Scientists and philosophers would be the closest we can get to experts on this, since they're dedicated to studying just what exists, just what the "nature" of various existents (and existence in general) are, etc. — Terrapin Station

Scientists are specially-qualified to study and describe the physical universe and the relations among its constituent parts. That's all.

Philosophers? The soundness of what they say about "existents" and "existence" depends on how sloppy the are, and on how committed to their prior beliefs they are. In other words, doen't expect much here.

Michael Ossipoff

A proposition is true iff it represents a fact, but a fact is not something that can be true or false at all, so a proposition and a fact are not the same thing. When I say, "it is true that all dogs are mammals," I am saying that the proposition, "all dogs are mammals," is true. When I say, "it is a fact that all dogs are mammals," I am saying that the proposition, "all dogs are mammals," represents a fact. — aletheist

A raisin is a grape that has been dried. It would be redundant to speak of a raisin that has been dried, because all raisins have been dried. But it's not incorrect to call a raisin a dried grape.

A fact--a state of affairs or relation among things--is (by the definition of "proposition") a true proposition. It would be redundant to speak of a true fact, because every fact is a true proposition. But it's not incorrect to call a fact a true proposition.

These intermediaries of sign, representation, etc aren't incorrect, but they're unnecessary to this topic.

Michael Ossipoff

You evidently have a very different definition of "hypothetical" than I and most others do. If everything is hypothetical, then nothing is actual. — aletheist

As I mentioned in my previous reply to that passage, I don't think we mean different things by "hypothetical".

But yes, the meaning of "actual" is what is in doubt. I don't know what you mean by "actual". I suggest that there's no reason to believe that anything describable is objectively-existent--but I readily admit that I don't know what "objectively-existent" would mean.

This physical world is, of course, fully real and existent in the context of your life

What more existence or reality would anyone want or claim for it? In what other context would anyone want or believe it to be existent and real?

And, if this physical universe is only real and existent in the context of your life, then its reality and existence are a bit more tenuous than a Materialist would have us believe.

If your experience is the basis, in the describable world, for what describably is, then that implies a tenuousness for the existence the describable world and its things.
.
Elsewhere in these forums, I've posted a more complete discussion of my suggestion that the basis of the describable realm is your life-experience story, with complementarity between you the protagonist and your physical surroundings of your experience. ...a hypothetical experience story consisting of a complex system of inter-referring abstract implications s about hypothetical propositions about hypothetical things.

...with logic entering that experience-story simply because of the requirement for consistency--because there are no mutually-inconsistent facts.

Michael Ossipoff

There's no such thing as a "scientific case" in physics for a position on a matter not within physics' legitimate range of applicability.

Attempt to apply science outside of is legitimate range of applicability is pseudoscience. — Michael Ossipoff


Tell that to Galileo.
— Sir2u

Galileo didn't try to apply science outside its legitimate range of applicability. He studied and advanced physics.

In fact, Galileo famously clarified and emphasized the inapplicability of science and religion to eachother.

Science has no fixed range of applicability. Everything anything can be investigated scientifically.

Physical science's range of applicability is limited to the physical world.

But yes, the requirements and desiderata of metaphysics are similar to those of science, and so you could fairly say that metaphysics should be discussed scientifically. Avoid unnecessary assumptions and brute-facts, for example. Definitions should be clearly specified and consistently used.

But no, physical science doesn't apply to metaphysics or religion.

Michael Ossipoff

I do not worship science, — DingoJones

When someone tries to apply science to religious questions, or even metaphysical questions, that person is trying to apply science outside its legitimate range of applicability. That person is practicing pseudoscience, making science into a religion, and engaging in Science-Worship.

I also said nothing about everyone having to share my world view. — DingoJones

Good. Some aggressive Atheists, but not you, like to loudly and continually assert that that they know others' beliefs, and that those other beliefs are less justified than their own.

Note to anyone who isn't an aggressive Atheist:

There's no reason to debate their issue with them.

Michael Ossipoff

A nonsensical statement on the face of it. — Michael Ossipoff


No its not, as someone pointed out if god is said to exist physically then science would have a role to play. — DingoJones

...and there is a door-to-door-promotion denomination that has asserted that God exists physically. But, if your objections only apply to religions that assert that God exists physically, then maybe you should clarify that when expressing your objection. When you do, specify the denomination.

Michael Ossipoff

Yes, science deals with physical world. Do I really need to specify that? — DingoJones

No, it's common knowledge.

Michael Ossipoff

If you have in mind a materialist God, then science has a lot to say potentially about such a God — Devans99

I've never heard of a materialist God.

. If you have in mind a non-materialist God, then by his works (the universe) shall we know him and science still has a role to play.

...in the study of the physical world and the interactions of its parts.

Michael Ossipoff

if god exists can somebody answer why he create the universe? — papamuratte

The notion of creation is anthropmorphic.

Theism isn't incompatible with inevitably spontaneous self-generating universes.

Michael Ossipoff

scientists [...] specialise in the way the world works; — Devans99

...the phyisical world.

Hawking makes a scientific case for there not being a god — DingoJones

A nonsensical statement on the face of it.

There's no such thing as a "scientific case" in physics for a position on a matter not within physics' legitimate range of applicability.

Attempt to apply science outside of is legitimate range of applicability is pseudoscience.

There's nothing wrong with saying that you don't share someone else's worldview. But to say that everyone must share your Science-Worship world view, or else they're wrong, that's presumptuous.

Michael Ossipoff

”The suggestion that the physical world consists of the hypothetical setting of a hypothetical experience-story, consisting of a complex system of inter-referring abstract implications about hypothetical propositions about hypothetical things is entirely consistent with our experience of the things and events of our physical surroundings.” — Michael Ossipoff
.
You evidently have a very different definition of "hypothetical" than I and most others do.

.
One accepted definition that I like is: “being the antecedent of an implication.”
.
That isn’t nonstandard.
.
Another well-accepted definition that I like is: “suppositional”.
.
Another that I like is: “not necessarily objectively real or existent.”
.
…easily satisfied, because “objectively-existent” and “objectively-real” aren’t well and unanimously defined. …especially by Materialists.
.

If everything is hypothetical, then nothing is actual.

.
Not by my practical operational definition of “actual”:
.
“Part of or consisting of the physical world in which the speaker resides.”
.

”No, I defined a fact as a state-of-affairs or a relation among things, and I defined “proposition” in terms of fact.” — Michael Ossipoff
.
So did I - a proposition is a sign that purports to represent a fact, which is a real state of affairs or a real relation among things.

.
As I said, I’m not saying that your system of definitions is wrong or not useful. I merely say that no one system of definitions is the only right one.
.

A state of affairs or a relation among things cannot be true or false, only a sign can - specifically, a proposition. There are no "true facts" or "false facts," only true propositions (representing facts) and false propositions (not representing facts).

.
Yes, there’s no need to speak of a fact as true or false. In fact, I agree that it would be meaningless. A false putative-fact obviously isn’t a fact. There’s no such thing as a false fact. A true fact? Well, if trueness is what belongs to a proposition that is a fact, then it follows that all facts are true propositions, and that, strictly speaking, facts, being true propositions, are true…only when spoken of as propositions.
.
Though truth or falsity of facts isn’t a necessary or even meaningful notion, it isn’t unreasonable to speak of a fact as a true proposition, and, in that limited sense, call it “true”…only when speaking of it as a proposition.
.

”One thing I like about 2c is that it doesn’t need to bring in additional entities such as signs and interpretants.” — Michael Ossipoff
.
What you see as a benefit, I see as a mistake.

.
Your definition system isn’t wrong.
.

Again, I think that distinguishing signs from their objects (and their interpretants) is very important in this context.

.
Certainly, in the definitional system that you’re speaking of. I repeat that your definition-system isn’t wrong or un-useful.

Michael Ossipoff

You are basically defining a fact as a true proposition, rather than as the object of a true proposition. This is inconsistent with defining a fact as a real state of affairs or a real relation among things.

.
No, I defined a fact as a state-of-affairs or a relation among things, and I defined “proposition” in terms of fact.
.
Yes, by the definition of “proposition” in terms of “fact”, that we’re talking about, a fact is a true proposition. …as a consequence of how I defined “proposition” in terms of “fact”. But I defined “fact” independently, and didn’t (in the “2” series of definitions) define “proposition” other than in terms of fact.
.
Yes, in definition 1, I first defined “proposition” and then defined “fact” in terms of “proposition”.
.
But, as I said, definition 2c is my favorite of those systems of definitions. In that system, “fact” is defined independently, and “proposition” is defined in terms of fact. Though, by those definitions, a fact is a true proposition, “fact” is defined independently, and “proposition” is defined only in terms of “fact”.
.

There is an important distinction between a sign (such as a proposition) and its object (such as a state of affairs); i.e., that which represents vs. that which is represented. There is also a third aspect, the sign's interpretant, which is the effect that it has on an interpreter.

.
That is indeed an important distinction in your system of definitions.
.
I’m not saying that your above-described system of definitions is wrong or couldn’t be used. My point was merely that the situation permits more than one valid and useful system of definitions.
.
One thing I like about 2c is that it doesn’t need to bring in additional entities such as signs and interpretants.
.
And of course it’s undeniable that when I say:
.
“Given the definition of the positive integers by repeated addition of the multiplicative identity:
.
“If the additive-associative axiom and the multiplicative identity axiom are true, then 2 + 2 = 4.”…
.
…That, to you, is only a proposition, if you don’t know if it’s true. Then you see the proof, and find out that it’s true. So now it’s true. It has become a true proposition. … and a fact.
.
Those are reasons why I prefer 2c as written.
.
I re-emphasize that I’m not saying that your system of definitions, with the added entities of signs and interpretants, isn’t valid and can’t be used.
.
I’m merely saying that there can validly be more than one system of definitions in these matters.
.
Michael Ossipoff

”I propose that the facts of the physical world are, ultimately, just abstract facts, like the other abstract facts. ...and that the describable realm (including the physical universes) consists of nothing other than abstract implications about hypothetical propositions about hypothetical things.” — Michael Ossipoff
.
The problem with trying to extend it to the actual universe…

.
The meaningful definition of the actual physical universe is: The physical universe in which the speaker resides.
.

…is what he called "the outward clash" - we constantly encounter resistance as we interact with other things; only some of our hypotheses turn out to be consistent with our experience.

.
The suggestion that the physical world consists of the hypothetical setting of a hypothetical experience-story, consisting of a complex system of inter-referring abstract implications about hypothetical propositions about hypothetical things is entirely consistent with our experience of the things and events of our physical surroundings.
.
No physics experiment could prove, establish, suggest or imply contrary to that suggestion.
.

”I don't know of any problem that results by letting a kitchen-table be called a false proposition “— Michael Ossipoff
.
A kitchen table is not a proposition at all, because it does not purport to represent a state of affairs or a relation among things, and does not have a truth-value. Even the English expression, "kitchen table," is not a proposition, but a term; it represents a certain general class of things, rather than a state of affairs or a relation among things.

.
Of course it wouldn’t make any sense to have a definition of “proposition” that makes it possible to truly (by that definition) say that a kitchen-table is a false-proposition. I just meant that I don’t know if it would result in any wrong conclusions about other matters, if that obviously inappropriate naming were allowed by a definition of “proposition”. But I added a clause to that definition, to avoid the possibility of saying that a kitchen-table is a false proposition.
.
I emphasize that I don’t and wouldn’t advocate that definition without that added clause.
.
Michael Ossipoff

”A fact is a state of affairs or a relation among things” — Michael Ossipoff
.
This definition is fine, but a proposition is not itself a state of affairs or a relation among things, so a proposition cannot be a fact. Instead, a proposition represents a state of affairs or a relation among things; i.e., a true proposition represents a fact.

.
I think there’s room for different definitions about that.
.
Given the definition of the positive integers by repeated addition of the multiplicative identity:
.
“If the additive associative axiom and the multiplicative identity axiom are true, then 2 + 2 = 4.”
.
That’s both a proposition and a fact. It’s a fact, and it’s a proposition with truth value of “True”.
.
What’s said in that line is both a fact and a proposition.
.
You can, if you want to, qualify what you say, by saying, “…but I only mean that as a proposition.” If you don’t say that, then you’re asserting it as a fact. Whether it’s really a fact is, of course, subject to proof.
.
When you hear me say that alleged implication about 2 + 2, and if you don’t know if it true, then you have it only as a proposition. When it’s been proved for you, then it’s a fact for you.
.
Michael Ossipoff

A proposition is or might be a state of affairs or a relation among things?

That can't be right. — creativesoul

I hope I've since improved the wording.

Michael Ossipoff

If facts are definite things... — apokrisis

They certainly fit my definition of things, because they're describable and can be referred to.

, then they would have to obtain...

But any putative "fact" that doesn't obtain isn't a fact.

by being judged in terms of some metaphysical strength dichotomy.

All it takes is being a state-of-affairs or a relation among things.

We would need an essential distinction - along the lines of claiming some hard and sure contrast between facts of the mind and facts of the world.

But a distinction between facts of this physical universe and abstract facts is a metaphysical assumption (...though of course a meaningfully-practical one) . I propose that the facts of the physical world are, ultimately, just abstract facts, like the other abstract facts. ...and that the describable realm (including the physical universes) consists of nothing other than abstract implications about hypothetical propositions about hypothetical things.

I suggest that the physical world centers on our experience, as a matter of "if..."

Michael Ossipoff

"A proposition is or might be a state of affairs or a relation among things?" — creativesoul

No, again, a proposition represents a purported state of affairs or a purported relation among things. A true proposition represents a real state of affairs or a real relation among things. — aletheist

Here is an attempt at a summary of the approaches that I know of:

1. A proposition is a statement, and a fact is what makes a proposition true.
(...but I don't know how well-worded that is--It isn't my favorite approach.)

2. A fact is a state of affairs or a relation among things, and...

a) A proposition is something that has a truth-value of "True" or "False", and is a fact if and only if its truth-value is true, and, if not a fact, would be one if it had a truth-value of "True"

(That last clause is so that someone can't assign a truth-value of "False" to their kitchen-table, and say that it's a false proposition.)

or

b) A proposition is something that has a truth-value of "True" or "False", and refers to what is or isn't a fact, and refers to a fact if and only if its truth-value is "True".

or

c) A proposition is something that purports to be a fact, and has a truth-value of "True" or "False", and is a fact if and only if its truth-value is true.
--------------------------------
I think I like 2c best, with 2a as next-best.
------------------------------

I don't know of any real problem in saying that a proposition is a statement. Also, I don't know of any problem that results by letting a kitchen-table be called a false proposition (...but I can't say that I've thoroughly examined the matter). It doesn't seem to matter if the set of false propositions is allowed to be extended to things that we don't really call "propositions". But it seems neater to avoid that.

Michael Ossipoff

The present King of France is bald, is a fact that doesn't correspond to reality. What can you say about that>? — Posty McPostface

If the king of France has hair, then "The king of France is bald" isn't a fact.

Here's what I could find about the Principle of Bipolarity:

As it is usually understood, the principle of bipolarity is that every proposition must be capable of being true and capable of being false, which rules out propositions that are necessarily true or necessarily false.

I don't understand that. If a proposition differs from a fact only by the fact that it might or might not be one, or if a proposition is what purports to be a fact, then there's nothing about that that says that a proposition can't be definitely true or definitely false. ...might definitely be a fact or definitely not be a fact.

Propositions are understood to have a truth-value of True or False. Maybe a proposition's truth-value could be unknown, or maybe it could be known.

For example, here's a definitely false proposition:

"There is a true and false proposition" is false proposition. It's truth-value is definitely "False".

So I don't know how it could be said that a proposition can't have a definite truth-value.

Just because some propositions' truth-values aren't known doesn't mean that no proposition can have a definite truth-value.

By the way, I've noticed that someone at an Internet discussion somewhere defines a proposition as a statement, and a fact as what makes a proposition true.

Maybe that fits too, but I like defining "proposition" in terms of "fact". ...but that might just be my bias or prejudice, due to my definition being the first one that occurred to me.



Sure, I guess it would make sense, too, to say that a proposition is a what tells of a purported fact.

That just wasn't the first definition that occurred to me.

Michael Ossipoff

A false proposition is still a thing that purports to be a fact. — Michael Ossipoff

No, a proposition is a sign that purports to represent a fact. — aletheist

Alright, but isn't a sign a thing?

I define things as what are describable and can be referred to.

Michael Ossipoff

So, facts are immune to the Principle of Bipolarity? — Posty McPostface

I'd say yes, but I'd better look up the Principle of Bipolarity.

Michael Ossipoff

"Then, there's no need to speak of a fact "obtaining", which would be redundant, because there's no such thing as a non-obtaining fact". — Michael Ossipoff


The Principle of Bipolarity would contradict this conclusion. — Posty McPostface

But it's tautologically-invevitable that if a proposition is true it's not untrue.

Consistency is tautologically-inevitable.

That consistency is the only rule governing a person's life-experience story, because it's inevitable.

That, the consistency-requirement, is why logic enters a person's experience-story, as a complex system of inter-referring abstract implications about hypothetical propositions about hypothetical things.

"A fact is that which is represented by a true proposition." — aletheist

What about a false proposition? Is that possible for a fact to represent a false proposition? — Posty McPostface

No. By its definition, a false proposition isn't a fact, and doesn't correspond to one.

A false proposition is still a thing that purports to be a fact. It's still a thing that differs from a fact only by the fact that it might or not be a fact. (...or whichever definition one prefers).

...but its truth-value is "False" because it isn't a fact.

Michael Ossipoff

Other than my girlfriend, I practically never talk to anyone, except for the minimal business-talk needed in daily life.

There just aren't conversations in person. Nothing to answer, nothing to say.

Online, there are conversations already going on, and it's a whole other environment that invites everyone's contribution.

Michael Ossipoff

That's Hanover's religious belief, but I don't agree with it. — Michael Ossipoff


I was being facetious. — Hanover

No sh*t? :D

It's the religious belief that you were espousing. Whether you're serious about what you say is a whole other matter, which, of course, determines the worth of and justification for your postings.

Michael Ossipoff

I don't believe that he said that he hates people--merely that he tends to avoid people. But you exemplify the familiar and dismal fact that there are people who need to be avoided or ignored.

Michael Ossipoff

”Life is an astonishing temporary phenomenon.” — Michael Ossipoff

.
But there appear to be infinities involved.

.
Yes, but Eternity doesn’t mean an infinite amount of time—It means timelessness.
.
But yes, there is Eternity, timelessness, for us, at the end-of-lives. During the increasingly-deep sleep at the end-of-lives, an experience of Nothing is approached, but never quite reached during our experience. …because of course we never experience a time without experience. …just the arrival of increasingly deep sleep.
.
Eventually, there’s no knowledge that there ever was or could have been such things as identity, individuality, time, events, concerns, lack, need, or incompletion.
.
Because then there’s no knowledge of there being such a thing as time or events, it can be said that, then, the person has reached timelessness. Of course (from the point-of-view of the person’s survivors) the shut-down of the body is imminent, but the person neither knows nor cares anything about that, and it’s irrelevant. S/he has reached timelessness.
.
That’s part of why I say that peaceful, completed, contented rest, in increasingly deep sleep is the natural, normal and usual state of affairs. …because it’s the final state of affairs for a living being, and because it’s timeless.
.
Compared to it, this temporary life, and the temporary finite sequence of lives of which it’s a part, is just a temporary blip in timelessness.
.
But life is astonishing. That we’re in a life is astonishing. As you mentioned, we’ve been used to it for so long that we forget how amazing it is.
.
Of course that experience of deepening, peaceful approach to Nothingness is only available to someone because they’re a being who has been born into a life. …something that happened because you were/are the protagonist of a hypothetical life-experience story. …as someone with “Will-To-Life. …because of that Will-To-Life….want or perceived need for life.
.
That peaceful, restful and contented eternal end-of-lives is, as I said, a return to the natural, normal, and usual state of affairs, from which a life (or a finite sequence of them) is a temporary anomalistic phenomenon, due the abovementioned (subconscious/emotional) want or perceived need for life.
.
Though explainable, our life is nonetheless an astounding temporary phenomenon.
.

I also thought that if God created the earth at what time in an infinite past did he decide to create it?

.
I suggest that the creation of the describable world, including this universe, needn’t be part of God’s relation to this world. I suggest that this universe is here as the setting for your life-experience-story, of which we’re the protagonist because we emotionally wanted, or emotionally perceived a need for life.
.
So, the decision that was the reason for this universe was our emotional want or perceived need for life, as the protagonist of an experience story, among the infinity of hypothetical experience-stories, among the infinity of complex hypothetical systems of inter-referring abstract facts about hypothetical propositions about hypothetical things.
.
I don’t think that there would be a reason for God to create or ordain that situation. God’s relation to that situation isn’t describable, other than Benevolence toward living beings. Thomas Aquinas said that God isn’t describable, and I’d agree that practically nothing can be said.
.
I’ve been saying that it’s my impression that there’s good intent behind what-is, and that Reality is Benevolence itself. Of course that’s what is meant when God is spoken of.
.
Anyway, I don’t think that any more than that can be said about God or Reality.
.
Thomas Aquinas said those things, when he said that God is Goodness itself, and that nothing (else) can be said about God.
.
Michael Ossipoff

God can do anything, including lifting the rock he can't lift.
— Hanover

That's Hanover's religious belief, but I don't agree with it.

Hanover believes uncritically in the doctrine of a completely omnipotent God. Presumably Hanover also believes that God can make there be a square circle, or a true and false proposition, or two mutually-contradictory, mutually-consistent.

To each is own.

Let's also not forget that God could conspire with the son and holy spirit, thereby self-conspiring.

Now Hanover is a believer in Catholic doctrine too.

Michael Ossipoff

Yes, "purports" (in a definition of "proposition) is a better word than "alleged", because it doen't require talking about an action of a speaker.

Michael Ossipoff

By the way, one of the definitions of a fact is, a state-of-affairs which obtains. — Sam26

That's redundant. A supposed "state-of-affairs" that doesn't obtain isn't a state of affairs.

My own wording used to be "An aspect of how things are." But "A state of affairs" is a good definition, as is "A relation among things."

Sometimes, to that latter definition, some people add "...or a set of properties of things". But that's redundant, because properties are things, and a thing's having of a property is a relation among those two things .

There are a whole range of facts from physical facts, metaphysical facts, to logical facts

I suggest that they all--all facts about the describable-realm and anything in it--come down to abstract logical facts, at the basis of all that's describable. That's what my Ontic Structural Subjective Idealism metaphysics consists of.

Because of the tautological inevitability of abstract facts or inter-referring systems of them (...regardless of whether someone wants to say they "exist" or not), there "being" a describable realm, including physical universes like ours, is explained. The describable realm is explained within itself.

And, in case anyone thinks that sounds Atheistic, no, that isn't inconsistent with Theism. Theism doesn't require that the describable realm not be self-explanatory as a complete logical system, any more than it requires that the physical world not follow its own laws.

Michael Ossipoff

Some people speak of facts "obtaining" or being true. When someone says that, they're using "fact" to mean "proposition" or an alleged fact.. I prefer to say that a fact is a state of affairs or a relation among things. Then, there's no need to speak of a fact "obtaining", which would be redundant, because there's no such thing as a non-obtaining fact.

Maybe a proposition could be defined as "something that differs from a fact only in that it might or not be one."

...or as "an alleged fact."

Michael Ossipoff

What is the thing that has yet to have become a fact... beforehand? — creativesoul

A proposition.

I guess there could be and are different systems of definitions about these things, but I suggest these:

1. Things are what are describable and can be referred to.

2. A fact is a state of affairs or a relation among things.

3. A proposition is a thing that is or might be a fact.

4. A proposition has a truth-value of "True" or "False"

5. A proposition has a truth-value of "True" if and only if it is a fact.

6. A statement is an utterance of a proposition.

(But, alternatively, someone could define a proposition to be a statement alleging a fact. I try to avoid that, because it brings people (who make statements and allege) into it, but it avoids the introduction of a proposition as a thing that is or might be a fact.)

7. I suggest that an abstract fact, or consistent system of them, always amounts to a truism, two different wordings of the same state of affairs. The statements of their corresponding propositions are saying the same thing.

I give the example of this abstract fact:

"There is no true and false proposition." Someone called that an unverified axiom, but it means "If a proposition isn't true, then it isn't true." That's a truism, and, as such, doesn't need any proof or verification.

So, consistency is tautological and inevitable.

I suggest that abstract facts always come down to such a truism, without needing reference to anything outside the system of facts being spoken of. That avoids the question of an abstract fact's how or why.

Michael Ossipoff

Life is an astonishing temporary phenomenon.

Michael Ossipoff

Logical facts about one proposition implying another obtain lexicographically and (it seems to me, and so I'll suggest it) tautologically.

An example is the fact: "There is no proposition that is both true and false."

...which means: "A proposition that's not true isn't true."

...or "If a proposition isn't true, then it isn't true."

...which is an obvious tautology.

In one earlier argument in an earlier thread, someone said that all (true) theorems* are tautologies, because they all merely show that one thing implies something else--means something else, as is the case with obvious tautological syllogisms like my Slitheytoves syllogism example.

*A true theorem is an implication whose antecedent consists, at least in part, of a set of mathematical axioms.

So the obtaining of an abstract logical implication is there, intrinsic in the implication itself, because one fact [the consequent] is there in another fact [the antecedent]

But yes, of course that's really a simplification, because often the implication of a consequent is by a chain of, or inter-related, inter-referring system of, separate implications. But that doesn't change the intrinsic truism-nature of the obtaining of an abstract fact or system of them.

So there isn't a metaphysical problem about the meaning of, or the how of, the obtaining of abstract facts.

Michael Ossipoff

When Purple-Pond says that material things are all that there is, then he’s also saying that this physical universe exists in no describable metaphysical context other than its own.
.
…which of course is what I’ve been saying.
.
And, if it has no other describable metaphysical existence than that, then what would it mean for anyone to say that its existence is “objective’ or a “actual” as opposed to “hypothetical”?

Declaring the lack of any reason or explanation other than itself, Purple-Pond seems to be borrowing from the notion of a necessary being, but positing instead a “necessary bunch of stuff”. :D
.
Michael Ossipoff

God giving you your life as a trial to master
Can this be disproved. — Andrew4Handel

I don't think much can be disproved. But it I suggest that there's something to what you say.

But whose idea is it? I suggest that it's your own idea (at least subconsciously/emotionally), and that you're in a life because of yourself, as the protagonist of a hypothetical life experience story, possessing "Will-To-Life" as your defining attribute which is what makes you that protagonist, making there be that hypothetical life-experience story....and hence a universe that is the setting for that experiene-story.

Einstein asked if God had a choice in creating the universe. He had a point, it seems to me. I feel that the abstract-implications that I've referred to, and the complex systems of inter-referring abstract implicateions, one of which is your hypothetical life experience story...are inevitable, as inter-relation of abstract-implications. ...hence the hypothetical story about your experience, from your point-of-view...hence the universe that is that story's setting.

In other words:

There'd be experience for you if... ...and away it goes.

After all, no one would say that God can make there be a square circle, or a true and false proposition, or two mutually inconsistent facts. So the notion of perfect and complete "Omnipotence" is unrealistic.

I don't think that is inconsistent with Reality being Benevolence itself.

I don't know what reason there'd be for God to want to create us and subject us to tests. But it makes sense that we're here because of our own intrinsic need or inclination. Things are still as good as possible under those circumstances...which amounts to pretty good.

Despite the inevitability of such things--which inevitably aren't always locally-good, in some particular temporary life one chapter of a temporary finite sequence of lives followed by well-deserved rest, a return to the natural, normal, usual state of affairs --things are good overall.

Michael Ossipoff

Your consistent attempt to instigate intimate social interaction here by openly revealing and discussing the personal details of your life belies your claim that you wish to live as a hermit without social interaction. — Hanover

And I do respect that, which brings up my callous but true conclusion, which is that if you are disabled to the point where nothing can be done about it, then what do you ask I (or anyone) do other than feel bad for you? I can share my insights, be nice, be mean, make jokes, pontificate, or whatever, but you are telling me that you have but one leg and will never be able to run. Well, I'm sorry about your one leg. What else do you seek? — Hanover

I don't like or understand the motivation for Hanover's derogatory tone.

I suggest:that you accept the fact that you naturally, by inclination, avoid people. ...as do I. There's nothing wrong with that, and it needn't be harmful to your life. Of course you just live your life in recognition of, and working around, that natural inclination.

I don't believe that it is a disability or a malady.

You might very well have the "Asperger's" attribute. That isn't a bad thing*, contrary to the implication of the word "syndrome".

*though it results in serious vulnerability to intimidation and bullying by parents and the ambient cultlure, during childhood.

I suggest not reading any more Schopenhauer. His metaphysics of the Will-to-Life makes sense, as a start that could lead to Ontic Structural Subjective Idealism, but his negative view of how things are is way wrong.

Michael Ossipoff

I would not be surprised if solipsism was true — Andrew4Handel

There's no reason to believe that Subjective Idealism isn't true, or in particular, Ontic Structural Subjective idealism.

"Solipsism" is variously defined, but Subjective Idealism is routinely called "Solipsism", with an implication that that name discredits it.

Of course no metaphysics can be proved, because no unfalsifiable-proposition can be disproved.

Michael Ossipoff

”There’s no reason to believe that your life and experience are other than that hypothetical logical system that I call your hypothetical life-experience-story.” — Michael Ossipoff
.
”I think this requires argument.”
.
”Well, when I say that there’s no reason to believe something, then the burden is on someone who disagrees, to produce a reason to believe it.” — Michael Ossipoff
.
Despite the negative phrasing, you are claiming "your life and experience are ... your hypothetical life-experience-story."

.
…only as wording for describing the metaphysics. I repeatedly emphasize that I can’t prove that it isn’t as Dfopolis says, or as Materialists say.
.
I avoid claims or assertions that can’t be proved.
.
That’s why merely I said “There’s no reason to believe [otherwise]”. That’s why I’ve repeated, so many, many times, that I can’t prove that Dfopolis’s objectively, intrinsically existent universe doesn’t exist, whatever that would mean. ...but that, if it did, it would be a fact in the describable-realm that isn’t explainable within the describable realm. …something that my metaphysics doesn’t posit.
.

By refusing to provide an argument in support of this peculiar view, you leave the impression that you have none.

.
I’ve cited parsimony.
.
But I’ve repeatedly admitted that I can’t prove that it isn’t the way that Dfopolis or the Materialists say it is.
.

On the realist side, I have provided a number of arguments that you have chosen not to respond to.

.
On the contrary, I’ve replied inline, point-by-point, to every word that Dfopolis has said in this discussion. I’ve patiently continued replying to various of his arguments when they’ve been endlessly-repeated.
.

So, There is no point in continuing to discuss a position that has no support with a person who will not respond to counter arguments.

.
See above. I’ve patiently replied point-by-point to everything Dfopolis has being saying, and have patiently replied to much of it every time Dfopolis repeated it.
.
But, very well, this conversation is concluded, with genuine finality, by agreement.
.
…though I’ll finish replying to Dfopolis’s comments that I haven’t answered yet.
.
I’m sorry that Dfopolis is so defensive and anger-filled.
.
Michael Ossipoff

”there's no reason to believe that any of the antecedents of any particular ones of those implications are true.” — Michael Ossipoff
.
Then there is no point in proceeding, as I am engaged in the search for truth. I have no interest in hypotheticals that explain posits that might not even be true to begin with.

.
But I suggest that an intrinsically, independently existent physical world is fiction, not truth.
.
Then what’s true about this physical world, and the describable realm in general? The abstract-implications are facts. That’s something factual. If labeled as propositions, they’d be true propositions. That’s where there’s objective metaphysical truth in the describable realm.
.
I’m not picking on you or singling you out. The Materialists, too, want to believe in an objective, intrinsic, independent “existence” and “reality” (whatever that would mean) for this physical world. I suggest that this physical world’s metaphysical basis is much more tenuous. …different from what we traditionally have been taught to assume.
.
This isn’t physics. It’s metaphysics. Don’t expect or assume concrete, objective, intrinsic, independent “existence” and “reality” for the things of the physical world, just because, as animals, we’re designed to deal with the physical world rather than investigate metaphysics. We still have to deal with it, of course, but we don’t have to believe the traditional notion of it.
.
Even in physics, there have been times when fact is drastically different from previous assumption (relativity & QM, for example). Why expect metaphysics to be more tradition-adhering?
.

”Godel showed that, in any logical system complex enough to have arithmetic, there are true propositions that can’t be proven.” — Michael Ossipoff
.
He showed many things. The inability to prove consistency is one of them.

.
Consistency doesn’t even need proving. It’s a tautology, a truism.
.
“A proposition can’t be both true and false” can be worded as:
.
“A proposition isn’t be true if it’s not true.”
.
That’s a tautology.
.
I don’t know what Godel proved, other than that any logical system complex enough to have arithmetic has true but unprovable propositions. But he certainly didn’t prove that consistency is unprovable (except maybe in the sense that tautologies don’t need any proof).
.
Obviously it can’t be proven that future physics observations will be consistent with today’s known physics. In fact it’s pretty much a sure thing that it won’t.
.
Is that the kind of consistency that he was referring? …or just the possible existence of true but unprovable propositions in any logical system complex enough to have arithmetic?
.
In any case, whether or not you agree that logical systems have to be consistent, you’ll agree that they have to be at least as consistent as a person’s life-experience has to be. And, if so, even if you’re right about consistency being unprovable, that doesn’t count against Ontic Structural Subjective Idealism.
.

Your life-experience story is self-consistent because there are no mutually-inconsistent facts, or propositions that are both true and false” — Michael Ossipoff
.
My point is this is an unjustified faith claim. Perhaps part of my Hypothetical Life Experience Story (HLES) assumes I did something that violates the laws of physics (which you think is impossible).

.
If there’s a seeming violation of the laws of physics, if there’s a violation of today’s laws of physics, then they aren’t laws of physics anymore. Usually, when that happens, subsequent physics will explain and encompass those previously seemingly anomalous observations.
.
For example, that was the case with the relation between black-body radiations wavelength and energy; the result of the Michaelson-Morely experiment; an the seemingly anomalous component of the rotation-of-apsides of the orbit of the planet Mercury.
.

For example, in my HLS, I may have made a decision which I think was free and you think is precluded by the laws of physics.

.
No, I don’t know of decisions that are precluded by the laws of physics. …unless you’re talking about a decision that required information not available to you. Say you found out via clairavoyance that there’s a 20-dollar bill on your roof, and so you decide to go up and retrieve it. If there’s no bill there, there certainly was no violation of laws of physics. If there’s a bill there, but your clairavoyant believe that it was there was entirely coincidental with its being there, then that, too isn’t a violation of laws of physics.
.
If that happened, no one can prove that your accurate clairavoyance wasn’t a coincidence, so no one can prove that laws of physics weren’t violated.
.
Now, suppose that you proved that you can reliably tell what number someone has written on a paper that you haven’t been shown, or that you can reliably predict every Lotto number?
.
That would be more convincing, especially as your uninterrupted series of successes increases.
.
Does that prove that the laws of physics have been violated? No, not even then. It just means that the laws of physics weren’t what physicists thought that they were, and that they need updating, as has so often been the case in the past.
.

Wouldn't that be an implicit contradiction for you?

.
No, for the above-stated reasons.
.

Or in my HLES I visit a glacier that should not have existed given how global warming works in my HLS.

.
Several possible explanations:
.
1. A climate-theory needs revision. That would be very unlikely to require revision of a law of physics. (Of course you could conceivably observe something that would require revision of a physical law.)
.
2. Your memory of that experience is mistaken. It’s known that memory isn’t entirely reliable. Ask crime-witnesses.
.
3. You hallucinated.
.
4. There was some sort of mirage.
.
I and some other people saw a tall white cliff, across a bay. …where there is no cliff. We were observing a superior-mirage of the white beach, caused by a temperature-inversion.
.

So, it is important to have some justification for thinking that a HLS is self-consistent.

.
The justification is that “A proposition that’s not true isn’t true” is a tautology, and needs no proof.
.

As a result of Godel's work there can be none.

.
See above.
.

I didn’t say that Realism is inconsistent. But your experience is subjective, …” — Michael Ossipoff

.
My point is not that realism is consistent, but that there is an ontological justification for its consistency, while there is none for your HLESs.

.
There’s the logical justification that I’ve describe above.
.

As for subjectivity, all knowledge is both subjective and objective.

.
There’s nothing about experience that would be inconstant with the objects of your physical experience not having an intrinsic, independent objective concrete “existence”, whatever that would mean (I try to always qualify my use of “existence” in that way.).
.
Faraday, Tippler and Tegmark said the same thing.
.

There is no knowing without both a knowing subject and a known object.

.
Of course. Your experience of the objects in your experience isn’t at all inconsistent with it all being a hypothetical experience-story, such as I’ve described.
.

I am happy to agree that experience is subjective because that is not an argument against it also being objective.

.
Of course it isn’t. Parsimony is an argument against an independently, intrinsically, objectively and concretely existent physical world.
.
We’ve discussed how I don’t claim that you postulate a brute-fact, but your metaphysics says that there can be an apparent brute-fact in the describable realm…something in the describable realm (like a physical universe) that has no explanation or reason within the describable realm.
.
But there’s a metaphysics that doesn’t require such a thing.
.
I asked you some questions about what you mean by “real”, “existent”, etc. If you’re sure that you’re satisfied with your answers, then alright.
.

”But I think we agree that your experience can’t be inconsistent.” — Michael Ossipoff[/i
.
Good. But, why do you think this?

.
Because “There can’t be a true and false proposition” means:
.
“A proposition that’s not true isn’t true”
.
…and that’s a tautology, and, as such, doesn’t need any proof.
.

I think it's consistent because I see it as an experience of being. What do you think is the reason for its consistency?

.
See above.
.

I live in a world that is actual

.
Of course. That’s a truism, by the way I define “actual”:
.
“ Part of, or consisting of, the physical universe in which the speaker resides.”
.
If you mean something else by “actual”, then of course my question is ‘What do you mean by “actual”.

If you’ve already answered that question, and if you’re really sure that you’re satisfied with your answer, then alright.

.

Of course, if we use the following useful definition of “actual”:
.
.
“Consisting of, or part of, the physical world in which the speaker resides.” “ — Michael Ossipoff


Or if we say that something is actual if it can act in any way.

Sure, and, by that definition, everything you experience is actual, because, in your HLEF, it acts on you in some way.

It all comes down to the matter of parsimony that I discussed above, and the matter of whether you’re completely sure that you’re satisfied with your answers to my questions.

I’ve been emphasizing that I can’t prove that the universe in which we reside isn’t your independently, intrinsically, objectively existent physical universe. I merely point out that it’s a metaphysical brute-fact in the sense that you’re positing something that can’t be explained within describable metaphysiscs. (I realize that what you posit isn’t a true brute-fact, without any explanation at all. –just not within describable metaphysics.
.

In either case, I do not live in a world that does not exist -- as you suggested.

.
I don’t make assertions using the word “exist”.
.
I merely assert that there’s no reason to believe that this physical world has “existence” different from that of abstract-implications. There’s no physics experiment that can prove, establish, suggest or imply that it does.
.
You can say that this physical universe exists, because it can act on you and inform you (which it would be able to do, as part of your hypothetical experience-story), but that’s an unsupported theory, and an unparsimonious one.
.

”That’s why, in 1840, physicist Michael Faraday pointed out that there’s no reason to believe that this physical world consists of other than a system of mathematical and logical structural-relation. …with the Materialists’ objectively-existent “stuff “ being no more real or necessary than phlogiston.” — Michael Ossipoff
.
Faraday was a great physicist, but that did not qualify him as a philosopher. Mathematics is an abstraction that cannot be applied unless there is something beyond itself to apply it to. It is what the abstract relations describe (that in which they are instantiated) that Faraday forgot.

.
As I answered in my “brief preliminary reply”, Faraday was well aware of that assumption, and he pointed out that there’s no reason to believe it.
.

”I know it is actual because it acts to inform me.”—dfopolis

”Of course…in your experience-story. “— Michael Ossipoff
.
I do not disown my experience

.
I didn’t mean to suggest that you should. It’s valid, as experience.
.

, but I'm making two additional points (1) In acting to inform me, objects act and so meet the condition to exist simpliciter,

.
Of course, and objects in your dream act on you in a dream, and, in the dream one often believes in the objective realtywhat seems to be happening, and the intrinsic, independent objective existence of the objects in the dream.
.
I don’t deny that objects of this physical world act on you in your experience-story. And yes, of course they exist in the context of that story.
.

(2) if we did not share common experiences, we could not communicate.

.
Of course your experience of being in a physical world requires, for consistency, some mechanism for your physical origination in that physical world. In this case, that’s achieved by parents. …and, more broadly,by there being a species to which you belong. Of course there must be other members of that species, and of course they experience the same physical world that you experience, since they, like you, are part of that world.
.
Among the infinity of HLEFs, there’s inevitably one for every one of the characters in your HLEF. But you don’t experience or directly-know their experience, of course. They’re there because, the consistency of your experience-story requires other members of your species to inhabit the planet on which you reside.
.
Michael Ossipoff

No, it doesn't imply any of those sizes. It refers to a size that is greater than any of those sizes, or any other specifiable size. — Michael Ossipoff


There is no such size: — Devans99

Of course no specific size is being referred to. Only the property of being bigger than any specifiable size. No one's claiming otherwise.

But remember that there's no observable or measurable infinite size. Any travel, observation or measure would merely show a size that increases without bound with continuing travel or increasingly distance-capable observations or measurements.

Hence none of the philosophical impossibility that you speak of.

Your traveled-distance would merely increase without bound, while always having a finite value. — Michael Ossipoff


Potential Infinity rather than Actual infinity again. — Devans99

Exactly. And therefore no philosophical paradox or impossibility such as you speak of.

Anyway, I just wanted to make these comments that I've made.

Michael Ossipoff

Also consider the universe is expanding. It cannot expand if it infinite because there would be nowhere to expand to. So the universe is not infinite. — Devans99

No one's saying that the universe is expanding into pre-existing space.

Galaxies distant from eachother are evidently receding from eachother.

You have a point when you say that it isn't so meaningful to speak of changing the size of something that doesn't have a particular size.

An Actual infinite universe is impossible; it implies the universe is at once 100x greater than everything else and at the same time 1000x, 10000x bigger etc... — Devans99

No, it doesn't imply any of those sizes. It refers to a size that is greater than any of those sizes, or any other specifiable size.

The east-west scale on a cylindrical map projection of the Earth, in standard equatorial-aspect (or of any line-pole projection in that aspect) increases without bound as the poles are approached.

In an infinite universe, your distance traveled would increase without bound as you travel out.

The former is undeniably known. The latter isn't known yet, because, at least for one thing, cosmology isn't that far advanced (and of course it might be un-determinable)..

But there'd be no philosophically-impossible "infinite distance" traveled. You'd never reach that. Your traveled-distance would merely increase without bound, while always having a finite value.

Michael Ossipoff