The last post is continuing with the self-contradiction... it's multiplying...

No need.

I might have created another problem by introducing the novel. — Brett

Nah. You didn't create another problem. Rather, it simply highlighted the inherent issues in the position you've been arguing for.

Use it wisely.

Realize that sometimes imagination can indeed lead one to better understanding an other. Revisit your position and make the necessary adjustments. It's not a big deal...

Just a matter of changing "all" to "some"...

I think meaning is being overthought — forswanked

I've nothing much to argue with in that post, except for the above...

What you're calling "overthought", I would call not thought about in the right sorts of ways... closer to underthought.

I'm asking what kind of thing a set of rules is, fundamentally. What kind of thing is a set, fundamentally? — S

"Set" is a name used to pick out a group of different particular things. All these particulars have something in common. The commonality is what makes them part of the set.

A set of rules is a group of rules. A more interesting and probing question remains...

Are the things in the set existentially dependent upon our taking account of them?

What kind of a thing is a rule, fundamentally?

That's debatable... obviously.

Is the rule existentially dependent upon being taken account of?

Perhaps a better question is this...

Does everything that governs the behaviour of thing count as being a rule, even when and if we have not yet taken it into account?

Gravity(space-time) governs behaviour. The Second Law of Thermodynamics governs behaviour. Shrodinger's Equation describes/predicts it. F=ma describes/predicts it. Does that difference between governing and describing matter here?

I would think it mattered to what counts as a rule, if all rules govern.

Another thing...

Some rules can be broken. Others cannot. Both govern behaviour. Not sure if talking about rules lends itself to substantive philosophical thought about the ontology of linguistic meaning.

What kind of thing is language?

Shared meaning being used to influence the world and/or ourselves. The use is important here, as a result of the fact that two creatures can share meaning and no know that one another exist. Shared meaning... alone... is necessary but insufficient for language. All language is existentially dependent upon shared meaning, but not the other way around.

What kind of thing is meaning?

Meaning is existentially dependent upon a creature capable of drawing correlations between different things. The drawing of the correlation is the attribution of meaning. Convention has it that there are two basic kinds of theories of meaning. Both presuppose symbolism. So... all meaning is existentially dependent upon something to become sign/symbol, something to become significant/symbolized, and a creature capable of making a connection between the two... drawing a correlation.

There are no examples to the contrary.

Linguistic meaning has this same 'core', so to speak.

What do they consist of, on a fundamental level? Physical? Mental? Abstract? Concrete? Objective? Subjective? Location? No location? Is location a category error? How does interaction work?...

I find that none of those notions can take proper account of meaning.

What are rules themselves existentially dependent upon?

What do the rules themselves consist in/of?

Are these two answers the same?
— creativesoul

These are interesting questions quite apart from any specific definition of the term "rule". — Echarmion

Thank you. I thought them necessary given the OP and the direction of the thread at the time.

The rules would have to depend on some kind of communication. Otherwise they cannot be shared.

This presupposes that all rules governing language use are existentially dependent upon being shared. I don't think that's right. Some. Not all.

The rules then consist of a bunch of connections of symbols (in any form) to observations, and connections of symbols to other connections and other symbols.

Rough and incomplete... but sure. Some. Not all.



Doesn't a rule exist prior to it's being shared?

You think/believe the following(assuming sincerity)...

Fictional characters give greater understanding.

You also argue the following...

Imagination is useless for understanding other people.

The problem is clear.

Fictional characters are imagined. Therefore, those two claims contradict one another. At least one of them is false.

Your quote doesn't even mention using imagination. I'm sure he's talking about the expressed views of the characters, knowledge about their history provided in the book and other things of that nature. — Judaka

It mentions a fictional character. Fictional characters are imagined.

You two are contradicting yourselves at every turn now...

Empathy can lead to understanding. It does not always. But it can.

I'm out.

It’s worth considering how the writer’s use of character in a fictional story gives us a greater understanding of people than empathy can because they give us more information about a character than empathy ever will. — Brett

Imagination doesn't lead to understanding though... so you say.

:smirk:

I told you from jump...

What you say here is contradicted everyday all day long by actual events.

That mistakenly presupposes that one cannot do both.

Perplexing... you say???

Must've hit a nerve.

Is there a valid refutation in the midst of that? A valid criticism? An argument of your own perhaps?

Edit:Nope.

Einstein imagined himself sitting upon a photon of light...

Listening lead to better understanding. Empathy leads to better understanding.
— creativesoul

Listening may lead to partial understanding. I’m not sure what you mean by better understanding. Better than no understanding? — Brett

More is better. There is no such thing as complete understanding. Leading to more is arriving at better.

The OP is just plain false. It works from a few utterly inadequate conceptions... All of the germane ones! Everyday fact contradicts it at every turn.

We're dealing with yet another logical fiction, and that's being quite generous in the assessment... granting coherency and/or lack of self-contradiction.

What makes that a problem?
— creativesoul

Because you are using imagination in place of certain knowledge. — Brett

Again. Says you. Your saying that it is so does not make it so... ya know?

All imagination consists in/of thought/belief.
Some thought/belief is true.
Some imagination is true.
Some true thought/belief is well grounded.
Some true imagination(s) is(are) well grounded.
All well grounded true belief is knowledge.
Some well grounded true belief is imagination.
All well grounded true imagination(s) is(are) knowledge.

QED

I’m not sure which arguments I should be addressing.

Start there.

What makes that a problem?

Your saying it is so does not make it so... ya know?

You'll have to do better than that. Address one of the arguments.

I've never been a slave in the way that blacks in America and throughout the world were and still are.

I know how much I value self-direction, freedom, the ability to improve my life's circumstances. I know this because I recognize the undeniable benefits that these things add to my life. By virtue of my knowing this, I can imagine what I wouldn't be able to do without them.

I certainly can imagine how unfulfilling life may be in a slave's eyes. I can certainly imagine how fearful for one's own health, well-being, and safety one may be when they are under the thumb of one who cared little to nothing at all about them as a person.

I've never been a slave. I could not imagine any of this if I didn't care enough to hear the words from the people with whom I empathize. Empathy most certainly can lead to better understanding an other.

Imagining what an other's life may be like can consist of true thought/belief.

If person A has a set of true thoughts/beliefs about an other's life, feelings, attitude, hopes, disappointments, etc., then person A has some understanding of an other.

One need not know the particulars of a person's life to understand their words. Wanting to understand another's plight is what having empathy is all about. Empathy allows one to listen. Listening and understanding an other's words facilitates better understanding of an other. Empathy can lead to - can be used as a means for - better understanding of an other.

Therefore, the OP statement is false.

You wouldn't try to use your imagination to learn about any other complicated topic like even basic chemistry or biology. Why would anyone try to use it for something as complicated as understanding other people? Only an idiot would try. — Judaka

Oh the irony...

So what counts as linguistic meaning?

Meaning expressed via language use, I presume.

Using language requires following the rules of language. Linguistic meaning requires following the rules of language.

There is no rule against coining new terms or using existing terms in novel ways. So, I would think that so long as enough people use the term in the same way, then eventually it would be - by definition - an accepted use.

That is, all linguistic meaning is existentially dependent upon following the rules of language... new and novel uses notwithstanding. There are no examples to the contrary. There is no stronger justificatory ground . Rules are clearly necessary.

What are rules themselves existentially dependent upon?

What do the rules themselves consist in/of?

Are these two answers the same?

Has an adequate methodology been elaborated and put to use here?

I mean, I haven't read the thread, but the OP asks about the origens of linguistic meaning. By my lights, that would require a very particular method of exploration.

What is each and every example of linguistic meaning existentially dependent upon?

That seems a relevant question.

What does each and every example of linguistic meaning consist in/of?

Do these questions share the same answers?

That seems to me to be a good place to start.

Not all belief in God is taken upon and/or based upon pure faith alone.

Rather, the need for humans to recognize, attribute, and misattribute causality is at the very foundation of thought/belief. The God of the gaps is a powerfully verifiable argument. It was the best explanation of the time, given their knowledge...

That seems pretty well grounded to me. Not true. But, truth isn't necessary for being well grounded. Gettier shows that much as well. His arguments contain falsehood that follows convention, and is thus well grounded(if following convention counts), despite the fact that his claims about Smith's belief are false.

My position is that if there is some supernatural entity or entities which are responsible for the creation of the universe, the intentional creation of the universe, then it/they must exist outside of spacetime. All knowledge is about that which appears within spacetime, or is otherwise inferred from such.

So, if there is some such entity, it is and will forever be unknown unless and until it/they show itself or themselves in some undeniable way.

It is not an outright denial of the possibility. Such is unwarranted, on my view. However, there's little to find appealing about historical/conventional religious 'debates'. I deny the God of Abraham on the grounds that if everything in the Bible that is attributed to Him is true, He would be one sick malicious son of a bitch, and render the notion of love virtually meaningless.

So...

Is God real?

I find no difference between God and a belief in God, no matter which supernatural entity is under consideration. That which is real has an effect/affect. Thought/belief has efficacy. Therefore, God(or belief therein) is most certainly real.

The effects are quantifiable.

Now...

I agree with the need to distinguish between well grounded belief and not so well grounded belief. It's just that I find that your explanations seem lacking in clarity and/or explanatory/justificatory power/strength. And there are several claims that are quite simply false... on their face. More than anything however, it seems that it could be a good start... something to further hone.

All thought, belief, attribution of meaning, presupposition of correspondence, correspondence, assertion, statement, proposition, imagining, truth/falsehood, sensibility, intelligibility, understanding, worldviews, etc.; all of these things are existentially dependent upon a creature capable of drawing correlations between different things. All of these things arise within and/or as a result of basic rudimentary thought/belief formation.

In general...

I argue in favor of direct physiological sensory perception. I argue in favor of thought/belief beginning in it's simplest form and growing in complexity according to the capabilities and/or dumb luck of the creature. I argue that the complexity of any particular thought/belief is determined by it's content(the content of the correlations).

I argue strongly against any and all conventional notions of "perception" which are informed by language, but do not draw and maintain the distinction between thought/belief and thinking about thought/belief. Such notions of "perception" are inherently inadequate for taking account of thought/belief which exists in it's entirety prior to language acquisition.

I argue strongly against the notion that all belief has propositional content.

If we are to call the mental ongoings(mind if you must) of a non linguistic and/or prelinguistic creature "thought/belief" while also calling statements of thought/belief by the same name, they must consist of the same basic necessary elemental constituents mentioned heretofore. Otherwise, the entire project falls prey to Witt's argument against essentialism... what do all "games" have in common? The namesake alone.

How do you define belief yourself? — Christoffer

Like that...

All belief is existentially dependent upon the believing creature. That is, all belief emerges onto the world stage by virtue of a creature capable of drawing correlations between different things. — creativesoul

Simple, basic, rudimentary level thought/belief is prior to our account thereof. That which is prior to our account is not existentially dependent - in any way, shape, or form - upon it's being taken into account. Simple, basic, rudimentary level thought/belief is one such thing.

What does it consist of?

What is it existentially dependent upon such that all thought/belief consists of the same basic necessary elemental constituents? The same basic core, so to speak. Where ought we look to find answers to such difficult questions? Statements of thought/belief, of course... where else?

Let's look...

Whenever dealing with a sincere speaker...

All statements express, by common means, the speaker's own thought/belief. Statements represent one's thought/belief. All statements of belief presuppose truth. All statements of belief are meaningful. All statements of belief are predication. All statements of belief are existentially dependent upon language.

But...

Rudimentary thought/belief is prior to language. That which is prior to language cannot consist of language. That which is prior to language cannot consist of any ingredient that is itself existentially dependent upon language. This presents a problem...

Some of these elemental constituents for statements of belief are existentially dependent upon language. That which is existentially dependent upon language cannot exist prior to language. Rudimentary thought/belief cannot consist of statements, or propositions, or anything else that is existentially dependent upon language. One may wonder what exactly is left of a statement of belief if all that is existentially dependent upon language is removed. It seems nothing at first blush...

All belief is meaningful to the thinking/believing creature. All belief presupposes it's own truth. All belief is existentially dependent upon a creature capable of drawing correlations between different things. The drawing of the correlation is the attribution of meaning:It is rudimentary thought/belief formation itself. Meaning initially emerges within such basic, rudimentary thought/belief formation. All correlation presupposes the existence of it's own content(regardless of subsequent further qualification/quantification). The presupposition of truth(correspondence to fact) emerges within basic rudimentary thought/belief formation.

Think Pavlov's dog.

It thinks/believes it is about to eat. It has no ability to doubt the veracity of it's own thought/belief. It has no ability to doubt that it heard the bell, smells the food, or feels hungry. It has no ability to sit back and consider it's own thought/belief. It has no ability to suspend it's own judgment. To carefully consider whether or not it's own expectation is well grounded or not; mistaken or not. It has no ability to think about it's own thought/belief.

Nonetheless, it's belief can become true, or become false. That would coincide with it's expectations being met or not. The dog wouldn't - cannot possibly - know any of that. We can and do.

All belief is existentially dependent upon the believing creature. That is, all belief emerges onto the world stage by virtue of a creature capable of drawing correlations between different things. — creativesoul

What sorts of things?

Well, what's actually available of course.

'Objects' of physiological sensory perception and/or the creature's own state of emotion, and/or mindstate. Think Pavlov's dog. The bell:The hunger:The experience of being fed after hearing the bell: The expectation that resulted from drawing these correlations/connections/associations between the hunger, the bell, and the satisfaction of hunger pangs time and time again. The evidence supporting my claiming the dog's expectation is the involuntary salivation itself.

The dog believed it was about eat.

No. It's not simple. At least...

Understanding human belief is not a simple task. That is particularly the case when so many for so long have been working from clearly inadequate terminological frameworks.

I would approach The Gettier Problem from an angle I doubt you've considered. I do not argue for the 19th or 20th century versions of JTB. Rather, I would argue how the conventional notion of JTB works from an inadequate notion of belief. By doing so I grant Gettier showed an otherwise neglected issue with that particular academic convention. At the same time, the new understanding shows that Gettier did not accurately represent Smith's belief in either Case I or Case II.

Gettier's cases show that i.)not all well-argued for true propositions are knowledge, ii.)not all 'logical' rules preserve the truth of their premises when followed, and are thus complete and utter misnomers(the rules of 'logical' entailment), and last but not least, iii.)the terms Gettier used as a means to take an account of Smith's belief in Case II were utterly inadequate for properly representing a belief that a disjunction is true.

Gettier cases were considered well argued because they followed conventional understanding at the time. Convention can take a while to catch up.

That's another matter altogether.

Somewhere on the timeline between conception and birth we begin to form the first beliefs of our lives. Exactly when doesn't matter. What they could possibly consist in/of does.

I work from the bare assumption that at the moment of a creature's initial conception, there is no thought/belief to be had. The necessary elemental constituents aren't there yet. Not all of the necessary ingredients inherently within all thought/belief formation are present at the moment of conception.

What we do have is basic rudimentary level survival mechanisms. Physiological sensory perception being one. We need not turn it on.

What do all belief have in common such that having it makes them what they are?

What do they all possess and/or include that is both necessary and sufficient for forming, remembering, considering, questioning, and/or otherwise 'having/using' belief?

What does all belief consist in/of?

...I can go on and write an entire essay on belief without really breaking the argument I made. — Christoffer

This is what it amounts to...

So, we have two kinds of belief. This kind and that kind. We know what it takes to deserve being called 'this' or 'that' kind of belief. That's the nutshell version. You're presenting what seems to me to be a carefully considered position on a particular subject matter.

What you've presented is much more about what you personally find to be satisfactory justification/reason/warrant for holding a belief, particularly after one self-reflects; after it's careful consideration.

What we need is an answer to the following question...

What makes them both belief?

What is the bare minimum criterion, which when satisfied, results in having a clear cut case of thought/belief?

:smile:

You demand a simple answer and I gave it. — Christoffer

There's been a misunderstanding.

I demanded a proper definition of "belief". It happens to be a simple answer. Not all simple answers suffice.

Belief does not exist without human thinking about something and starting to believe something, out of that comes to different types of belief.

Not all belief is well-considered... human belief notwithstanding.

You cannot detach the belief from humans, even if a belief was written down and people forgot the one expressing the belief, it is still an expressed belief from that forgotten person.

I agree with the sentiment. The account though... it could use some help.


All belief is existentially dependent upon the believing creature. That is, all belief emerges onto the world stage by virtue of a creature capable of drawing correlations between different things.

You are taking different concepts of belief and counter-argue the basic definition with that there's "too many versions of belief and therefore you can't define it".

To quite the contrary. I'm demanding that it be properly defined. If our notions of thought and belief are mistaken, then we've gotten something or other wrong within every report about and/or account of anything ever thought, believed, spoken, written, and/or otherwise uttered.

So no... I'm not saying that we cannot properly define our notions of "belief". I'm demanding that we make sure that we do.

When we look carefully at notions of belief, we find that some of them are inherently incapable of taking account of pre-linguistic thought/belief.

I didn't say anything like that. — Terrapin Station

What you did say was that your use of "feelings" has the same referent as my use of "thought/belief about acceptable/unacceptable behaviour". That is quite mistaken. For whatever reason, you've focused upon that and left out any of the important bits regarding morality.

Let's move on to the concept notion disagreement.

I say all concepts are existentially dependent upon language. You disagree.

Can we set out our reasoning behind our positions? It is relevant to conceptions of morality.

I didn't say anything like that. I don't even believe that word usage can be wrong. — Terrapin Station

If I am pointing at a tree and say "look at the dog", that is wrong word usage, no?

I take it that you cannot distinguish between concepts and that which is being conceived of — creativesoul

Concepts are abstractions. They don't exist externally. There are external particulars that serve as influences or bases for concepts, but concepts are "of abstractions," they're not "of particulars." — Terrapin Station

Which is the concept, and which is that which is being conceived of?

If concepts are abstractions, and they are of abstractions, then they are of themselves?

:yikes:

Do it.

I take it that you cannot distinguish between concepts and that which is being conceived of...