It is logically impossible to name anything whatsoever from a particular, re: my innate idea of a moral belief, to a universal, re: my innate idea of a moral belief residing in every similar agency, and have sufficient means to prove such must be the case. — Mww

What are you talking about?

Are you denying knowledge of pre and/or non-linguistic thought/belief? Are you denying the actual distinction between thought/belief and thinking about thought/belief?

Which moral belief. I say we begin with the universally formed and/or re-formed ones... You know, the ones we all have? Point of view invariant.
— creativesoul

OK. Good place to start... I’d be interested in what you think a possible universal moral belief would be... — Mww

Thought/belief about unacceptable/acceptable behavior that grounds all morality.

How do we compare/contrast as a means to determine which is best?
— creativesoul

Which what? — Mww


Which moral belief. I say we begin with the universally formed and/or re-formed ones... You know, the ones we all have? Point of view invariant.
— creativesoul

Great idea. Let's have the list then, of all these universal, completely invariant objective morals with which no one but the mentally damaged disagree.

I'll start you off. — Isaac

Nah. You cannot start off explaining what I'm referring to by virtue of saying something remarkably different and then talking about that.

Not interested.

Edit: perhaps another good analogy is this:

p∧(p→q)⊢qp∧(p→q)⊢q

show that to someone who hasn't learned to process propositions in logical syntax and it wouldn't mean a damn thing. We have to 'learn to see' the connections between natural language argument forms and the modus ponens. The 'representation' of our argument forms (in terms of validity, soundness, truth functionality and so on) consists in fabricating rules for propositional calculi spurned on by real argument patterns, and then we may say that the above formula is modus ponens. Even someone who understood how to argue using the modus ponens syllogism would not necessarily immediately 'map' it to the representation of it in the theory. — fdrake

Brilliant account.

"Spirit" is a term. Terms exist. "Spirit" can also be an integral basic foundational element of a larger worldview. The notion, idea, and/or conception referred to by using the term "spirit" can be an operative and quite influential interconnected set of different thought/belief. That which is real has an affect/effect. The notion of(one's thought/belief involving and/or about) "spirit" exists as numerous different conceptions thereof. Those conceptions can be operative influences regarding deliberately chosen behaviour. Thus it is very real.

Perhaps it is because promises are not a single proposition, but two? I think so. The one to make the world match the words, and the other is the overt guarantee(the statement of intent).
— creativesoul

I agree with this answer. A promise could be both true and false in different senses. — Janus

I grant the case you've made for it. I'm glad I followed it to your liking. I would not assent what you're saying here though, for reasons already given.

If this marks the end of this discussion, it also marks an appropriate time for giving thanks...

Cheers!

This second parsing is similar to what I'd been thinking all along... At the time of utterance, a promise is not the sort of thing that can be true/false. The first is interesting and seems apt as well. There need be some sort of commonality between the two ways if we are to say that promises can be true in two ways. Correspondence to the actual intention, and correspondence to states of affairs(what's happened). Seems the former could be rendered as a kind of the latter, but not the other way around.
— creativesoul

I missed this response of yours. I remember reading something by Bertrand Russell where he claimed that statements about what will happen in the future are true or false now depending on what happens in the future; it's just that we obviously can't tell which. — Janus

Well, I respect Russell tremendously. If what you say is true then he and I have different positions regarding what sorts of things can be true and what makes them so. I'm fairly settled on the idea of correspondence to fact where facts are actual events; that which has happened; what has happened. There can be no such correspondence between a statement and that which has not happened. Prediction are about exactly that. They're complex 'forms' of expectation. All expectation is grounded upon thought/belief about what has happened, but expectation is always about what has not.

So, for example, according to this line of thought the statement "The Sun will go supernova in 2 billion years" is true or false now. That seems odd to me, and I'm not sure what to think about it. For example, would that statement being true or false now presuppose rigid determinism?

Good question. Off the cuff, because that is a new line of thought for me, it seems it could be a consequence thereof. Not sure though.

I think predictions are about what has not happened. Being true requires corresponding to that which has. At least, that rendering seems to be working fairly well for me.

Morality is codified rules about acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour. Belief about those rules involves coming to terms with them. Coming to terms with them involves common language use. Belief about acceptable/unacceptable behaviour is existentially dependent upon neither; thinking about morality, nor the language necessary to do so. — creativesoul

Coming to terms with them involves common language use
— creativesoul

Show me how my common language use facilitates me coming to terms with my codified moral rules. — Mww

Do I really need to? Can't you see that for yourself?
— creativesoul

No. Yes. (Ok...only partly)

Humor me, for comparative purposes. Besides, you’ve asked me to expound, and I did. Now I’m calling fair play. — Mww

Well. There's much that I've set aside. One who understands Kant ought not have issue understanding what I'm arguing here. I mean, even the Everydayman understands that coming to terms with anything and/or everything that one can come to terms with involves common language use.

An odd question: can you see, hear, or touch the odor of a plastic dog toy? or, how can we recognize the scent of perfume without sight, hearing, or touch? — praxis

No, and solely by virtue of drawing correlations between it and other things.

I don’t have a great understanding of it but the theory of biological intelligence I like claims that different categories of sense data is processed in parallel using the same basic algorithm.

This presupposes that algorithms are the sort of things that are not existentially dependent upon language. I would reject such a presupposition, but am more than willing to follow an argument based upon common sense premisses for it.

Red’s olfactory concept of ‘ball’, for instance, may in part be built of sense patterns representing basic components like plastic and his own slobber. When the right set of sense patterns is recognized and verified it goes up the hierarchy to a larger concept or mental representation culminating in an invariant form. The highest invariant form contains patterns from all sense categories.

The process is actually quite simple and efficient, at least compared to a computer. It accomplishes in a small number of steps what a computer would require thousands. — praxis

All that? The "right set of sense patterns"...??? Is that an unknown set?

Verification somehow within Red's thinking/knowing what "ball" means?

Could it be just as simple as Red and you both making a connection between the utterance of "ball" and the ball?

Welcome. Thank you. Warning:This thread is heavily language laden, but is a concerted attempt to take proper account of that which is not always.

Shared meaning(and the beginnings of common language).

How do we compare/contrast as a means to determine which is best?
— creativesoul

Which what? — Mww

Which moral belief. I say we begin with the universally formed and/or re-formed ones... You know, the ones we all have? Point of view invariant.

I was thinking more along the lines of a language between the two of you. For example, your saying his name out loud. Would you say that the two of you share the same meaning? If so, how do you take account of it? What does it consist in/of such that the two of you can both understand it in the same way, by the same process, or however else meaning is shared on your view?
— creativesoul

I'd rather focus on a different word to avoid the complexities of dogs and identity, if you don't mind. — praxis

Notta problem. Take it where you like. You and I haven't had many exchanges, but I remember things you've written here leaving a good impression...

"Ball" is a word that he has an invariant representation or concept for. If I say 'ball' to him, he'll start looking for one of his toys that we sometimes fetch with. I imagine the pattern he associates with 'ball' is basically any one of his toys that we've fetched with in the past, so there's no difference between a frisbee or a tennis ball, for instance. A ball isn't necessarily spherical for him. That level of abstraction or type of meaning is lost on him. His olfactory concept of 'ball' is surely more acute than mine. He could no doubt find one blindfolded.

Though our capacities and senses are different, the process of how we both developed an invariant representation of 'ball' is the same, which is patterns of sense data processed in hierarchical auto-associative memory. Where our different concepts overlap is in fetching. Red's concept may be limited to fetching but then our concepts, on a larger scale, are similarly limited.

I don't know why dogs love to fetch, and it's not in the activity itself, they're not interested in fetching alone, so part of it must be social interaction or cooperative play. Whatever the case, I don't think it's a stretch to say that the activity is meaningful for them. I enjoy the activity as well, though I mostly do it for his exercise and to help burn off his energy. I believe it's most meaningful because we're both social species and the activity fulfills basic social needs and facilitates bonding.

Indeed, fetching is undeniably meaningful to the dog, as is his name, and the word "ball" and all sorts of other things...

I agree that physiological sensory perception plays a necessary role in the attribution of meaning, in thought, in belief, in discourse, etc. You've implied here that Red's olfactory organs play a role, but I'm left wondering if it is helpful at all to talk in terms of an "olfactory concept"...

Here's why.

It seems to us both that physiological sensory perception is necessary for conceptions. On my view physiological sensory perception alone is not at all sufficient/adequate. Venus Flytraps, for example. I mean, surely his senses play an irrevocable role in his knowing what to look for when you call out "ball". But if we were to take account of the dog's thinking in such terms, Red would need multiple conceptions for each named object, and all those different conceptions would based upon the arbitrary categorization of biological/physiological sensory perception that we use as a means to say that he possesses.

Seems unnecessarily complex. Am I mistaken? That follows from the framework you're using. Doesn't it?

Seems to be much simpler than that. I mean, if a language-less creature can attribute meaning, the ability to do that, cannot be language laden. Our reports of simple things ought be accordingly simple.

Could it be as simple as both of you drawing a mental correlation between the language use and the thing being picked out to the exclusion of all others by virtue of that language use? Is not a prima facie example of successful reference? No different - in it's basic elemental constitution - than examples of two humans involved in the same situation.

There is no good reason whatsoever to think/believe that human beings are the only creatures capable of attributing/recognizing causality, attributing/recognizing meaning, and thus forming thought/belief. It is formed via the very same basic process as all human thought/belief is formed.

A language-less creature can learn that touching fire hurts, because that is one of those events that can happen even if it is not taken into proper account and/or reported upon. It is not existentially dependent upon language. Our reports are.

The same holds good with your dog's thought/belief... wouldn't you agree?

It is not existentially dependent upon our report of it.

All thought is of something; all thought has an object of thought — Mww

That's just not true. While it is quite true that we can think about individual things - like trees and such - we can also attribute meaning and causality prior to language acquisition.

Drawing a correlation between touching fire and the subsequent pain happens everyday. That event quite simply cannot be taken into proper account with the framework you've adopted and are using. The fire example is thought/belief formation. It is meaningful to the creature. It presupposes it's own correspondence to what happened.

It required something to become sign/symbol(the fire - an 'object') something to become significant/symbolized(the pain - not an object) and a creature to draw the connection between the two. Prior to the correlation all three things, the fire, the pain, and the creature existed in their entirety. That is true of all thought/belief. The position I argue in favor of situates thought/belief, the attribution of meaning, and the presupposition of correspondence to fact(what happened) exactly where they belong. Thought, belief, meaning, and the presupposition of truth(as correspondence, of course) are inextricably entwined. They all emerge onto the world stage solely via thought/belief formation itself.

Clearly, I'm leaning very heavily towards methodological naturalism...

The term "object" carries far too much philosophical baggage, and besides that, the object/subject distinction cannot take proper account of that which consists of both, and is thus... neither.

Rudimentary thought/belief, the attribution/recognition of meaning, the attribution/recognition of causality, and the presupposition of correspondence to what happened are all such things.

Show me how my common language use facilitates me coming to terms with my codified moral rules. — Mww

Do I really need to? Can't you see that for yourself?

Well...

I've come full circle to just about exactly where Terrapin is... aside from concluding that moral belief is prior to language.

Certainly law is necessary. Legitimized moral belief. How do we compare/contrast as a means to determine which is best?

I mostly just find it amusing that you present yourself as you do despite such fundamental and obvious reading and learning deficiencies... — Terrapin Station

Weaknesses: None noted.

That's the opinion of those reviewing the standardized intelligence testing that I've personal 'taken'...

Morality is codified rules about acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour. Belief about those rules involves coming to terms with them. Coming to terms with them involves common language use. Belief about acceptable/unacceptable behaviour is existentially dependent upon neither; thinking about morality, nor the language necessary to do so.

Moral belief is prior to language. That which is prior to language cannot be existentially dependent upon it. Moral belief is not existentially dependent upon language. Morality is existentially dependent upon both; pre-linguistic moral thought/belief and language.

It all boils down to thought/belief about acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour. How one comes to terms with their own behaviour matters. The consequences of one's own behaviour, notably how others are affected/effected, surely matters.

Moral judgment, consideration, discourse, conceptions, worthiness, admonition, admiration, thought/belief, understanding, arguments, positions...

...always involve acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour.

It is a kind of thought/belief, and like all other kinds... it is determined solely by the content of the correlations being drawn. In this case, being moral in kind, always involves acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour.

Moral judgment. Moral consideration. Moral discourse. Moral conceptions. Moral worthiness. Moral admonition. Moral thought/belief. Moral understanding. Moral argument. Moral position.

What makes all these different things moral in kind?

What do they all have in common such that any and all things having that common denominator or set thereof also counts as being moral by virtue of having it? Is it just by virtue of having been called such?

Except that, sometimes, comments about the person you're talking to are very relevant. — S

Always against the rules of formal debate. However, it is often knowingly used, despite being struck from the 'official' record, because some know you cannot strike the rhetorical effect/affect from the mind of the listener.

That's part of the overall explanation. — S

What's that...

..."the overall explanation"?

What's interesting is why you might be saying it. — S

Some folk are interested in irrelevant things. Most - arguably all - Western philosophers have been for the better part of two centuries.

As true as the above is, this is a philosophy forum and the only appropriate reply to personal attacks, regardless of the possible psychological underpinnings, is calling it out. It is unacceptable, and is usually a clear sign that the author's position lacks 'substance'. If that doesn't help, it is usually best to simply ignore such people.
— creativesoul

This highlights the problem well. What you're saying there is either true or false, but that's not a full explanation. — S

It's the beginnings of one. And it's true. There is no better ground.

Egocentrism is mainly about not being able to differentiate self from other. Psychologizing is necessary as I see it, nowhere does it connote having an outward/external context. It means not being ignorant of one's own states of mind, foremost, and to be aware when one is starting to egocentrate, so as to nip it in the bud.

Ego is complemented by superego; narcissism needs collective narcissism. How someone relates to themselves when alone is of tremendous import as ego and narcissism aren't possible with a cloistered lifestyle.

Enter psychologizing, which for me is none different than auto-psychoanalysis. Completely necessary. Also, projection and introjection are often seen in severe mental illness. Why we wouldn't want to talk about this I can't understand. As said, ecocentrism is confusion of self and other...in other words precisely caused by projection and introjection,... these issues can't be ignored whatever term you choose to denominate the process. — Anthony

Well described. Ego is Freud's notion. Common use is different. Philosophical use, according to that link... seems bunk to me. An astute philosopher would be using Freud's notion as he intended, or else common use, and s/he ought make that much clear either way. That said...

As true as the above is, this is a philosophy forum and the only appropriate reply to personal attacks, regardless of the possible psychological underpinnings, is calling it out. It is unacceptable, and is usually a clear sign that the author's position lacks 'substance'. If that doesn't help, it is usually best to simply ignore such people.

sometimes it is better to take the long-winded approach by avoiding labels in exchange for a description of the thing the label is intended to point to. Your writing will become less concise, but your intended meaning will be much clearer. — VagabondSpectre

Good suggestion. If one cannot do this, then they really do not know what it is that they are talking about anyway.

Thinking about thinking is just thinking... — Mww

Gratuitous assertion that is false. It is not 'just' thinking. It is a kind of thought/belief. Not all thought/belief is about pre-existing thought/belief.

Thinking about thinking is existentially dependent upon complex written language replete with names/proxies/signs/symbols for the creature's own mental ongoings. Thought/belief exists in it's entirety prior to our becoming aware of it.

By naming, we pick out an individual thing/entity/object/subject for subsequent consideration. The same holds good for our own mental ongoings. We use the terms "understanding", "judgment", "comprehension", "thought", "belief", "propositional attitude", "feelings", "emotions", "reason", etc.

I was thinking more along the lines of a language between the two of you. For example, your saying his name out loud. Would you say that the two of you share the same meaning? If so, how do you take account of it? What does it consist in/of such that the two of you can both understand it in the same way, by the same process, or however else meaning is shared on your view?

71 pages... small hops if you ask me.

Some people like to talk about what matters most.

Promise making is - by any and all accounts - relevant to moral discourse.

What I understand - all too well - is that you have voluntarily offered the exact same definition for three different things. In addition, you've been using the term "moral" in both a descriptive sense(as a kind) and in a prescriptive sense(as a sign of approval). That is a prima facie example of equivocation. The result is self-contradiction and/or incoherence.

That is completely unacceptable.

That is to conflate being mistaken with being called "mistaken"
— creativesoul

As...the promising and the making of a promise?... — Mww

Not what I was getting at.

Judging something as being right is not equivalent to being right. Judging something as being mistaken is not equivalent to being mistaken. Here, I'm not using the term "right" as a synonym for morally acceptable. Rather, it is better put as "true", for it is in comparison to being mistaken, which amounts to forming, having, and/or holding false belief.

Here again... is a consequence of neglecting to draw the actual distinction between thought/belief and thinking about thought/belief. Judgment is existentially dependent upon the latter. Being mistaken is not. Neglecting to draw and maintain the distinction can lead to conflating what it takes to think/believe(and thus render judgment) that X is mistaken and what it takes for X to be mistaken. Two remarkably different criterion.

It is humanly impossible to make a mistake on purpose. All by ourselves, we are incapable of recognizing our own mistakes. Strictly speaking... that always takes an other. If it is indeed the case that Kant's framework(deontological ethics) cannot take proper account of being mistaken, then there is a very big problem. Perhaps it stems from Noumena?

conscience... it is most certainly not always a reliable guide to good behaviour.
— creativesoul

Gotta go with what ya got, doncha know. — Mww

Very good point. Entirely agree. Gotta start somewhere.

The problem of course is that the only one satisfying one's own conscience is the one who has it. Rationalization comes easy to some... regardless of the behaviour they are self-justifying.

Being right, or its complement, mistaken, is a rational judgement... — Mww

That is to conflate being mistaken with being called "mistaken" and/or awareness/knowledge thereof. The difference pervades this thread in the form of empty charges of such. The irony, of course, lies therein.

Earlier I almost quoted Bob Dylan regarding conscience... it is most certainly not always a reliable guide to good behaviour.

Let's look again, shall we?
— creativesoul

Re "you're not reading what I'm writing, what happened to reading this:

"Did you read 'The nature of morality is that it's opinions of the relative permissibility. . . — Terrapin Station

I read it. That would be the third different thing with the exact same definition/criterion. Morality. Moral. Immoral.

Three very different things.

Your “not all promises are good” is a judgement made on a morality not belonging to it, and is merely a continuation of an objection to a promise-making procedure, and is moral relativism proper. — Mww

Given my view on truth and meaning, that's an interesting assertion. Judgment? Sure.

On my view, we can be mistaken. What we thought was good ends up being not. You? How does being mistaken fit into this deontological schema?

Plato's dialogues were monologues. You are not me. I'm just trying to understand.

An insincere promise is a deceit, so I would say it isn’t following the lawful procedure. — Mww

And a promise to injure?

I said promising itself follows a procedure grounded in a law of willful choosing, which is always morally good.

The procedure is morally good, from a deontological point of view. — Mww

The last bit is not about what is morally good. It is about what is considered such from a deontological framework.

I was asking clearly, what makes something moral in kind. I took the answer to be about that. Now you're saying that that answer is from a particular point of view.

How is stating that "Not all promises are good" an example of moral relativism?

Promising itself follows a procedure grounded in a law of willful choosing, which is always morally good. Just because promising is always morally good, it does not follow that which is promised must also be good, as measured by the relativism of the law chosen to ground it. — Mww

The second sentence above states "just because promising is always morally good"...

Are you saying that promising to cause injury aren't promises, or do not follow a procedure grounded in a law of willful choosing?

Seems that you must admit/claim that all promises are morally good even when what's being promised is not. That seems to follow from what you've been arguing...

Yes?