However, Superman is an actuality here. — Posty McPostface

Where? "Flying like Superman" is shorthand for "flying like Superman is imagined to do in comic books, television shows, movies, etc."

So, in your example, Superman is not analytic, yet, we talk about him as a synthetic a priori sense. So, is he a synthetic a priori conception of the human mind, only? I mean, he could exist in a possible world, no? Therefore has he become analytic? — Posty McPostface

As above, and as in the case of Hamlet, we would have to specify the universe of discourse.

So, how is it so obvious that a proposition represents states of affairs? — Posty McPostface

It is obvious that we use language to express propositions. It may not be obvious that propositions represent states of affairs. It should be obvious that words represent all kinds of objects.

I think you're overlooking the addition of concrete to the batter which not only increases their ballistic attributes but it makes them more likely to float! — frank

:chin:

"Flying like Superman" is shorthand for "flying like Superman is imagined to do in comic books, television shows, movies, etc." — aletheist

Yes, I neglected to mention that facts themselves cannot be subjected to the Principle of Bivalence.

"Flying like Superman" is shorthand for "flying like Superman is imagined to do in comic books, television shows, movies, etc." — aletheist

Why "like" being used here? Like denotes that nothing in the real world is representative of something idealized, like Superman?

That's the mystical part! No? — Posty McPostface

Yes and no.

When all of your senses are screaming in agreement that a particular perceptual phenomenon exists, you're as sure as can be that the phenomenon somehow really exists. It's not mystical at all in that being hit over the head with a frying pan convinces the victim that the frying pan exists (repeated strikes enhance certitude).

The how or why of perception itself is the somewhat mystical bit. We are rapidly demystifying the physical biological structures and mechanisms which comprise our internal and mental machinations (in ways that can predict our behavior as if we're biological robots), but we still have that nagging feeling like something, we, are actually behind the wheel, and in so far as that relates to the "we" in "how do facts obtain?", we will likely not find satisfying answers.

Why do we actually feel feelings? We're wired to feel them (to take in stimulus, somehow parse it, and then learn via an output/input loop) but why do feelings feel like anything?

The mind-matter gap is now easily bridged, but the mind-feeling gap is not yet so.

Why "like" being used here? Like denotes that nothing in the real world is representative of something idealized, like Superman? — Posty McPostface

As far as we know, nothing really flies the way that Superman is imagined to do in comic books, television shows, movies, etc. By all appearances, he simply wills himself to fly without activating any particular mechanism for physically doing so. I seem to recall that in the earliest comic books, he was portrayed more as jumping than flying - "leaping over tall buildings in a single bound" - which is perhaps more plausible.

We're wired to feel them (to take in stimulus, somehow parse it, and then learn via an output/input loop) but why do feelings feel like anything? — VagabondSpectre

What do they feel like?

As far as we know, nothing really flies the way that Superman is imagined to do in comic books, television shows, movies, etc. By all appearances, he simply wills himself to fly without activating any particular mechanism for physically doing so. I seem to recall that in the earliest comic books, he was portrayed more as jumping than flying - "leaping over tall buildings in a single bound" - which is perhaps more plausible. — aletheist

We can invent ways to occupy our mind with things. Suppose we created a new meta-material that can interface with our minds and fly or levitate or change in form and heighten certain features that Superman has. I mean use your imagination and think about how we could become akin to Superman or woman one day.

I don't know if that's effible, because anything I say can only be weighed against your own eminent subjective feelings. Anything I say would amount to they feel like feelings.

It comes out as a brute fact, that we feel, and we can either accept or reject them as valid epistemic starting points.

How many frying pan strikes does it take to get to the center of an ontological philosophy?

Yes, feelings are ineffable. They can't be spoken of. But, we're deviating from how facts obtain their status of facthood. Is it when reality hits you ob the head?

They're status of facthood. — Posty McPostface

If facts are definite things, then they would have to obtain by being judged in terms of some metaphysical strength dichotomy. We would need an essential distinction - along the lines of claiming some hard and sure contrast between facts of the mind and facts of the world.

1. Things are what are describable and can be referred to.

2. A fact is a state of affairs or a relation among things.

3. A proposition is a thing that is or might be a fact.

4. A proposition has a truth-value of "True" or "False"

5. A proposition has a truth-value of "True" if and only if it is a fact.

6. A statement is an utterance of a proposition. — Michael Ossipoff

Ok. Something to play around with...

A proposition is or might be a state of affairs or a relation among things?

That can't be right.

That the fact that the cat is on the mat obtains just is that there exists the cat and there exists the mat and the cat is positioned on top of the mat.

That the fact that the cup is in the cupboard doesn’t obtain just is that the cup doesn’t exist or the cupboard doesn’t exist or the cup is not positioned within the cupboard.

So are you asking how things come to exist? Are you asking how one thing comes be positioned relative to another? — Michael

Do you use this notion of "facts obtaining"?

Do you use this notion of "facts obtaining"? — creativesoul

No, I'd just say that the cat is on the mat and the cup isn't in the cupboard. Might stretch to say that it's a fact that the cat is on the mat and the cup in fact isn't in the cupboard.

Why do you ask?

A proposition is or might be a state of affairs or a relation among things? — creativesoul

No, again, a proposition represents a purported state of affairs or a purported relation among things. A true proposition represents a real state of affairs or a real relation among things.

"A proposition is or might be a state of affairs or a relation among things?" — creativesoul

No, again, a proposition represents a purported state of affairs or a purported relation among things. A true proposition represents a real state of affairs or a real relation among things. — aletheist

Here is an attempt at a summary of the approaches that I know of:

1. A proposition is a statement, and a fact is what makes a proposition true.
(...but I don't know how well-worded that is--It isn't my favorite approach.)

2. A fact is a state of affairs or a relation among things, and...

a) A proposition is something that has a truth-value of "True" or "False", and is a fact if and only if its truth-value is true, and, if not a fact, would be one if it had a truth-value of "True"

(That last clause is so that someone can't assign a truth-value of "False" to their kitchen-table, and say that it's a false proposition.)

or

b) A proposition is something that has a truth-value of "True" or "False", and refers to what is or isn't a fact, and refers to a fact if and only if its truth-value is "True".

or

c) A proposition is something that purports to be a fact, and has a truth-value of "True" or "False", and is a fact if and only if its truth-value is true.
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I think I like 2c best, with 2a as next-best.
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I don't know of any real problem in saying that a proposition is a statement. Also, I don't know of any problem that results by letting a kitchen-table be called a false proposition (...but I can't say that I've thoroughly examined the matter). It doesn't seem to matter if the set of false propositions is allowed to be extended to things that we don't really call "propositions". But it seems neater to avoid that.

Michael Ossipoff

If facts are definite things... — apokrisis

They certainly fit my definition of things, because they're describable and can be referred to.

, then they would have to obtain...

But any putative "fact" that doesn't obtain isn't a fact.

by being judged in terms of some metaphysical strength dichotomy.

All it takes is being a state-of-affairs or a relation among things.

We would need an essential distinction - along the lines of claiming some hard and sure contrast between facts of the mind and facts of the world.

But a distinction between facts of this physical universe and abstract facts is a metaphysical assumption (...though of course a meaningfully-practical one) . I propose that the facts of the physical world are, ultimately, just abstract facts, like the other abstract facts. ...and that the describable realm (including the physical universes) consists of nothing other than abstract implications about hypothetical propositions about hypothetical things.

I suggest that the physical world centers on our experience, as a matter of "if..."

Michael Ossipoff

A fact is a state of affairs or a relation among things — Michael Ossipoff

This definition is fine, but a proposition is not itself a state of affairs or a relation among things, so a proposition cannot be a fact. Instead, a proposition represents a state of affairs or a relation among things; i.e., a true proposition represents a fact. In other words, 2c is correct (assuming bivalence) once modified to read as follows: A proposition is a sign that purports to represent a fact, and has a truth-value of "True" or "False," and does represent a fact if and only if its truth-value is "True."

I don't know of any problem that results by letting a kitchen-table be called a false proposition — Michael Ossipoff

A kitchen table is not a proposition at all, because it does not purport to represent a state of affairs or a relation among things, and does not have a truth-value. Even the English expression, "kitchen table," is not a proposition, but a term; it represents a certain general class of things, rather than a state of affairs or a relation among things. However, every proposition involves terms; for example, "some kitchen tables have four legs" is a (true) proposition.

A proposition is or might be a state of affairs or a relation among things?

That can't be right. — creativesoul

I hope I've since improved the wording.

Michael Ossipoff

I propose that the facts of the physical world are, ultimately, just abstract facts, like the other abstract facts. ...and that the describable realm (including the physical universes) consists of nothing other than abstract implications about hypothetical propositions about hypothetical things. — Michael Ossipoff

This is what Peirce identified as the subject matter of mathematics - drawing necessary conclusions about hypothetical states of affairs, the universe of pure possibility. The problem with trying to extend it to the actual universe is what he called "the outward clash" - we constantly encounter resistance as we interact with other things; only some of our hypotheses turn out to be consistent with our experience. Inquiry is the process by which we distinguish truth from error - retroduction generates hypotheses, deduction explicates them, and induction evaluates them.

”A fact is a state of affairs or a relation among things” — Michael Ossipoff
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This definition is fine, but a proposition is not itself a state of affairs or a relation among things, so a proposition cannot be a fact. Instead, a proposition represents a state of affairs or a relation among things; i.e., a true proposition represents a fact.

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I think there’s room for different definitions about that.
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Given the definition of the positive integers by repeated addition of the multiplicative identity:
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“If the additive associative axiom and the multiplicative identity axiom are true, then 2 + 2 = 4.”
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That’s both a proposition and a fact. It’s a fact, and it’s a proposition with truth value of “True”.
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What’s said in that line is both a fact and a proposition.
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You can, if you want to, qualify what you say, by saying, “…but I only mean that as a proposition.” If you don’t say that, then you’re asserting it as a fact. Whether it’s really a fact is, of course, subject to proof.
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When you hear me say that alleged implication about 2 + 2, and if you don’t know if it true, then you have it only as a proposition. When it’s been proved for you, then it’s a fact for you.
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Michael Ossipoff

You are basically defining a fact as a true proposition, rather than as the object of a true proposition. This is inconsistent with defining a fact as a real state of affairs or a real relation among things. There is an important distinction between a sign (such as a proposition) and its object (such as a state of affairs); i.e., that which represents vs. that which is represented. There is also a third aspect, the sign's interpretant, which is the effect that it has on an interpreter.

”I propose that the facts of the physical world are, ultimately, just abstract facts, like the other abstract facts. ...and that the describable realm (including the physical universes) consists of nothing other than abstract implications about hypothetical propositions about hypothetical things.” — Michael Ossipoff
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The problem with trying to extend it to the actual universe…

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The meaningful definition of the actual physical universe is: The physical universe in which the speaker resides.
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…is what he called "the outward clash" - we constantly encounter resistance as we interact with other things; only some of our hypotheses turn out to be consistent with our experience.

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The suggestion that the physical world consists of the hypothetical setting of a hypothetical experience-story, consisting of a complex system of inter-referring abstract implications about hypothetical propositions about hypothetical things is entirely consistent with our experience of the things and events of our physical surroundings.
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No physics experiment could prove, establish, suggest or imply contrary to that suggestion.
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”I don't know of any problem that results by letting a kitchen-table be called a false proposition “— Michael Ossipoff
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A kitchen table is not a proposition at all, because it does not purport to represent a state of affairs or a relation among things, and does not have a truth-value. Even the English expression, "kitchen table," is not a proposition, but a term; it represents a certain general class of things, rather than a state of affairs or a relation among things.

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Of course it wouldn’t make any sense to have a definition of “proposition” that makes it possible to truly (by that definition) say that a kitchen-table is a false-proposition. I just meant that I don’t know if it would result in any wrong conclusions about other matters, if that obviously inappropriate naming were allowed by a definition of “proposition”. But I added a clause to that definition, to avoid the possibility of saying that a kitchen-table is a false proposition.
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I emphasize that I don’t and wouldn’t advocate that definition without that added clause.
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Michael Ossipoff

You are basically defining a fact as a true proposition, rather than as the object of a true proposition. This is inconsistent with defining a fact as a real state of affairs or a real relation among things.

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No, I defined a fact as a state-of-affairs or a relation among things, and I defined “proposition” in terms of fact.
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Yes, by the definition of “proposition” in terms of “fact”, that we’re talking about, a fact is a true proposition. …as a consequence of how I defined “proposition” in terms of “fact”. But I defined “fact” independently, and didn’t (in the “2” series of definitions) define “proposition” other than in terms of fact.
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Yes, in definition 1, I first defined “proposition” and then defined “fact” in terms of “proposition”.
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But, as I said, definition 2c is my favorite of those systems of definitions. In that system, “fact” is defined independently, and “proposition” is defined in terms of fact. Though, by those definitions, a fact is a true proposition, “fact” is defined independently, and “proposition” is defined only in terms of “fact”.
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There is an important distinction between a sign (such as a proposition) and its object (such as a state of affairs); i.e., that which represents vs. that which is represented. There is also a third aspect, the sign's interpretant, which is the effect that it has on an interpreter.

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That is indeed an important distinction in your system of definitions.
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I’m not saying that your above-described system of definitions is wrong or couldn’t be used. My point was merely that the situation permits more than one valid and useful system of definitions.
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One thing I like about 2c is that it doesn’t need to bring in additional entities such as signs and interpretants.
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And of course it’s undeniable that when I say:
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“Given the definition of the positive integers by repeated addition of the multiplicative identity:
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“If the additive-associative axiom and the multiplicative identity axiom are true, then 2 + 2 = 4.”…
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…That, to you, is only a proposition, if you don’t know if it’s true. Then you see the proof, and find out that it’s true. So now it’s true. It has become a true proposition. … and a fact.
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Those are reasons why I prefer 2c as written.
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I re-emphasize that I’m not saying that your system of definitions, with the added entities of signs and interpretants, isn’t valid and can’t be used.
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I’m merely saying that there can validly be more than one system of definitions in these matters.
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Michael Ossipoff

The suggestion that the physical world consists of the hypothetical setting of a hypothetical experience-story, consisting of a complex system of inter-referring abstract implications about hypothetical propositions about hypothetical things is entirely consistent with our experience of the things and events of our physical surroundings. — Michael Ossipoff

You evidently have a very different definition of "hypothetical" than I and most others do. If everything is hypothetical, then nothing is actual.

No, I defined a fact as a state-of-affairs or a relation among things, and I defined “proposition” in terms of fact. — Michael Ossipoff

So did I - a proposition is a sign that purports to represent a fact, which is a real state of affairs or a real relation among things. A state of affairs or a relation among things cannot be true or false, only a sign can - specifically, a proposition. There are no "true facts" or "false facts," only true propositions (representing facts) and false propositions (not representing facts).

One thing I like about 2c is that it doesn’t need to bring in additional entities such as signs and interpretants. — Michael Ossipoff

What you see as a benefit, I see as a mistake. Again, I think that distinguishing signs from their objects (and their interpretants) is very important in this context. YMMV.

”The suggestion that the physical world consists of the hypothetical setting of a hypothetical experience-story, consisting of a complex system of inter-referring abstract implications about hypothetical propositions about hypothetical things is entirely consistent with our experience of the things and events of our physical surroundings.” — Michael Ossipoff
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You evidently have a very different definition of "hypothetical" than I and most others do.

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One accepted definition that I like is: “being the antecedent of an implication.”
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That isn’t nonstandard.
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Another well-accepted definition that I like is: “suppositional”.
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Another that I like is: “not necessarily objectively real or existent.”
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…easily satisfied, because “objectively-existent” and “objectively-real” aren’t well and unanimously defined. …especially by Materialists.
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If everything is hypothetical, then nothing is actual.

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Not by my practical operational definition of “actual”:
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“Part of or consisting of the physical world in which the speaker resides.”
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”No, I defined a fact as a state-of-affairs or a relation among things, and I defined “proposition” in terms of fact.” — Michael Ossipoff
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So did I - a proposition is a sign that purports to represent a fact, which is a real state of affairs or a real relation among things.

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As I said, I’m not saying that your system of definitions is wrong or not useful. I merely say that no one system of definitions is the only right one.
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A state of affairs or a relation among things cannot be true or false, only a sign can - specifically, a proposition. There are no "true facts" or "false facts," only true propositions (representing facts) and false propositions (not representing facts).

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Yes, there’s no need to speak of a fact as true or false. In fact, I agree that it would be meaningless. A false putative-fact obviously isn’t a fact. There’s no such thing as a false fact. A true fact? Well, if trueness is what belongs to a proposition that is a fact, then it follows that all facts are true propositions, and that, strictly speaking, facts, being true propositions, are true…only when spoken of as propositions.
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Though truth or falsity of facts isn’t a necessary or even meaningful notion, it isn’t unreasonable to speak of a fact as a true proposition, and, in that limited sense, call it “true”…only when speaking of it as a proposition.
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”One thing I like about 2c is that it doesn’t need to bring in additional entities such as signs and interpretants.” — Michael Ossipoff
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What you see as a benefit, I see as a mistake.

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Your definition system isn’t wrong.
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Again, I think that distinguishing signs from their objects (and their interpretants) is very important in this context.

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Certainly, in the definitional system that you’re speaking of. I repeat that your definition-system isn’t wrong or un-useful.

Michael Ossipoff

No, I'd just say that the cat is on the mat and the cup isn't in the cupboard. Might stretch to say that it's a fact that the cat is on the mat and the cup in fact isn't in the cupboard.

Why do you ask? — Michael

That sounds fine by me. I asked because it would affect/effect how the conversation goes if I knew that much.

No, again, a proposition represents a purported state of affairs or a purported relation among things. A true proposition represents a real state of affairs or a real relation among things. — aletheist

Again?

Have we discussed this already?

You are basically defining a fact as a true proposition, rather than as the object of a true proposition. This is inconsistent with defining a fact as a real state of affairs or a real relation among things. There is an important distinction between a sign (such as a proposition) and its object (such as a state of affairs); i.e., that which represents vs. that which is represented. There is also a third aspect, the sign's interpretant, which is the effect that it has on an interpreter. — aletheist

Nothing here jumps out to me as being wrong.

...a proposition represents a purported state of affairs or a purported relation among things. A true proposition represents a real state of affairs or a real relation among things. — aletheist

Propositions are existentially dependent upon language on my view...

What's yours on this?