I don't know what you are driving at here. 'The natural evolution of thought and belief" and "complexity increase" (if they are assumed to be real independently of your mind) already presupposes an external world; that is it rests on an assumption that it purports to prove. — Janus

Follow the argument being given. Neglectful rhetoric doesn't suffice. The questions you ask, if they are sincerely asked, can only be answered by me, since it is of me that you ask...

Read more. Yack less.

1.)All thought and belief is meaningful.
2.)All meaning is existentially dependent upon something to become symbol/sign, something to become symbolized/significant and a creature capable of drawing correlations, connections, and/or associations between the two.
3.)All philosophical positions are existentially dependent upon something to become sign/symbol, something to become significant/symbolized and a creature capable of drawing correlations, connections, and/or associations between the two. — creativesoul

Thinking about one's own thought and belief is existentially dependent upon language. Language requires shared meaning. Shared meaning requires another mind.

If ones thoughts about "one's own thought and belief' ( or anything else for that matter) consist in drawing correlations between different things (i.e. between one's different thoughts and perceptions, assuming for the sake of the solipsist argument that one's perceptions consist in nothing beyond one's feelings, thoughts, and beliefs) then your argument against solipsism fails. — Janus

This is neglecting the natural evolution of thought and belief, particularly regarding the complexity increase.

This is not to say that I am convinced by solipsism, rather just solipsism cannot be rationally disproved (or proved for that matter). — Janus

Sure it can.

If we know that solipsism requires metacognition, and metacognition requires cognition, and cognition requires an external world, then we know and have rationally proven that solipsism is false.

Just because there is not a logical(formalized) proof doesn't mean that there is no other kind.

Why could the thoughts in one mind not be different things? — Janus

What difference would that make? The thoughts in one mind are not one mind. The claim you're asking about says "One mind is not different things." It does not say the thoughts in one mind are not.

What's the relevance of the question?

I thought there was such an argument, but (having just tried to describe it), I find I was mistaken. :yikes: The solipsist argument cannot be refuted or disproven. :wink: As long as this is the case, I don't think there can be an argument to support point #4. :chin:

If we want point #4, I think we must declare it as an axiom (assumption; guess). — Pattern-chaser

This is not true on a plurality of levels...

The solipsist argument is false for it is impossible to arrive at such a complex high level of abstract thought and belief without an external world.

Solipsism is existentially dependent upon thinking about one's own thought and belief.
Thinking about one's own thought and belief is existentially dependent upon drawing correlations between different things. One mind is not different things.

Solipsism is existentially dependent upon precisely what it denies the existence of.

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Based upon all examples of thought and belief, including but not limited to solipsism:

1.)All thought and belief is meaningful.
2.)All meaning is existentially dependent upon something to become symbol/sign, something to become symbolized/significant and a creature capable of drawing correlations, connections, and/or associations between the two.
3.)All philosophical positions are existentially dependent upon something to become sign/symbol, something to become significant/symbolized and a creature capable of drawing correlations, connections, and/or associations between the two.

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All philosophical positions are existentially dependent upon thinking about one's own thought and belief.
Solipsism is a philosophical position.
Solipsism is existentially dependent upon thinking about one's own thought and belief.
Thinking about one's own thought and belief is existentially dependent upon pre-existing thought and belief.
All thought and belief is meaningful.
All meaning is existentially dependent upon something to become symbol/sign, something to become symbolized/significant and a creature capable of drawing correlations, connections, and/or associations between the two.
All philosophical positions are existentially dependent upon something to become sign/symbol, something to become significant/symbolized and a creature capable of drawing correlations, connections, and/or associations between the two.
Solipsism is existentially dependent upon something to become sign/symbol, something to become significant/symbolized and a creature capable of drawing correlations, connections, and/or associations between the two.

One can know what "the cup is on the table" means without knowing what the word "premiss" means.

Do you see how that is fatal to what you maintain?

I maintain that it is impossible for a person to have knowledge prior to thinking about their own thought and belief therefore both of your objections do not stand as such: — khaled

One can say something as many times as one likes. That doesn't make it true. It does make it 'maintained'...

You have no idea what you're talking about.

Your entire storyline here is chock full of self contradiction.

What reason is there to believe that one can dream of hands prior to thinking about them?
— creativesoul

None... — Marchesk

And if thinking of hands is existentially dependent upon and external world?

I am not avoiding anything, you're missing a distinction between knowledge and belief. All of the examples you have cited so far are examples of beliefs. Unreasoned thoughts. I maintain that knowledge requires metacognition as you defined it and that a strong belief that does not use metacognition is nothing but that, a belief. — khaled

You're either avoiding the valid objection, or you don't understand it. I'll grant sincerity. You don't understand it.

Of course I've provided you examples of belief... The distinction between belief and knowledge is irrelevant here.

I'm objecting to p3. It was written as follows...

There is no way for a premise to be determined true or false except relative to another premise. — khaled

That is false. I've offered an everyday example to the contrary. The belief statement "the cup is on the table" could be used as a premiss. There is no need to consider another premiss in order to determine whether or not "the cup is on the table" is true. All that is necessary is knowing what the statement is talking about and looking to see if the cup is on the table.

QED

Knowing what "the cup is on the table means" is talking about does not require metacognition.
— creativesoul

Yes but knowing what it means has no bearing on it's truth value. Yes the kid knows what "the cup is on the table" means but that doesn't mean there is a cup on the table. A flat-earther knows what "the earth is flat" means but that doesn't make the earth flat — khaled

Nor does it need to in either case in order for the person to have knowledge prior to thinking about their own thought and belief. Thus, your criterion for knowledge is inadequate, for it cannot account of the knowledge that you yourself have admitted to here.

In both cases, the person knows what a statement is talking about.

QED

I do not have an argument to support that. I thought it would be easy enough to invent one. I was wrong... at least for now.

:blush:

Understood.

what the dream argument shows is that it's possible to have an experience of my hands without them being external. — Marchesk

What reason is there to believe that one can dream of hands prior to thinking about them?

...philosophical doubt raises the possibility that we could be wrong. Thus the simulation, BIV, demon arguments. — Marchesk

What you've called "philosophical" I would call "radical". It is borne of failing to draw the distinction between thought and belief and thinking about thought and belief.

Such doubt is belief based. All belief consists of meaningful correlations drawn between different things.

On what ground do you disagree with p1?

It is not known if it is not reasoned, which is why it doesn't take that long to convince a kid that external reality is fake if you're the parent you could do that. — khaled

Reason requires a baseline from which to reason. The baseline consists of language use which talks about the world and/or ourselves. Reason requires language use about the world and/or ourselves.

One reason parents can convince a kid of anything is because the kid trusts the parent and the kid is amidst the initial formation of his/her baseline(worldview).

There is no reason whatsoever to deny that the kid can know something simply because it's still in the beginning of it's worldview development.

I watched a pharmacist sort through shelves as she spoke on the phone, looking at this and that, walking around the room, asking questions and listening as she suggested, remembered, discovered...

Her thinking was not seperate from this bodily activity; nor from the items on the shelf, or the phone. Thinking is not just something that happens in minds. — Banno

Yes. Thinking doesn't have a definitive spatiotemporal location. It owes it's existence to a plethora of simpler things. One is physiological sensory perception. Another is an external world. Another is some innate instinctual state of mind... Fear and Hunger suffice.

I think that Moore is separating the fools of the audience. Who - in that situation - would deny that Moore's hand is external to them?

What's the formal fallacy?

So if your objection want to be coherent, you must now admit that thoughts and ideas are not existentially dependent upon sensory perception.
— creativesoul

No, I gave thoughts and ideas, as examples of connections and correlations which are carried out completely within the living being, to support my premise that connections, correlations and associations are carried out completely within the being. Sensations are of things external to the living being and are therefore not a necessary part of such processes. — Metaphysician Undercover

:yikes:

No... and then explain why the correct answer is "yes"...

So, you admit that thoughts and ideas are not existentially dependent upon physiological sensory perception...

Using a belief statement as a premiss requires metacognition.
Metacognition includes thinking about one's own thought and belief.
Knowing what "the cup is on the table means" is talking about does not require metacognition.

If you want to tie truth to the beliefs of 8-year-olds then go ahead but I wouldn't do that. — khaled

Denying that eight year olds have true belief is outlandish!

I haven't defined it and you're avoiding a valid objection.

...if it is not reasoned, it is not known. — khaled

It would only follow that all knowledge is existentially dependent upon thinking about thought and belief.

What a hypothetical 8-year-old believes about the existence or lack thereof of a cup on a table does not stand as proof neither for nor against the premise: "Visual input is reliable". Giving me an example of someone accepting said premise and using that as proof of the premise's truth value is absurd and logically flawed. It's like me saying: "The premise "The earth is flat" has no proof" and then you rebutting by saying "So you're telling me that if a flat-earther says the earth is flat, that he does not know that statement is true?"

I said that the premise "Visual input is reliable" is based on nothing and so, upon further examination, anyone would see that it is not necessarily a true premise. Also, the fact that you had to include "average" 8-year-old suggests that this isn't even that absurd. Ask the kid later "Do you KNOW that to be true?" once or twice and they'll start to doubt. If you want to tie truth to the beliefs of 8-year-olds then go ahead but I wouldn't do that.

It is not known if it is not reasoned, which is why it doesn't take that long to convince a kid that external reality is fake if you're the parent you could do that. I mean, people can convince their kids that there is a giant bearded man in the sky that knows and sees everything they're doing so.... — khaled

Care to explain why you think that this reply is relevant to what it's supposed to be addressing?

One can know that the statement "there is a cup on the table" is true by virtue of knowing what the statement is talking about, and then looking to see if the cup is on the table. There is no need for one to refer to another premiss. One certainly does not need to believe anything at all about visual input. If one does not believe anything at all about visual input, then one most certainly cannot use it as a premiss. If one does not know what the statement is talking about, then one cannot believe the statement. One can know what "there is a cup on the table" is talking about, and then one can look to see. We can know that they know what the statement is saying by virtue of their looking and offering an answer one way or the other. All of this happens everyday, and it happens long before one is able to carefully consider their own thought and belief.

Referring to another premiss such as "visual input is reliable" requires thinking about one's own thought and belief. That's a metacognitive endeavor. Pre-metacognitive thought and belief come first.

One can know that some statements are true, and they can know how to tell if they are long before one is able to use them as a premiss, long before having come to terms with it, long before considering the statement in isolation as a premiss.

Thought/belief and statements thereof are long prior to logic. Logic is meant to take account of them. Your argument neglects these facts and suffers as a result.

Incorrect. One would have to accept the premise "Visual input is reliable" — khaled

So, if an average 8 year old child is asked if "there is a cup on the table" is true and s/he answers "yes" while pointing at the cup, you're saying that they do not know that the statement is true or that in order to know that they must also know what "visual input is reliable" means and believe it too?

As if knowing that that statement is true requires knowing how to do logic?

:yikes:

It's a reductio. Don't deny it. Fix it.

Yes, by definition, knowledge is something that is justified. As Wittgenstein says, satisfying oneself is part of the language-game of knowledge. — Sam26

Surely everyone knows that self-satisfaction plays no crucial role in being justified...

I know how to ride a bike - and can demonstrate my knowledge by riding a bike. I know I have a hand - and can demonstrate my knowledge by waving my hand. Bikes and hands form the world in which such language takes place. — Banno

This lets me know what Moore and I have always had in common that I had yet to have ascertained...

Moore is also getting beneath language in the sense of setting out what language creation and/or acquisition is existentially dependent upon.

Why must all knowledge claims(I'm assuming empirical claims) be able to be doubted?
— creativesoul

If this wasn't so, then one could infer knowledge from a simple claim that one knows. It has to be more than reasonable that in many situations the knowledge claim is something to be demonstrated. — Sam26

So, it's about the justification aspect?

Hey Marchesk...

One could deny any one of the premisses, I would think. Common sense prevails to me...

A correlation requires a plurality of things. As far as I'm concerned, that is a death knell to any and all solipsistic views. An idealist has his/her own issues to deal with. I just stumbled upon this argument while re-reading one of my older threads... Thought it was interesting. Could be better though.

So...

On what ground would one base such a condition for knowledge?

Why must all knowledge claims(I'm assuming empirical claims) be able to be doubted?

I watched a pharmacist sort through shelves as she spoke on the phone, looking at this and that, walking around the room, asking questions and listening as she suggested, remembered, discovered...

Her thinking was not seperate from this bodily activity; nor from the items on the shelf, or the phone. Thinking is not just something that happens in minds. — Banno

I would readily agree. Give me another few years, and I'll have you on board before you know it!

:wink:

Doesn't Witt claim that knowledge must be dubitable? Wouldn't that condition disqualify Moore's claim all by itself?
— creativesoul

Yes, isn't that his point? All knowledge claim are doubtable, and if they're not, like Moore's claims, then there not knowledge claims, they're beliefs of a different sort (bedrock). — Sam26

Yeah. Sorry, I was more hesitant than was warranted. I wasn't certain about the accuracy of my recollection. It's been a while since I seriously read OC, aside from a bit here and there in order to refresh for discussion with you, Banno, and a few other Witt fans...

I'm a strict determinist...

:wink:

You're right though. There are more than one legitimate relation between the brain state and groups of similar activities. The attribution of meaning being one. Showing meaning when there's more than one person involved... "Block!"...

What do you have in mind though? I'm certain it's different than what I've said...

:smile:

See we're just making my point about the dichotomy... as we speak! It cannot take account of that which is both. Toss it and come to better terms.

Right - but I'm not saying it is simply ‘dreamed up’ by us; it is not simply 'in the mind' but always has an irredeemably subjective pole or aspect - which is almost always 'bracketed out' by 'dogmatic realism'. And I also think that was Kant's view, and the crucial point of the CPR. — Wayfarer

Yeah. My apologies...

We agree here. I've no problem with Kant's Noumena, as I understand it to be... a negative limit on our thoughts, and that's it! For me, it is equivalent to the unknown 'realm'. His Pure Intuition was also a mark of his genius!

So Sam...

With Witt's strict application of the phrase "I know", aren't there things that we can surmise about his thoughts on the matter that perhaps he had not written down, but was still in process, or some such?

Doesn't Witt claim that knowledge must be dubitable? Wouldn't that condition disqualify Moore's claim all by itself?

It's more that the state of a brain and the performance of some act, or better, group of similar acts, are related. — Banno

Causally, no less...

I do happen to hold to an attitude rather like Kantian idealism, in this sense - that what we call “the world” isn’t something wholly outside ourselves, something we experience in a completely detached and objective way. — Wayfarer

I wholeheartedly agree with this...

It’s something that is created moment by moment in our minds, by piecing together the jumble of unconnected glimpses our senses give us—and we do the 'piecing together' according to a plan that’s partly given us by our biology, partly given us by our culture, and partly a function of our individual life experience. But attempting to understand that process of 'putting together' is very difficult because the very effort of understanding it is also part of that process. That's the sense in which we can't get 'outside it'. — Wayfarer

Here though, you take the equally extreme other end...

The world is not entirely outside of ourselves that we experience in a completely detached and objective way, nor is the world something that is entirely created by us, in our minds...

I'm in the middle of those two extremes. I think Kant was as well.

There's good reason why the term object is scarequoted...

:wink:

So in the kind of analysis you're working on, you're actually drilling down (or trying to) into questions that are epistemically prior to naturalism as such. When we think about thinking, there's a problem of recursion, i.e. of trying to objectively depict the subjective processes of understanding. And that's why, despite the fact that you seem to think 'the existence of an "external" world can be proven in a series of ten propositions, it remains a thorny philosophical problem. — Wayfarer

I love ya Jeep...

I agree that it remains a thorny problem.

On my view, much of the problem is/was the result of poor conception. The objective/subjective dichotomy being a prima facie example thereof. What I mean is that it cannot effectively take account of that which is both, and is thus... neither.

Thought, belief, meaning, and correspondence...