I don't even properly remember... — S

That's a recurring problem.

Now about "concepts"...

:wink:

How do you draw and maintain the distinction between a concept and what is being conceived of?

Conception of "morality" as compared/contrasted to morality?

The same with a rock. Conceptions of "rock" with the rock?

"Rock" is a conception. You earlier charged morality with being 'just a concept'. What were you attempting to argue?

It's your point. I showed it adds nothing. Your problem, not mine.

It's actually prone to a reductio...

Naturalism has artificial aspects in the same way.

Of what use is "artificial" here?

Nah. I'm in agreement thus far. It doesn't add anything helpful though, does it?

Artificial: made or produced by human beings rather than occurring naturally.

Scientific language, scientific rules, scientific principles, scientific concepts, scientific theories, etc. comprise an aspect of science.

Scientific language, scientific rules, scientific principles, scientific concepts, scientific theories, etc. are artificial.

Therefore, an aspect of science is artificial.

Do you have an argument for the conclusion that morality has an artificial aspect?

I doubt it.

Surprise me.

I only said that morality definitely has an artificial aspect. — S

I know what you said. I quoted it verbatim. Your argument for your conclusion does not hold good. It does not follow from the fact that we've named something - anything - that that which is named is artificial.

Clearly, you're invoking notions like "conception" and "artificial" in an attempt to bolster your view on morality. The attempt fails. The arguments are fallacious. The viewpoint is based upon rhetoric. You do not even seem to have a coherent notion of either "conception" or "artificial".

Morality, at the very least, definitely has an artificial aspect. We came up with "good" and "bad", moral language, moral rules, moral principles, etc. We came up with moral concepts. — S

We come up with all sorts of names for all sorts of things. It quite simply does not follow from that that all of those things are artificial.

Trees come to mind as an obvious example, or rocks, if you prefer. These are obviously not equivalent to our notions/conceptions of them, obviously not artificial. They are physical things. Only a moron would think that they are existentially dependent upon our names for them, or that they were artificial.

However, there are other things that are not physical objects that we've named, talked about, conceived, and misconceived even. Human thought and belief is one such thing. Morality consists entirely thereof. Thus, if one does not understand the former, there can be little hope of understanding the latter.

Our moral concepts, ideas, rules, and principles can be mistaken/false. — creativesoul

That's a misunderstanding. I wasn't talking about things, at least not things as in trees and rocks and whatnot. These are obviously things, and obviously natural things. I was talking about language and abstractions. — S

Clear it up then. You invoked the notions of "artificial" and "conception"...

I thought we were talking about morality. Particularly I was making the point that just because we 'come up' with a conception of "morality", it does not follow that morality is artificial.

But Banno, if what is right is found by intuition, then there's no way for a person to distinguish between something actually being right and it merely seeming right to that person. — Banno

I'm not sure that that follows. I'm also not sure that the alternative explanation would satisfy you. It can 1)be the case that what is right/good is found by intuition, and 2)intuition can be mistaken.

Intuition is thought/belief based. Those can be wrong. We can think/believe(intuit) that something or other is good, only to find out later that it was not. This happens all the time. People's thought/belief about acceptable/unacceptable behaviour(about what's good/right) changes throughout their life(most people's anyway).

Human history shows this change as well.

Perhaps.

I mean, it does seem quite odd to me when someone else(you in this case) insists that their use of the term feelings has the same referent as my use of thought/belief about acceptable/unacceptable behaviour even when it does not. The oddity arises not from the mistake, but rather from the insistence of telling me that I'm wrong about my own terminological use. This oddity is further perpetuated/compounded when this person remains adamant while openly voicing no interest whatsoever in understanding my position.

Without knowing both frameworks, one cannot possibly know which terms - if any - in the respective accounts share the same referent. There can be no comparison between without knowledge of both.

:sad:

Your question asks the participant a question about their approval/disapproval of the behaviour.

My argument shows that not all utterances of "ought" are equivalent to a voice of approval/disapproval.

The appropriate question to ask is the one I suggested.

If there's no example of you using "thought/belief about acceptable/unacceptable behavior" where I wouldn't use "feelings" then there's no reason to believe that you're using "thought/belief about acceptable/unacceptable behavior" differently than I'm using "feelings" — Terrapin Station

If "feelings" are thought/belief about acceptable/unacceptable behaviour on your view, then you're working from a conception of thought/belief that is in stark contrast to my own. There is no better reason to believe that you're using the same terms differently.

I answered the apple questino right? Didn't have anything to do with anything. But I answered, because you asked. — Terrapin Station

The apple question had everything to do with how feelings are not equivalent to thought/belief.

What's an example where you'd use "thought/belief about acceptable/unacceptable behavior" where I wouldn't use "feelings" (in this moral context)? — Terrapin Station

What difference does that make?

None.

You conflate thought/belief and feelings.

I don't.

Your question does not bear upon the argument I'm giving. Mine does.

When we're talking about thought/belief in any context, it is never equivalent to feelings.
— creativesoul

It is re the way I'm using "feelings" in this context. That's the whole point I've been making. — Terrapin Station

Which is why I've been at pains to explain to you how your use of "feelings" is not equivalent to my use of "thought/belief about acceptable/unacceptable behaviour". Those two uses do not have the same referent.

How much would you wager on this:

We take 1,000 random people and tell them the first paragraph.

We then ask them, "Agree or disagree: it ought to be the case that the family will suffer"?

There's more to this, but what would you wager on the the majority of respondents saying "agree"? We can talk about why after you answer that. — Terrapin Station

Better to ask them what ought happen if the speaker keeps his promise.

Feelings, like apples to apple pies, are necessary but insufficient for thought/belief.
— creativesoul

When we're talking about thought/belief in a moral context, we're talking about ways that people feel about behavior. This has nothing to do with apples/apple fritters. — Terrapin Station

When we're talking about thought/belief in any context, it is never equivalent to feelings. That was the point with the analogy. I thought you bright enough to understand that.

She promised to do X. X ought be done.
— creativesoul

That's a preference that someone has about behavior in relation to promises. It's a way they feel. If it's moral to them, they approve of following through with promises and do not approve of not following through. — Terrapin Station

No, it's not.

Not all use of "ought" is a voice of one's approval. This is particularly the case when one is giving their word, such as in promising.

I'll use Moliere's earlier example..

Say we have a gambler who owes a lot of money to a loan shark. The loan shark tells the gambler "Since you owe me and cannot pay, I promise you that your family will suffer"...

Anyone who knows what the meaning of that is knows that it ought be the case that the family will suffer.

That is not a voice of moral approval. Rather it is a voice of understanding what the words mean.

Thus, not all utterances of ought are voices of approval, or are equivalent to someone's feelings of approval about the behaviour in question.

Your position cannot account for these cases.

Is an apple equivalent to an apple fritter?
— creativesoul

Not in my usage. — Terrapin Station

Good.

Feelings, like apples to apple pies, are necessary but insufficient for thought/belief. Both apples and feelings are an elemental constituent of a more complex constitution.

It is often the case that when someone says "X ought happen", they are making a prediction
— creativesoul

What you're describing there is "if x is correct, then y should obtain"--what in the world does your example have to do with morality? — Terrapin Station

That's not a good translation. A prediction need not take if/then form. Most do not... most average people's talk. Rather, these kinds of utterances of ought are the ones that place conventional understanding of morality in question.

She promised to do X. X ought be done.

That is not an indication of moral approval. Thus, not all utterances of "ought" are equivalent to voicing one's moral approval and/or feelings.

Is an apple equivalent to an apple fritter?

I was asking how you'd know that my referent of "thoughts/beliefs about acceptable/unacceptable behavior" isn't α. — Terrapin Station

Rubbish.

You claimed that your use of "feelings" had the same referent as my use of "thought/belief about acceptable/unacceptable behaviour"...

It doesn't. If it does then we can remove all your use of "feelings" and replace them with "thought/belief about acceptable/unacceptable behaviour" and not lose/change the meaning of the claim.

According to whom?

That's an ill-conceived question.

If the referent of your use of "feelings" is the same as the referent of my use of "thought/belief about acceptable/unacceptable behaviour", then the meaning does not change... cannot change.

Fido ate his food.

My dog ate his food.

Your dog ate his food.

"Fido", "my dog", and "your dog" all have the same referent.

In all contexts, when I write "thought/belief about acceptable/unacceptable behaviour", thought/belief is never equivalent to feelings. That is because feelings are but one of the necessary elemental constituents of thought/belief. Feelings are never equivalent to thought/belief.

If we substitute one for the other the meaning drastically changes, because the referent and the truth conditions of the claim drastically change. All of that is point of view invariant. That's how it works. None of this is the case when the referent is the same.

Thought/belief are not equivalent to feelings.

If you cannot even accept this, there's nothing I see compelling about continuing.

The question doesn't make sense really. Belief is the ideas in your head about the world around you. — Christoffer

The question makes perfect sense if one has an adequate criterion for belief. Here you've basically said that belief is the ideas in your head about the world around you(us).

So, all belief consists of ideas in the head about the world around us.

Is that acceptable to you? It's not to me.

Statements of belief are not in the head. They are belief. Therefore, not all belief is in the head.

Some belief is about ourselves. They are belief. Therefore, not all belief is about the world around us.

Surely, you see the point here? Your notion of belief is unacceptable when viewed under this kind of scrutiny.

I get your point, but I think you are fragmenting belief into the concept's smallest parts. — Christoffer

Belief is not a concept. Concepts are existentially dependent upon language. Belief is not. Our talk of "belief", our ideas about "belief", our notions of "belief"...

These are concepts.

Belief is prior to language. That which is prior to language cannot be existentially dependent upon it. Belief is not a concept. My charge here is that your conception of "belief" is inherently inadequate for taking proper account of belief.

I think you aren't really looking into what I actually present in my argument. Why is the Type-scale not working for you? What is unclear about its definition? — Christoffer

What do all belief have in common that makes them belief?

I've explained the issue clearly. You have no criterion for what counts as belief. You are talking about the ground for belief, not the belief itself.

The question above needs answered.

What are your thoughts regarding these claims?

True belief is as well.

Well grounded belief is as well.

Belief is prior to language.

What do all beliefs have in common such that that is what makes them belief? — creativesoul

Have you read previous posts in this dialectic? Maybe you find answers there. I've written in detail about this numerous times in this thread.

In essence belief (outside of unsupported belief which is just emotional ideas conceptualized out of chaotic memory) is a posteriori out of facts. — Christoffer

The parenthetical content above highlights a flaw.

That is, you've given two kinds of belief. You've explained which kind qualifies as which. Unsupported belief... and all belief that is not unsupported.

Two kinds of belief.

I am asking what makes them all belief. What do all belief have in common that make them what they are, such that whenever anything has this commonality... it too... is a kind of belief. You've enumerated and explained a plethora of ways that they are different beliefs. You've yet to have delivered a clear cut easy to understand criterion for what counts as being a belief.

You might need to explain your question better if you want another answer.

Better?

Well, your referent of "feelings" in a context of talking about what we're basing morality upon... — Terrapin Station

It makes no sense whatsoever, on my view, to talk or to think/believe that 'we base morality' upon something.

Rather...

What we base our conceptions of "morality" upon... sure.

Morality, as it is conventionally understood is the rules of acceptable/unacceptable behaviour.
— creativesoul

I don't agree with that either. — Terrapin Station

Look it up at SEP. Definition of morality.

Your agreement isn't necessary. The conventional understanding exists regardless. I'm granting it for the sake of accepting current convention somewhere.

Why not start there? I mean, it seems as good a place as any. If you would rather not make our discussion about a position that neither of us hold, then that's fine by me too.

:wink:


If you would like to have me go over another conception of morality, say yours?... I would be more than glad to. I've been reporting upon lots of different aspects of my own thought/belief about the subject matter. You could always ask an interesting question about that as well. So, there are all sorts of good options at our disposal.

Here's something we disagree upon...

Not all utterances of ought are equivalent to voicing one's approval/disapproval of the act/behaviour in question. Some utterances of ought lend a voice to expectation. Verification is existentially dependent upon knowing what we ought or ought not see in and under certain conditions if a certain claim(statement of thought/belief) is true.

Given that you argue for emotivism. Here's a direct question.

How do you make sense of and/or reconcile everyday events when a speaker's utterance of ought is not indicative of approval?

It is often the case that when someone says "X ought happen", they are making a prediction based upon pre-existing thought/belief. They are using their own thought/belief as a means to predict the future, even if it is only in some small way. They are doing it nonetheless.

The first solar eclipse that happened after Einstein's second paper was used to make and verify a prediction about the well documented position of a particular celestial body. That is a report of the facts. Those people who were planning upon verifying knew...

They knew what they ought see if Einstein was right. They also knew what they ought not see if Einstein was right. They ought not see the same body in the same place in the sky from the earth's vantage point.

I've already argued for most all of this without subsequent attention from you.

Say that your referent of "thoughts/beliefs about acceptable/unacceptable behavior" is α. — Terrapin Station

The above is prima facie evidence of misunderstanding being hard at work.

All thought/belief(my referent) consists of the same basic set of necessary elemental constituents. Necessity is determined by existential dependency. Thought/belief cannot be properly accounted for and/or reported upon by a single variable. A single variable cannot properly account for a plurality of things.

You should know because I am telling you. I am offering a report based upon true statements about my thought/belief system... my worldview.

That didn't answer my question.

What do all beliefs have in common such that that is what makes them belief?

Something else...

Unsupported belief can be true, so I'm not sure what you're trying to say with the last statement.

No idea starts as a supported idea, — Rank Amateur

That's not true.

Some conclusions are novel new ideas that can definitely follow from well supported premisses.

What do all those different kinds of belief have in common that make them beliefs?

Hee Haw...

:kiss:

Empathy is a fantastic tool that can be used to gain a better understanding of other people's plights. Empathy is not equivalent to understanding everything there is to know about another, nor need it be. We need not know everything about another to empathize with them about something or other. When we empathize, we begin to listen closer, more carefully. We empathize with someone's plight by virtue of knowing what it is like to have the feelings that they have, whatever they are. That's a fantastic start to better understanding...


When we empathize with a group of people, say young American blacks, it means that we understand the all too common difficulties that group faces on a daily basis. We can know that young black men get harassed by police far more than whites. We can know that young black men get sentenced far more often and for much longer sentences for the same crimes as whites. We need not know anything at all about their personal particulars to be able to empathize with them as a group, based upon what is common to the group.

You're wrong because what you say is contradictory to everyday events. All sorts of people actually do the shit everyday, on a daily basis, that you say cannot be done.