So, we agree that we can get some knowledge of pre-lingual thought/belief. That's good. Is there any good reason to hold that we cannot acquire knowledge of what all thought/belief consist in/of?

That certainly does not require omniscience.
— creativesoul

What comes to my mind is 'nothing is hidden.' We already live and experience these phenomena. Beyond that we can articulate them better with superior formal indications. — macrosoft

Not following this...

:worry:

Indeed. Though I'm still trying to find the words for it. I'd say think of a conversation with a lover or a friend. Think of those two faces communicating and the complex play of meaning, the flexibility.

Or I like to think of my cat in her living complexity. I can analyze this or that sub-system, but her living complexity is something else. I am not saying to stop looking for better accounts. I don't think we can help. We just naturally synthesize accounts. And even we are part of this with our meta-accounts. — macrosoft

Nah. Don't give up on the idea of getting it right yet.

Draw and maintain the aforementioned distinction between thought/belief and thinking about thought/belief. Use the earlier method I presented...

Take it for spin. I'll be here.

The first example was one that is ripe with very complex language use, countless connections...

The second seemed to wave the white flag before it got started...

I think we can get some knowledge of it, but we are talking about the most complicated object in the known universe. Or rather it is talking about itself. — macrosoft

So, we agree that we can get some knowledge of pre-lingual thought/belief. That's good. Is there any good reason to hold that we cannot acquire knowledge of what all thought/belief consist in/of?

That certainly does not require omniscience.

I would strongly argue that all mind/language requires thought/belief, but not all thought/belief requires mind/language(unless one equates mind with thought/belief, and I wouldn't object).
— creativesoul

I think we agree on this point. What surprises me is that you think we can capture this animal pre-thinking in an explicit account. I think it's too pre-lingual to drag into the light. I have the sense that the operating system we use to do so is just staggering complex and yet incredibly smooth and elusive. We look through it like clean glass or as a fish through water.

I want to say that the quest is like trying to put walking into words. I believe we discussed the phenomenon of 'true for us.' People debate theories of truth in the light of this 'blind' assumption that something like true-for-us is already there. — macrosoft

Yeah, I kinda got the feeling that you had such a position...

What does being pre-lingual have to do with our knowledge of it, or rather the capability and/or possibility of us to acquire knowledge of that which is pre-lingual?

Mt. Everest is pre-lingual.

What rule and/or law is there that stops us from acquiring knowledge of pre-lingual thought/belief?

A second concern is that even if we could define our terms perfectly, such a concern overlooks the way words join together. Can I define every relation between every word? The assumption might be that definition takes care of this, but I'm not so sure. If I can use words differently in the first place, why can I not understand their combination differently? — macrosoft

Strong agreement here as well...

We have to discover, determine, and/or otherwise clearly establish that they share the same set of basic elemental constituents. Then we have to consider this set of basic elemental constituents in a different light.
— creativesoul

For me these would be part of that knowledge touched on in On Certainty. — macrosoft

Witt would never agree that all meaning has the same basic elemental constituency, would he???

His bit about the fact that there is no commonality that makes all games what they are aside from the fact that we call them that seems to denounce the very idea. Although he was arguing against "essence" I think.

I think our main point of misunderstanding is that maybe I'm more on the semantic holist side. I think explicit accounts need to use the same word in a different context, hence the problem. Each account builds up its own mini-language — macrosoft

Using the same word in a different context is to show all the different ways the term is used. An account of the accounts.

What good is that if this account of the accounts is incapable of showing what they all have in common that makes them what they are... an example of how meaning is attributed?

I would think that having this capability is the only standard to strive for. Otherwise, we're just entrenched in the same ole endless debates...

I'm suggesting something like a pre-human 'bottom' of our mind/language. Some things are just so automatic that we live rather than see them. With difficultly we can get a vague sense of them, by looking at certain problems in attempts at explicit accounts. — macrosoft

Yes. Where else is there to look?

I would strongly argue that all mind/language requires thought/belief, but not all thought/belief requires mind/language(unless one equates mind with thought/belief, and I wouldn't object).

This is of course a good idea, but one must already be in a language to begin with. Similarly I think one has to feel one's way into another personality. While there's no truly private language. I also think the perfectly public language is an abstraction. A second concern is that even if we could define our terms perfectly, such a concern overlooks the way words join together. Can I define every relation between every word? The assumption might be that definition takes care of this, but I'm not so sure. If I can use words differently in the first place, why can I not understand their combination differently? — macrosoft

Not sure if this line of consideration is helpful, although there is much to agree with.



"Hammer" is name. Hammering is an experience. We need not know the name to have the experience. Hammering with a hammer is existentially dependent upon language, for one cannot be hammering with a hammer without a hammer and hammers are existentially dependent upon language, although hammering with something other than a hammer is not.

Again, here I think that I agree wholeheartedly that the attribution of meaning is largely mischaracterized and misunderstood by many of not most philosophers. I think you said earlier that all of them have something to add(to our understanding?) but none of them got it right.
— creativesoul

It's nice that someone else sees where I'm coming from on this issue. Yes, I think explicit accounts tend to emphasize some aspect in a useful way. But the explicit accounts get entangled, hence the endless arguments between those who assume an explicit account is possible. — macrosoft

I would say that no such entanglement is inevitable. It's not fait accompli. I would also point out that it quite simply does not follow from the fact that different schools in philosophy proper hold quite different - seemingly incommensurate - explicit accounts of meaning that the possibility of arriving at an explicit account that gets it right is somehow not possible...

Our agreement is strong when it comes to the fact that we've not quite gotten it right yet...

Seems we diverge from that point.

There's been a bit of back and forth between participants regarding whether or not metaphor ought be valued and how/why and/or in what way... A bit of loose comparison between the analytic and continental views(pertaining to methodological approach with particular attention to how it pertains to "meaning")...

I find that when one knows what they're talking about they can speak clearly about it. Speaking clearly requires consistent language use. One dominant trend in philosophy proper was to clearly define one's terms. That trend is indispensable. It is absolutely necessary for reading comprehension... intelligibility???

Problems arise when we (mis)conceive of that which exists in it's entirety prior to our awareness of it's existence. Non-linguistic thought/belief is one such thing.

Now, here the critic may argue that the terms "thought" and "belief" are invented and/or created by us, and thus as a result there is no way for us to have gotten them wrong for what those terms mean is determined solely by virtue of how they're used by us.

That is irrelevant to the point being made. Allow me to invoke a far less controversial thing to talk about: This is Mt. Everest. We can say things about it's elemental constitution that are wrong. We can think/believe that it is existentially dependent upon things that it is not. We can think/believe that it is not existentially dependent upon things that it is. The reason for that is obvious. It exists in it's entirety prior to our naming it.

I would further argue that thought/belief is no different in that respect.

That is not to say that all thought/belief exists in it's entirety prior to our usage of "thought" and "belief"...

Rather, it is to say that some does. All thought/belief have the same set of basic elemental constituents.

The critics point applies here when we consider what method of approach could lead us to such knowledge. We have to start at the conventional notions, all the ways we use the terms "thought" and "belief". We have to discover, determine, and/or otherwise clearly establish that they share the same set of basic elemental constituents. Then we have to consider this set of basic elemental constituents in a different light.

Can we sensibly say that non-linguistic thought/belief consist of them as well? If not, then we surely have no good reason to call both sets of thought/belief by the same name.

An inexplicit ground is a direct threat to the project of the perfect system, which would like to be its own explicit ground. Uncomfortably, the operating system is quietly functioning, out of reach for the most part, big and soft (hence 'macrosoft'.) — macrosoft

This is most agreeable...

An inexplicit ground... I've been wondering for quite some time now how it is that so many people think/believe that well-grounded thought/belief requires the thinking/believing creature to be able to provide those grounds...

That's absurd given the evolution of thought/belief.

It is to conflate what being well-grounded takes with being able to talk about one's own thought/belief takes. Again, another consequence of neglecting the distinction between thought/belief and thinking about thought/belief.

There is also the dictionary problem. One word is defined in terms of others. And these others are still defined in terms of others. All a dictionary can do is aid someone who is already partially 'inside' a language. Correct usage is tested against how people treat us in response. There is no obvious connection to pure meaning. I do not in the least doubt the consciousness of meaning, but I think it is more of a flow with feedback and projection. The meaning is like electrons running through a string of words as their wire. Individual words just stared at do have some meaning. Or we can quickly fish for some by coming up with typical uses. But every serious thinking is immensely complex in the way that meaning rushes through it with memory and expectation. The very complexity involved in our background linguistic know-how outstrips the complexity of the thoughts so delivered. Explicit systems are sad little shadows of that which makes them possible in terms of sophistication.

I speculate that our phonetic alphabet and the spaces between words are misleading. Our dominant visual sense (which takes static objects as its ideal object) encourages us to 'visualize' thinking and meaning, despite their more plausible connection to the temporality of music/hearing.

Another motive that holds atomic meaning fast (as a default semi-automatic approach to be dismantled) is the common project of making a knock-down argument --often for the projection of authority. We need atomic meaning, as stable as possible, to do 'math' with words and build explicit metaphysical/epistemological systems. So our fear of groundlessness (or of just relying on the inexplicit ground we started with) also encourages an ignorance of a semantic holism that might otherwise be obvious. — macrosoft

Again, here I think that I agree wholeheartedly that the attribution of meaning is largely mischaracterized and misunderstood by many of not most philosophers. I think you said earlier that all of them have something to add(to our understanding?) but none of them got it right.

It seems that there may be a bit of indirect perception bubbling forth... that is to conflate physiological sensory perception and thought/belief by virtue of talking about perception as if it is informed by language.
— creativesoul

Is there a strict boundary? I'm not so sure there is. — macrosoft

I think there is. I also think that that is not something that we decide. Rather, it is something that we discover to be the case as a result of getting thought/belief right to begin with. It's a consequential bit of knowledge stemming from an adequate understanding of what thought/belief is.

Here's something to consider regarding perception that is informed by language...

Language less creatures have physiological sensory perception. They have no language. If perception is informed by language, then either there is more than one 'kind' or language-less creatures are incapable of perception. The latter is obviously false. So, we're faced to bear the burden of the former...

What do all examples of perception have in common such that we're not equivocating when we use the term to describe our perceptions as well as language-less creatures' perceptions?

I would argue that to use the term "perception" as a means to talk about highly complex linguistically informed thought/belief is prima facie evidence of not getting thought/belief right to begin with.

Given semantic holism as I understand, none of our supposed-to-be explicit categories cut very sharply...

What does the many facets of the attribution of meaning(semantic holism) have to do with whether or not we can get things that exist in their entirety prior to our awareness of them right or wrong?

There's been much talk in this thread about pre-conceptual existence(Umwelt???), as though it is an unthinking 'kind' and/or 'mode' of existence. Someone earlier even said as much... 'unthinking'...

I think that that notion stems from conflating thinking about thought/belief with thought/belief. The latter does not always require the former. The former always requires the latter.

What about pre-conceptual thought/belief?

I'm always willing to consider an example to the contrary.

Got one?

What you've said is that meaning requires a sign and a thing to be signified and that this can only happen if there is an external world, which is false. — Michael

I haven't said that.

If there is the word "cat" and if there is the experience of a cat then even if there isn't an external world then there is a sign and a thing to be signified.

If... if... if...

Sigh...

Even the external world realist can accept the example of the word "pain" and the experience of pain, or the word "ghost" and the fact that there are no external world ghosts (or ghosts of any kind). Meaning just doesn't require an external world.

The argument is more nuanced that this... if you cannot follow it, it's not my problem.

You could always simply offer one example to the contrary.

Semantic holism...

Explain a bit?

Insert pleading hands...

Not much else to add...

It seems that there may be a bit of indirect perception bubbling forth... that is to conflate physiological sensory perception and thought/belief by virtue of talking about perception as if it is informed by language.

Witt, as much as I like him for a number of ways, was himself the fly in the bottle when it came to thought/belief.
— creativesoul

I've got On Certainty. I haven't reread it for years, but I had the impression that he was more sophisticated than that. — macrosoft

Not sure what the term "that" is referring to at the ending... more sophisticated than what? It may not matter, if that is the case then there is no clarification necessary. If so, then please do so as you see fit...

Either way, curiously enough... it is in On Certainty that Witt is seeking to solve the problem of infinite justificatory regress. Unfortunately, the notion of "belief" that he worked from led him to look for hinge propositions as the foundation/basis/bedrock of all subsequent thought/belief; the kind of belief that is outside the purview and/or bounds of justification. Looking for propositional content as the basis of all thought/belief is looking through the clouded lens of an utterly inadequate criterion. It is to look at an apple pie and conclude that crust and filling is part of the basis of apples. In his defense, it was because of an inherent presupposed falsehood tightly bound wihin that particular notion/conception of "belief"... notably that all belief has propositional content. This also fueled some of his later mantras. Enough of that though...

He never drew and maintained the crucial distinction between thought/belief and thinking about thought/belief. In his defense, no one else in philosophy proper has either to my knowledge. Not even to this very day...
— creativesoul

This is a surprising perspective. Philosophy strikes me as being largely itself a thinking and believing about thinking and believing --and a thinking and believing about this same philosophy. It eats itself to the n-th power in limitless self-consciousness. Examine the Sheehan quote. Let me know what you think. — macrosoft

Yes. I see that he skirts around what I'm asserting here regarding the aforementioned distinction being sorely neglected. I mean, there's evidence of that in his words about Heiddy.

His dasein, as I understand it, is akin to an unquestioned original world-view... all of which are virtually entirely adopted.
— creativesoul

This doesn't square with my experience. — macrosoft

I would actually agree that that was a bit too oversimplified. Still yet, I do think that dasein includes one's initial worldview(thought/belief system)...

What first grabbed me about Heidegger was his dimantling of certain taken-for-granted approaches the subject and object theme, the idea of the world, etc. He uses the word 'existence' (dasein) in order to avoid all the meanings attached to person, subject, mind. The so-called mind is largely immersed in (is) activity. Existence doesn't drive. Existence is driving. Existence doesn't wash dishes. Existence is the washing of dishes. For him, being-in-the-world is 'primordial.' The idea of proving that other minds or an external world exists indicates a failure to grasp this pre-theoretical phenomenon.

Yes. I would credit Heiddy with the very same thing that I credit Witt for... how's that for a surprising grouping?

They both realized and struggled(on my view) to clearly set out what it was that was driving them. The driving force, if I may use a bit of poetic license, was that they both realized that meaning was attributed in far more ways than had been accounted for.

Heiddy wanted to make it a point to talk/write in such a way as to emphasize the fact that meaning is always being attributed... or at least that's how his style strikes me. Admittedly, I've not read a whole lot of Heiddy. Being And Time was left unfinished. On The Way To Language impressed me quite a bit. "Where word breaks off no thing may be..." left it's mark, and the dialogue in the beginning of the book, the one with the Japanese philosopher that is about that which goes unspoken... That dialogue is actually brilliant and very relevant to traditional Japanese cultural mores.

Witt, as much as I like him for a number of ways, was himself the fly in the bottle when it came to thought/belief. Unfortunately he followed the conventional(epistemological JTB) vein of thought regarding belief, and it's wrong at it's very foundation. One consequence was Gettier's foothold, aside from the fact that he also showed that 'logical' entailment is a misnomer.

I like to think of philosophers arguing about theories of truth. In terms of what shared theory of truth can they be arguing? And yet they argue! This IMV suggests a pre-theoretical 'primary' sense of 'our reality.' Explicit formulations are secondary to this and only entertained and advanced in the light of this receding phenomenon. — macrosoft

I'm fairly certain that I agree with this wholeheartedly. Arguing about theories of "truth" is to argue about a product of thinking about thought/belief. On my view, and I've argued it many times over, true belief is prior to language... thus, either true belief does not require truth or that which makes belief true is prior to language. Only correspondence theory gets close. Although I reject it in it's details, I have supplanted it with my own version.

Correspondence to: fact, reality, the world, the way things are, events, happenings, etc, does not always require language.

This is not in the direct spirit of the thread though, so I'll not expand.

He never drew and maintained the crucial distinction between thought/belief and thinking about thought/belief. In his defense, no one else in philosophy proper has either to my knowledge. Not even to this very day...

That difference helps to acquire knowledge of all thought/belief. That knowledge has the broadest possible rightful scope of application.

His dasein is akin to an unquestioned original world-view... all of which are virtually entirely adopted.

If... is begging the question(in the sense that you're using "begging the question"). Double standard. Your own argument cannot meet your own standard.

The argument I've presented is if all examples of the attribution of meaning are existentially dependent upon an external world then solipsism is false. I offered a (universal)criterion for the attribution of meaning. There are no examples to the contrary. Thus, there is no stronger justificatory ground for assent. That is the case. Therefore... solipsism is false.

Heidegger attempted and failed at understanding the role language has in one's world-view.

The willful pursuit of ignorance...

Putting forth a criterion that has no examples to the contrary has the strongest justificatory ground possible...

Call it "terrible" if you want...

The fact that meaning is existentially dependent upon an external world
— creativesoul

You've yet to show that this is the case. — Michael

There is no evidence to the contrary. What more shewing could one ask for?

...the existence of meaning isn't evidence of an external world. You need a better argument — Michael

Well no. The fact that meaning is existentially dependent upon an external world and meaning exists is all the argument that is necessary.

There's the word "cat" and there's the cat that I see. I connect the two. There is meaning. But neither is an external world object. — Michael

The cat you see is not something external to you? Really now?

What is the best description of the “Gettier Problem”? — Areeb Salim

Proof that 'logical' entailment is a misnomer.

So...

How do we know which things are exclusive to humans and which things are not? If we do not know that much, how can we possibly know when anthropomorphism is happening?

Everyone's mental states might be very different. It is actually hard to compare any mental states because of their private nature. I think that similar behavior may or may not entail similar mental states but I would not rush to conclusions. — Andrew4Handel

Yes. It is best to exercise caution about mental states when the only measure of evidence is behavioural observation.

It is hard to compare mental states because of a whole plethora of reasons. However, it is not so hard to acquire a good understanding of them. Langauge shows that mental states aren't so private after all. We can use what we learn through language to acquire knowledge of that which exists in it's entirety prior to our account of it.

Dirt is not meaningful outside the various human practices of making it meaningful. — bloodninja

My ducks plough their own bills through the dirt while chasing earthworms after a rain. It seems to me that after this happens enough, the ducks come to have some expectation about finding earthworms in the dirt after a rain. The more it happens, the more often they go looking even during times when there is not an earthworm on the surface.

Seems that the duck has drawn a(some) correlation(s) between their own hunger, earthworms, rain, and/or the dirt. The same could be said of them regarding me and their duck food.

I think it is a mistake to presuppose or conclude that attributing meaning is something that is exclusive to humans.

It is when a plurality of creatures draw correlations between the same things that meaning is shared. It is when a creature draws correlations between things that meaning is attributed.

The gardener gardens the soil. The soil becomes meaningful to the gardener solely by virtue of the correlations drawn by the gardener between the soil and things aside from the soil. When the gardener draws a correlation between the soil and his/her own blood sweat and tears, the soil becomes meaningful. When the gardener draws correlations between the soil and the food that it can help provide, the soil becomes a meaningful part of a source of food.

This notion of 'unmeaning' seems unnecessary,

One mind is not a plurality of things. Period.
— creativesoul

This is like saying that one universe is not a plurality of things.

The mind isn't just some single, indivisible thing. My thoughts are distinct from the pain in my throat, from the ringing in my ears, from the microwave sense-data presented to me in the top-right of my vision. — Michael

No, it's not.

Thoughts are not mind. Pains are not mind. Vision is not mind. Stars are not the universe. Etc...

I'm quite capable of deriving meaning from all of this without there being some external world that is causally responsible for my experiences. — Michael

I would like one example of the attribution of meaning that does not consist of something to become sign/symbol, something to become significant/symbolized, and a creature capable of drawing correlations, associations, and/or otherwise 'connecting' the two.

Just one will do.

Only after the concept of something like the ego has emerged can we go back and try to make it a foundation. — macrosoft

This seems the wrong way around.

If something exists in it's entirety prior to our conception thereof, then we do not make it a foundation. We discover the foundation that is already there.

I don't know enough about Freud to know whether the ego can exist - as it is conceived - prior to our account of it.

I'm thinking about branching off of this topic and beginning a new one that focuses upon what all is involved with language acquisition. Care to join me?

...Some people give animals or machines human attributes in order to try and demystify or deflate them in humans. Or to see where an attribute might have arisen in a simpler form.

So the problem could be said to be mistaken or politicized or ideological comparison. — Andrew4Handel

Maybe. Attributing particulars that are exclusive to humans to that which has none is anthropomorphism. One cannot see if these particulars are capable of arising in a simpler form solely by attributing them.

The OP begins discussion that underwrites all that...

I quite readily anthropomorphize dogs. I am quite aware that even a very bright dog has limits which prevent them from having the sort of complex, abstract ideas that humans have. On the other hand, most dogs seem abundantly capable of having wants, fears, preferences, learned behaviors, memories of good and bad, and various instinctive drives that add up to fairly complicated behavior.

A man and a dog connect at various levels, mutually, which is a pleasurable experience (usually -- unless the dog is trying to get you to play by shoving its slimy tennis ball into your mouth). Were I to treat the dog as a warm, wetware mechanism, there would be very little pleasure in interacting. Indeed, it might even be desirable from an ecological point of view to embrace our connection with all living creatures. Better that than treating ones cow like a machine, the forest like a warehouse, the birds like ornaments.

Anthropomorphizing one's car, one's computer, or one's force of robots is common, but mistaken. A geranium has more personality than a robotic vacuum. My computer knows nothing, feels nothing, and most of the time, does nothing. — Bitter Crank

As always Bitter, you've garnered an increase in my respect for you, not to mention the sheer amount of appreciation. I would readily agree with the benefits you've mentioned above. I mean, you've done a fantastic job of tempering my own approach here. Thank you for that.

So, not all anthropomorphism is something to be avoided. It's not 'bad' in and of itself.

That being said...

When we're looking to acquire knowledge of what humans and animals both have in common as far as the content of their respective thought and belief systems, it ought be avoided.

I'm just asking if you agree that... if the premisses of the argument are true, then solipsism is not.
— creativesoul

No, because as I said here, a "plurality of things" does not entail a "plurality of external things". The different kinds of experiences that a solipsistic mind has can be the plurality of things from which the thinking part draws its correlations, connections, and associations. — Michael

"A plurality of things" entails whatever I say it does. A plurality is more than one. A thing is anything and everything. A plurality of things is more than one thing. One mind is not a plurality of things. Period.

Besides all that...

The notion of entailment is riddled with problems. It's bullshit anyway. A can entail B despite the fact that A and B have different truth conditions. Entailment does not constitute warrant for moving from A to B. Period. That's one of Gettier's footholds.

It's simple and easy to forget, but...

Logic is the rules of correct inference. Logic presupposes truth as correspondence by virtue of presupposing the truth of the premisses. The sole aim of logic is to preserve truth.

So...

If one can follow a so-called logical rule such as 'logical' entailment and fail to preserve truth as a result, then entailment is not rightfully called "a rule of correct inference".

I think it goes that deep. What could someone mean by 'it is not the case that there is an external world.'? To whom are they talking? To deny the external world they need something like an external world. As I see it, there is a kind of embeddedness in a community that makes conversation possible in the first place. We are we before we are me. The me emerges from the we. Only after the concept of something like the ego has emerged can we go back and try to make it a foundation. In short, we have to have all kinds of semi-conscious beliefs/practices in common before we are even intelligible to one another. It seems like a hopeless task to try to go back and justify all of this shared understanding rigorously. Of course it's good to clarify here and there (wisely picking our battles.) — macrosoft

Very well put.

I agree that we can find lots of dubious presuppositions therein, but for me this is a problem with all discussions of this issue. We understand well enough what we mean in our everyday interactions. But then we want to hold some meaning in an exact position to build an argument with it. If the argument succeeds, then we've really only shown something about our artificial use of the word. The results depend on and apply only to some idiosyncratic semi-fixing of the meanings involved. — macrosoft

I think I understand and agree with the gist here.

It seems you're skirting around consistency/coherency in language use... or perhaps in the bigger picture - the rules of language games and their affect/effect in general. I agree that that approach is very useful and can be quite helpful in showing that a problem is nothing more than a consequence of language use. Bewitchment. It may be the best approach for reasonably and rightfully denouncing solipsistic thought/arguments.

However, Witt never seemed to properly account for that which exists in it's entirety prior to our account of it. Philosophy proper hasn't either so. Witt wrote, on more than one occasion, that much of his project involved whether or not there was such a thing as a priori knowledge and if so how we could attain/obtain it(how could we know). That starts off on the wrong foot to begin with, so to speak, by adopting an inherently inadequate framework.