Let's look again, shall we?
— creativesoul

Re "you're not reading what I'm writing, what happened to reading this:

"Did you read 'The nature of morality is that it's opinions of the relative permissibility. . . — Terrapin Station

I read it. That would be the third different thing with the exact same definition/criterion. Morality. Moral. Immoral.

Three very different things.

Being right, or its complement, mistaken, is a rational judgement... — Mww

That is to conflate being mistaken with being called "mistaken" and/or awareness/knowledge thereof. The difference pervades this thread in the form of empty charges of such. The irony, of course, lies therein.

Earlier I almost quoted Bob Dylan regarding conscience... it is most certainly not always a reliable guide to good behaviour.

conscience... it is most certainly not always a reliable guide to good behaviour. — creativesoul

Gotta go with what ya got, doncha know.

Why almost?
————————-

That is to conflate being mistaken with being called "mistaken" — creativesoul

As...the promising and the making of a promise? May I say I think I handled that well enough.

legislated by reason with pure practical predicates — Mww

:lol:

I read it. That would be the third different thing with the exact same definition/criterion. Morality. Moral. Immoral.

Three very different things. — creativesoul

Do you understand that I was answering "What is the nature of morality" rather than only "What is morally permissible (contra impermissible)"?

conscience... it is most certainly not always a reliable guide to good behaviour.
— creativesoul

Gotta go with what ya got, doncha know. — Mww

Very good point. Entirely agree. Gotta start somewhere.

The problem of course is that the only one satisfying one's own conscience is the one who has it. Rationalization comes easy to some... regardless of the behaviour they are self-justifying.

That is to conflate being mistaken with being called "mistaken"
— creativesoul

As...the promising and the making of a promise?... — Mww

Not what I was getting at.

Judging something as being right is not equivalent to being right. Judging something as being mistaken is not equivalent to being mistaken. Here, I'm not using the term "right" as a synonym for morally acceptable. Rather, it is better put as "true", for it is in comparison to being mistaken, which amounts to forming, having, and/or holding false belief.

Here again... is a consequence of neglecting to draw the actual distinction between thought/belief and thinking about thought/belief. Judgment is existentially dependent upon the latter. Being mistaken is not. Neglecting to draw and maintain the distinction can lead to conflating what it takes to think/believe(and thus render judgment) that X is mistaken and what it takes for X to be mistaken. Two remarkably different criterion.

It is humanly impossible to make a mistake on purpose. All by ourselves, we are incapable of recognizing our own mistakes. Strictly speaking... that always takes an other. If it is indeed the case that Kant's framework(deontological ethics) cannot take proper account of being mistaken, then there is a very big problem. Perhaps it stems from Noumena?

What I understand - all too well - is that you have voluntarily offered the exact same definition for three different things. In addition, you've been using the term "moral" in both a descriptive sense(as a kind) and in a prescriptive sense(as a sign of approval). That is a prima facie example of equivocation. The result is self-contradiction and/or incoherence.

That is completely unacceptable.

Anyone notice how the tangents often seem to stem back to @creativesoul? Why are promises being talked about?

Some people like to talk about what matters most.

Promise making is - by any and all accounts - relevant to moral discourse.

It's a bit of a leap from, "What's morality? Is it anything other than how people feel, whether they approve or disapprove, etc. of interpersonal behavior that they consider more significant than etiquette?", to, "What's a promise, and do they matter?".

71 pages... small hops if you ask me.

Moral judgment. Moral consideration. Moral discourse. Moral conceptions. Moral worthiness. Moral admonition. Moral thought/belief. Moral understanding. Moral argument. Moral position.

What makes all these different things moral in kind?

What do they all have in common such that any and all things having that common denominator or set thereof also counts as being moral by virtue of having it? Is it just by virtue of having been called such?

It all boils down to thought/belief about acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour. How one comes to terms with their own behaviour matters. The consequences of one's own behaviour, notably how others are affected/effected, surely matters.

Moral judgment, consideration, discourse, conceptions, worthiness, admonition, admiration, thought/belief, understanding, arguments, positions...

...always involve acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour.

It is a kind of thought/belief, and like all other kinds... it is determined solely by the content of the correlations being drawn. In this case, being moral in kind, always involves acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour.

Morality is codified rules about acceptable/unacceptable thought, belief, and/or behaviour. Belief about those rules involves coming to terms with them. Coming to terms with them involves common language use. Belief about acceptable/unacceptable behaviour is existentially dependent upon neither; thinking about morality, nor the language necessary to do so.

Moral belief is prior to language. That which is prior to language cannot be existentially dependent upon it. Moral belief is not existentially dependent upon language. Morality is existentially dependent upon both; pre-linguistic moral thought/belief and language.

Right, so I'd have to figure out why you're incapable of understanding that I was answering, "What is the nature of morality," even though I keep making this explicit to you. But diagnosing why you can't read, comprehend and learn something so simple is too much of a task for me to bother with given the resources at hand (where all I have to work with is posts you choose to make), especially without more motivation for it (because I don't really care enough to try to figure out just what the problem is; I mostly just find it amusing that you present yourself as you do despite such fundamental and obvious reading and learning deficiencies . . . although it's kind of sad that it's symptomatic of the board overall, with maybe a handful of exceptions).

Morality is codified rules — creativesoul

I asked you a couple times just what codification you're talking about, but you've yet to answer.

Rationalization comes easy to some. — creativesoul

Yes, quite, and the ground of the intrinsic circularity of pure reason. And why the idea of law is incorporated into the moral condition, insofar as respect for law becomes the regulatory agency for such rationalization. Not to dispose of unwarranted rationalization, but to recognize it and attempt to circumvent it, by which a moral worthiness is established.

It is humanly impossible to make a mistake on purpose. — creativesoul

This is catastrophically wrong. To make a mistake purposefully is an instance of immorality, of disrespect for a moral law in the form of negligence of duty proper. Knowing the good thing to do and reasoning oneself to not doing it, is a purposeful mistake, readily apparent to any moral agent with what is conveniently and conventionally regarded as “a guilty conscience”, which is a knowledge and no ways a mere feeling.

In a rational system, judgement is nothing more than the faculty of uniting the concepts of understanding to the intuitions of sense, from which an external object is cognized without contradiction, and is called experience.

In a moral system, which is rational but with different means and ends, employment of the faculty of judgement responsible for uniting a freely determined law with a willful volition, from which an act is cognized as good, and is called morality.

Need be no more complicated than that.

Coming to terms with them involves common language use — creativesoul

Show me how my common language use facilitates me coming to terms with my codified moral rules.

“...But to explain how pure reason can be of itself practical without the aid of any spring of action that could be derived from any other source, i.e., how the mere principle of the universal validity of all its maxims as laws (which would certainly be the form of a pure practical reason) can of itself supply a spring, without any object of the will in which one could antecedently take any interest; and how it can produce an interest which would be called purely moral; or in other words, how pure reason can be practical-to explain this is beyond the power of human reason, and all the labour and pains of seeking an explanation of it are lost....”

counts as being moral by virtue of having it — creativesoul

Freedom. The idea of freedom as primitive causality.

I mostly just find it amusing that you present yourself as you do despite such fundamental and obvious reading and learning deficiencies... — Terrapin Station

Weaknesses: None noted.

That's the opinion of those reviewing the standardized intelligence testing that I've personal 'taken'...

Well...

I've come full circle to just about exactly where Terrapin is... aside from concluding that moral belief is prior to language.

Certainly law is necessary. Legitimized moral belief. How do we compare/contrast as a means to determine which is best?

Show me how my common language use facilitates me coming to terms with my codified moral rules. — Mww

Do I really need to? Can't you see that for yourself?

Weaknesses: None noted.

That's the opinion of those reviewing the standardized intelligence testing that I've personal 'taken'... — creativesoul

As if you've displayed nothing here. :confused:

You think, with a handful of exceptions, that this board is full of people with reading and learning deficiencies?

You think, with a handful of exceptions, that this board is full of people with reading and learning deficiencies? — DingoJones

I doubt he does, but it certainly does seem to have more than its fair share of people who can't tell the difference between rhetoric and factual claims.

In a rational system, judgement is nothing more than the faculty of uniting the concepts of understanding to the intuitions of sense, from which an external object is cognized without contradiction, and is called experience.

In a moral system, which is rational but with different means and ends, employment of the faculty of judgement responsible for uniting a freely determined law with a willful volition, from which an act is cognized as good, and is called morality.

Need be no more complicated than that. — Mww

Oh great. Well if its that simple... Just the small matter of translating any of that into language that actually means anything and we're done.

So let's make a start.

"The faculty of uniting the concepts of understanding to the intuitions of sense". Care to explain what that actually means? Faculty (a capability or power of the mind), concepts of understanding (totally lost as to what they might be), intuitions of sense (I know what intuitions are, I know what senses are, but not sure why you've specified intuitions related to these), cognized without contradiction (lost again).

Have you tried writing in English, it really is a perfectly adequate language.

Lol, I see what you did there.
The reason why im asking HIM to clarify, is because its not obvious it IS rhetoric considering the exchanges Ive seen between the more prolific posters.
In other words, I cannot tell if he was joking or not because it might actually be a case someone could make.

Oh great. Well if its that simple... Just the small matter of translating any of that into language that actually means anything and we're done.

So let's make a start.

"The faculty of uniting the concepts of understanding to the intuitions of sense". Care to explain what that actually means? Faculty (a capability or power of the mind), concepts of understanding (totally lost as to what they might be), intuitions of sense (I know what intuitions are, I know what senses are, but not sure why you've specified intuitions related to these), cognized without contradiction (lost again).

Have you tried writing in English, it really is a perfectly adequate language. — Isaac

I'm so glad you're around. You restore my sanity.