Gotta rest, my friend. Building some furniture tomorrow, lotsa millwork needs a good night's rest!

You claim that the clock in S's belief is both... broken and not. You first claimed that the clock in S's belief was not broken, then agreed entirely with me when I claimed it was.

Do you not see that?

"The broken clock" cannot refer to the clock in S's beliefs, because that clock is not broken. — Banno

The clock in S's beliefs is the one they looked at, and it is most certainly a broken one. On this... I'll not budge.
— creativesoul
Sure. I agree entirely. — Banno

This looks like a contradiction to me.

I think we just made a bit of progress.

Next time!

Cheers!!!

:smile:

"The broken clock" cannot refer to the clock in S's beliefs, because that clock is not broken. — Banno

This looks suspiciously like unnecessarily multiplying entities.

The clock in S's beliefs is the one they looked at, and it is most certainly a broken one. On this... I'll not budge.

Banno's law: the easiest way to critique some view is to begin by misunderstanding it. — Banno

Yeah! That 's it. I was close...

:wink:

I'll call it by name from this point forward when using it!

So, am I correct in thinking that you're claiming that S's attitude towards the broken clock at time t1 does not count as S believing that that particular broken clock was working?

My position here is neither difficult to understand nor somehow complex. I'm simply claiming that at time t1 S believed that a broken clock was working.

Why can't it be said that S had a propositional attitude towards the clock — Janus

Well, that's not the sort of thing we say when discussing propositional attitudes. Those are attitudes towards propositions. We don't talk about having 'propositional attitudes' towards other things... clocks notwithstanding. Propositional attitudes are towards propositions... by definition nonetheless.

So, to directly answer your question, it could be said, but it would amount to nonsense or misuse.

Call me old-fashioned, but I think it would be helpful if creativesoul provided a compass like, "Banno believes X. I believe Y. X contradicts Y." — Leontiskos

You take belief to be some sort of mental furnishing, while I take it to be some sort of stopgap imputation used in explanations of intentional acts. — Banno

The above is what Banno believes about the notion of belief I'm working from. I do not take belief to be some form of mental furnishing. All furnishings have a fairly precise spatiotemporal location. On my view, belief is not the sort of thing that has a spatiotemporal location. Banno's account of my position on belief contradicts my own position on belief.

It's been around a decade ago that Banno and I participated in a debate about whether or not truth was/is prior to language. He argued in the negative. I argued in the affirmative. We have since had another debate about whether or not all belief have propositional form.

Banno holds that belief is imputed/attributed to another creature as a means for explaining its behaviour. I do not disagree completely with that idea. We do just that and we do it quite often. It's just not an explanation for how belief emerges onto the world stage nor what belief consists of.

I am of the carefully considered opinion that some belief is prior to language. Hence, it only follows that language less belief cannot possibly be equivalent to a propositional attitude unless propositions can exist - somehow - prior to language in such a way that a language less creature could have an attitude towards one. Most defenders of the position he's arguing from deny the very idea that language less creatures have belief. He does not.

That just scratches the surface of the disagreement between Banno and myself. The differences between his position and my own are often tied to the respective notions of belief that we're working from.

The poisoning the well fallacy looms large here, my friend. I'm perfectly capable of making and defending my own position. I'm not going to spend the limited time I've available fending off strawmen.

You've been consistently misattributing belief to me throughout. I once saw you exclaim that the easiest way to win a disagreement with someone else(yourself at the time you said it) was to begin by misunderstanding it. Trust me when I tell you that you've misunderstood a few things - evidently.

I've asked you several times to explain the proposition that S had an attitude towards at time t1 such that they believed it to be true. We agreed that S's attitude - at time t1 - was towards a broken clock. Broken clocks are not propositions. So, either S's attitude towards the broken clock - at time t1`- was not a belief about the broken clock or not all belief is equivalent to a propositional attitude, because broken clocks are neither propositions nor attitudes.

Are you claiming that S's attitude towards the broken clock - at time t1 - was not that that particular clock was working?

I ask you to reread our exchange here.

So... they both share the exact same belief about your spatiotemporal location and do not?

:worry:

Not following your point at all. — Banno

May I suggest attending to what I've written?

If you go back a couple of pages, to the beginning of this discussion, you'll see that instead of addressing what I've written, you've addressed other things... consistently. I want to continue, but I need you to address the words I've written.

A believes that Banno is at x; B believes that Banno is at y; C believes that Banno is at z; and so on. Each has a different belief.

Not following your point at all. — Banno

According to the practice you're defending, all of them believe that you're not at w.

Earlier we agreed that S's attitude was towards the broken clock. Broken clocks are not propositions.
— creativesoul

Sure, the clock is not a proposition, nor an attitude. . But "The clock is broken" is a proposition, and to believe that the clock is broken is to adopt an attitude towards that proposition. — Banno

At time t1, S did not believe the clock was broken.

At time t1, S believed the clock was working. It was not. S believed a broken clock was working. What I'm asking you to do is show me how the accounting practice you're defending handles such a situation. We can - and do sometimes - believe that a broken clock is working. However, what I'm pointing towards is the fact that no one would say so at the time. After having been shown, they would readily admit that they had indeed once believed that a broken clock was working, despite never having an attitude towards the proposition "a broken clock is working" such that they believe it to be true.

I'm saying that this and other examples show the inherent inadequacy in the conventional understanding of belief as propositional attitude as well as the belief that approach.
— creativesoul
I still don't see how. — Banno

Hopefully the above helps?

:yikes:

There are other issues as well. Following the practice you've defended, five different people can believe that you are currently in five different places, but the practice in question will render them all as having the exact same belief about your spatiotemporal location. The earlier example you set out about my being rational could be used by me to show you.

Fair enough. I should've said some... not all.

:yikes:

...millions choose to believe Trump's lies over reality. — Wayfarer

In order to choose better, one must first know of better. For reasons that are far too numerous for me to get into here, I'm not at all certain that many of those supporters are even able to comprehend all the relevant facts that may influence their worldview... particularly about Trump and US government.

Okay. So, at time t1, where's the proposition that S has an attitude towards. Earlier we agreed that S's attitude was towards the broken clock. Broken clocks are not propositions.

I'm saying that this and other examples show the inherent inadequacy in the conventional understanding of belief as propositional attitude as well as the belief that approach.

I've a bit of time tonight, so...

I appreciate the kind words earlier, and I can only hope that you already know that I have quite a bit of respect and admiration for your participation in the forums throughout time. In addition, as you've said concerning my role in helping you, you've helped me in more ways than I can think of. Davidson, Searle, Kripke, and other respected academics have helped me via you.

I appreciate ya!

:wink:

Are you claiming that at time t1, S had an attitude towards your words now?

S has an attitude towards the broken clock. — Banno

That's what I arrive at.

So where's the proposition/statement that S has an attitude towards?

Do you see a problem with that? — Banno

You complained about ambiguity, then added some.

Are you claiming that at time t1, S had an attitude towards your words now?

Next time...

Cheers!

Beliefs are propositional attitudes, and as such can be put in the form: M believes that p for some proposition p and some believer M. — Banno

At time t1, S believes that a particular broken clock is working.

Show me.

Next time...

Cheers!

My only point about de re and de dicto would be that they too fail to take proper account of someone's belief at time t1, when - at that time - they believe that a particular broken clock is working. As before...

If at time t1 someone believes that a particular broken clock is working, they would not say so. — creativesoul

Because you perhaps believe that I am in Australia, and hence that I am on Earth, and hence that I am not in orbit around Jupiter. Or are we not to make such deductions? — Banno

Entailment has issues. See my recent stuff on Gettier.

creativesoul What? — Banno

Sorry about that... accidental post. Corrected now.

All beliefs can be put into the form "M believes that p". — Banno

Sure, we can say stuff about other creatures' belief(s) using that form. Not so much the grammar of belief, but rather the grammar of our report.

We can believe that a broken clock is working. No one believes that "a broken clock is working" is true.

If at time t1 someone believes that a particular broken clock is working, they would not say so.

All of these things point out problems with belief as propositional attitude as well as the common malpractice of treating all belief as equivalent to statements and/or propositions.

When an infant goes in search of its pacifier, he/she/they already believe that there is one to be found. That's an implicit belief that is not always made explicit. Note the infant has no language. So, not all belief is equivalent to belief statements, nor propositional attitudes.

I've tried here to defend a view of belief roughly in line with mainstream analytic thinking, and you've been helpful in challenging that. It might be that I need to adjust my view somewhat. The view I was defending is that not all our beliefs are explicit. I find it puzzling, given our previous interaction, that you choose this with which to disagree. — Banno

I agree that "Not all our beliefs are explicit". I disagree with your example which was basically a report of all readers' belief. At time t1, you claimed we already believed a statement made by you at time t1. I didn't then, and I don't now.

At time t1, you misattributed belief to me.

Ok, cut off the conversation even as it begins. — Banno

Not my intention...

That is, you are not supposing... ..."Banno is floating in space in the orbit of Jupiter" was not false before being written in that post, nor was it true, and nor was it some other, third truth option, but that it didn't exist at all, and therefore was ineligible for any truth value? — Banno

I'm saying that it was never a belief of mine to begin with.

I place considerable value on bivalence. I'm not claiming "belief statements are not bivalent."

I can't make sense of your use of the term belief.

Your statement at time t1 is not equivalent to my belief at time t2 after agreeing with it. <-----that's the gist of it.

One of the thought-experiments I sometimes consider it, imagine having the perspective of a mountain (were a mountain to have senses). As the lifespan of a mountain is hundreds of millions of years, you wouldn't even notice humans and animals, as their appearances and dissappearances would be so ephemeral so as to be beneath your threshold of awareness. Rivers, you'd notice, because they'd stay around long enough to actually carve into you. But people and animals would be ephemera. — Wayfarer

Anthropomorphism.

the mind tends to ignore the reality. — NOS4A2

Much of it anyway...

that is my point. By this means I am making clear the sense in which perspective is essential for any judgement about what exists — even if what we’re discussing is understood to exist in the absence of an observer, be that an alpine meadow, or the Universe prior to the evolution of h. sapiens. The mind brings an order to any such imaginary scene, even while you attempt to describe it or picture it as it appears to exist independently of the observer. — Wayfarer

Sure... judgment about what exists always comes via perspective. It does not follow from that that everything that ever existed does as well.

Some parts of reality... sure.

What preceded us... never. Impossible.

This is a bit tricky. I would want to say that it is something I do not believe, but not something I do believe. Or rather, it was. Now that you have brought it to my attention I have assented to it and I believe it. That I believe you are sitting at a computer on Earth explains why I would assent to any entailed propositions that are brought to my attention, or which become generally relevant. — Leontiskos

I find timestamps clear up a few things... no need to rely on the 'rules of logical entailment'(scarequotes intentional)
.

So your idea is that the proposition does not exist at all until voiced? — Banno

With enough specificity, even you'll agree.

Call me whatever you'd like.

...not all our beliefs are explicit. You believe, arguably, that I am not writing this while floating in space in the orbit of Jupiter, yet until now that belief had not been explicated. — Banno

That's supposed to be a belief we already had that was not yet explicated

We could neither assent nor agree with Banno's report until he penned the words. We could not have possibly believed anything at all regarding his whereabouts while he writing his report until we were aware that he had written one. His claim is that we had unexplicated belief regarding his whereabouts while he was writing despite the fact that none of us, aside from him, had any idea that he was writing such a report, and thus no one could possibly have any belief at all regarding his whereabouts while he was writing.

He claimed we had belief that had not been explicated, then explicated what we did not believe.

:meh:

We cannot believe Banno's report of what we did not believe at time t1 is true until we read it. He says we did not believe he was in Jupiter's orbit at time t1. He's right. We didn't. So...

Where is the belief that had not been explicated? He offered up something we did not believe.

His claim is that we had belief at time t1 about his whereabouts at time t1 that had not been explicated, but he then sets out what we did not believe about his whereabouts at time t1.

Am I the only one who finds this odd?

When someone's worldview is not possible until some particular state of affairs happens, that particular sequence of events is necessary for that worldview to emerge. That worldview is existentially dependent upon those events. Someone cannot believe that what so and so says at time t1 is true until it is first written by the author and then read by the reader/potential believer...

Here we may have a proposition that acts like a hinge... opening the door of possibility to subsequent beliefs about the proposition... namely, whether or not it is true.