No. You asked for a deductive argument for an external world. I offered two separate outlines.

The claim you're now questioning is part of an argument you asked for. This kind of questioning could go on without stop, because that kind of skepticism can be insincere. I hope that you're 'arguing' in good faith here. To answer that last question...

All thought and belief is meaningful. All meaning is attributed. All attribution of meaning is existentially dependent upon something to become sign/symbol, something to become significant, and a creature capable of drawing correlations, connections, and/or associations between the two. That is a plurality of things.

I find myself in agreement with much of what you have proposed. Not all.

I'll outline our agreements first, if you'd care to elaborate with me.

These are outlines of deductive arguments, no?

Here's what I want to discuss...

If it is the case that all thought and belief are existentially dependent upon a plurality, and a plurality negates solipsism, then solipsism is negated by the way things are... which is the way it should be.

If it is the case that solipsism is a philosophical position, and all philosophical positions are existentially dependent upon thought and belief, and all thought and belief is existentially dependent upon an external world, then it is the case that solipsism is existentially dependent upon an external world.

Which of the two outlined arguments above would you like to discuss?

I just outlined two of them.

Double meh...

Why is a psychological question.

I'm convinced by virtue of knowing what all thought have in common that makes them thought.

While we can't compare the object itself with our cognition of the object... — macrosoft

And yet you've distinguished between the two...

You remain convinced that that objection made a difference of some sort or was valid in any way? I don't but...

I'm talking about the most recent two outlines...

Care to directly address them?

The same proposition can be (and often is) expressed in different languages, so the proposition itself does not depend on those languages for its reality as a general sign, only for its existence in particular replicas. — aletheist

Propositions exist in more than one way?

I already gave the example of a weathervane as the expression of a proposition without language, although it can be translated into one, such as "the wind is blowing from that direction." — aletheist

Without language there is no propositional meaning, on my view. Translation presupposes pre existing meaning, a plurality of languages, and someone who can translate what the one says into the other.

All propositions are language.
— creativesoul
Propositions can be (and often are) expressed in language, but are not themselves language, whatever that would mean. The same proposition can be (and often is) expressed in different languages, so the proposition itself does not depend on those languages for its reality as a general sign, only for its existence in particular replicas. I already gave the example of a weathervane as the expression of a proposition without language, although it can be translated into one, such as "the wind is blowing from that direction." — aletheist

So, this admits - good or bad - that propositions are not existentially dependent upon language?

I have significant trouble accepting that.

It does not follow from the fact that the same proposition can be expressed in different languages that propositions exist independently of language.

Multiple languages can talk about the same thing. If we are going to claim that whatever they are talking about exists independently of language, then we ought at least get what they're talking about right. They're not talking about the proposition. They're talking about the states of affairs. Some states of affairs can exist independently of language. Others cannot. Relationships as well...

You've arrived at incoherence(self-contradiction) — creativesoul

I'm tempering my judgment... a little late, but the above very well may be wrong.

Not all states of affairs are fact. All facts are states of affairs.
— creativesoul
These two statements are not contradictory. Not all mammals are dogs. All dogs are mammals. In any case, here is what I actually said about facts.

Yes, we established earlier in the thread that facts are real states of affairs or real relations among things; i.e., they are as they are regardless of what anyone thinks about them.
— aletheist
Unreal states of affairs are not facts. All facts are real states of affairs. Again, no contradiction. — aletheist

Agreed. Right now, I'm considering what you're arguing...

Not all states of affairs are facts. All facts are states of affairs. There are two kinds of states of affairs then:Real states of affairs and unreal states of affairs. Real states of affairs are fact. Unreal states of affairs are not.

Propositions represent both real and unreal states of affairs.

Are facts states of affairs on your view?
— creativesoul
Yes, we established earlier in the thread that facts are real states of affairs or real relations among things; i.e., they are as they are regardless of what anyone thinks about them. — aletheist

What do false propositions represent?
— creativesoul
False propositions purport to represent facts, but do not really do so; i.e., they represent unreal states of affairs or unreal relations among things. — aletheist

So some propositions represent nonexistent(unreal) states of affairs, while others represent states of affairs.

How can one thing represent something else if that something else does not exist to begin with? There's nothing to represent.

Facts obtain if they're real?
— creativesoul
All facts are real, so all facts "obtain." A state of affairs or relation among things that does not "obtain" is not a fact. I tend to avoid the use of "obtain" in this context, because in ordinary usage it carries the idea of getting something not previously possessed. — aletheist

Exactly. So you do not use this notion of 'facts obtaining'?

...what did you think it meant, such that you suspected me of being comfortable with incoherence/self-contradiction? — aletheist

I was confused... dialetheism... para-consistent logic... true contradictions...

And by the way, "aletheist" comes from the Greek word "aletheia," which means truth; I am someone who believes in truth. — aletheist

My mistake. Apologies.

If it is the case that all thought and belief are existentially dependent upon a plurality...
— creativesoul

I asked before and I don’t think you explained, but what does it mean to be “existentially dependent” on something? — Michael

When the existence of a thing requires the existence of an other thing.

...if people claim to see or believe in an external world, that qualifies as there being an illusion of an external world, — Janus

An illusion of an external world is not an external world; that much is obvious. — Janus

Sigh...

You need to go back to the texts and reconsider Kant’s remark about ‘the scandal of philosophy’. All you’re doing is begging the question, which means, assuming what needs to be proven. You’re simply stating that the reality of the external world is apodictic and then wondering why others aren’t agreeing with you. There’s nothing else at issue here. — Wayfarer

Why not just address the argument?

False propositions purport to represent facts, but do not really do so; i.e., they represent unreal states of affairs or unreal relations among things.

Facts obtain if they're real?
— creativesoul
All facts are real, so all facts "obtain." A state of affairs or relation among things that does not "obtain" is not a fact. — aletheist

Not all states of affairs are fact. All facts are states of affairs.

You've arrived at incoherence(self-contradiction)

Judging by your avatar name, I suspect you do not mind.

No doubt... much groundwork had to be laid... as has been.

I agree that facts cannot be false. But, in logical space with possible worlds, they can be wrong in another possible world.

It gets frustrating to introduce possible worlds, but they are true also. — Posty McPostface

The actual was once the possible.

Would you concur or object?

I'm not so interested as to begin a thread. I may join one already in progress...

I mean, Witt was wrong about stuff too.
— creativesoul

Like what? — Posty McPostface

His conception of belief. It's an aside. Not relevant to this fact talk.

Facts cannot be false.

So facts are representative of all logical possibility?

That can't be right.

I mean, Witt was wrong about stuff too.

So, "logical space" refers to all logical possibility(that which has yet to have happened, and/or may never happen but could if the world were different than it is).

I'm a fan of Witt, and I'm a vehement opponent as well.

I think that is pertinent to advancing this discussion about what facts are. — Posty McPostface

This discussion is about one particular framework, or so I thought it was...

Facts are states of affairs on my view, but I've yet to have found this notion of "obtaining" to prove worthy of use...

Logical space?

What's that?

So, can we say that facts are representations of states of affairs, and then delve more deeply and state that facts are logical relations between objects in logical space?

We could if we abandon the meaning of "fact" as states of affairs.

The question on my end is how do facts obtain their status of facthood. — Posty McPostface

That's one that I've found imperative to understanding this framework as well.

A proposition represents a purported fact or a purported relation among things. A true proposition represents a real fact or a real relation among things.

So...

Propositions represent one of two things. Facts and/or relations. True propositions represent real facts and/or real relations. What do false propositions represent?

Facts obtain if they're real?

...a proposition represents a purported state of affairs or a purported relation among things. A true proposition represents a real state of affairs or a real relation among things. — aletheist

How do "facts" come into the picture here? Are facts states of affairs on your view?

What exactly do you mean by "existentially dependent"? — aletheist

All propositions are language.

A Supreme Court which paves a legal path to offering a foreigner the power of free speech during a general election is one which has just reduced the inherent power of American citizens' free speech. That's a mathematical fact.

Free speech is an inalienable right. The inalienable rights of being an American belong to all Americans, and to no other people. Any law that allows unlimited untraceable campaign contributions has offered any and all foreigners who have the financial means to have much more powerful freedom of speech - at a time when this American freedom is exercised at it's most - than the large majority of American citizens themselves.

Creativesoul: I never stated that Trump was the USA. However, Trump is president of the USA and he does act a lot like the leader of North Korea --- who also has an ego a mild wide and constantly lies his ass off. The fact the American people elected this liar, who even lied about his height, and who claimed that it stopped raining when he gave his speech when he was sworn in as president, two factual claims that are easily verified as false, tells me that America is accepting conduct from our president that three years ago I never thought possible, that such conduct would only be tolerated in places like North Korea. For a large percentage of Americans, although I am hopeful it is not the majority of us, the truth about the most basic facts no longer matters. For them, what matters is how they feel about the "facts" and what their leader wants them to believe about the "facts." — LD Saunders

It's the inevitable consequence of monetary corruption in government.

A poorly informed people.

Here's what I want to discuss...


If it is the case that all thought and belief are existentially dependent upon a plurality, and a plurality negates solipsism, then solipsism is negated by the way things are... which is the way it should be.

If it is the case that solipsism is a philosophical position, and all philosophical positions are existentially dependent upon thought and belief, and all thought and belief is existentially dependent upon an external world, then it is the case that solipsism is existentially dependent upon an external world.

Which of the two outlined arguments above would you like to discuss?

I'm not clear on why you would say that. It seems that if people claim to see or believe in an external world, that qualifies as there being an illusion of an external world, just in case there is no independently existent (that is apart from the seeing and believing) external world. — Janus

That's an unnecessarily complex attempt at the justification of that which is unjustifiable.

The only sensible coherent use of "illusion" presupposes that an illusion of X is not X.