You are right though that this kind of progress against the oldest of foes like death itself are only now on the verge of technological possibility, but striving to make them technologically possible should have been a driving goal for the whole history of humanity. — Pfhorrest

Well, I suppose the question is going to be whether just due to recent events T-Humanism is having a fad or whether at any other point in history was this promoted. I mean, alchemists or the search for the Holy Grail were things Kings only got access to, yet nowadays in a short period of time we might see these things become a reality that can be bought at a sufficient price.

Now, the question would be, would you jump on?

I’m extremely proud of transhumanists and techno-progressivists more generally, like David Pearce, for having the courage to dare to at least try to fix the biggest of problems that have always been either seen as hopeless inevitabilities or excused away with happy fantasies as not real problems at all. — Pfhorrest

I was just trying to specify it as a term, and this almost definitionally means they are neo-Epicureans, no?

First and foremost the general excuses for defeatism (quitting) need to be vanquished. I call these broadly “dogmatic transcendentalism” (roughly the religious mindset), “cynical relativism” (basically radical skeptics cum effective nihilists), and most dangerously “dogmatic relativists” (“Postmodernists”) and the “transcendent cynics” (what Postmodernists call “Modernists”) who are doomed to collapse into them. In short, we need people to get on board with the idea that doing something, in general, in every context, is both possible and necessary, neither useless nor hopeless. — Pfhorrest

Well, as these sample populations didn't exist in the 2000's, only around some kind of, dare I say, 'fad' with avoiding accepted existential norms. But, I think it's mostly economical, in how these things are becoming possible?

And 9/11 happened 20 years ago. — ssu

Yet, terrorism is still such a prominent topic, with there being 12 intelligence agencies in the United States doing different tasks along with the same thing.

@Noble Dust

One for you:

Does anyone remember the liberalism of Bill Clinton? Those were good times.

Being a individual, or even rugged individual is quite lonely, aloof, and not really social.

Typically, individuals remain silent about what they believe to be better norms than what society accepts, and hence are called lone individuals, or schizoid, or unordinary.

That's how I see it in the US where individualism is popular yet a drag on being poor and all that.

You broke my parser. — fishfry

What I'm asking is if there's a way to determine partial computable functions from total computable functions for the Busy Beaver issue not to arise?

The Chinese Room is some kind of Turing oracle, no, @Banno?

For BB(n) grows faster than any computable sequence of integers: indeed, if it didn’t, then one could use that fact to solve the halting problem, contradicting Turing’s theorem.

consider again a Turing machine M that halts if and only if there’s a contradiction in ZF set theory. Clearly such a machine could be built, with some finite number of states k. But then ZF set theory can’t possibly determine the value of BB(k) (or BB(k+1), BB(k+2), etc.), unless ZF is inconsistent! For to do so, ZF would need to prove that M ran forever, and therefore prove its own consistency, and therefore be inconsistent by Gödel’s Theorem.

Pretty wild stuff. — fishfry

Is this due to the bounded values between partial computable functions and total computable functions is itself indeterminate to determine thus complexity, and therefore, following from this complexity for the precise boundary is unascertainable?

Also, asking @TonesInDeepFreeze?

Coherentism: none of our beliefs are foundational, and the truth of a belief can only be confirmed by its coherence with other beliefs. Thus, knowledge arises from a network of interdependent and mutually reinforcing beliefs. — Noisy Calf

This sounds closer to redundancy theories in my mind. Although, there is significant overlap between coherentism and redundancy theories. Yes?

Oh, and the Chineses Room - Google might be showing how the room could be constricted without a rule book... showing that Searle's basic insight, that language use is not syntactic, is correct, but without dismissing machine intelligence. — Banno

Yeah, I can see how this is true, and think it makes sense.

Here's a link that works:

oreilly.com/content/machines-that-dream/

• Natural language processing has come a long way since its inception. Through techniques such as vector representation and custom deep neural nets, the field has taken meaningful steps toward real language understanding.
  
• The language model endorsed by deep learning breaks with the Chomskyan school and harkens back to Connectionism, a field made popular in the 1980s.
  
• In the relationship between neuroscience and machine learning, inspiration flows both ways, as advances in each respective field shine new light on the other.
  
• Unsupervised learning remains one of the key mysteries to be unraveled in the search for true AI. A measure of our progress toward this goal can be found in the unlikeliest of places—inside the machine’s dreams.

Connectionism and Searle seem intertwined. I have come to the conclusion that it seems more like redundancy theories (which inherently rely on Chomsky or a general accepted syntax to reinforce) and then the correspondence theory to make Connectionism work out.

Just reading it in more detail.

But I don't know enough about the busy beaver problem and its comparison with incompleteness to say anything about it. — TonesInDeepFreeze

See:

https://math.stackexchange.com/questions/4164255/alphabetical-complexity-of-algorithms/4164291?noredirect=1#comment8623761_4164291

That what does actually happen normally? That people follow norms? Yes, that is (statistically) normal. — Luke

That the feature of ethics in terms of Wittgenstein, happens in regards to what those social norms consist of. I think, that shouldn't be unclear.

OK, here they are:

https://slate.com/technology/2011/10/google-translate-will-google-s-computers-understand-languages-better-than-humans.html

https://slate.com/human-interest/2015/09/take-a-wittgenstein-class-he-explains-the-problems-of-translating-language-computer-science-and-artificial-intelligence.html

The link in the OP is for paid membership, sorry, can't do anything about that.

I still cant find my investigations into Google and Wittgenstein has so few results!

One puzzle may be that in Wittgenstein meaning is pretty much replaced by use in a form of life; that is, it is not to be separated from the everyday activities in which you and I engage. But arguably that is what Google does in abstracting a vector representation of a word. — Banno

I think that's pretty much true. Yet, what do you think about their hierarchical organizing? Is it really science or facts that get the most views in their vector's directionality? And even more interesting, what about saying and showing for Google Images search results?

It will be interesting to see how the divide between Chomski and Bengio plays out - the link in your cited article is unfortunately broken. — Banno

Care to elaborate?

Here are some more links, regarding Natural Language Processing and Wittgenstein:
https://towardsdatascience.com/neural-networks-and-philosophy-of-language-31c34c0796da

I posted something to the sort of:

When you mention point (i), that you can't expect this in general, as a consequence of Godel's theorem, what do you mean? Furthermore, when you say that "free" partial computable functions exist that are non-subject to the Busy Beaver problem, what does that render them as? Finally, are you artificially drawing this distinction between partially computable and total computable for the complexity class of NP complete or are they in separate classes?

To the above.

@TonesInDeepFreeze

I got an answer to this question in regards to partial computability and total computability.

See:

https://math.stackexchange.com/questions/4164255

I think the issue here is a confusion re: partial vs. total computable functions. (Below I fix some "appropriate ambient axiom system," say ZFC - so e.g. "theorem" means "ZFC-theorem" and so on.)

Via brute-force-search, the partial function p defined as follows is computable:
p(#φ)={The length of the shortest ZFC-proof of φ↑if ZFC⊢φ otherwise,

where "↑" denotes "is undefined" and #φ is the Godel number of φ. This is utterly unproblematic. Note, however, that p is not always defined. This makes sense: if I try to brute-force-search for a proof of a non-theorem φ, I'll just spin my wheels forever and not get anywhere. Granted, for some specific non-theorems there may be an easy argument that they are not provable from ZFC, but (i) I can't expect that in general (this is a consequence of Godel's theorem) and (ii) regardless of point (i), such cleverness isn't something the brute-force-searching-function p does.

So all that is pretty simple. When we try to relate p to total computable functions, however, things get a bit weird. While computable, p grows extremely fast: for every total computable function t there is some n such that p(n)↓>t(n). (Here "↓>" means "is defined and greater than.") This may feel absurd at first, but in fact is a key point illustrating just how much more "free" partial computable functions are than total computable functions.

---
The busy beaver function, or any of its many variants (e.g. we could forget it entirely and just think about Godel's incompleteness theorem), comes into the picture when we prove the claim in the previous paragraph. But it's utterly irrelevant to the existence of the original partial computable function p.
----

It's hard to believe that the issue really amount to categorizing mathematics, due to Godel.

All criticisms aside, I still think there's merit to mentioning that ethics consists, at least extensionally by my own reasoning from Wittgenstein, to an adherence to those very norms in society.

In what sense does Wittgenstein advocate an adherence to these norms? — Luke

Wittgenstein might have not said this, and I mistakenly said that he did; but, isn't it a feature of language that this does actually happen normally?

What? — StreetlightX

Nothing. I was interested in a discussion.

As others have pointed out, this is an incorrect reading of Wittgenstein. — StreetlightX

I kind of advocate, the notion that a social reality where social dynamics evolve in this manner that precisely label individuals, using whatever method necessary to do so, would render one to assume that Wittgenstein should have stated this explicitly, no?

Far from that, Wittgenstein repeatedly rejected the labels assigned to him, moving restlessly from heir to a fortune to engineer to philosopher to teacher to hermit to architect to hospital orderly... while explicitly rejecting being labeled a behaviourist or logical atomist or logical empiricist.

I think you need to drop mention of Wittgenstein from your thesis. — Banno

But, this is how social dynamics evolves through time, no? So, I concede that perhaps dropping Wittgenstein might be necessary.

I quite agree. The suggestion in the OP strikes me as a conservative misreading. Hence my request for further information, for which we will wait. — Banno

I think you know all about the life of Wittgenstein in treating his life as a 'duty' or even in personal letters to Russell. And, then finally becoming antiphilosophical in Cambridge and saying one ought to simply live out these social norms in a reality presented in which one accepts (or remains sane) in these sentiments of society.

Hence my question. I would say Wittgenstein advocated keeping track of the rules one was using, or going against; but not blind adherence to them. — Banno

I think the idea of adherence to the rules of language paints a false picture. It is not as if we follow a rule book. — Fooloso4

I think linguistics and social sciences provide a large degree of information towards this sentiment by the very way we obey from childhood certain implicit or explicit "rules".

Can you support this conjecture? — Banno

Well, yes, by the very fact of how bias and norms create quasi-rules of how language is used in a society. I understand that terms become reified with time as these tendencies abate or are pressured due to how social norms progress.

I can also mention the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis or the Flynn effect likewise.

Stakeholder capitalism sounds too good to be true. I wonder how it would work in practice, or game theoretically. Sounds like they would have to maintain private shareholding rights for an owner still to prevent buyouts.

Is this based on Schopenhauer? It sounds like Schopenhauer or Kant?

The 2008 financial crises almost took them down.

Whell, if I'm not mistaken they have the most sophisticated AI computer working on stock markets.

Humans, after all, reason to a logical judgement, but reason from an aesthetic judgement. On the one hand, we have to understand things about an object before we know what the object is, but on the other hand, we very well may already have feelings about something before we know what it is about it, that causes those feelings.

Expressions of emotion may be rational/irrational. But emotions themselves, as purely subjective conditions, are not. — Mww

I like the distinction that emotions provide an aesthetic 'intuition' about a decision and its potential outcome based on reason. How do these aesthetic judgements arise or change in one's mind?

As i see it both are labels the mind attaches to emotions. It's not the labels themselves that are important/interesting, but it's the motivations and the process of labeling that's important. — skyblack

Well, labels are context dependent. But, there are some situations like labile emotions where they seemingly spontaneously arise, which might puzzle a person experiencing them.

I think that education about "feelings" have always been primarily part of the hidden curriculum. — baker

In what manner, or can you provide an example?

Western psychology prides itself in being morally neutral. This limits its scope. — baker

How so?

The summary isn't bad in the link below:

https://www.ihhp.com/meaning-of-emotional-intelligence/

Given that the concept of ‘emotional intelligence’ isn’t very widely accepted means any measurement of it is on pretty sketchy footing. — I like sushi

Can you link me something on the matter? A Buddhist or Stoic would object mostly, no?

What have been the most worthwhile threads on the forums? — Banno

I liked the reading groups.

I read the Wiki on the McIntyre entry for After Virtue, and almost laughed at what emotivism has come to be defined by in modern thought, @Wayfarer.

It's a joke to think about moral emotivism in terms of capitalist thought, even though, I'm not much of a Marxist or anything; but, know all about the sociocultural aspects of a capitalist society fairly well.

Meaning, that moral emotivism can be hijacked to serve the need or desire of the socio-economic system under which one lives.

It's pretty interesting to note, that behaviorism is such an old theory of psychology that won't change despite the 2000's being an era of cognitivism, heh.

The ancient notion is that reason should rule the passions (emotions). It is that idea that has been overcome in modernity, replaced by the notion that we must be allowed to express them in a “healthy way”. But when you are overcome by anger, for example, how can you express that in a healthy way? You are already overcome. The outcome of that expression is most likely to be destruction...either of yourself or some other(s) or both. — Todd Martin

Sounds like Fromm.