This topic has been discussed and/or skirted around for centuries in one form or another. The result is that it is extremely complex discourse to navigate. There are numerous different notions of reference throughout history, not all of which are compatible with one another. The sheer quantity of subtopics and/or otherwise tangential aspects is downright daunting.

The irony(or difficulty depending) is that what we're doing here - the activity we're all involved in - is the referent of our own discourse. That holds good for all historical accounts as well. Via discourse, we are drawing an other's attention to the fact that we draw an other's attention to some thing in particular that our attention is already upon. We are accounting for how that happens. We do not need to draw an other's attention to the fact that we're drawing an other's attention to some thing in particular in order to draw an other's attention to that. In other words, we do not need to talk about the fact that we can draw an other's attention to some thing or other in order to be able to do so. The other need not know that that is being done. We need not know that we're doing it.

Drawing an other's attention to the same thing in particular that our attention is already upon is something that all of us began doing long before we came to realize that we were doing it. Drawing an other's attention to the same thing in particular that our attention is already upon is not existentially dependent upon our awareness of it. It does not require being named. Rather, it is something that exists in it's entirety(it is something that we do) prior to our knowing that we're doing it. Drawing an other's attention to the same thing in particular that our attention is already upon is not existentially dependent upon our ability to take an account of it.

We can draw an other's attention to the same thing in particular that our attention is already upon by virtue of ostension and/or description, despite the fact that the description need not be true. What we cannot do is take account of the fact that we're drawing their attention to some thing that ours is already upon by virtue of false description. What we're doing when we draw an other's attention to some thing that ours is already upon cannot be adequately taken into account by a single name/term. It just cannot be done. Rather, what we're doing can only be taken into account by virtue of true description.

That's the irony here.

There is a clear distinction between the necessary and sufficient conditions for drawing an other's attention to some thing that our attention is already upon and our accounts thereof. Drawing an other's attention to some thing that our attention is already focused upon is not something that is capable of being true/false. It's something that happens. The necessary and sufficient conditions for drawing an other's attention to the same thing in particular that our attention is already upon do not include our thought/belief and/or terminological jargon about the fact that we're doing it. Rather, our thought/belief and/or jargon(our reports/accounts) about drawing an other's attention to some thing that ours is already upon can be true/false.

We cannot use false descriptions about what we're doing when we're taking an account of drawing an other's attention to some thing that ours is already upon and expect to arrive at an acceptable conception and/or notion of reference. Any and all acceptable conceptions/notions of reference must be able to properly take account of the fact that in all cases of referring we are drawing an other's attention to some thing that ours is already upon. This can only be arrived at by virtue of true descriptions about how that happens.

That sheds a bit of much needed light upon the elephant in the room.

There's a difference between what successful reference takes and what a proper account of successful reference takes. The former can happen with the use of false descriptions. The latter cannot consist of such.

On the one hand you agree that false descriptions can successfully refer. On the other, you seem to be implying that they cannot refer 'descriptively'. How else do descriptions refer if not descriptively?
— creativesoul

Remember how Kripke explained how he intended use the phrase "reference of the description" in order to match up with the descriptivist logical tradition. (That was on page 25, if I remember). That's how referring descriptively works. You supply a definite description of the item you intend to refer to, and you intend this item to be whatever uniquely satisfies this description. (That's what makes the description definite). — Pierre-Normand

I do remember that. It's been the source of a bit of confusion on my part.

Another way for a description to refer would be as a reference fixing rather than a reference determining device. In that case, it might serve to disambiguate among several items that a speaker could be making reference demonstratively, or by means of a shared proper name, while accounting for the fact that the content of the description could be false and merely believed to be true by the speaker.

See if I have this right...

Here the difference between reference fixing and reference determining would be that the former makes use of an otherwise inadequate description(one that is incapable of successfully picking out an individual), whereas the latter is making use of a purportedly adequate description, according to one who argues in favor of definite descriptions.

If the intended reference is singled out demonstratively, for instance, and we can account for demonstrative reference non-descriptively, then it's possible to express a false belief by means of a false definite description of this demonstratively referenced individual. — Pierre-Normand

You're saying that false description does not pick out the referent, but rather that it has/had already been picked out by true description or demonstratively(pointing, showing).

Is that about right?

False beliefs are not true. What's said about the referent in a false description is about the referent. It need not be true in order to refer.
— creativesoul

Of course. It only needs to be true in order to refer descriptively, in case the intended reference would be singled out descriptively by the predicative content of the definite description. If the intended reference is singled out demonstratively, for instance, and we can account for demonstrative reference non-descriptively, then it's possible to express a false belief by means of a false definite description of this demonstratively referenced individual. — Pierre-Normand

This seems odd to me.

On the one hand you agree that false descriptions can successfully refer. On the other, you seem to be implying that they cannot refer 'descriptively'. How else do descriptions refer if not descriptively?

Have I misunderstood or is there a bit of nuance here? I'd appreciate - and do appreciate - your participation here.

As a result of the speaker knowing how to use language to draw an other's attention to the 'object'.
— creativesoul

Yes, that's sketchy but basically right. It also takes us out of the realm of Kripke's descritivist targets, and dovetails with his own account. — Pierre-Normand

Well you asked a question that could only be answered with such ambiguity. I also do not see how it takes us out of the realm of descriptivist accounts. I'm ok with agreeing with Kripke. I'm ok with not. I don't think I understand his position well enough to know which is the case...

This account presupposes that your belief about that person indeed is about that person and not about someone else who might actually be, unbeknownst to you, drinking champagne, (or about nobody, if nobody is having champagne). What is this account of the reference of your belief on the basis of which the truth of the predicative content of the DD can be evaluated as matching up with this belief? — Pierre-Normand

Not to speak on behalf of andrewk, but rather on my own behalf...

The above criticism is based upon a misunderstanding of belief and how it works. False beliefs are not true. What's said about the referent in a false description is about the referent. It need not be true in order to refer.

Jane believes Joe killed Bob. She refers to Joe as "the man who killed Bob". Joe did not kill Bob. Allen did. When Jane says "the man who killed Bob", she is not expressing a belief about Allen even if and when it is the case that he satisfies the description(that he matches up with the description).

That alone shows us that satisfying the description is not necessary for successfully reference. To talk about "matching up with this belief" is to talk about whether or not the description is true. That is irrelevant to successful reference.

The issue is to explain how the speaker's belief comes to be about the speaker's intended referent in the world. — Pierre-Normand

Simply put...

As a result of the speaker knowing how to use language to draw an other's attention to the 'object'.

The truth of the DD is irrelevant to successful reference. The speaker believes it to be true. That's relevant.

Do you see the problem? — Pierre-Normand

If one believes that the person is drinking champagne, then the description represents the belief. The belief refers to the person the speaker believes to be drinking champagne.

So, it seems that at times I'm understanding Kripke's lectures, and at others I've critiqued what he offers as though it is his own position when it is not. My apologies to all here. I'm just trying to grasp what he's getting at. Evidently, I do not have enough background knowledge to tell when he's setting out his own position and when he's critiquing another...

There is one concern/question that persists for me despite all this, but it's best to remain silent as of now. It may turn out that it is answered.

Thanks to all here who have shown me where I'm in error...

Thanks. Perhaps I have conflated what Kripke is granting as a means to argue against, and what he's actually claiming himself with regard to reference. That doesn't seem very clear to me...

Hmmm...

His text and his footnotes both clearly set out his notion of the 'referent of the description' as the object uniquely satisfying the conditions of the description. I'm showing how that notion leads to a reductio when it comes to explaining the referent of false description.

Could you point me to "the case Kripke describes". I'd like to see him put his own notion to use as a means for clearing up the charges I'm levying against his notion of the 'referent of the description'.

This is from earlier... cleaned up a bit.

...Kripke's doctrine doesn't seem capable of properly accounting for false belief. In fact, some cases of false belief are quite problematic for it.

So you may say,
'The man over there with the champagne in his glass is happy',
though he actually only has water in his glass. Now, even
though there is no champagne in his glass, and there may be
another man in the room who does have champagne in his
glass, the speaker intended to refer, or maybe, in some sense of
'refer', did refer, to the man he thought had the champagne in
his glass. Nevertheless, I'm just going to use the term 'referent
of the description' to mean the object uniquely satisfying the
conditions in the definite description.

Nevertheless???

:gasp:

Jane believes Joe killed Bob. She refers to Joe by stating, "You know - the guy who kiled Bob...". She is saying stuff about Joe. She is picking Joe out. The referent of the description is the specific individual that is being picked out of this world by Jane. That is clearly Joe.

Kripke's framework(his notion of the 'referent of the description') demands concluding otherwise when Jane's belief is false.

Let me repeat...

Kripke's framework would be forced to report Jane's belief in a remarkably different way if it were false.

In such a case, according to Kripke's notion of 'referent of the description', the referent of Jane's description could not be Joe. She believes Joe killed Bob. Allen did. Jane doesn't know of Allen. Yet, according to Kripke's notion of the 'referent of the description', the referent of Jane's description is Allen.

This framework leads one to say that Jane is referring to someone she does not even know about, and that the person she is saying stuff about is not the referent of her description. Are we to conclude that it makes any sense at all to say that Jane can describe and talk about Joe while the referent of Jane's description about Joe is not Joe, but rather it is Allen.

That looks like a fundamental error in taxonomy. If you get thought and belief wrong, you'll have something or other wrong about everything ever thought, believed, stated, written, and/or otherwise uttered.

Kripke's notion of "proper referent" cannot properly account for Jane's referring to Joe by virtue of saying stuff about him that's false. Ask Jane who she is referring to. Tell her that Joe is innocent. Prove it to her. Ask her again who she was referring to... She will say "Joe" if she knows his name. Let's say she doesn't. Put Joe in a lineup. She will still pick out Joe. She is referring to Joe.

Kripke would tell Jane that the referent of her descriptions was Allen. Jane would tell Saul that she doesn't know Allen, and that she certainly knows who she was talking about even if she said some stuff about him that was wrong, mistaken, false, and/or otherwise not true. I would agree with Jane.

I cannot see that.

What's your take on Kripke's notion of the 'referent of the description' in cases of false belief in the form of false description?

It seems you're talking about something that I am not.

What's at issue is whether or not false description can be used to successfully refer. Kripke's account does not seem to be able to provide an acceptable explanation of these cases when they happen. That is the point I'm currently arguing...

You're wanting to argue about whether or not Jane needs to know something else about Joe in order for her to be able to use false description to successfully refer to Joe(to pick Joe out by saying false stuff about Joe).

While I offered a case where Jane knows Joe by name, it is not necessary for her to successfully refer to Joe, even in cases where she does not know his name. I've offered that as well...

So, now you claim that Jane doesn't know what he looks like after all? — Janus

Did I? Where?

IF what you say is true, then Jane could not successfully pick Joe out by virtue of false description alone.

BUT SHE DOES...

It's up to you what to do with this...

Something else of equal importance. There are cases where there is no need for use of definitive description being accompanied by proper name in order to successfully refer to a particular individual...

Let's say that Jane does not know Joe's name, but rather can recognize him as the person she believes killed Bob. Her definite description, "the guy who killed Bob" refers to Joe, even when Jane does not know Joe's name. According to Kripke, the referent of Jane's definite description is Allen. Yet if we place Allen and Joe in a line up and ask Jane to whom she was referring, she would pick out Joe.

Kripke's account is contrary to everyday fact(that which actually happens on a daily basis). — creativesoul

And there...

Jane believes Joe killed Bob. She refers to Joe by stating, "You know - the guy who kiled Bob...". She is saying stuff about Joe. She is picking Joe out. The referent of the description is the specific individual that is being picked out of this world by Jane. That is clearly Joe.

Following Kripke's framework demands concluding otherwise when Jane's belief is false.

Let me repeat...

Kripke's framework would be forced to report Jane's belief in a remarkably different way if it were false.

In such a case, according to Kripke's notion of 'referent of the description', the referent of Jane's description could not be Joe. Rather, the referent of Jane's description would have to be someone that she may not even know exists. She believes Joe killed Bob. Allen did. Jane doesn't know of Allen. Yet, according to Kripke's notion of the 'referent of the description', the referent of Jane's description is Allen.

This framework leads one to say that Jane is referring to someone she does not even know about, and that the person she is saying stuff about is not the referent of her description. Are we to conclude that it makes any sense at all to say that Jane can describe and talk about Joe while the referent of Jane's description about Joe is not Joe, but rather it is Allen.

That looks like a fundamental error in taxonomy. If you get thought and belief wrong, you'll have something or other wrong about everything ever thought, believed, stated, written, and/or otherwise uttered.

Kripke's notion of "proper referent" cannot properly account for Jane's referring to Joe by virtue of saying stuff about him that's false. Ask Jane who she is referring to. Tell her that Joe is innocent. Prove it to her.

Ask here again who she was referring to... She will say "Joe". Put Joe in a lineup. She will pick out Joe.

Kripke's got a bit of bullshit mixed in there.

Kripke would tell Jane that the referent of her descriptions about Joe was Allen. Jane would tell Saul that she knows who she was talking about even if she said some stuff about him that was wrong, mistaken, false, and/or otherwise not true. I would agree with Jane. — creativesoul

There and elsewhere...

What does your reply have to do with whether or not Jane can successfully refer to Joe by virtue of false description?
— creativesoul

It points out that Jane cannot refer to Joe merely on the basis of a false description alone; she needs to know something true about him; at the very least what he looks like, for example. — Janus

Jane shows otherwise.

How could she know that he "looks like the person she believes killed Bob" if she didn't know what he looks like? — Janus

To her there is no difference. That is precisely the point.

Read and quote my example...

Then address it's flaws if you see any.

If all she is saying about Joe is that he killed Bob, then she is saying something false about Joe. But this reference depends on her knowing who Joe is independently of her false belief about him. — Janus

emphasis mine

This contradicts everyday events like Jane's. Clearly her reference does not depend upon her knowing who Joe is independently of her false belief about him. Jane's case is one in which the only thing she knows about him is that he looks like the guy she believes killed Bob. That's more than adequate for her successfully referring to him.

...

She must at least know what he looks like as I said. In order to identify a particular person you must know something about them. — Janus

He looks like the man who she believes killed Bob. She knows that. Doesn't hardly pass the muster of knowing something about Joe independently of her false belief though... does it?

If all she is saying about Joe is that he killed Bob, then she is saying something false about Joe. But this reference depends on her knowing who Joe is independently of her false belief about him. — Janus

No. It doesn't. Jane need not know anything at all about Joe. She need only to recognize Joe as the person she believes killed Bob.

I don't understand your criticism. In the quotes you cite, he is setting out the theory he then shows to be mistaken. His point is that there is a difference between the referent and the description, in that one is necessary and the other contingent. — Banno

It can be the case that his critique of certain positions holds good, and that both he and the proponents of those other positions are both wrong about what it takes to successfully refer. As time passes here, I'm leaning more and more to that conclusion.

I'm pointing out that Kripke's framework is inherently inadequate for taking proper account of what Jane does. I'm not passing judgment upon whether or not he points out valid issues with some descriptivist positions by virtue of using the historical conventional notions of necessity and contingency.

I'm looking at what Kripke is claiming...

In the footnotes on page 25...

Call the referent of a name or description in my sense the 'semantic referent'; for a name, this
is the thing named, for a description, the thing uniquely satisfying the description.

There it is.

Accompanied by the text of both pg. 25 and 26...

...Nevertheless, I'm just going to use the term 'referent of the description' to mean the object uniquely satisfying the conditions in the definite description. This is the sense in which it's been used in the logical tradition...

There it is again...

I've shown the consequences. What's not to understand?

Something else of equal importance. There are cases where there is no need for use of definitive description being accompanied by proper name in order to successfully refer to a particular individual...

Let's say that Jane does not know Joe's name, but rather can recognize him as the person she believes killed Bob. Her definite description, "the guy who killed Bob" refers to Joe, even when Jane does not know Joe's name. According to Kripke, the referent of Jane's definite description is Allen. Yet if we place Allen and Joe in a line up and ask Jane to whom she was referring, she would pick out Joe.

Kripke's account is contrary to everyday fact(that which actually happens on a daily basis).

Sure. No problem. I'm painfully aware of my tendency to go off on a tangent without leaving enough breadcrumbs, so to speak, for a reader to follow. Earlier in this thread I objected to some stuff being said regarding false belief. I was told then that I misunderstood. I stood down then, but I do not think I misunderstood then, and do not think that I've misunderstood now...

If we accept Kripke's notion of 'the referent of the description', we are forced to say that the referent of some definite description is not the individual to whom the speaker is referring, but rather it is the individual uniquely satisfying the conditions in the definite description.

Jane is talking about Joe, not Allen. Allen is the individual satisfying the conditions in the definite description. According to Kripke, the referent of Jane's definite description is Allen... not Joe.

That's unacceptable, to say the least...

Maybe I've misunderstood? Sure, I mean that can happen. I see no reason to believe that that is the case here. Rather, it seems clear to me that Kripke is just following a mistaken path for definite description. He's conflating the truth conditions of a definite description with the referent thereof.

From pages 25 and 26...

I'm just going to use the term 'referent of the description' to mean the object uniquely satisfying the conditions in the definite description.This is the sense in which it's been used in the logical tradition.

That's what....

Ya'll have fun...

What does this have to do with Kripke's theory? — andrewk

If by "this" you're referring to the bits I've been raising about false belief...

Well, in short, Kripke's doctrine doesn't seem capable of properly accounting for false belief. In fact, some cases of false belief are quite problematic for it.

So you may say,
'The man over there with the champagne in his glass is happy',
though he actually only has water in his glass. Now, even
though there is no champagne in his glass, and there may be
another man in the room who does have champagne in his
glass, the speaker intended to refer, or maybe, in some sense of
'refer', did refer, to the man he thought had the champagne in
his glass. Nevertheless, I'm just going to use the term 'referent
of the description' to mean the object uniquely satisfying the
conditions in the definite description.

Nevertheless???

:gasp:

Jane believes Joe killed Bob. She refers to Joe by stating, "You know - the guy who kiled Bob...". She is saying stuff about Joe. She is picking Joe out. The referent of the description is the specific individual that is being picked out of this world by Jane. That is clearly Joe.

Following Kripke's framework demands concluding otherwise when Jane's belief is false.

Let me repeat...

Kripke's framework would be forced to report Jane's belief in a remarkably different way if it were false.

In such a case, according to Kripke's notion of 'referent of the description', the referent of Jane's description could not be Joe. Rather, the referent of Jane's description would have to be someone that she may not even know exists. She believes Joe killed Bob. Allen did. Jane doesn't know of Allen. Yet, according to Kripke's notion of the 'referent of the description', the referent of Jane's description is Allen.

This framework leads one to say that Jane is referring to someone she does not even know about, and that the person she is saying stuff about is not the referent of her description. Are we to conclude that it makes any sense at all to say that Jane can describe and talk about Joe while the referent of Jane's description about Joe is not Joe, but rather it is Allen.

That looks like a fundamental error in taxonomy. If you get thought and belief wrong, you'll have something or other wrong about everything ever thought, believed, stated, written, and/or otherwise uttered.

Kripke's notion of "proper referent" cannot properly account for Jane's referring to Joe by virtue of saying stuff about him that's false. Ask Jane who she is referring to. Tell her that Joe is innocent. Prove it to her.

Ask here again who she was referring to... She will say "Joe". Put Joe in a lineup. She will pick out Joe.

Kripke's got a bit of bullshit mixed in there.

Kripke would tell Jane that the referent of her descriptions about Joe was Allen. Jane would tell Saul that she knows who she was talking about even if she said some stuff about him that was wrong, mistaken, false, and/or otherwise not true. I would agree with Jane.

False description unaccompanied by proper name will not pick out the individual, regardless of the speaker's belief.

The proper name is irrevocable to being able to successfully refer when positing hypotheticals. This is obvious as a result of proper name and false description still being able to successfully pick out the individual despite the fact that what's been said about him/her is false. A listener who knows better can still pick out the referent as a result of the proper name. A listener who does not know better doesn't matter.

The false description alone is never capable of successful reference.

I think Kripke's lectures(N&N) are in agreement with this, and argue in favor of it.

That's how the idea came up to begin with... Kripke's examples... it shows the primacy of the proper name...

You have not understood correctly. You have not quoted the relevant material being referred to in the beginning of that reply.

No. I would not agree that the criterion for successful reference that I've just put before you can be accommodated within either, let alone by both...

To be clear here... I mean neither - individually - can take proper account of what I've put forth. I've not only talked about unsuccessfully referring, but also successfully referring...

So Kripke points out that false descriptions can still successfully refer to a specific individual if they are accompanied by proper name. Is that an "if, and only if..." circumstance? I don't think so...

They(false descriptions alone) cannot guide another's attention to the same thing without being accompanied by proper name unless all people involved share the false belief that the description reports and the description picks out a unique individual and nothing more.

It seems that way to me anyhow.

Here's my view on the matters at hand, as I understand them to be. It's a bit beneath others' notions of "reference"...

Initial successful reference(as reported above) instantiates shared meaning. All meaning requires something to become sign/symbol, something to become significant/symbolized, and a creature capable of drawing correlations between the aforementioned different things. All shared meaning requires a plurality of capable creatures making these same connections. All language requires shared meaning. Not all shared meaning requires language. Not all shared meaning requires successful reference. At times it is the birthplace thereof.

Successfully referring to some thing or other is something that we all do prior to our ability to take account of what we'd long since already been doing. Successfully referring to some thing or other does not require our ability to think about the fact that we're doing it. All notions of reference involve complex written language directly involving thinking about thought and belief. Not all successful reference does. Thus, any acceptable criterion for what counts as successfully referring(all notions of reference) must be able to take that into proper account.

Have you never failed to catch the gist of something said to you, misheard a name, or heard the name but thought the reference was to somebody else with the same name? — andrewk

Sure, but what relevance does this have to what's at issue? What's at issue is whether or not false descriptions are capable - all by themselves - of successfully referring to some specific individual but nothing else.

In cases where one mishears the name, there's a name being used. What's at issue is whether or not false descriptions - all by themselves - are capable od successfully referring to some specific individual but nothing else. Thus, it's not a valid counterexample. In cases where one correctly hears a name but mistakenly believes that the speaker is talking about someone when s/he is not, there's a name being used. Again, what's at issue is whether or not false descriptions - all by themselves - are capable of successfully referring to some specific individual but nothing else. That's also not a valid counterexample.

Cases of basic misunderstanding(failing to catch the gist) are too numerous to account for here. The discussion is about reference, and what that requires in order to happen.

Are you claiming that you do not understand what "successful reference" means?
— creativesoul
Yes! Of course I can guess at meanings, but there are more than one possible meaning, and I want to know which one you mean.

What do you mean by 'successfully refer'? — andrewk

I've been setting it out. I'll try to offer the simplest adequate criterion here.

All referring is done with language. It is to direct and/or otherwise guide an other's attention to some thing or other. There is more than one way to do this. One can show an other some thing. One can point to some thing. One can talk about some thing by description, by name, or by both.

Referring to some thing or other can be successful in two ways. The first is when the person referring to some thing or other and the person whose attention is being guided towards some thing or other both pick out the same thing. This is required for all successful reference to initially take place.

Once that initial reference is successful, subsequent successful reference no longer depends upon the listener picking out the same thing. Rather, at that time, one successfully refers by virtue of appropriate name usage and/or adequate description. The listener need not understand...

Seems to me that Kripke has an entire thought process that directly involves offering examples that satisfy/meet some criterion or other for successful reference, and yet clearly do not pick out a specific individual but nothing else. That seems to be the gist of the lectures themselves. or at least the method.

...people often don't know who others are talking about, even when they are both familiar with the referent... — andrewk

Then the referent is not equivalent to the person being spoken of.

That doesn't sound right to me...