When one says “X is immoral” he is not stating his belief. He is stating a conclusion from the fact he must know what is moral given necessarily from his own constitution, which makes explicit he must know the negation of it as well. — Mww

This is prima facie evidence that a gross misunderstanding of thought/belief is at work.

If he believes what he says, then he is most certainly stating his belief. It doesn't matter if it is true/false. It doesn't matter if he knows where, when, or from whom he picked it up. It doesn't matter if it is well-grounded. It is his belief.

It seems a logically coherent possibility. It just requires it to either not be recognized as valuable or always disvalued. Do you disagree? — Andrew M

The problem I see here is: imagine that something no longer exists, and was never valued while it existed, so no one knows that it ever existed. In this hypothetical scenario, could we coherently say that the thing could nonetheless have been valuable?

Or look at it another way: if to be valuable is only to be potentially valuable, even if never actually valued, then that would seem to apply, given suitable circumstances, to almost anything we could imagine.

It seems a logically coherent possibility. It just requires it to either not be recognized as valuable or always disvalued. Do you disagree? — Andrew M

Perhaps it be better put a bit differently.

That which already exists in it's entirety prior to our account/report of it, is not existentially dependent upon our recognition of it's existence.

Goodness is one such thing.

So if the moral property/judgment/whatever-we-want-to-call-it isn't in the action itself, but requires a standard for determination, we need to ask just how/where the standard obtains. What is it a property of/what properties is it?

What is it a property of/what properties is it? — Terrapin Station

The framing of standards is a human property...what else?

In other words say the claim is "The cat is on the mat (and necessarily at time Tx, in regard y, from perspective z, etc.)" We can call that claim P.

A contradiction only obtains when we say both P and not-P. The claim, P, can't change, it can't be equivocated in any regard. We need to both assert (P) and deny (not-P) the same claim (the claim is P), at the same time, in the same regard, etc.

If it's a human property, then how, exactly, does it occur independently of humans/outside of minds?

Evidence of misunderstanding.......Yeah, I’ll go with that.

What can I say. When I talk about my morality, I speak from knowledge. I KNOW the condition of my moral nature. And even if I can’t say what a moral judgement will prescribe for my actions, I can still say with absolute certainty my volitions upon which the judgement is based, shall be consistent with a fundamental truth I hold no matter the circumstance. And even if I should act counter to my inner truths, in no other way is even possible to know I have judged immorally, then to know what it is I should have done instead.

One either is moral or he is not, which is to say one is morally worthy or he is not. There is no maybe, no partially, moral. Because “is” is a certainty it must have for its ground a law, which in its turn must have for its ground a principle, the negation of which is impossible If the lawfulness is to be maintained. One cannot “think” the law, nor can he “believe” the law, for law itself carries with it necessity and universality.

The rest is metaphysical gravy. Bring your own salt.

The standard is necessary for us to determine whether or not the action is moral or not... that is... it is necessary for us to acquire knowledge of the morality of the action. It is not necessary for the action to be moral/immoral.

What it takes for us to acquire knowledge of what's moral is not the same as what it takes for something to be so.

Good things existed in their entirety prior to our coming to that realization. Such things are not existentially dependent upon our report/account of them. It only follows that those particular good things are not equivalent to linguistic conceptions. We can be mistaken about such things. — creativesoul

Nice post and I think we essentially agree. I would just add that I don't think the good is a brute fact - we can seek a deeper explanation of those good things.

That which already exists in it's entirety prior to our account/report of it, is not existentially dependent upon our recognition of it's existence.

Goodness is one such thing. — creativesoul

:up:

The problem I see here is: imagine that something no longer exists, and was never valued while it existed, so no one knows that it ever existed. In this hypothetical scenario, could we coherently say that the thing could nonetheless have been valuable?

Or look at it another way: if to be valuable is only to be potentially valuable, even if never actually valued, then that would seem to apply, given suitable circumstances, to almost anything we could imagine. — Janus

Perhaps this is a difference between "in principle" and "in practice". Certainly a mountain of diamonds on a planet in another galaxy has no practical value for us.

But for a practical and potentially life-or-death example, a valuable water supply might be readily available to a community, but they never searched for it, or disvalued it when they did find it (e.g., wilfully polluted it). Thus something valuable was lost.

So if the moral property/judgment/whatever-we-want-to-call-it isn't in the action itself, but requires a standard for determination, we need to ask just how/where the standard obtains. What is it a property of/what properties is it? — Terrapin Station

The standard is a fact about what is valuable for human beings (independent of human opinion). Whether a human action is right or wrong is determined by that standard (and again independent of human opinion).

As I mentioned earlier, right or wrong is a property of human actions, the value standard is a property of human beings (certain things are universally valuable to humans) and that standard is also implicit in the action (since an action is done by human beings).

If I am the one who claims, and I claim it is immoral for the Engineer Tom (person B) to maintain the Empire Cascade’s speed (behavior X) approaching Lady Jane (person A) tied to the tracks up ahead, while Boris waits in the bushes for Dudley to rush to the rescue. Poor ol’ Lady Jane certainly believes it truly immoral that Tom refuses to slow down. But Tom, on the other hand, with a train full of passengers trailing behind and a 7% grade he absolutely must ascend or he will roll backwards and wind up in the river, truly believes it sucks to be Lady Jane for sure, but he isn’t about to scatter 14 cars and 67.5 people over 1/2 mile of river bed for her, so he truly believes my claim is false, that is, it is not immoral to maintain speed.

It is clear my claim for X being immoral is true relative to one ground of belief and false relative to another. — Mww

It's not so clear to me. :-)

Naturally both Lady Jane and Tom want to avoid bad consequences, particularly to themselves and whoever is included in their immediate duty of care (for Tom). But I think Lady Jane (perhaps only after the event of being saved) would be capable of understanding that Tom's intended action was morally permissible, perhaps even morally required. It is really only Boris here who is morally culpable.

Part of our moral calculus is the contexts of others (and their perspectives). To the extent that we do each factor in the contexts of others, I think there is a convergence towards what we might identify as "the good".

As I mentioned earlier, right or wrong is a property of human actions, the value standard is a property of human beings (certain things are universally valuable to humans) and that standard is also implicit in the action (since an action is done by human beings). — Andrew M

So where do we look to check what the things are that are universally valuable to humans, where that value is independent of human opinion?

Hey. Good to have your comment, thanks.

That both Lady Jane and Tom want to avoid bad circumstances is the very root of the entire moral issue. There is only one outcome, therefore one of them is going to be on the short end of the stick. Whomsoever is on the short end is going to say my claim of immoral action is true, *because* the other guy believes it to be false. Tom would believe as Lady Jane believes, that not slowing down would be immoral, iff he had no sufficient reason to believe something else was of greater moral import and thus made a counter-action necessary.

This is of course, an idealized moral dilemma, as most are. The last car in the train could have blown a wheel bearing, jumped the tracks, ended up sideways, and Tom, seeing that, slows down hoping the sideways car will stop him from descending the grade. Or a big tree falls, or a tremor looses a boulder.

Yeah, you’re right about ol’ Boris.....hanging out in the bushes, waiting for one calamity or the other. He doesn’t know he was nothing but an afterthought, an add-on of mine, an embellishment because my imagination overstepped itself. My Andy Rooney influence, I guess.
————————-

On the context of others and their perspectives with respect to “the good”.......under those conditions, how do we distinguish an act of morality from an act of mere civility? Even if they are both predicated on some sense of “good”, can it be the same sense of good for both?

Even if you see green? — Banno

What of it? Cut to the chase, would you?

It doesn't make sense to feel such that you judge it to be blue, because, unlike moral judgement, that sort of judgement isn't typically made based on how we feel. That would make you very peculiar.

Your turn. What scientific test can be performed to determine whether something is immoral, if I don't feel such that I judge it to be immoral?

Answer the question, please.

The only possible contradiction will arise when I derive congruent moral *and* immoral judgements simultaneously, which is quite impossible. But never from making a claim of morality *or* immorality with respect to observation of a determination I did not myself make. — Mww

I missed a bunch of posts, but re the above, (logically problematic) contradictions require that we're not equivocating --it needs to be the same exact claim, in the same respect, etc. that's being both asserted and denied at the same time. Different people having different beliefs is not a (logically problematic) contradiction. — Terrapin Station

In other words say the claim is "The cat is on the mat (and necessarily at time Tx, in regard y, from perspective z, etc.)" We can call that claim P.

A contradiction only obtains when we say both P and not-P. The claim, P, can't change, it can't be equivocated in any regard. We need to both assert (P) and deny (not-P) the same claim (the claim is P), at the same time, in the same regard, etc. — Terrapin Station

@creativesoul, now do you believe me? Or do you think that all three of us are wrong, and you're right?

I hate to say I told you so, but...

If someone were to come to me, in some hypothetical scenario, and tell me that what I'm seeing is not green, but red, I'd tell them that what I am seeing is green even if the nanometers of the wavelength of light happened to roughly correspond to what most people call red. — Moliere

Good for you. :grin:

Are you saying that all human properties are merely subjective?

Monetary. Alice values the ring at a few dollars but it is worth thousands. — Andrew M

Ok, then analogously, you're merely talking about what's conventional with regards to morality. The ring is worth thousands and murder is immoral, but trivially, this is only so in accordance with a convention that we made up. To say that murder is immoral ultimately boils down to "murder is unconventional". What's more, there's much variation, at least on the finer points, of moral conventions between different cultures. And the finer points can and do matter a great deal. What's conventional in one place might not be so in another.

Your talk of a "natural" standard here is obviously inappropriate, as it is the opposite of that. It is an artificial standard.

Perhaps this is a difference between "in principle" and "in practice". Certainly a mountain of diamonds on a planet in another galaxy has no practical value for us.

But for a practical and potentially life-or-death example, a valuable water supply might be readily available to a community, but they never searched for it, or disvalued it when they did find it (e.g., wilfully polluted it). Thus something valuable was lost. — Andrew M

I think what you have shown here is that, in extremis, it is possible for humans to value or dis-value almost anything. I do generally agree with what you seem to be proposing, though: that what is most universally valued should reflect what, objectively speaking, is beneficial to human flourishing, and can rightly be said to be, on account of being beneficial, valuable. And this could be applied to actions, which could thus be said to be moral or immoral depending on whether they foster or hinder social harmony.

But all of this is predicated on a desire to promote human flourishing in a context of social harmony, so again we can say 'If we want to promote human flourishing in a context of social harmony then we should value some acts and dis-value others, and cal the former morally correct and the latter morally incorrect. There is no contradiction then if others who do not value social harmony do not agree with our moral assessments, even though it certainly seems to be the case that the vast majority of people will agree that social harmony is of primary importance.

Perhaps it be better put a bit differently.

That which already exists in it's entirety prior to our account/report of it, is not existentially dependent upon our recognition of it's existence.

Goodness is one such thing. — creativesoul

Goodness is just a concept we use for judging morality. What of it?

Insofar as we're talking about anything mental.

Aside from that, obviously the properties are not going to be human-independent.

So you are claiming that moral thought and action cannot be driven by anything in humans apart from the merely mental, or in other words cannot be motivated by anything beyond their mere opinions, which you take to be completely arbitrary?

It is really only Boris here who is morally culpable. — Andrew M

Oh dear. What's he gone and done this time? First that thing with the bus, now he's been messing with trains. I predict that Theresa will make him the new Transport Secretary once failing Grayling has been given the boot.

I'd have to clarify what the scope of "motivated by" would be, but in general, no--I'm simply claiming that moral judgments, or whatever we want to call moral xs such as "Murder is wrong," "It's obligatory to nurture children," etc. are mental phenomena, and are not phenomena that obtain elsewhere than minds.

I said nothing at all to suggest that I believe the phenomena in question is arbitrary. I'm just saying that it's mental phenomena, not ocean phenomena, not oven phenomena, not atmospheric phenomena, or anything else like that.

Moral judgements are mental by definition insofar as they are conceptual and linguistically expressed. Does it follow that such judgements cannot be motivated by anything unconscious, that is cannot be motivated by pre-conceptual, pre-linguistic, and thus extra-mental, conditions?

Yup. You're all three mistaken. Let me know when you find a way out of the pickle? Yes? Do you remember where you ended up contradicting yourself if you gave an answer? I'll remind you...

"X is moral relative to A" is false if A does not believe that X is moral and true if A believes that X is moral.

And...

A's belief can be false.

How is that possible if the truth of "X is moral" is relative to A's belief?

Goodness is just a concept... — S

Not all conceptions of goodness can account for that which exists prior to our conceptions. Goodness, on my view, does not requires our awareness of it. Rather, it is often discovered... and sometimes quite unexpectedly.

I would just add that I don't think the good is a brute fact - we can seek a deeper explanation of those good things. — Andrew M

Thanks. We do seem to share a position, or at least they're very close...

Goodness is not a fact on my view either. Facts are what has happened. Rather goodness is something discovered and hopefully continually aspired towards afterwards.

Tom would believe as Lady Jane believes, that not slowing down would be immoral, iff he had no sufficient reason to believe something else was of greater moral import and thus made a counter-action necessary. — Mww

Yes, so Lady Jane can think Tom is immoral to not slow down because she does not have all the relevant facts available. So that would be similar to conventional positive disagreements about the world. But if she did have the relevant facts that Tom has, then she could see why Tom's action is morally permissible, despite not liking the outcome. (Because that's the sort of rational reflection one does when a train is bearing down on you...)

On the context of others and their perspectives with respect to “the good”.......under those conditions, how do we distinguish an act of morality from an act of mere civility? Even if they are both predicated on some sense of “good”, can it be the same sense of good for both? — Mww

They're not the same sense of good, since one can be moral and uncivil at the same time (e.g., protesting loudly against slavery). But no doubt they can overlap in complex ways.

So where do we look to check what the things are that are universally valuable to humans, where that value is independent of human opinion? — Terrapin Station

You just have to look at what the basic needs of human beings are. For example, food and water are universally valuable for human beings.

Or do you think that is something that opinions can legitimately differ on?