Sorry to say...

I have yet to have read a philosophical position on mind that does not have fundamentally fatal flaws. That said, Searle is interesting and well-known/respected.

I really miss the Mr. Green emoticon...

The CERN website offers brief mention in simple easy to understand terms...

I think that he wouldn't equate an object with being the value of a bound variable. That's more about being an object within an account, is it not... for Quine? More about the use of "existence" or "exists"... Yes?

I haven't got the patience to be dealing with uncharitable nonsense about worms, dogs and critters as though it bears any relevance whatsoever to what I was getting at... — S

Special pleading, ad hom, gratuitous assertion, and moving goalposts is much better philosophy. Keep doing that.

At least you got in the ring.

"Aren't advanced enough"...

What matters here is what - exactly - counts as brains/emotions that are "advanced enough"? That is the line between a creature having morals and not.

Brains and emotions are not enough for morals.

Claims about morals evolved to claims about moral agents...
— creativesoul — S

Yes, and where did that stem from? — S

So you're suggesting that critters have morals, S? — praxis

Brains are insufficient for morals. Worms have brains. Worms have no morals.

Emotion is insufficient for morals. Dogs have emotions. Dogs have no morals. — creativesoul

Worms, dogs, and critters don't have morals because they're not moral agents because their brains aren't advanced enough. There, spelt it out all nice and clear for you). — S

Clear enough. You wrote "moral agents". No one else did. Nice prima facie example of moving the goalposts.

That's unacceptable. And to think... I was going to let that go until you kept editing your way into admission. At any rate... You presuppose(in your new goalpost) that morals are existentially dependent upon moral agency. They are not.

Not all creatures capable of forming, holding, and/or otherwise having moral thought/belief are also capable of contemplating what steps to take; what to do next; what they think is the best action to take given the circumstances that they find themselves within at that particular time.

That is moral agency.

Morals are thought/belief about acceptable/unacceptable behaviour. Not all thought/belief about acceptable/unacceptable behaviour is adequate for moral agency. Moral agency requires thinking about one's own pre-existing moral thought/belief(morals). The former(moral agency) is always existentially dependent upon some form of the latter(pre-existing moral belief;morals).

Some more complex moral thought/belief(morals) are informed by and/or arrived at by more complex and/or critical thinking about one's pre-existing morals(moral thought/belief). Some of which would be the ones arrived at by virtue of complex moral discourse such as the one we're having. All philosophical positions regarding ethics/morality are exactly such.

Having moral agency isn't that complicated. Having morals even less so. The aim here is the source of morals, which I take to be the source of all morals.

In order to be able to carefully consider one's choices regarding which is the best thing to do next(regardless of the complexity of one's worldview) - in order to have moral agency - s/he/they must discriminate between choices(imagine/recognize different possible behaviours) and then decide which is the best given the circumstances. Moral agency arises from pre-existing moral thought/belief(morals).

In the simplest terms...

That which exists prior to something else cannot be existentially dependent upon that something else. That which is existentially dependent upon something else cannot exist prior to that something else. Some morals exist prior to moral agency. Some morals do not. All that exist prior to moral agency are not existentially dependent upon moral agency. Moral agency is neither equivalent to morals nor the source of all morals.

Claims about morals evolved to claims about moral agents...

creativesoul

Simpleton or Oblivion, pick a side. — Merkwurdichliebe

When it comes to questions in this context... simple is best.

You're being one of those people who want a direct answer instead of a more intelligent answer where you have to think about the problem with your question. Do you understand the problem with how you're responding? I didn't spell it out, but if you think about it, maybe you could figure it out from my previous reply without my having to do so. — S

No thanks.

Speak clearly and sensibly(without self contradiction and/or equivocating terms) and there's no need for me to guess. Logical possibility/entailment does not constitute adequate justificatory ground/warrant on my view. I could later surely arrive at more logically possible scenarios than I can currently imagine based upon what little you've claimed. I've no good reason to assent to one anymore than others. I mean they would all be about what you have not clearly stated.

Now, do you understand my objection, or do you need me to explain it to you? — S

What proposition/claim/assertion/thought/belief/statement are you're objecting to?

Ad homs aren't acceptable.

Brains and emotions are insufficient for morals.

So do you agree or not?

I just remembered, or at least I think I remember, that I owe you an apology. There is no excuse, no justification, for my attitude displayed towards you as a person in a recent thread. I think that it was the Kripke reading group thread. No matter which thread... I am regretful for not handling that situation with the respect that was/is due. That said...

The Higgs particle was posited as a result of necessity stemming from taking account of things other than the Higgs. In other words, regarding the Higgs field and boson, it's discovery was a consequence of other accounts(the standard model). Post hoc. The Higgs field/particle was posited as a means to account for (missing)mass that the standard model couldn't account for without positing the Higgs field/boson.

With that in mind...

The Higgs particle was taken account of(conceived) prior to it's physical detection - assuming, of course, that it was actually detected. That is still contentious for some it seems. Nevertheless, I'll grant that it was, for it will allow our discourse to continue unabated.

I've no problem at all with being able to discover some things before they are detected/verified. Some things are discovered by taking account of other things.

Brains are insufficient for morals. Worms have brains. Worms have no morals.

Emotion is insufficient for morals. Dogs have emotions. Dogs have no morals.

That which is insufficient for morals cannot possibly be the source of morals.

Brains and emotion seem to be necessary for morals. We can confidently say this much simply because all morals as we know them are had by creatures whose overall 'makeup' includes both. However, we also know that not all things capable of emotion have morals, and that not all things with brains have morals.

It clearly takes more.

Does the difference between what counts as being a variable and what counts as being a bound variable bear upon whether or not existence is equivalent to being taken account of?

As I understand it, Quine wants to reject certain conceptual schemes(linguistic frameworks), namely those which posit the existence(the reality) of abstract objects, or how certain schemes posit such things... at least.

If it is true that some things exist prior to our account of them, then it cannot be true that to be(if that is synonymous with "to exist") is to be the value of a variable, regardless of existential quantification...

If being the value of a bound variable is equivalent to being (adequately?)taken account of, then I've no objection, but being taken account of is clearly not necessary for existence, otherwise there could be no such thing as discovery.

I hold that there is most certainly a difference between being taken account of and existing prior to being taken account of. I would take it even further than that...

However, what I'm hoping to see here is someone who can set out Quine's line of reasoning that supports his mantra.

Quine argues - quite impressively actually - on empirical grounds. His work is theory laden, and I find much agreement between some things he holds and my own position. However, I am very confident that I do not grasp much of what Quine argues. The formal aspects require formal understanding, and in that I am surely lacking.

I would say that not all human minds are superior. An infant does not have the same superior mind as an adult. Not all adults have the same superiorness of mind. Not all adults have the same conception/notion/idea of what a mind is.

The ontology of mind is paramount here.

Seems undeniable to me that the human mind is something that existed in it's entirety prior to our taking account of it(at least in some more rudimentary sense). Thus, like all things that exist in their entirety prior to our account of them, we can be wrong in our account.

Any and all notions of mind that posit elements/constituents/parts of mind that are themselves existentially dependent upon language are mistaken in a specific way, for mind is prior to language and that which is prior to language cannot be existentially dependent upon language.

Is there such a thing as a common cultural conception of the human mind?

I do not think that there is.

I never meant to generalize, human minds, but you're right. How do we define our own minds, besides in opposition from those other beings?

Human minds: Above/superior to other beings — Grre

Then your answer is no... by definition alone. If human minds are superior to other species, and that superiority is what makes our minds different, then no other species think like humans.

Is your book going to be full of distinctions that no one is unclear about, and which don't need to be made? You do this often. — S

Indeed, and for good reason. It's called groundwork. It's something that people actually doing philosophy find necessary. The interesting part comes when one holds them all in consideration at the same time while looking at the consequences.

Some people sit in the safest seats around the arena criticizing actual participants in battle. There's no vulnerability there. Nothing to defend, because no firm stance is taken on anything.

Get in the ring.

I've re-read Hume's Enquiry, and in doing so came across several issues that all seem to be consequences of not drawing the distinction between thought/belief and thinking about thought/belief. I'm not sure when I'll have time to expose these issues, but it needs to be done.

His notion of belief shows this nicely, I think. The interesting thing to me is the similarity between some of his justifications and my own.

What began as as assignment for a philosophy class this year (epistemology) has turned into a bit of an obsession.I started with the skeptical premise that we cannot be sure, due to the nature of subjective minds/qualia, that animals do not have minds/think like us. — Grre

This presupposes that all humans think in the same way, or words to that effect/affect. While I would not disagree, there is much to be said and/or unpacked here.

In order to know whether or not animals 'think like us', we must first know how we think, or perhaps what all human thought consists of and/or is existentially dependent upon.

Proper critique first requires understanding that which is being critiqued.

One who is blunt but clearly offers a modicum of respect for others, despite the differences in world-views tends to be thought an asshole or a dick much less than one who is blunt and has little to no respect for another's person.

Assholes and dicks have little to no respect/value for others. One can be blunt without being a asshole or a dick.

The closest thing we have to free will is becoming aware of how things influence us, and acting accordingly.

Off topic? I just told you the very origin of the term... It was a response to Epicurus' argument.

Free will was invented as a means to exonerate the God of Abraham from the existence of evil.

My position refutes the very notion of 'pure reason'.
— creativesoul

I'd like to see the reasoning to support that. I'd say there is pure reason, but it consists only in tautologies and 'contentless' formal logic. Some people, Kant among them, claim that there is synthetic a priori reasoning (as well as the tautologous analytic a priori kind) but I'm pretty sure that should not be accepted. — Janus

I reject both 'kinds' of a priori reasoning/knowledge set out by Kant and both 'kinds' of reasoning set out by Hume. That said, what you're asking me for is groundwork that is book-worthy in it's own right, to say the least. I'll do what I can to convince you that of the possibility that pure reason is a (mis)conception. During this, I'll try to summarize and briefly cover both, Hume and Kant, since their philosophies are closely related. They both stem from the same convention, particularly the conventional 'understandings' of causation, knowledge, and belief.

It is worth mentioning what was driving Hume's philosophy at the time. Much like today, there were many assertions, many incommensurate and/or incompatible positions all of which were equally valid/consistent... So, the question was/is what and/or who to believe and by what standard ought we assent? Hume chose Empiricism.

Hume was not alone when he focused upon the truth conditions of propositions. He was an empiricist. Propositions are empirical - I suppose. However, truth conditions are not equivalent to truth, and neither truth conditions nor truth is equivalent to a proposition. Propositions are nothing more and nothing less than complex thought/belief. Setting out the truth conditions for a proposition says nothing at all about what the proposition itself consists in/of. Propositions do not consist of truth conditions, and yet truth conditions are crucial when considering the difference(s) between the two kinds of reasoning coined by Hume. The truth conditions are the only difference he focuses on. He fails to take account of the similarities. That is the fatal flaw.

The very notion of 'pure reason' is a consequence of Hume's framework/taxonomy; his dividing 'all the objects of human inquiry' into two categories, "relations of ideas" and "matters of fact"; aka Hume's Fork. These are/were held to be the mutually exclusive and exhaustive categories of all human inquiry. The former - "a priori" - presupposes that reasoning can be somehow independent of human experience. That dubious presupposition has more than two centuries worth of being glossed over, but it is entirely false and based upon a gross misunderstanding, neglect, and/or outright willful ignorance of the existential dependency and/or elemental constituency of both 'kinds' of reason he delineates.

A priori propositions/reasoning(relations between ideas) and the reasoning that they support(according to Hume) have truth conditions that we determine - by definition alone. The things we're talking about are of our own invention. This is seen below...

The following is from the SEP article...

Propositions concerning relations of ideas are intuitively or demonstratively certain. They are known a priori—discoverable independently of experience by “the mere operation of thought”, so their truth doesn't depend on anything actually existing (EHU 4.1.1/25). That the interior angles of a Euclidean triangle sum to 180 degrees is true whether or not there are any Euclidean triangles to be found in nature. Denying that proposition is a contradiction, just as it is contradictory to say that 8×7=57.

Here we see that he is talking about propositions that are true as a result of corresponding definitions and/or further descriptions of abstract conceptions of our own invention(relations of ideas). The demonstration of which comes by logical argument with definitions for premisses. A Euclidean triangle is what it is because we won't let it be anything else. The same holds good for 2+2=4. There is also the implicit assumption/premiss/presupposition that not all 'objects' of thought exist. We can only take this to mean that that which exists can be literally found and/or perhaps physically observed 'in nature', like trees and such. There is also yet another implicit premiss that draws a distinction between human thought/belief and nature such that thought/belief itself, along with being a result and/or product of human thought/belief excludes it(the 'object of thought/understanding) from being a part of nature - by pure definition alone. By this framework, thought/belief cannot be empirical or natural, save it's complex empirical manifestation via language(thought/belief in statement/propositional form).

Then there's the other kind of reasoning Hume delineates...

In sharp contrast, the truth of propositions concerning matters of fact depends on the way the world is. Their contraries are always possible, their denials never imply contradictions, and they can't be established by demonstration. Asserting that Miami is north of Boston is false, but not contradictory. We can understand what someone who asserts this is saying, even if we are puzzled about how he could have the facts so wrong.

Now seems an apt time to further expose the aforementioned fatal flaw...

The introductory phrase directly above is misleading. The only sharp contrast here is between two purportedly mutually exclusive categories of reasoning that are only found together in Humean thought. Humean thought corresponds to Humean invention. Humean invention does not correspond to fact.

In nature, as compared/contrasted to Hume's notion of nature, we invented cardinal directions. We invented math. We invented names for people, places, and things.

That is the way it is, because that is the way it happened.

There is no elemental, existential, and/or constitutional difference between the conception(s) of cardinal directions, the names of cities, and Euclidean triangles. Cardinal directions cannot be found in nature any more than a Euclidean triangle. Miami is certainly not something that exists independently of thought/belief(relations of ideas). To quite the contrary, "Miami" is the name we've given to an area. "Miami" picks out that area. That area may exist in nature independently of all human thought/belief, but "Miami" does not, and thinking about that area in terms of it's being Miami is existentially dependent upon our naming it such. What's north of Miami is determined solely by relations between our ideas of cardinal directions and names of cities. That is no less a relation of ideas than what we say/learn and/or conclude about Euclidean triangles.

There is no difference in elemental constitution between reasoning amounting to relations of ideas and reasoning amounting to matters of fact(Hume's notions) for - as just argued above - the latter consists of the former.

That doesn't even touch on the non-existent distinction between passions and reason. If I recall correctly, Mww and I thoroughly discussed that earlier in this thread, even if for clearly different purposes/reasons/motivations.

That is not true, language is a societal phenomenon, sight is a natural phenomenon.
— Merkwurdichliebe
More anthropomorphism.

A societal phenomenon is a natural phenomenon for some particular species. Language doesn't make us separate from nature. It is just a more complex form of communication between organisms. — Harry Hindu

More complex form of thought/belief... Communication(shared meaning) is one manifestation thereof.

Toothpicks and eyelids...

I'd say there is pure reason, but it consists only in tautologies and 'contentless' formal logic... — Janus

Just want to note that there is most certainly a conception called "Pure Reason". Much if not most of Western Philosophy holds to it.

Sure. Later though. I promise. Tired. Terribly distracted. Real life calls for the next few days...

:wink:

The intrinsic circularity of pure reason has been known for centuries. It is inescapable when reductionism is taken too far, which leads inevitably to illusions and manufactured contradictions. But it’s your theory; you’re more than welcome to expound it until the common understandings finally see the light. — Mww

You're confused.

My position refutes the very notion of 'pure reason'. The inherent flaws of that conception have no bearing upon my position.

Show me the black swan.
— creativesoul

Assuming you’re not joking, it’s not my burden to show you a black swan, but it wouldn’t be difficult to show you that which falsifies the notion of universal moral belief. You would have to prove a universal moral belief is possible without considering a particular example of what one would be, in order to circumvent the induction principle. — Mww

Why suppose a need to circumvent that which is untenable/self-contradictory? It is itself a universal claim based upon particular examples thereof.

I think I'm done here. It's getting way too ridiculous for my tastes. You win. I've shown how the framework you're using is inherently flawed. You've offered nothing more than distractions, and failed to directly address valid objections, but instead just keep on denying what is obvious. That simple true statement that has such far-reaching consequences when combined with a few other ones...

Sigh... Indeed.

Be well.

I don’t have to know what everybody knows to know there is at least one thing nobody knows. — Mww

What is it?

I think about what Empiricus thought... — Mww

Think about that at the same time you're denying the difference between thought/belief and thinking about thought/belief.

Are you denying knowledge of pre and/or non-linguistic thought/belief?
— creativesoul

Yes. Nobody knows how what appears to be mind comes from what the brain does. — Mww

The irony. Do you know what everyone knows?

Are you denying the actual distinction between thought/belief and thinking about thought/belief?
— creativesoul

Yes. I’ve said before, to me they are the same thing. Or, I see no good reason to think they are not the same thing, and I get no help from you as means for granting the distinction. — Mww

Are your thought/belief about Empiricus' the same as Empiricus'?

What are you talking about?
— creativesoul


He who says it first usually says it best:
“....When they propose to establish the universal from the particulars by means of induction, they will effect this by a review of either all or some of the particulars. But if they review some, the induction will be insecure, since some of the particulars omitted in the induction may contravene the universal; while if they are to review all, they will be toiling at the impossible, since the particulars are infinite and indefinite....”
(Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism)

I’m both surprised and disappointed you failed to connect your point-of-view invariant universal moral belief to my counter-argument against it. You must have failed to connect because you asked what I was talking about, instead of showing what I was talking about is wrong, or at least does not apply. — Mww

So, because we might be wrong... we are?

All statements of thought/belief come via language.

Now... Show me the black swan.

Drawing a connection between another's behaviour and ourselves does not require common language acquisition. These kinds of thought/belief are moral in kind as a result of the content of correlation.

Morality consists entirely of thought/belief about acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour. Morality consists of moral belief. All moral belief is belief about acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour. Some belief about acceptable/unacceptable behaviour is formed prior to language acquisition.

No pre-linguistic human likes being hurt by another. Every one dislikes it. These are not innate thought/belief about experience. They are formed after conception, after birth... the result of experience.

These experiences - including the thought/belief formation within them - are universal in that they are common to all humans that go on to use common language.

This report is of that which exists in it's entirety prior to our awareness of it(universally held moral belief), regardless of the individual particulars.

Which moral belief ought be prioritized and/or valued most?

Which ought be legitimized, nurtured, and/or enforced?

Which ought be outright rejected?

...my innate idea of a moral belief... — Mww

There is no such thing as an innate idea of a moral belief. There are ideas of moral belief. Those are existentially dependent upon language. There are pre-linguistic thought/belief about acceptable/unacceptable behaviour. Those are not.

Ideas about pre-linguistic belief can be wrong.

If coming to terms with everything necessarily involves common language use, how did we come to terms with common language... — Mww

By thinking about our thought/belief and the utterances/expressions thereof. We named it. There is no reason whatsoever to think that our language is not capable of taking proper account of that which existed in it's entirety prior to our awareness and/or account of it.

What are you doing here... now? Do you believe the things you write?