You have to be very careful how to do this, because more censorship likely isn't the answer as likely many politicians aren't so inept as Trump, who hasn't been able to communicate so well as once off Twitter (as he of course has minimal leadership or organizational skills). It will likely just irritate people more. — ssu
Are they? — AJJ
If these orders entail those things you say are “definitely effective” then why aren’t they associated with reduced mortality? — AJJ
If the US would be, as Kagan writes, "is heading into its greatest political and constitutional crisis since the Civil War", election technicalities aren't the answer. To do something about the polarization of politics is the problem. The political discourse is just spiraling out of control. It's like people are just waiting for the next clash to ensue. Who would want to join politics in this kind of political environment? Basically seeing part of the voting public as the problem won't help: it's a way to advance the polarization, encourage alienation and separation of the voting blocks. And naturally the right in the US has already for years has been on this path: the other side simply hasn't lousy policies, it's a mortal threat. And this drumbeat just continues. — ssu
There are important limitations with our data, including the fact that
at or prior to May 1, 2020, many countries included in our dataset were
not yet in the “plateau” or downslope phase of their individual epidemiologic
curves, with border restrictions having been introduced only very
recently. In the context of COVID-19, it is thought that public health
interventions typically require from 2 to 3 weeks to affect outcomes,
hence the impact of widespread border restrictions may not have yet
been detected in our dataset. Additionally, the relative difference
in the number of cases in neighboring countries is likely to have a significant
impact on whether border closures are effective. Two countries
with similar epidemiologic curves and effective social distancing policies
may not see a major impact from border closures, whereas two countries
with very disparate epidemiologic curves may be more likely to
see a significant impact from travel restrictions. In the case of full lockdowns,
such a government policy may only be effective in those countries
where it can be easily implemented and enforced. For example, the
United States has had challenges enforcing lockdowns, with citizens in
several states publicly protesting public health measures to limit viral
transmission, and encouraging open revolt.
Lockdowns are an effective way of reducing the reproduction number of COVID-19 and controlling the spread of disease in local communities. However, there is no consensus on when governments should take this action. Here, we found that communities, which implemented the lockdown at or prior to the inflection point (defined as 7 days before the date on which at least 5 cumulative cases were first reported in the community) experienced a slower rise in COVID-19 rates over the first 50 days and a lower cumulative count consistently across all time points during follow-up compared with counties that implemented lockdowns after the inflection point (Fig. 1). In our models, the timing of the lockdown at the county level explained nearly 50% of the total in COVID-19 case counts across US counties, highlighting the importance of early lockdown implementation in controlling the pandemic at the county level.
At a glance the studies you’ve shared are models/guesswork. — AJJ
It’s also worth pointing out that infection numbers are a product how much testing you do. An alarming figure can be created out of thousands of people who test positive but who aren’t actually ill. — AJJ
The histrionics surrounding and inspiring these measures have had their own consequences for peoples’ freedom, happiness, livelihoods and by extension their health. On this basis I don’t accept the choice not to participate in the parade is irrational. — AJJ
I also don’t accept that lockdowns are necessary; I believe we could have had normalised social rules (that included hand washing and taking care around the vulnerable) from the beginning without the consequences suspect characters like Neil Ferguson convinced so many of. — AJJ
This is the typical response (not in a bad way, just useful to summarise). The common themes are
1. It doesn't matter how little the risk is reduced, it makes sense to reduce any risk that one can.
2. It's not about you it's about
2a - the hospital bed you might take up putting pressure on the health service, and
2b - the vulnerable others you might infect if you remain unvaccinated, and
2c - the return to normal that's being postponed by lack of vaccine uptake.
The counter arguments have already been presented, but
1. Low risk reduction means that only small preferences are sufficient to outweigh it, like coffee, bacon, sugar, skipping gym... Just not trusting (or even not liking) the corporations who produce these medicines is clearly in the same category of minor preference as coffee, bacon and gym avoidance. If you do trust the vaccine, then I admit a jab in the arm might be too small a preference, but it depends how much you hate jabs in the arms, it's down to personal preferences at this point. Taking a small increased risk for personal preference is quite normal behaviour. — Isaac
2a. The actual risk is relevant again here though, otherwise the same pressure would apply to a huge swathe of acceptable activities which increase your risk of needing a hospital bed. A moral imperative has to be at least vaguely consistent to have any normative force. Insisting that a very low risk of hospitalisation is reduced even further would apply to dozens of other activities normally considered acceptable. As with personal risk, a small increase in risk to others is still considered part of a normal social compromise made to allow a diversity of personal preferences, so the actual relative figures matter.
2b. The data on how vaccines might reduce transmission is limited and if they do reduce transmission it will vary by cohort. The transmission argument is often wheeled out alongside the symptom reduction argument as if to share in its authority - the two have very different degrees of confidence in their risk reduction. In any case, the person living in rural Wales with a small social group and good hygiene habits is extremely unlikely to have their rate of transmission reduced by any significant amount (and again, as above, there's no normative force behind the argument that all reduction in risk must be taken no matter how small, it's simply not a normal requirement).
Often ignored, but relevant to all these arguments is the fact that immunity drops over time after vaccination. The effects touted for the first 28 days can't be used to assume long-term risk reduction as we know for a fact they they drop off by four months and we don't have any robust data at all on how effective they are after that. Again, if you don't mind the vaccine, and trust the suppliers, then this is all irrelevant because you might as well reduce the risk if you can, but if you don't like the vaccine or don't trust the suppliers, then the risk reduction has to be considerably higher to outweigh the costs and we just don't have the data on that for the long term.
2c. Again, scientific opinion is now largely that vaccination will not bring about an end to the pandemic. The UK's chief adviser recently called the idea "a myth". The sole focus is on preventing the health services from being overwhelmed whilst the virus slowly becomes endemic.
To meet this effect, it's only necessary that people at real risk of hospitalisation (or at real risk of spreading the virus to such people) take the vaccine. That's a very large majority of the population, particularly in America, but it's not everyone. Public health mandates have never tried to account for a minority to whom they don't apply as it waters down the message to very little gain (see 'potatoes are not a vegetable', and 'every unit of alcohol increases your chances of heart disease' as examples - both false, both aimed at a majority who would have taken the truth out of context and missed the important message), so using to public health messages as evidence to contradict this is not appropriate. A public health message is a tool, not a statement of fact.
The public health message on this should be exactly as it is - take the vaccine, mask, distance, clean. But this is not a public health forum and we can afford a little more subtlety here, surely.
You said it was safe based on a claim some doctors had made. But on that basis I’m not willing to dismiss or downplay the accounts of injuries and deaths so easily. — AJJ
But the covid vaccines are not actually being made mandatory, in the actual legal sense of the word.
On principle, a medication that legally has the status of merely an experimental medication cannot be made mandatory. A medication has to pass a long vetting process before it can move up from being merely an experimental medication, and again there is a vetting process before it can be made mandatory by law. — baker
Or is it the case that in those countries, covid vaccinations are demanded by government decree (which is less than a law), or they found a roundabout way to enforce covid vaccinations? — baker
You can distrust your negotiation partner because you have a trusted social world. Start with global social distrust and you will see that you are deprived of language entirely. This too is a lie, or might (as) well be. — unenlightened
I'm suggesting that it is a moral imperative. I'm suggesting that rationality cannot exist without trust. I'm suggesting that we are social beings before there can be any question of our being rational or irrational beings. I'm suggesting that reason is and ought to be only the slave of passion. — unenlightened
So I think you go too far, and not far enough. If trust isn't ever rational, then nothing is ever rational but what one sees with one's own eyes. Perhaps I can adapt Wittgenstein a little and suggest that distrust and trust are on a par, and equally need some, but not absolute, justification. There is, alas, good reason to distrust governments and medical companies, in the record of lies and bullshit that they have promulgated over the years. It is clear that the truth is not as high on their priorities list as their self-interest.
It should be. It comes down to this: if society does not value the truth it disintegrates. A century of moral nihilism has brought us here, to where the truth is simply unavailable, and talk has almost no value. Thus the thread does little but allow some emotional venting. If trust is irrational, then no one should rationally believe anything another says or posts, and we cannot talk at all. — unenlightened
there isn't a need for one's arguments to be understood as rational anyway — Tzeentch
Indeed, because according to the constitutions of many countries, one's body is by default considered private and granted the right to exist. — baker
If you don't get caught, who can say that you didn't have the freedom to do those things? — baker
Do your own research before sticking crap into your body. — MondoR
When making decisions about one's own body, there isn't a need for one's arguments to be understood as rational anyway. — Tzeentch
Sure, we can say that these people are irrational, that they are jumping to conclusions, and so on. That they rely on the government too much, that they are even childish and "can't think for themselves". But right now, this is irrelevant. For these people, trust is the primary heuristic, and that's how they function. — baker
Indeed, it isn't evidence, but it is cause for action, or in the case of those who don't get vaccinated, inaction. — baker