believing it's true(between assumption and belief).

That's just not applicable in the scenario of Russell's clock though. The person is not taking an attitude towards a proposition. That person's belief was not at all about propositions. It's about what time it is, and it was based upon a broken clock. Our considerations are about whether or not looking at a broken clock is a justified means to know what time it is.

In our assessments, we examine propositions... the person's knowledge claim. It does us all a disservice of understanding to neglect assessing the person's pre-existing belief upon which that knowledge claim rests it's laurels.

...the gap between automatic trust and conscious belief seems important. — softwhere

The former is existentially dependent upon the latter.

The gap is nowhere to be found aside from the gap in our knowledge base and thus our explanations. Trusting clocks is not always automatic, to be as clear as possible. That's learned thought, belief, and/or behaviour. It becomes operative thought and belief(automatic) when we do not consider our belief and it's role in what we are doing while we're doing it.

We learn to tell time with clock usage. Somewhere during this learning process we also learn to distinguish between working clocks and broken ones. We learn that even a broken clock tells the correct time twice a day. We learn that working clocks are a reliable means for time telling, but broken clocks are not. Thus, we are justified in knowledge claims about what time it is when we use a working clock as a means to check, but not when using a broken one.

So...

I struggle to make sense of the notion that using a broken clock offers the same justificatory ground for knowledge claims about what time it is. And yet... that's exactly what's happening in Russell's example. Those who grant that the belief is justified are completely forgetting that broken clocks are not a reliable means to tell time, and neglecting to take into consideration that the person believes that that particular broken clock is reliable(is a working one).

It's not.

In summary, belief about the time that is based upon using a broken clock as a means is not well grounded. I want to say that it is not a justified belief, because I'm partial to my own notion of JTB which seems to be significantly different than academia's if advocates for JTB tend to grant the justification aspect regarding this case.

No worries. Curious to see it argued for though.

Are you suggesting fait accompli? As if it is impossible to acquire?

:worry:

Yes. The only way the shift will take place is that we abandon philosophy — Wittgenstein

Are you agreeing that we are in dire need of an acceptable theory of mind(thought and belief on my view)?

Are you also claiming that logical empiricism has the only acceptable criterion for what counts as an adequate theory/explanation of human thought and belief(mind)?

That's seems quite odd to me at first blush. Are all notions of mind incapable of meeting Hempel's criteria?

I'm just happening upon Hempel... so...

Yes, where well-grounded means that the belief as well as all the premises that the belief depends on are true... — Andrew M

Hmmm....

Would that exclude language less creatures' belief from being well grounded? That would be at odds with my current leanings.

Seems to me that the entire field of philosophy of mind is in dire need of a paradigm shift. Does that make me guilty of having less than worthy or admirable critical thinking skills?

Can Hempel help out here? Is there such a thing as philosophy/theory of mind that can meet Hempel's criteria of adequacy?

Yes, that's what I want to say. I think we can assume that it's working. — fiveredapples

The difference between assuming that the clock we're looking at is working and believing it's working is what... exactly?

I cannot distinguish between the two,

Are we to say that when we look at a clock to see what time it is that we do not believe that the clock is working?
— creativesoul

Yes, that's what I want to say. I think we can assume that it's working. I don't think assumptions count as beliefs. After all, if you look at a clock to form a belief about the time, are you really checking to see if the clock is working? — fiveredapples

No. That's precisely the point. You already believe it is, otherwise you could not possibly trust it as a means to tell the time.



So, we assume a clock is working, we do not check to see, we have a long held practice of looking at clocks to tell the time, but when we look at a clock to check what time it is...

...we do not believe that it is a reliable means of telling time(that it's working)?

That's nonsense.

Yes, where well-grounded means that the belief as well as all the premises that the belief depends on are true. — Andrew M

Yes. That's what makes sense to me as well; especially if we are drawing a distinction between being justified and being well grounded. If proponents and/or advocates of JTB find Russell's clock to be a problem, then I'm no such advocate.

This question strikes me as odd for two reasons. One, the man in the Russell example has a true belief, so I'm wondering what motivates the question about a false belief. — fiveredapples

The motivation is regarding whether or not the true belief about the time is well grounded, and/or justified.

That's why there is a difference between knowing that it is 3pm (which Bob doesn't know) and merely having a justified, true belief that it is 3pm (which Bob does have). — Andrew M

So, in Russell's clock example, the belief is justified but not well grounded?

I can just deny that I had a false belief that the clock was working on the grounds that I had no belief on the matter. — fiveredapples

Do you believe that such a denial is adequate here?

Are we to say that when we look at a clock to see what time it is that we do not believe that the clock is working? Surely we all do. We need not wonder to ourselves at the moment of looking in order to believe that we're looking at a working clock. If we did not believe that it was working, we would not have looked at it.

Right?

Now we could raise the justification bar and require that Bob check that the clock is working first and perhaps also verify the time against other clocks. But even that could conceivably fail to produce a true belief. And, more importantly, it starts to get away from what we ordinarily require for knowledge claims. — Andrew M

Don't we ordinarily require them to be well grounded, to be based upon true belief? Bob believed that a broken clock was working.

There are some rather strange notions of "lies" being put forth in this thread. I think that better question, prior to taking account of all the different kinds of lies, is to take proper account of what counts as a lie to begin with.

The question is...

What do all lies have in common such that anything and everything sharing this set of commonalities counts as being one?

Deliberate misrepresentation of one's own thought and belief.

I think that that covers them all.

Anyone have an example to the contrary?

Any examples that satisfy that criterion which are not?

Let's ignore the whole “to our reason” talk. It's unnecessary. In simpler terms, in less technically loaded terms, most of us probably agree with Bartricks that the man does not have knowledge. Now, the million dollar question is, “Why doesn't he have knowledge despite having a justified true belief, which technically satisfies the definition of knowledge as JTB (Justified True Belief)? Again, I believe most us would be drawn directly to the obvious answer: namely, the man lacks the proper epistemic justification because the broken clock doesn't lend him the epistemic justification needed for knowledge. Let's call this the “Broken Clock Explanation.” — fiveredapples

So, five. I want to see if I understand you correctly.

You're granting Russell's clock as qualifying for a justified true belief. Do you find that false belief counts as adequate justificatory ground for a knowledge claim based upon that belief?

In Russell's example, the person believed that a broken clock was working. On my view, false belief never counts as adequate justificatory ground from which to deduce/infer knowledge.

By the way, a couple days back I answered your request for a one page summary regarding Gettier's paper. I'm of keen interest to get your take on it.

Me?

Hah!

I voluntarily put what I think I know, even when I think I know it's novel, out there for all the world to see!

:wink:

My income doesn't depend so much on philosophy! Good thing too!

I just like puzzles.

One of the biggest lie that we are all told is that everyone is creative. — Wittgenstein

Who is saying that everyone is me?

Yeah, that's a big fat lie! My gawd, the world would be in a heap of trouble.

:yum:

There you go. You believe that thinking is not experience, and I believe that it is. Now what?

What you wrote presupposes that there can be human thought so complicated as to have resulted in mathematics that somehow does not count as human experience.

:brow:

Mathematics is indeed a product of human thought, hence independent of human experience for its rules... — Mww

:brow:

Hence, you never see the ding an sich with your eyes, but merely a collection of photons that are converted to chemical and electrical codes that in turn remind your brain of a similar "object" that you have experienced before. — Gnomon

A photon is a thing in and of itself. We do not see photons though, at least not with the bare naked eye. We can see the tree outside in the yard. The tree is not photons. Photons are not what's being seen. Trees are. Photons play a role.

How else could philosophy have existed this long? — BrianW

Philosophy is the result of taking very careful account of the world and/or ourselves.

Oh, I am not at all dismissing the crucial importance of critical thought when it comes to becoming aware of conventional historical mistakes. It is a crucial element. Sometimes what was once thought to be true turns out to be mistaken in some way or other. We all know this.

We are fallible creatures. We form and/or hold false belief. When they are held across the spectrum of an entire population or society, and they are false, we could have a case of operative false belief with a tremendous amount of power. Such beliefs are considered to be common conventional wisdom by most if not all of those members.

Here...

"Thinking outside the box" has some weight so long as it's not so far outside that it becomes utterly irrelevant. The revolution of conventional wisdom always comes in amenable terms.

I cannot answer what the significance of Davidson's rejection amounts to, aside from perhaps an outright denial of the importance regarding the discovery he mentions early on regarding the truth of a statement largely depending upon the language being used. Taken strictly, that amounts to a sort of epistemic relativism or some such...

I really don't know though. I can't say that I understand exactly what Davidson's position includes.

Human thought and belief is the basis of my own position, and truth - while being existentially dependent upon thought and belief by virtue of presupposition within all of it - is not relative to belief in the strong sense, for belief that X is insufficient for X's being true. Statements have truth conditions. Those, in my view anyway, set out what it takes for a statement to be true. Belief is more than sufficient for X to be called true, but a statements being true does not require any particular speaker to believe that it is.

So, I can acknowledge and grant that some conceptual frameworks are not amenable to direct translation into others. However, it seems that the only sorts of things which are problematic are abstract objects and/or other indirectly perceptible things.

Deductive reasoning, and the process of elimination involves knowing what to look for. Good mechanics and good doctors perform the same process of elimination... House aside, it's a bit fantastical, real doctors do much the same. I've recently watched it happen. Interestingly enough, she was as absolutely certain as she could be, but would not dismiss the possibility of being mistaken...

...turns out she was right.

All that said, deductive reasoning and the process of elimination involved in identifying a problem or a cause is but one aspect of critical thinking, not the only one.

Ray Charles could see that Trump is the epitome of obstructing justice, and has been since the inauguration. I would be more surprised if something were done, than if something were not. Both parties... the entire bi-partisan governmental system in the States has been monetarily corrupt for so long that it has been legalized.

So...

Say what you like. Cheer for one side or other. Indulge in the day to day entertainment value. Continue to belittle other people as a result of differences in political views fed primarily by propaganda. It's puppeteering at it's autonomous finest....

The problem of course, is that when anything goes... anything stays... and...

Trump if proof.

As I've said more times than I can remember... Trump is not the problem. He is a symptom thereof.

Here's the thing...

I do not think that critical thinking is something that can be taught. Questioning authority is not equivalent to critical thinking. Doubt without adequate ground is not the result of critical thinking. It's the result of something else much less worthy... much less admirable.

...you're the dogmatist. You've now got an unfalsifiable thesis. — Bartricks

As if the position put forth in the OP is anything other than an unfalsifiable thesis.

The irony of pots and kettles...

It's those who have taken the time to understand the topic who are in the best position to critique it. — Banno

Coming from one who has come to understand that my own past critiques have sometimes been based on a misunderstanding, I would readily concur with this. It's exactly right.

Later on he says: "...belief is in its nature veridical."

The word "veridical" strikes me as suspicious here. — ZzzoneiroCosm

He's right there, if using a certain sense of "truth"... The more I read Davidson, I think he struggled with what to think about truth. He seems to waffle between coherence and correspondence. Some other folk hereabout have the very same problem...

We can accept both uses all the while knowing that only one exists prior to language use, and it's not coherence.

America, if you sign off on this, then you will deserve the terrible fate that awaits you. — Wayfarer

I first wanted to say "fuck you!" But... I've decided that that would not be the best reply. Do not say that every American deserves Trump, it's just not true and you ought know better than to say such a bullshit claim.

Smith believed Jones would get the job, and no one else. Gettier needs Smith to believe otherwise, but he quite simply does not. — creativesoul

That's my refutation of Gettier's Case I in a nutshell.




We're talking about Smith's belief.

That needs kept in the forefront of consideration. Gettier only begins by talking about Smith's belief. Gettier then conflates propositions and belief and loses sight of Smith's belief in the process.

The truth conditions of "The man with ten coins in his pocket will get the job", when examined by us as a general proposition(which is what Gettier wants and needs us to do), and the truth conditions of "The man with ten coins in his pocket will get the job" when examined by us as Smith's belief(which Gettier neglects entirely) are drastically different from one another. And remember, we're talking about Smith's belief.

So, the aforementioned distinction needs drawn and maintained.


The truth conditions of the general proposition "The man with ten coins in his pocket will get the job", amount to any man that has ten coins in their pocket and gets the job. In other words, any man with ten coins in his pocket who gets the job counts as "the man". That's all it takes to satisfy the truth conditions of (e) when we examine it as general proposition. It doesn't matter who it is. However...

Remember that we are talking about Smith's belief, and the same just cannot be said about it...


Smith's belief (e) was based upon Smith's prior belief(s) that Jones is the man with ten coins in his pocket that will get the job. That much is undeniably clear. I mean, Getter himself writes... and I quote...

Jones is the man who will get the job, and Jones has ten coins in his
pocket

So, we can clearly see Smith's belief is Jones is the man who will get the job. The problem is that Gettier loses sight of the fact that that's Smith's belief, and he does so immediately afterwards. This is shown by Gettier's examination of Smith's belief as though it were equivalent to a general proposition.

That's just not the case.

Smith does not believe that just any man with ten coins in his pocket will get the job. Smith's belief is only true if Jones gets the job and had ten coins in his pocket. No one else matters. Smith believes that Jones will get the job. Gettier's own words stand in clear support of this. Let's look again for ourselves...

Gettier wrote:

(d) Jones is the man who will get the job, and Jones has ten coins in his
pocket.

Here we can see - yet again - where Gettier offers Smith's own belief that Jones is the man who will get the job and has ten coins in his pocket. Gettier then claims those beliefs count as Smith's ground for believing the following...

(e) The man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket.

That's a fair enough account, as long as we keep in mind that it is still Smith's belief. Gettier doesn't. When examining (e) - as Smith's belief - we know that that's about Jones and only Jones. I mean, with just a moments thought, there is no question whatsoever regarding who Smith's belief is about. Gettier said it clearly. The president of the company picked Jones out to the exclusion of all others when he told Smith that in the end Jones would get the job. Jones was the man that allowed Smith to count the coins in his pocket. Smith picked Jones out to the exclusion of all others when talking about the man that allowed him to count the coins in his pocket.

Clearly Smith is picking out one particular Jones to the exclusion of all other men when he deduces (e). So, there is no question who Smith's belief is about. Smith believes Jones is the man who will get the job as well as believing Jones is the man with ten coins in his pocket. Thus, it can only be the case - when interpreting Smith's belief (e) that the referent of "the man" is the exact same Jones that the president was talking about; the exact same Jones that allowed Smith to count the coins that were in his pocket; the exact same Jones that Smith believed would get the job; and the exact same Jones that was there with Smith throughout the very thought process Gettier describes.

Gettier neglects all of this, and conflates proposition and belief as a result.

Smith believes Jones is the man with ten coins in his pocket who will get the job. Jones is not the man with ten coins in his pocket who got the job. Thus, Smith's belief is false.

False belief is not a problem for JTB.

QED


In summary, Gettier confuses propositions and belief by conflating the truth conditions of the general proposition "the person with ten coins in his pocket will get the job", with the truth conditions of Smith's belief that "the person with ten coins in his pocket will get the job". In the former(a general proposition), any man that has ten coins in their pocket and gets the job counts as "the person with ten coins in their pocket". Whereas in Smith's belief only Jones counts...

Smith's belief was about none other than Jones, and it was false. This also is more than adequate explanation for the intuitive dissonance that everyone who reads Gettier's paper has upon first contemplation. The logic is impeccable. Unfortunately, it's a bait and switch, going from truth conditions of a particular belief had by a particular person about another particular person to the truth conditions of a general proposition that is not about anyone in particular. Thus, it's nothing more than an accounting malpractice. Every Gettier example following that formula has the same flaw... the rules of entailment permit a change in both the truth conditions and meaning of P. That's unacceptable. Salva Veritate.

Would it be too much to have it all in one post? Reading someone's theory piecemeal is way too taxing for a sluggard like me. — fiveredapples

Notta problem... Gotta say five... your manners are impeccable nowadays! Not that we've ever been at rhetorical odds.

:wink:

Cheers!

Good to have someone like you here... I must say... and I know that I'm not alone regarding the sentiment!

Again, I'm not sure how your claim pertains to the Gettier examples, — fiveredapples

That one doesn't. It was about Russell's clock, and it's both wrong and unnecessary.

:wink:

Broken clocks are not good ground to base knowledge of time on. Simpler is better.

Gettier's cases have different issues, which I've explained at length beginning on page six, and again on the last couple pages. I've only touched on Case I, but II suffers the exact same flaw... conflation of proposition(conjunction that time) and belief.