All we know is that the animal has come to habitually respond to the sound... — Janus

Are you actually denying that the sound of the bell is meaningful/significant to Pavlov's dog?

...you've just repeated the same old tired refrain. — Janus

This coming from someone who has yet to have offered a valid refutation to the argument on any level.

You actually haven't... explained anything... — Janus

Pots and kettles...

All we know is that the animal has come to habitually respond to the sound. Talk of "connections, "correlations' and "associations" is superfluous and anthropocentric. — Janus

Your rhetoric is boring.

What counts as "superfluous and anthropocentric"?

How do we know that anything means anything to an animal? — Janus

By knowing what all examples of meaning are existentially dependent upon(what they all consist of) and the subsequent judicious application of that knowledge as a measuring device to determine whether or not animals are capable of drawing correlations, connections, and/or associations between different things.

This is falsifiable/verifiable. Pavlov's dog, the sound of the bell(the sensation), the drive to eat, and getting fed after hearing the bell.

We know only because we can observe that they respond to things in appropriate ways. We have no evidence that they "draw correlations, connections, and/or associations between things". Unless you can explain how you know they do that, I will remain convinced that you are indulging in anthropomorphic thinking. — Janus

When a specific sound is made just prior to feeding, and it is only made just prior to feeding, then the capable creature will make a connection between the sound and what happens afterwards, assuming enough repetition. We can know that that connection has been made by virtue of careful study. The differences in behaviour prior to and after the connection has been made are undeniable. Involuntary salivation. Going to the food bowl. Etc.

I'm wondering...

Do you have the same skepticism about knowing another human's thought/belief?

I can see the conversation getting too loose...

Before long we will need to draw and maintain the distinction between some and all...

As I indicated way back when this particular topic arose, there are correlations, connections, and associations which are drawn by the living being, at the subconscious level, which are prior to, and necessary for the occurrence of sense perception. So sensation is inherently meaningful. — Metaphysician Undercover

This presupposes that a creature can draw correlations, connections, and/or associations between things that have yet to have been perceived, sensed, and/or detected.

Impossible.

I don't see any reason to believe that "all meaning is attributed". Do you have an argument to support that? — Janus

Sure. Glad you asked.

Do you have an example of meaning that does not consist of a plurality of different things and a creature capable of drawing correlations, connections, and/or associations between them? All meaning requires something to become sign/symbol, something to become significant/symbolized and a creature capable of connecting the two.

That's a strong claim. All it takes is one example to the contrary. It agrees with current convention in terms of theories of meaning, and there are no examples to the contrary. That's more than adequate reason to warrant belief that those statements are true.

I also don't see any need to, or sense in, employing the kind of anthropomorphic language exemplified in phrases like "drawing a correlation, connection, and/or association between them".

As I see it you commit the fallacy of misplaced concreteness, by attributing the kinds of conceptualizations to animals (and not just the 'higher" animals either!) that humans are capable of due to their linguistic abilities.

You've misunderstood.

A quick perusal of the thread will clearly show the astute reader that I draw and maintain the distinction between that which is existentially dependent upon language and that which is not. Animals without language cannot have the same complexity of thought and belief(conceptualizations) that linguistic animals such as ourselves can have... nor do they need to.

To accuse me of anthropomorphism is to neglect all sorts of things I've been arguing, which amounts to an invalid objection.

Your view is thus a tissue of confusion, and therefore not helpful in any way.

A prima facie example of a conclusion that is false as a result of it's having been based upon false premisses borne of misunderstanding(assuming sincerity in speech).

All meaning is attributed. All attribution of meaning requires a plurality of things and a creature capable of drawing a correlation, connection, and/or association between them. In order draw a correlation between different things, those things must first be perceptible. Physiological sensory perception facilitates this capability to detect the perceptible.

Sensations are detection based The sensation becomes meaningful when the perceiving creature draws a correlation between it and something other than it.

So sensation is part of experience? You apparently agree with me, so is sensory experience (the sensation part of experience) not, just as with the rest of experience, interpreted? — Janus

Yes, sensation is part of meaningful experience.

No. In and of itself, sensation is utterly meaningless. Venus Flytrap.

Sensation...

Is it existentially dependent upon language?

I would argue in the negative.
— creativesoul

So, are you implying that if having sensation is not dependent on linguistic capability it therefore cannot be meaningful? — Janus

No. Meaning is not existentially dependent upon language. Nor is sensation. Sensation is a necessary elemental constituent of both meaning and language.

I'm saying that sensation is not existentially dependent upon language. There are everyday examples of creatures replete with physiological sensory perception that are otherwise incapable of drawing correlations between different things. Where that capability is absent there can be no meaningful attribution.

Do you draw this distinction between sensation and experience?

What is a sensation if not a sensory experience? I see. I hear, I taste, I smell, I feel; those are sensations, experiences. What is interpreted if not those experiences? — Janus

All experience, on my view, must be meaningful to the creature. I do not conflate sensation with experience. Rather, the latter consists, in part at least, of the former, but not the other way around. Physiological sensory perception alone is inadequate/insufficient for meaningful experience as a result of it's being inadequate/insufficient for the attribution of meaning by the creature.

Venus Flytrap.

All meaning requires a plurality of things and a creature capable of making connections between them. So, it is clear that existence precedes meaning, unless one posits some supernatural creator of the first things. I do not.

All interpretation is of something already meaningful. The meaning is precisely what is being interpreted. Sensations aren't meaningful in and of themselves. They are necessary but insufficient for the attribution of meaning.

Sensation is but one part of meaningful experience. It is not equivalent to.

Venus Flytrap.

And of course... ...you have failed to answer the question as to what sensation is... — Janus

That's still false.

Sensation...

Is it existentially dependent upon language?

I would argue in the negative. — creativesoul

This bears repeating...

You weren't leaving aside the question of whether or not experiences are meaningful when you first asked me what was being interpreted if not for those experiences.

What is a sensation if not a sensory experience? I see. I hear, I taste, I smell, I feel; those are sensations, experiences. What is interpreted if not those experiences? — Janus

Really? Then quote where I said that experiences are meaningful. — Janus

What is a sensation if not a sensory experience? I see. I hear, I taste, I smell, I feel; those are sensations, experiences. What is interpreted if not those experiences? — Janus

I think you are just being asked to justify your sweeping statements on the issue. — apokrisis

I'd love to have an audience capable of allowing that to take place. You'd be a great participant in such a situation.

Sensation...

Is it existentially dependent upon language?

I would argue in the negative.

What is usually referred to by "sensation" is sensory experiences; seeing, hearing, tasting, smelling and touching. Leaving aside the question of whether those experiences are "meaningful'; I asked you what sensation could consist in if not in those sensory experiences. — Janus

You weren't leaving aside the question of whether or not experiences are meaningful when you first asked me what was being interpreted if not for those experiences.

You have merely asserted that sensation is not meaningful, without any arguments, explanations or examples.. — Janus

That's false.

Well, we could always compare/contrast our respective conceptions of "sensation"...

Something tells me that none of you will.

If the one questioned thinks the question is poorly conceived or irrelevant or otherwise deficient in whatever way, then the onus is on the one questioned to demonstrate that such is the case. mere assertion is not sufficient for, and it is in fact fatal to, fruitful discussion. — Janus

Your questions were based upon your framework(your notion of "sensation" to be exact). Your framework is different than mine. That's a problem all by itself if you're looking to criticize my position.


I claimed the following(basically)...

Sensation is not meaningful. All interpretation is of that which is already meaningful. There can be no interpretation of sensation.

You offered a description of "sensation" that is remarkably different than my own, and then proceeded to ask a question that ignored what you were supposed to be critiquing. You asked me what was being interpreted in your own conception of "sensation". The only appropriate answer from me was to ask you to further elucidate upon your own candidate.

What was already meaningful?

All interpretation is of that which is already meaningful. — creativesoul

What is a sensation if not a sensory experience? I see. I hear, I taste, I smell, I feel; those are sensations, experiences. What is interpreted if not those experiences? — Janus

What is already meaningful? — creativesoul

NOTHING is more fatal to discussion than having questions answered by questions. — Janus

The quality of the question plays a significant role too, right?

Sensations aren't meaningful. It makes no sense at all to say "the interpretations of our sensations".
— creativesoul

I really cannot understand this at all. The statement that sensations are not meaningful appears as blatantly false. So until you back this up with an explanation, or a demonstration of a sensation which is not meaningful (because sensations seem to all be meaningful to me), I'll have to dismiss what you say as nonsense. — Metaphysician Undercover

Our criteria for what counts as "sensation" differs. Mine excludes all things informed by language.

All meaning is attributed. All attribution of meaning requires a plurality of things and a creature capable of drawing a correlation, connection, and/or association between them. In order draw a correlation between different things, those things must first be perceptible. Physiological sensory perception facilitates this capability to detect the perceptible.

Sensations are detection based The sensation becomes meaningful when the perceiving creature draws a correlation between it and something other than it.

It may be that the solution lies in what's being neglected by the problem itself
— creativesoul

Two different questions are being confused here.

The OP was not intended to be about Norton's dome and its claims of Newtonian indeterminism due to a latent jounce concealed in the initial conditions. The OP was about how we would think about an initiating cause when it comes to spontaneous symmetry breaking. — apokrisis

The OP presupposes an utterly impossible entity. It would have ended rather abruptly had it's author noticed this fatal flaw.

What is a sensation if not a sensory experience? I see. I hear, I taste, I smell, I feel; those are sensations, experiences. What is interpreted if not those experiences? — Janus

What is already meaningful?

If meaning is prior to language and you are using language as a means to giving direction to this premise, how is language not meaningful? — eodnhoj7

I do not understand the relevance of this question. All language is meaningful.

THE PURPOSE OF this discussion is to determine how philosophy is related to psychology or vice versa. The reason this is the purpose is due to the fact of psychology being a form of knowledge, and knowledge itself is a focal point of philosophy. So, in order to have a well-ordered, factual and consistent psychology, this psychology must rest upon a philosophy capable of holding it in place. — Blue Lux

How about a philosophy which gets thought and belief right?

Psychology is philosophy of the mind...

Yes. Although Norton's dome isn't the only shape that allows this, many shapes, such as a spherical dome, or a paraboloid, wouldn't allow it since it would take an infinite amount of time for a perfectly balanced ball to "fall off" from the apex. (Or, equivalently, in a time-reversed scenario, it would take an infinite amount of time for a ball sent sliding up to come to rest at the apex). — Pierre-Normand

Hmmm... Sounds eerily similar to Zeno. It may be that the solution lies in what's being neglected by the problem itself(how it's being framed is the problem). Molecular decay disallows perfect spheres and perfect domes...

...it still doesn't address the initial problem regarding Newton's laws: namely, that they allow the ball to start moving even in the case where there is no such initial departure from symmetry. — Pierre-Normand

And this is solely as a result of the shape of the dome?

Not sure what molecular decay is. But if you're thinking of thermal molecular motion, yes. It would be a source of fluctuation of the net force, and then could be appealed to as the cause of the fall. But that doesn't solve the conceptual issue since, according to Newton's laws of motion, the "fall" (or initiation of the movement) is possible even if there is no initial perturbation at all. — Pierre-Normand

I'm not seeing the need for an initial perturbation either. The system of molecular decay can change the net force causing the bearing to begin being in motion all the while never appealing to a force outside the system, aside from gravity. The physical structure of molecules changes over time. This change alone is enough to account for the movement of the bearing after sufficient time without introducing another force.

The radial component of the reaction force is proportional to the sine of the slope at the point of contact with the ball, and hence null when the ball is located at the apex. — Pierre-Normand

This part in particular. The sine of the slope changes with molecular decay(in the 'right' places), right?

Doesn't the net force change alongside molecular decay?

Is it? Gravity is never zero. Accompanied by a significant enough amount of molecular decay of either the bearing or the dome, and it will fall...

Right?

I suppose my simple mind is struggling to see the relevant difference between being pushed or falling...

I mean, when taking gravity into consideration...

Newtonian gravity then...

What does "the physical" refer to other than the interpretations of our sensations. — Metaphysician Undercover

Sensations aren't meaningful.
— creativesoul

Like I was born yesterday? — Metaphysician Undercover

All interpretation is of that which is already meaningful. Sensations aren't meaningful. It makes no sense at all to say "the interpretations of our sensations".