Yes, as long as X existing is contingent, then x existing ultimately obtained by chance.

If God wanting X contingently obtained, then yes, he could've not wanted X. So, yes, there are two possible outcomes. Contingency entails at least two possible outcomes. Chance, as I'm using the term, is an explanation of why one possibility obtained over another when there's not some contingent, contrastive explanation that entails that one of the possibilities obtained over the other(s).

What this means is that answering why one possibility obtains over another will always bottom out, so to speak, at chance. That's why I say that states of affairs that obtain contingently ultimately obtain by chance.

Again, I'm not talking about impotence. When I say fail, I'm not saying that God is trying to do something and failing. I'm merely saying that if God is wanting X, then he's necessarily failing to not want X. It's not because God can't not want X (he can, if his wanting X is contingent), he's just failing to (I.e., he's just not wanting X).

That's true, but God's wanting X would be contingent, if it could fail to obtain. I wasn't implying that God's choice could fail to obtain because he's impotent. It could fail to obtain just because it is contingent. That is, it is just analytically true that a state of affairs that obtained contingently could've failed to obtain.

I could use your creating something, but God will work, as long as there is contingency involved.

It's just a scenario I was constructing. I'm sure there are some metaphysical necessitarians that wouldn't agree with it.

While that is fine and true, that could still be the case and yet God choosing to create X could've failed to obtain. It contingently obtained, so I wouldn't expect a contrastive, entailing-type of explanation from you, but that's how I know and why I say it was chancy. It's not necessarily a bad thing, it just is.

I didn't mean to suggest that the origin point in a causal chain has a cause. I'm perfectly happy to work with an uncaused cause. What I'm trying to do is give you an example of a state of affairs that obtained contingently, to ask you why it obtained instead of another that could have, and for you to not appeal to another contingent state of affairs to contrastively explain it obtaining. I thought God's choosing to create X would be a good candidate for this because it is presumably contingent and I wouldn't expect you to appeal to another contingent state of affairs to contrastively explain it. Perhaps my use of the word "origin" threw you off. Anyway, again, simply why did God choosing to create X obtain instead of fail to obtain?

I can appreciate determinism and indeterminism and routinely think in terms of the latter.

I'm not opposed to suggestions. Out of curiosity, suppose someone asked you why an initial (or origin, as you put it), contingent state of affairs obtained instead of another state of affairs that could've obtained. Maybe you could use the state of affairs of God choosing to create X. Presumably that state of affairs obtained contingently (I.e., God choosing not to create X could've obtained, or whatever). What would you say settled the matter? When I say chance settled the matter, I'm pretty much saying that the matter got settled but it's not as if there is something that made it settle one way or another, it just did settle one way over the other. I'm at a loss for what else I could say other than chance.

Maybe you'd suggest that I need not mention chance because everything I associate with chance is perfectly accounted for by my having already said it obtained contingently, but that's where I distinguish that a contingent outcome could be immediately settled by something we could point to, yet ultimately settled by chance. To further illustrate, take God's choice to create:

Someone might point to God choosing to create the universe as the reason why the universe exists. In other words, God choosing to create the earth settled the matter of whether or not the earth was created. So, even though the earth being created obtained contingently, it wasn't by chance in the immediate sense, but in virtue of being contingent, it will have been by chance in the ultimate sense. So I think my mentioning chance is not without warrant. In fact, you and MU initially countered my claim of chance by pointing to another contingent event.

Sorry that was a bit long winded, but maybe you have a better way to articulate what I'm trying to convey.

I would suspect that there might be some propositions about the state of the actual world that are necessarily true, no? I suspect most theists would say that God existing (or 'God exists') is necessarily true, for example. But, I think most people would probably say there is no shortage of contingent truths.

Well, I don't really see it or use it as another word for contingency. I generally say that contingency entails chance, so they're closely related, but I don't use the terms interchangeably, usually.

Yes, chance would be present in any libertarian free choice. I don't think it misrepresents a free will choice. Libertarian free choices are contingent, so it's just a categorical thing in that way. If there was no chance/contingency involved, then the choices would be necessitated.

I think we may be employing chance differently here. I'm not really suggesting that chance modifies a cause, as if chance was something doing this or that. Chance would almost be like a space in the sense that a cause is just inherently capable of causing this or that. That is, I wouldn't say, as you point out, that chance is something impacting/changing on uncaused cause; instead, chance is just an opening/capability/space that allows for alternate outcomes.

I know that explanation is rough and probably doesn't employ terminology that professional philosophers would use, but I'm just trying to convey what I'm meaning by chance.

I think that that is just what contingency entails. It seems that if God has a free (in the libertarian sense) choice, then we have something like the following two possible states of affairs, for instance: 'God choosing X' and 'God choosing -X.' Let's say that 'God choosing X' obtained. Since it obtained contingently, 'God choosing -X' could've obtained but simply failed to, by chance, I would say.

Yea. The way I put it is that world-X ultimatelyobtained by chance. As I just mentioned to MU, if we trace back to the root, we should arrive at chance, IFF the state of affairs obtained contingently.

Yes, I'd say a choice could necessitate a state of affairs to obtain, but, again, if the state of affairs contingently obtained, then so did the choice. So, at some point, as we get to the root, we should arrive at chance.

Well the idea is that if world-X obtained (or was actual in the way that the abstractionist uses the term) contingently, then your making it so would also be contingent. In other words, when you get to the root of why one possible state of affairs obtained over the others, you should arrive at chance (one just obtained over the others and there wasn't anything that necessitated that that be the case).

Yea, I've got you. I'm not too knowledgeable in that area either, so we can leave it there. Thanks for your input.

I guess I don't see why one wouldn't say it was just by chance. But that's why I started the thread, because I wasn't sure.

Well, the concretist would say all possible worlds obtain, and so S1 obtains in at least one and S2 obtains in at least one other. So the question of 'why does one possible world (or state of affairs) obtain instead of the other possible ones' wouldn't really apply to a concretist. Unless I'm misunderstanding you.

I've got you. I'm not really sure which position I find more convincing. All that being said, the point of the thread was to assume abstractionism, and so to assume that this possible world obtained instead of all of the others, and to inquire as to what could possibly account for this one obtaining instead of the others.

I pretty much agree with everything you're saying. So, when the abstractionist says that w1 obtains but the others don't, what do you take that to mean, Michael? You might be a concretist and reject it, but do you know what the abstractionist is meaning?

I understand what you're saying, I think. You are saying that if S1 obtains at possible world w1, then a world where S2 obtains instead of S1 is obviously not w1, and I agree with this. However, because S1 obtained contingently, nothing about/in w1 necessitated that S1 obtained. Does that make sense? It just so happened that S1 obtained there instead of S2, even though, after S1 obtained, so to speak, we identify that world as w1.

I'm having a little bit of difficulty understanding your response, I think. It seems like I agree with your post, yet you're denying my contention of chance. Why would you say that S1 obtained over S2? Are you saying that that question doesn't really make sense, or would you say that more information is needed to answer it?

The question is not confused, you're just not approaching it from the abstractionist position, which is what I've asked for in the OP.

Maybe try this: take the world that we're at (or any one of the possible worlds, for that matter). Let's say that a certain state of affairs S1 obtains contingently in that world. Now, for the sake of simplicity, let's say that if S1 had failed to obtain, then, necessarily, S2 would've obtained (which means there is a close possible world where S2 did obtain). That is to say that one or the other necessarily obtained in the particular world, but which obtained was contingent. Essentially I'm asking in the OP and here: what settled the matter that S1 obtained in this particular world instead of S2 when S2 was a state of affairs that this world could've included (was compatible with up until S1 obtained), alternatively? So far, you're answering by saying something akin to "because S1 is what obtains in the particular world we're discussing," but that's not the answer to the question. That fact is already imbedded in the question. To elaborate, let's say that S3 obtains necessarily (there is no possible world in which S3 doesn't obtain). If I asked you "why does S3 obtain in this world," you wouldn't and shouldn't answer with "because S3 obtains in that world." That's already established. You should instead answer by saying "because S3 necessarily obtains" or "because S3 can't fail to obtain."

Now, back to where S1 obtains contingently instead of S2, I'm asking why S1 obtained over S2. Unlike the answer to the question I asked when S3 necessarily obtained, it would be strange to say that "S1 obtained in this world because it contingently obtains" or "S1 obtained in this world because it could've obtained." But that is all that contingency implies. So what settled the matter in the way that necessity settles that S3 obtains? My contention was that it must be chance as far as I can tell, which, as I mentioned to SophistiCat, just means that it just settled this way instead of that and there's nothing to point to that could account for why.

There is a section on abstractionism in the "Possible Worlds" entry on the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (SEP) website.

Although, as I said, I think contingency entails chance, as I'm using the word, I think I can make a distinction between the two. I employ "chance" when a matter is settled by nothing (I.e., when a matter is settled, but it is not settled by anything at all). So, if a contingent state of affairs obtained and we look at why, we should always arrive, if not immediately, then ultimately, at an instance of the matter being settled by chance (settling one way or another with nothing to point to explain why this instead of that).

That's probably the best I can do in illustrating how I'm using the term.

Yea, I think we're on the same page. All my knowledge of this pretty much comes from the SEP Possible Worlds entry as well. After thinking about it and seeing the responses, I may have been better off coming at this from a states of affairs angle (e.g., ultimately, why did this possible state of affairs obtain instead of some other possible one), as it might be less likely to prompt an answer that both obtained, just at different worlds.

Not one abstractionist in this community, huh? Feels like no one is even willing to wear the hat.

As I mentioned in the OP, I'm asking for what the answer would be IF the abstractionists' position was to be correct. I figure that it has to be chance, which is entailed by contingency, but I was checking to see if I'd failed to consider or understand something.