Which is to say that "the way things are" is "the way they seem to us" (creature specific standard). — khaled

So if there aren't any creatures about, there isn't a way things are?

Now I'll point out yet another issue with the idea... it's untenability.

In order to know that we cannot see the world as it is, we must know the world as it is, the world as we see it, and the differences between the two. — creativesoul

My thought was that we can tell from the robin and the tetrachromats that there are aspects of the world that are inaccessible to us.

Hi Banno, I was picking up Andrew M's suggestion about colour-blind people (see quote in my first post) and running with it.

With regard to this very specific distinction (and the color-normal standard), they would not be seeing things as they are. — Andrew M

I don't have very clear views myself as yet about "seeing things as they are".

The observer is the only difference between the way the world was and the way the world is now, however the world is, is because that’s the way it occurs to the observer. Or, which is the same thing, the world is as the observer says it is. — Mww

Hi Mww,

I don't see why the mere arrival of the observer should change the way the world is in the way you suggest, so that it is now dependent on his views, however misguided they may be.

I'm working off @Andrew M 's idea (or acceptance) that colour-blind people can't see the world as it is. Fish and birds can see into the ultra violet, and snakes can detect infrared. I think that means they would see all your examples differently to us (they would see some things we can't see). The things they can see that we can't see are aspects of the world as it is, so we can't see your things as they are.

You got a candidate something that we can see as it is?

I found it quite difficult to read beyond Chalmers' description of functional organisation and his announcement that he would defend it.

It's absurdly ignorant of what we know about how our bodies work, and how differently computers and robots work.

That's the sort of thing we might say. Usually we would say something like "He thought you were in the other room". — Banno

Yes. But anyway it's not just patterns of behaviour?

I don't mind if you want to expound on that, but that wasn't what I was asking. I was trying to get clarity about whether you had said that a belief is a thing in your mind, as that seemed to contradict other things you said. I'm just trying to understand.

But instead let's talk about my dog. I've had him since he was a puppy and he's 8 now, and I have spent a lot of time over those 8 years thinking about his mind, and what he can know, and believe.

So, can he have the attitude that such-and-such a statement is true, despite being unable to formulate or understand statements? When he sees me go into the other room, does he believe I'm in the other room?

I was under the impression you were saying a belief was a thing in your own mind. I asked if a belief was a thing in your own mind, or just a pattern of behaviour, and you said that was a good question, and then came back and said it must be both.

Don't want essays, just enough to go on. It seemed to me that you were saying that a belief was a thing in your own mind, which puzzled me.

We use talk of beliefs in order to explain human behaviour. We can extend this to cats, but the belief is not a thing in the mind of the cat; it's just a pattern of behaviour. That is, the belief is not in the cat, but in the explanation. — Banno

Would you also hold that your own belief is not a thing in your own mind, but only a pattern of behaviour? — Daemon

You responded that it would have to be both. So I sought clarification:

Just to make sure I understand, a belief is a thing in your own mind, and also a pattern of behaviour? But for a cat it's just a pattern of behaviour? — Daemon

But you said that was very badly expressed. I'd just like to know what I got wrong.

Just to make sure I understand, a belief is a thing in your own mind, and also a pattern of behaviour? But for a cat it's just a pattern of behaviour? — Daemon


Well, no, I think that very badly expressed. — Banno


Oh, I'm sorry, it was an honest attempt to summarise what you said. Where did I go wrong? — Daemon

I would like to know what you meant Banno.

Is a colourblind person capable of seeing things as they are? — Daemon


That depends on what one's standard is for seeing things as they are.

In game theory, a focal point (or Schelling point) is a solution that people tend to choose by default in the absence of communication.... — Andrew M

Hi Andrew M,

I'm seeking to apply the Principle of Charity [In philosophy and rhetoric, the principle of charity or charitable interpretation requires interpreting a speaker's statements in the most rational way possible and, in the case of any argument, considering its best, strongest possible interpretation.]

But your response here seems like irremediable bollocks. Were you serious? Are you really saying that how things are is determined by majority vote?

But we are still capable of seeing things as they are, no? — Andrew M

Is a colourblind person capable of seeing things as they are?

Do you know of any philosophers who deny ontological pluralism? No abstracts, no numbers? — magritte

In case there's any doubt, I was straightforwardly asking Janus if he or she knew of a school of Ontological Pluralists.

As for your question, surely philosophers have argued over whether abstracts and/or numbers exist? Not that I can name them.

Ontological pluralism does say there are different ways of being, so perhaps I misspoke. — Janus

Do you know of any philosophers who espouse(d) OntPlu?

It depends on whether you count different ways of being as amounting to different forms or different constitutions.

I'm interested to know where that forms/constitutions terminology comes from.

If the latter, then the claim would have to be that there are no fundamental constituents of the different forms, or that there are a plurality of fundamental constituents that are not all of the same basic nature; i.e. not all physical, or even not all in the categories of physical and mental.

"Fundamental" is a concept that vaguely troubles me in this context. Of course it's a sensible way to look at things from a practical point of view, but does it properly reflect reality "in itself"? Is there a non-arbitrary, objective distinction between what is fundamental and what is derived? We're only seeing things from our own situation (in time and space).

Modern physics tells us that the basic nature of everything is energy and that energy is equivalent to matter. We do have the four fundamental forces: the electromagnetic, the strong and weak nuclear forces and gravity. (Maybe add to that Dark Matter and Dark Energy) They are all counted as physical forces, though, insofar as we can detect and measure their effects.

I'm not dismissing science, I'm pro-science, but these are still only theories, they could be overturned or transcended, our knowledge is far from complete. Maybe there's Dark Matter and Dark Energy, and what else is around that we don't and very likely can't understand? What about adding Space and Time or Spacetime to your list? And particles: where do they feature? Biology? Agency?

Thanks again for prompting these reflections. As you see I am really only starting to explore the topic. And helping us get to 100 pages so we can stop talking about qualia altogether.

I wasn’t really aware that Pluralism is a recognised school of thought. I’m not sure how I feel personally about ‘fundamental’ categories, so there’s something to think about, for which much thanks.

Does it matter whether we say that "physical" or not? "Everything is x" doesn't explain anything.

Any form of dualism faces the issue of explaining how these simple things can happen. Somehow, thoughts are causally linked to the world.

Indeed, not just dualism but anything apart from monism. — Banno

Or "pluralism"? There are lots of different kinds of things in the world. Not just two, not just one.

What about "there are lots of different kinds of things in the world?".

It's like being able to feel stuff at a distance. — Banno

Same as sonar, and hearing and smelling then?

— Daemon


I don't understand this insistence - from you and from others. What similar experience could you have to my looking at a tree? You could start by looking at a tree. — Banno

The idea, now lost in the mists of time, was that you couldn't explain what vision is like to someone who lacked vision.

I enjoyed your counterexample, but I'm not convinced that the facial exploration expectations should qualify as beliefs. I learned recently how we work out where to position ourselves to catch a flying cricket ball or baseball.

If a is the angle of elevation of gaze from the fielder to the ball, then the acceleration of the tangent of a, d2(tan a)/dt2, will be zero if, and only if, the fielder is standing at the place where the ball will land.

But all this maths is unconscious. It would be straining things to say that the fielder believes that the acceleration of the tangent of a will be zero if he's at the right spot. The purported beliefs in your counterexample are subject to the same criticism.

Ok, thank you.

Just to make sure I understand, a belief is a thing in your own mind, and also a pattern of behaviour? But for a cat it's just a pattern of behaviour? — Daemon


Well, no, I think that very badly expressed. — Banno

Oh, I'm sorry, it was an honest attempt to summarise what you said. Where did I go wrong?

Thanks but I've already eaten.
What were you getting at?

Ah sorry, I made a confusing and weak joke. I have had similar experiences. But what is a similar experience to vision, for example?

The idea that matter could be made of the stuff you can feel and see is absurd, arse-about; the stuff you can feel and see is made of matter. — Janus

Could I suggest that neither is "made of" the other? Matter is the stuff you can feel and see.

Thanks to both luck and good management I've never actually had a full bladder so I don't know what you mean. Seriously though, it's only because I've had a similar experience that I can understand you.

Just to make sure I understand, a belief is a thing in your own mind, and also a pattern of behaviour? But for a cat it's just a pattern of behaviour?

And finally, and I think most tellingly, we can talk about the experience of sonar. We can talk about the distance at which a dolphin can recognise a mackerel, or at which a bat can track a moth. — Banno

That's not talking about their experience of sonar though?

We can't talk much (sense) even about our own experiences, to someone who hasn't had such experiences. Experiences can only be described by pointing at them.

So we can't know directly what things taste like or look like to other people: but how likely is it in practical terms that red looks different to all of us? I can see there's room for variability, more or less sensitivity, genetic variation as with colourblindness, but I reckon in general things probably look and feel and taste and smell broadly similar to us all. I know that's not a philosophical argument.

Possibly due to memory processing. — frank

Don't you think it's because of human-style language? Allows us to think in the abstract, frame hypotheses, think about the past and the future, etc etc.

↪Daemon

Robots don't have experiences. They don't feel, they don't hear, they don't see things. — Daemon


How do you know? — khaled

Same way you know Khaled.

A robot has a relationship with its environment as well. Humans are part of the environment. To assert that humans are somehow special in this regard, is unwarranted.

The practical contact with the world for both humans and robots is via the physical senses.

Experience is information. — Harry Hindu

Humans and other living organisms are special in this regard. The specialness comes about with the development of single-celled organisms, and results from the division between "self" and "other".

Humans and certain other living organisms are more special still. We have experiences.

Robots don't have experiences. They don't feel, they don't hear, they don't see things.

You say that experience is information, but then you also say that everything is information, so this claim of yours doesn't explain anything.

↪Daemon
What do you think? Posit an example, and we can have a look. — Banno

I may post some examples, but whether this is worthwhile will depend on your response to another question:

We use talk of beliefs in order to explain human behaviour. We can extend this to cats, but the belief is not a thing in the mind of the cat; it's just a pattern of behaviour. That is, the belief is not in the cat, but in the explanation. — Banno

Would you also hold that your own belief is not a thing in your own mind, but only a pattern of behaviour?

That's pretty much it. We use talk of beliefs in order to explain human behaviour. We can extend this to cats, but the belief is not a thing in the mind of the cat; it's just a pattern of behaviour. That is, the belief is not in the cat, but in the explanation. — Banno

Can an infant have a belief? Can a cat think?

By coincidence I am reading about exactly this amazing research right now, in an excellent book called The Idea of the Brain by Matthew Cobb. He is Professor of Zoology at the University of Manchester where his research focuses on the sense of smell, insect behaviour and the history of science. The book is described as "a monumental, sweeping journey from the ancient roots of neurology to the most astonishing recent research".

He discusses the lady drinking using the robot arm, and other related research, and then he says:

"Important as all these developments are, they do not imply that brains are actually computers, or that we know how they work. In reality they highlight the plasticity of our brains - Donoghue's group has not cracked the neural code in the brain for volition and planning; instead their computer programs are able to translate patterns of neuronal firing in the brain into the movement of the robot arm, and the patients are able to rapidly tune the activity of their brains so as to manipulate the arm in the desired way.

So the information processing in the computer is piggybacking on the neuronal activity in the brain, which is not like digital computation.

The book explores the similarities and the differences between brains and computers in some detail. It's not a philosophy book, but it, and the research you point to, supports my view and not yours.

Well I couldn't think of anything, which is why I asked, so maybe that's the answer.

No. It's just logic and the principle of Occam's Razor. — Harry Hindu

Since Occam's Razor ought to be invoked only when several hypotheses explain the same set of facts equally well, in practice its domain will be very limited…[C]ases where competing hypotheses explain a phenomenon equally well are comparatively rare. — Kent Holsinger

My hypothesis is that I am conscious as the result of very specific and highly organised brain states, and computers, pianos, beaches and waves on the sea are not conscious because they don't have the appropriate equipment to achieve such states.

What's your hypothesis?