. Are you trying to say that in some form the agreement supersedes the legal requirement for a mortgage? — AmadeusD

No, I'm pointing out that without agreement there can be no mortgage, in the very same way, by the very same means that without obligation there can be no promise. Mortgages require agreement and promises require obligation because in both cases the one consists of the other much like an apple pie requires apples.

Real... neither only in the mind nor mind independent. It's a matter of what ideas consist of.

Tell me how you would go about enforcing a property interest if there's no record anywhere of you having any interest in the property?

Given I deal with this problem for my clients regularly - this should be quite interesting. — AmadeusD

Enforcing it is not the question. It's whether or not the agreement remains intact. The agreement is not physical. The record of it is.

I'm not speaking for Banno, although I suspect he would agree.

Weird. Those words were just used by you for the first time, and yet I'm somehow avoiding something that you've just now expressed.

Odd indeed.

Do you have a question that you've asked that I've not answered clearly enough?

You seem to be trying quite hard to avoid this, which was why I changed the question. — AmadeusD

I've no idea what you're on about. I think that you're misattributing meaning to my posts.

I'm trying very hard to 'dovetail' the substantive to the minimalist version you voice.

:razz:

↪creativesoul Trouble is, "a state of affairs" traps folk into thinking about how things are, nti how they ought be. One of the issues with taking a substantive view of truth. — Banno

Yeah, I'm still working through all this... for me "states of affairs" are just what's happening at some specific time and place. It's a proxy for the term "reality" and the phrase "the way things are", etc.

There's always Hume's guillotine. I see it. However, I think there's a way to render it toothless.

Did I claim anything about what - exactly - establishes a state of affairs?

I, for one, cannot make sense of something being forbidden unless there is some authority figure who has commanded us not to do something. — Michael

We agree on that. Where we disagree is on b earlier. There is no need for such a thing, as I said earlier for the reasons I said earlier, all of which you agreed with. Sometimes, all we need is knowledge of causality to justify admonishing certain behaviours and/or encouraging others.

We could be the authority.

So what does it mean for something to be wrong? How do we verify or falsify (or justify) the claim that something is wrong? You say kicking puppies is wrong, I said kicking puppies is right. How do we determine which of us is correct? — Michael

There's all sorts of different standards/criterions for what exactly counts as being right/wrong. If we are to set the societal norms aside, then our own respective moral belief would need to be argued for.

Right?

So, how do you justify that kicking puppies is acceptable?

Right, so you're arguing for moral relativism. I'm okay with that. — Michael

Not exactly, although like I said... I acknowledge the fact that all codes of conduct are subject to individual particulars.

...if it is the case that kicking puppies is forbidden, then it is the case that one ought not kick puppies. Those two claims express the same state of affairs.
— creativesoul

Let me shift the question: From where does your confidence in that claim come? No need to justify - I want to know where your confidence in it's "truth" comes from? — AmadeusD

I know what they both mean.

Well... I think that rules come down to individual particulars. I'm sure you'll agree. Different communities hold different rules/moral belief.

So, with enough qualification it may be the case that kicking puppies is forbidden in some communities but not in others.

I'm okay with that.

But what do we do about moral rules? There's no authority to point to. The very concept of there being rules without a rule-giver is nonsense. — Michael

Well, yeah. For the most part. Currently the American legal system is just a gloried form of morality. But why the need for rules here? Kicking puppies is wrong in and of itself.

Premise 2 is stating the rules. You're the one asking me to justify 2. Hence, I asked. I'm not sure why you think it's ambiguous... it's pretty straightforward to me.


You answered. Why do the same standards not apply to codes of conduct? That's what the rules of chess are? If those are good enough for your to justify claims about chess behaviour, then why are the rules governing behaviour in a society/community that forbids kicking puppies not good enough?

I acknowledge that all moality(codes of conduct) are subject to individual particulars. I do not profess moral relativism/subjectivism.

Statements are not states of affairs. I'm not sure what you're objecting to. I've never claimed statements are states of affairs.

Fair summation of that part... :smile:

How do we 'justify' stating the rules?

Here is empirical evidence of you admitting that you're not even interested in justifying your position. — Michael

That was me rejecting your method of justification/verification(criterion for what counts as being justified).

My position is that some utterances of ought are true. Utterances of ought are a kind of claim. All true claims correspond to reality. Some utterances of ought correspond to reality. I set all that out simply already. My position may not be readily amenable to your current view. I suspect your view cannot meet it's own standard of what it takes to be sensible, rational, and justified. I could be wrong, but I doubt that I am in that regard.

I'll circle back to something earlier...

If it is the case that kicking puppies is forbidden, then it is the case that one ought not kick puppies. Those two claims express the same state of affairs/situation/set of circumstances/the way things were/are...etc. When it is the case that one ought not kick puppies, then it is also the case that kicking puppies is forbidden, and vice versa. Hence, "one ought not kick puppies" is true when those situations 'obtain'(to borrow your language).

I cannot make you read and/or take into consideration what I've wrote in support of what claims I've made here.

You also seem fixated upon changing what I write into statements I've not made. All of this can be verified.

These are all irrelevant questions.
— creativesoul

They're not. They're central to metaethics.

You're asserting that some type of ontological entity exists ("moral obligations") but won't justify your assertion. Hence your position is unjustified, and I am justified in rejecting the unjustified. I reject your moral realism. — Michael

Can you verify those claims? I'd love to see that.

If, like above, you "do not feel the need to [justify the claim] that we ought not kick puppies" then your assertion is, quite literally, unjustified, and hence a dogma. Dogmas are irrational, and so your position is irrational. — Michael

So what evidence – whether empirical or rational – supports your assertion that there are non physical things? — Michael

These are all irrelevant questions. Relations are not physical. Intent is not physical. Truth is not physical.

All of these things and others are existentially dependent upon physical things, but do not consist of only physical things. I'm that sort of physicalist, I suppose, but I'm not married to stuff that is that far beyond the practical matter at hand.

I do not require omniscience from others either. Do you satisfy your own criticisms/criterion about what counts as dogma and being irrational?

Just curious.

Okay, so we're getting somewhere.

Obligations are non-physical states of affairs. As it stands it then seems that a moral realist cannot be a physicalist.

So what evidence – whether empirical or rational – suggests that non-physical states of affairs exist? — Michael

That particular state of affairs consists of both physical and non physical things.

I personally do not feel the need to verify that we ought not kick puppies. I do not need a rule for that. I could also care less whether or not that particular claim could be verified.
— creativesoul

This seems to give up the claim of truth, then. — AmadeusD

Well no. A claim need not be verified in order for it to be true.

That doesn't follow.

It seems your argument is something like if a claim cannot be verified it ought not be believed, or it doesn't make sense, or something like that?

That's not what I mean either. While you may get bit if you were to kick certain puppies, that's not why you ought not kick them.
— creativesoul

But you just quoted yourself saying "demonstrably provable negative affects/effects stemming from not honoring one's voluntarily obligations(promises) should work just fine in lieu of a rule-giver and/or reward/punishment."

If this had nothing to do with explaining what it means for one to be forbidden from kick puppies then why did you bring it up? — Michael

Well, you were seeking verification. Hence... rules. Rules... are an example of b. At least you're consistent.

I personally do not feel the need to verify that we ought not kick puppies. I do not need a rule for that. I could also care less whether or not that particular claim could be verified. So, it's not so much that I brought it up for any other reason than to point out where the need for verification leads one sometimes.

If it is the case that kicking puppies is forbidden, then it is the case that one ought not kick puppies, and hence "one ought not kick puppies" is true.
— creativesoul

The bits in bold are the bits I'm trying to make sense of. Are they physical states-of-affairs — Michael

Those expressions reference states of affairs, the case as it was/is, the particular situation/circumstances at the time, etc.

Such things consist - in part at least - of that consists of things that are both physical and nonphysical, hence, I would not put it quite like that... "physical states of affairs".

So moral obligations are pragmatic suggestions? I ought not kick puppies because... they might bite me in retaliation?

I can accept that. But I don't think that's what moral realists mean. — Michael

That's not what I mean either. While you may get bit if you were to kick certain puppies, that's not why you ought not kick them.

Yup, when our report of the utterance is qualified enough, we'll be talking about certain communities' codes. Not all.

No worries.

Seems like the demonstrably provable negative affects/effects stemming from not honoring one's voluntarily obligations(promises) should work just fine in lieu of a rule-giver and/or reward/punishment.
— creativesoul

Sure — Michael

Not an argument, but an agreement. That's adequate enough here.

This case requires rule giver and/or reward/punishment... an external judge. Granted.

I owe your last reply more consideration than that. :wink:

I'll look...

The claim rests on the rule being the benchmark for truth. — AmadeusD

Nah. Sometimes codes are wrong/mistaken.

I argued how b was false
— creativesoul

You didn't. You just asserted it and threw out vague suggestions to "check the codes of behaviour" without explaining where to find these codes of behaviour and where they come from. Do I check the village noticeboard where the Elders have listed their decrees? — Michael

You're conflating two separate issues.

A few pages back I argued how an external judge was not necessary. You now offer a case where one is. I never argued that there are no such cases, only that it is not always the case. Your counterexample to my claim is of no issue, I've not made such a universally applicable claim... yet. The counterexample to b is most certainly an issue for your claims.

There is no single place where you can find all particular behavioural codes. The point is that they can be found sometimes. Wherever they may be kept, assuming you have access, that's where they are.

From whence punishment from external entity/judge? There is no need on my view. I covered that part already. In the first few posts of this particular discussion. It has since went sorely neglected.
— creativesoul

A search for posts by you containing the word "forbidden" this week brings up five results, all of which only assert that something is forbidden without explaining what this means. — Michael

You missed the point. You unnecessarily multipled entities again.

Earlier you expressed your cognitive dissonance involving a, b, and c. I argued how b was false, leaving a and c. That alone would have resolved the dissonance if that report was accurate.

When one's argument against moral realism involves claiming to not know what it means when some behaviour is forbidden, then I'm not sure what else I could say to help. Knowing that much seems to be a necessary prerequisite for doing metaethics.

This is boring me.

You objected that you could not make sense of what I wrote.

Is your argument that if you cannot find the applicable code of behaviour which clearly and unambiguously forbids kicking puppies that it does not make sense to you or is it that making sense requires being verifiable/falsifiable? Something else?

What I wrote stands. I'm failing to see the relevance in what you're doing.

Check the codes of behaviour.

Pose a clear question.

how do I verify or falsify the claim that we ought not kick puppies? — Michael

What if such a claim cannot be verified/falsified by your choice of method?