Not a big fan of the term 'scientism' but certainly the very human need to neatly box up concepts to make them more understandable. Unfortunately, in this case, it makes a coherent position on morality impossible. — Baden

Does it?

All conceptions of "goodness" are existentially dependent upon highly complex thought/belief replete with value assessment. All conceptions are heavily influenced by language. They are informed by it.

That which exists prior to our conception(s) of it is not; cannot be. That which is discovered to exist in it's entirety is not; cannot be.

What's the difference between the term "goodness" and my conception?

If "goodness" were equivalent to my notion thereof, I would have never been able to discover otherwise. I once thought something was the right thing to do, and found myself painfully aware of being mistaken.

Goodness is something we learn about solely by virtue of looking for it. It cannot be equivalent to our notion, for notions consist of language. Trees and goodness does not.

It is the quality inherent to all good things.

Not all conceptions of goodness can account for that which exists prior to our conceptions.
— creativesoul

Like what? What do you mean? Give an example. Rocks existed prior to our conceptions, but they don't seem relevant in this context. — S

Let us simplify by performing the following operation...

Not all conceptions [snip]of goodness[endsnip] can account for that which exists prior to our conceptions.

...and we'll all see that we're left with the following...

Not all conceptions can account for that which exists prior to our conceptions.

How do we know if something exists prior to our naming and describing it?

If you know what making a promise means, then the utterance of ought in question simply confirms that. It is what one expects to happen, solely as a result of knowing what making a promise means and believing that the speaker is sincere.

I've explained this numerous times in the other thread we're both involved in. Care to address what I've asserted? — creativesoul

Pffft,

Meh.

We can say, without doubt, that our exit from life on earth has absolutely no bearing whatsoever upon whether or not 'time passes on'.

What would we use to support a conclusion and/or belief statement either way?

Well, we observe all sorts of people dying everyday. Time passes on. Things continue to evolve.

What's the ground for doubting it? Always... it is always...

Logical possibility alone based upon more inherently inadequate notions/conceptions than one can shake a stick at.

If someone were to say, "When one promises to do X, then X ought not to be done"--so they were to claim that that's the "meaning" of a promise, what would we appeal to if we want to claim that they're (objectively) incorrect?
— Terrapin Station

Misunderstanding accompanied by a dichotomy that is inherently incapable of taking proper account of morality. — creativesoul

Misunderstanding of what and a proper account of morality per what? — Terrapin Station

Misunderstanding of the role that meaning plays in making a promise, particularly regarding truth conditions setting that out. That's what I was discussing.

Proper account of morality cannot involve the objective/subjective dichotomy. I've already offered more than adequate argument against that idea. You've neglected those offerings and continue on unabated.

You've jumped to questions about how to discriminate between competing utterances of ought, regarding a previous promise.

If you know what making a promise means, then the utterance of ought in question simply confirms that. It is what one expects to happen, solely as a result of knowing what making a promise means and believing that the speaker is sincere.

I've explained this numerous times in the other thread we're both involved in. Care to address what I've asserted?

I would just add that I don't think the good is a brute fact - we can seek a deeper explanation of those good things. — Andrew M

Thanks. We do seem to share a position, or at least they're very close...

Goodness is not a fact on my view either. Facts are what has happened. Rather goodness is something discovered and hopefully continually aspired towards afterwards.

Goodness is just a concept... — S

Not all conceptions of goodness can account for that which exists prior to our conceptions. Goodness, on my view, does not requires our awareness of it. Rather, it is often discovered... and sometimes quite unexpectedly.

Yup. You're all three mistaken. Let me know when you find a way out of the pickle? Yes? Do you remember where you ended up contradicting yourself if you gave an answer? I'll remind you...

"X is moral relative to A" is false if A does not believe that X is moral and true if A believes that X is moral.

And...

A's belief can be false.

How is that possible if the truth of "X is moral" is relative to A's belief?

If I believe that "kicking puppies is wrong" is true then "kicking puppies is wrong" is true

"Kicking puppies is wrong" may be true, but my belief, or lack thereof, in said statement does not change its truth-value. — Moliere

Gotcha. I would concur.

This seems to cloistered in one's own thoughts, to me. — Moliere

Drawing and maintaining the distinction between thought/belief and thinking about thought/belief is imperative to understanding all sorts of things about us and the world we find ourselves within. It's crucial for the ability to discriminate between conceptions/notions, including but not limited to morality. Academia has failed here, and still does as far as I can tell. The relevance to moral philosophy and doscourse would include allowing one to be able to distinguish between moral thought/belief that is informed by language, and moral thought/belief that precedes language. Again, the term moral denotes a classification and/or kind of thought/belief.

I am of the very strong opinion that everyone is involved in the same process, in the same set of circumstances, regarding forming and/or having our initial worldview, which includes belief about what's good/bad, right/wrong, moral/immoral. By and in large one's, initial worldview is adopted via language acquisition and it's subsequent use.

We're all in the same boat in this way. Unpacking what that is existentially dependent upon gleans knowledge of morally relevant common denominators. Trusting the truthfulness of the teacher being an important one.

When we moralize we are addressing others.

And ourselves...

When Ted moralizes on the evils of adultery, he is not talking about his beliefs, he is talking about adultery.

I would concur that this is often the case. Ted is expressing and/or presenting his beliefs about adultery, via language use. That's an overly simplistic account though.

When we begin to explain our reasoning, our ground for our belief, or when we begin to compare/contrast... we are most certainly talking about our belief. Knowing the difference is crucial to understanding the world and/or ourselves.

A point I use because we can often moralize about what I don't think is within the domain of morality. You can rationalize why adultery is wrong by making some notion about promises, but to me it just doesn't come on the same level as, say, ensuring the hungry are fed or preventing murder.

But even when we moralize about what I believe is not morally significant, we're talking about actions, dispositions, or character -- not our own beliefs.

I get what you're saying here Moliere. It is interesting that you've chosen to invoke promises, giving one's word. I would sharply disagree regarding the moral significance of making a promise, but do not look to argue this point here, as the thread is about the meaning of moral statements/claims.

It seems a logically coherent possibility. It just requires it to either not be recognized as valuable or always disvalued. Do you disagree? — Andrew M

Perhaps it be better put a bit differently.

That which already exists in it's entirety prior to our account/report of it, is not existentially dependent upon our recognition of it's existence.

Goodness is one such thing.

When one says “X is immoral” he is not stating his belief. He is stating a conclusion from the fact he must know what is moral given necessarily from his own constitution, which makes explicit he must know the negation of it as well. — Mww

This is prima facie evidence that a gross misunderstanding of thought/belief is at work.

If he believes what he says, then he is most certainly stating his belief. It doesn't matter if it is true/false. It doesn't matter if he knows where, when, or from whom he picked it up. It doesn't matter if it is well-grounded. It is his belief.

It is clear my claim for X being immoral is true relative to one ground of belief and false relative to another. — Mww

No. All you've done is further prove my earlier point/criticism of relative/subjective morality. You're conflating belief and truth.

It is clear that it is believed relative to one's belief-system and not believed relative to another's.

It is believed by one, but not the other.

You just agreed that the standard is not in the action itself.

If the standard is necessary for determining whether the action is moral or not, then the action being moral or not is not in the action itself.
— Terrapin Station

Fair enough. — Andrew M

No. Andrew. You're ok here.

The standard is necessary for us to determine whether or not the action is moral or not... that is... it is necessary for us to acquire knowledge of the morality of the action. It is not necessary for the action to be moral/immoral.

What it takes for us to acquire knowledge of what's moral is not the same as what it takes for something to be so.

Good things existed in their entirety prior to our coming to that realization. Such things are not existentially dependent upon our report/account of them. It only follows that those particular good things are not equivalent to linguistic conceptions. We can be mistaken about such things.

it needs to be the same exact claim, in the same respect, etc. that's being both asserted and denied at the same time — Terrapin Station

Then it's not the same exact claim.

Do you not know what counts as a moral statement? — Moliere

I think that I know. However, what I think I know does not always match up to conventional understanding/notions. I asked not to be intentionally obtuse, but rather to perhaps seque into reasoning that leads us to scrutinize the conventional notion of moral statement.

I'm hesitant to put necessary and sufficient conditions to the notion. It seems to me that it's not hard to discriminate between moralizing and statements of preference. — Moliere

See, right there is something queer to me. I mean, don't get me wrong. I totally agree with what you said above. I would readily concur.

However...

Moralizing is thinking about one's own thought/belief about acceptable/unacceptable behaviour. Thought/belief about acceptable/unacceptable behaviour is prior to thinking about it. On my view, not all thought/belief about acceptable/unacceptable behaviour is moral thought/belief, but all moral thought/belief is thought/belief about acceptable/unacceptable behaviour. Moral statements have the same conditions/criterion as moral thought/belief.

Here, of course, I'm not using the term "moral" to denote value, or approval. Rather, it is a kind of thought/belief and statements thereof.

Some aspects seem to include claims to universality across all responsible moral actors, the notion that one's belief does not change whether something is good or evil, and that the subject matter is of particular import to living life.

I don't understand the bit about unchanging belief...

If someone were to say, "When one promises to do X, then X ought not to be done"--so they were to claim that that's the "meaning" of a promise, what would we appeal to if we want to claim that they're (objectively) incorrect? — Terrapin Station

Misunderstanding accompanied by a dichotomy that is inherently incapable of taking proper account of morality.

Being subjective is dependent upon thought/belief. I suppose then that being objective is not dependent upon thought/belief.

But if morality is subjective and has objective consequences, then it only follows that the objective consequences are dependent upon thought/belief.

One ought not do X...

If that is a command, and commands are not truth-apt, then neither is that utterance of ought.

It seems to me that moral judgments not only assert that something is immoral/moral, but also that they are universally applicable. If X is morally wrong, then no one ought do X.

I like the direction of fit notion that Banno invoked. It involves the meaning of the statement but not solely in terms of moral judgments.

Promises come to mind.

Without expressing my approval/disapproval, but rather just acknowledging what the making of a promise is...

When one promises to do X, then X ought be done.

Whether or not I approve of X is irrelevant to what it means.

Being subjective is dependent upon thought/belief. — Mww

In what way can something be dependent upon something else if that something else doesn't exist? In what way can something be dependent upon something else if not existentially?

Goodnight.

I already said that S...

It's irrelevant and petty.

What counts as a moral statement?

Are we limiting the scope to moral judgments? "X is moral/immoral"? "X is good/bad"? "One ought do/not do X"?

Prior to writing "I'm sitting here on my couch" you sat down. The statement corresponds to what happened. If you had not sat down, you could not be sitting. It's petty.

It doesn't matter anyway S. Facts are states of affairs. If you want a complete definition, they would be what has happened and/or what is happening. It doesn't affect anything at all concerning my position on what makes true statements so.

Petty bickering. Is that what you've been reduced to?

You sat prior to writing...

Your lack of understanding does not make my position contradictory. It makes yours untenable... unknowingly.

It's a fact that I'm sitting presently sitting here on my sofa. That's what is happening... — S

It had already happened by the time you wrote what you did.

That you cannot recognize the inherent untenability of that is not my problem.

On my view being subjective is being existentially dependent upon thought/belief. Whereas being objective is not.

Agree?

Yeah well, I'm assuming that you're capable of more than making derogatory statements about an interlocutor. I certainly am.

I cannot understand what you're claiming without knowing how you define terms...

I'm interested in hearing you out. That's the only way to start a sophisticated dialogue.

Gratuitous assertions won't do...

Facts are what has happened. There's nothing contradictory about that.

You’re engaged in a philosophical dialectic. If you don’t understand the terms of common use within the context of that dialectic, you shouldn’t be here. — Mww

Fer Pete's sake...

Define your terms. Different folk use different definitions. I want to avoid all the problems arising from that.

When were the goalposts established?

I'm looking forward to ignoring S, and seeing what you've got to say about morality...

I've offered quite a bit of my own position earlier and the grounds for it. I'm now looking to place yours under the same scrutiny that my own came through...

Set the posts.

Define morality while your at it.

Morality is subjective, the consequence of morality, which is not in itself morality, is objective.

Dichotomy both absolutely necessary, and philosophically preserved. — Mww

Define both objective and subjective...

It does not follow from the fact that you cannot recognize the relevance that there is none...

First you presented carne asada as the subject, beef as the predicate. Now you present beef as the subject and carne asada as the object, and treat it with equitable argumentative value.

It doesn’t have that. — Mww

Perhaps...

All I was getting at was that carne asada consists - in part - of beef, just as morality consists - in part - of belief.

Personally I try to avoid analogies. They always fail.

Much of this thread is yet another example of how getting thought/belief wrong to start with leads to inherently emaciated positions, approaches, and (mis)conceptions...