Who is "everyone else"? If you're referring to Hacker and the reddit stuff, those don't make any sense either. (As I noted in my post above.) — Terrapin Station

So, point out what you're having trouble understanding here; because, I don't know exactly where you're having difficulties in understanding my OP.

It is of course legitimate to demand that people follow actual laws. It is in no way legitimate to demand that people follow laws that are unofficial. Once again, a rule that is unofficial is not subject to checks, balance and accountability. This means that it has nothing to keep it from becoming tyrannical. And tyranny is not what America is meant to be about. — Ilya B Shambat

Here's the dark reality that is America. Laws have to be made explicit and enforced. Take for example the fact that we have within the Declaration of Independence the famous egalitarian statement by Jefferson that "All men (and women) are created equal."

Now despite this supremely egalitarian statement, we still had slavery going on in the great States. Why is that? (Perhaps something someone can help tell us).

Instead, we now have civil rights laws that protect us from people who think contrary to this sentiment. So, laws have to be made explicit as I said, without them we don't know right from wrong...

Quite interested, thanks Tim!

You completely ignored this part: "Consider thoughts you have, things you imagine, ways you feel, etc. Aren't they sometimes vague/uncertain for you?" — Terrapin Station

Well, yes, there's the issue of hidden processes of the mind that are unknown to the conscious mind, such as intentions, the very existence of dream characters (a really interesting question, as to how do dream persona have their own intent), and feelings.

But, this seems to not detract from the gist of the solipsist being tantamount to a fictional god-like entity. I mean, aren't you in control of all aspects of your dream-world, when you dream?

That's not a tenet of solipsism and it doesn't follow from anything. — Terrapin Station

It follows from assuming from assuming that everything that there is to know is contained within the world. And, if the solipsist self is one and the same with the world, then s/he knows everything there is to know about the world.

Maybe it may be easier to assume that God is a solipsist, also?

There must be someone who can write clearly, in a way that makes sense, that has some sort of logical flow to it, and that doesn't seem ridiculously murky and confused. — Terrapin Station

Maybe I'm writing in Swahili? Everyone else seems to get the idea, about the ambiguity of stating that pure realism coincides with solipsism in the Witty quote.

Yet another "Huh?" response from me. A lot of what you wrote seems bewildering to me. — Terrapin Station

Then address the following if you will:

A solipsist is one and the same with his or her own world.
Epistemically the solipsist lives in absolute certainty.
A solipsist cannot doubt and live in absolute certainty at the same time.
Therefore, where doubt arises, there is more to the world of a solipsist than only their self in it.

The first question, I suppose, is why are you conflating solipsism and whether knowledge is possible? — Terrapin Station

I'm using solipsism as a template to compare an entity to that which a fictional entity might assume to have knowledge about in an absolute manner. Given that a solipsist is tantamount to being a godlike entity, I then proceed to show that their omniscience of the world they inhabit, corresponds with a degree of knowledge that leave no room for doubt. Thus, where doubt is not possible, then that solipsistic world excludes the existence of other minds, or an outer world apart from one's own self. Therefore, where doubt is possible, then that would validate, through contradiction of the previous, the idea that there exist other minds or an external world.

First off I dont even understand how you get from "thoughts exist therefore a self exists" What is the self? — GodlessGirl

I don't know if you're being facetious or not. The self of course exists, otherwise who's talking here?

I see my remark went right over your head. — Fooloso4

OK, I will review what has been said already. Apologies.

StackExchange is a reaalllly good place for these sort of non-argumentative questions:

https://philosophy.stackexchange.com/questions/64433/wittgensteins-solipsist-from-tractatus/

Dream, Death, and the Self J. J. Valberg
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Personal_horizon

We could see all of us as part of one self, seemingly disconnected, but connected in a way we have not quite uncovered yet. — leo

Yeah, this is pretty much the starting point for any form of spiritualism. Yet, the solipsist is a fictional God if you can extrapolate from what I've been preaching.

Sorry, I totally missed your post...

The difference between the matrix and a solipsist is in that the matrix still engendered the idea of separate selves in the simulation. Which, is fundamentally different than the world view of the solipsist.

It could be said that there is more to the self that one's knowledge of the self at a particular time. — leo

Yes, and that is an issue worth exploring. The self as we know it in today's Western pop-psy lingo is composed of an ego-ID-and super-ego. I have a very small ego, infinitesimally haha. The continentals have exalted the ego to the point of arriving at postmodernism and the like. Yeah, a lot can be said here.

As an analogy, if you consider that a lucid dream stems from a self, then there are things you can doubt within a lucid dream, but that doesn't imply in itself that the lucid dream stems from something outside the self. Then continuing with that analogy, to a solipsist everything is a lucid dream, so doubt doesn't imply something outside the self, but only that the self doesn't know itself completely. — leo

Well, you might be taking the analogy too far. I suppose the point is that in a word where only the self exists, there is absolute certainty. Perhaps the ID is Satan, the ego Jesus, and the super-ego God?

A limitation in this kind of discussion is that our language and concepts stem from what we experience, so for instance the very concept of doubt stems from our experiences, and then if you assume that doubt cannot exist if there is only a self then you conclude that there is something separate from the self, but if you assume that doubt is a normal part of the self then it doesn't follow that there is something separate from it. — leo

Yes, go on, what do you mean by something separate from the self?

Doubt doesn't presuppose you aren't a solipsist. — GodlessGirl

I'm convinced it does. Here it is again in standard form:

A solipsist is one and the same with his or her own world.
Epistemically the solipsist lives in absolute certainty.
A solipsist cannot doubt and live in absolute certainty at the same time.
Therefore, where doubt arises, there is more to the world of a solipsist than only their self in it.

I am saying you do not have justification that the external material world exists. — GodlessGirl

Therefore solipsism or a brain in vat? No, I already expanded on the fact that doubt epistemically presupposes that one is not a solipsist, and hence the external world exists.

Before you asserted that belief in the external material world was warranted and now you are saying it cannot be proven false. — GodlessGirl

Well, yes just as the fact that I am doubting cannot be proven false or analogously the cogito ergo sum entails that existence is a prerequisite for the statement to even be plausible. Conversely what would the contrapositive even mean in that case?

In order to know something you have to know that the contrary is impossible. — GodlessGirl

I think I laid out my thoughts about this with the above.

How could you justifiy your belief in the external material world without begging the question? — GodlessGirl

I'm not quite on the same page, can you elaborate, please?

If your belief that the external material world existed was false then you wouldn't be able to have doubts and knowledge would be impossible? — GodlessGirl

It could not be proven false in the same way the set of all sets cannot contain itself. Or another way to frame the issue is if you were born in a coma and lived in a dreamless world, since dreams attain their ontological significance from the waking world.

Well, the ability to learn more, establish norms, and do all sorts of things would be moot for a solipsistic being that lives in a world full of certainty. Yes?

and there remains the reality co-ordinated with it.”
— Wallows

What does this mean? — Brett

I really wish I could answer this question, as you seem to have picked out the essential feature of the OP being how is reality "co-ordinated" with the microcosm of the solipsist. Is this like some epsilon-delta ad hoc method at showing that an infinitesimal can reach a limit, or something like that?

:roll: All I know about positivism, is that they wish to declare metaphysics meaningless and validate every proposition against observable states of affairs. — Wayfarer

True, I should have just left it as logical space.

In regards to QM. I believe, given my limited understanding, that the wave-function is inherently metaphysical by nature. I don't know if it's a top-down order or entropic bottom up emergent phenomenon that encompasses the sum total of all possible worlds; but, just throwing that out here.

Interesting how this discussion has evolved. I think, aether's modern understanding under the logical positivists would be 'logical space'.

Does this sound vaguely familiar to you, @Wayfarer?

To go all Zen here and answer a question with another question, are law's by which we govern ourselves also a form of consensus-driven ritualism or icon?

I think not.

Wishes and interest have priority over understanding. How hurt I would be if you were to say, "I understand what you are talking about, but I don't wish to. It is uninteresting."

So I want to start with what is interesting and what hurts and make that the object of enquiry, not knowledge, information, understanding... — unenlightened

This is some form of overgeneralizing in my mind. I've long been trying to elucidate the notion of rationality in the form of emotional reasoning. We aren't fatalistically driven by passions, hurrah-boo responses according to Hume. Higher order volitions do exist, and are formed through reasoned deliberation.

So, one might want to bullshit here and there about the meanings of rituals or traditions; but, from an evolutionary standpoint, or at least even under a Marxist understanding, we are driven not by instinct, emotions, passions, and desire if they do not coincide with the common denominator that is 'reality'.

The role of the organism is to maintain a state of homeostasis (not homeostasis driven by imposing my/your/her will over reality), even in a possessed state that passions and emotions can drive a person.

So, I'm going to polish up everything I have stated thus far.

1) A solipsist lives in a world full of certainty.
2) Epistemologically, Cogito ergo Sum, ergo, a solipsist self is one and the same with the world, leaving no room for doubt in such a world.
3) A solipsist cannot doubt and live in a world full of certainty.
4) Where doubt arises, the world is not solipsistic.
5) Therefore doubt presupposes a world where epistemologically one can find out new facts or experiences about the world.
6) Hence, where doubt arises, the existence of an external world that is non-solipsistic is warranted to assume and/or conclude.

Recollecting a bit, I seem to see more and more of Trump's... humanity?

The fact that he choose to give a history lesson on the fourth of July was initially viewed by myself as some grandiose act of stoking one's ego; but, in fact was a show of confidence to expose one's self with a lack of knowledge on a subject.

Yet, there was no authoritarian parade of tanks, ICBM's painted red, or some such stuff.

Gasp, am I getting used to Trump?

Ditto.

In other words don't you need specific assumptions to justify your iff. — CaZaNOx

In the analogy of death I used above: death as internal shortcoming/necessary process change from within without conceptualizing external factors that lead to death (this case gets clearer if a solipsistic position doesn't necessarily postulate a material body that could be subject to external forces.) — CaZaNOx

Yes, you're on point here. These conditions are multifaceted in the Tractatus. Spinoza's pantheism and necessitarianism, Schopenhauer's theoretical egotism, Kant's Transcendental Idealism all contribute to the conditions allowing Wittgenstein to postulate such an entity as novel and unheard of until its publication. Mind you, even in his Investigations I don't believe he repudiated the notion of a hypothetical solipsist. This line of thought continues into his latter philosophy presented in On Certainty.

Here is P.M.S Hacker on this solipsism present in the Tractatus:

What the solipsist means, and is correct in thinking, is that the world and life are one, that man is the microcosm, that I am my world. These equations... express a doctrine which I shall call Transcendental Solipsism. They involve a belief in the transcendental ideality of time. ... Wittgenstein thought that his transcendental idealist doctrines, though profoundly important, are literally inexpressible.

— Hacker, Insight and Illusion, op cit., n. 3, pp. 99-100.

Where is the pointer to an external world in this at all? — CaZaNOx

Sorry that I can't address the entirety of your post, given my limitations here.

The point with the domains analogy was that the solipsist can only doubt if and only if there is something more than the self of the solipsist in existence. Hypothetically, we can assert that the solipsist lives in a world that only is immediately knowable to the solipsist and not other.

Thus, my post about domains of discourse and the like. Let me know if that helps.

A solipsist cannot doubt because they are trapped in their own world. Epistemically closed off, hermetically sealed, thus doubt cannot arise because it is the opposite of what a solipsist experiences, supreme certainty.

The key conclusion is that a self that is purley based on doubt can not doubt itself at it's core. This view simultainously asserts that there seem to be other domains, being part of the self, that can be doubted. So the self would have only uncertainties no matter what is in question exept it's own existence. — CaZaNOx

And, this is why solipsism was/is (at least in my mind) thought of as a valid idea that one can hold, what cannot be doubted is the fact that one is doubting, within the domain of the self.

OK, before we agree, I wanted to raise the issue of 'domains' with @Janus but, was too busy trying to reach some common ground...

The point with domains, is that the experience of the domain or 'world' of the solipsist is truth apt from within the world, and not by analysis wrt. to other domains. To try and phrase this abstract issue another way, if I and you spoke different languages, then we could only reach a common understanding through the use of ostensive definitions, which we could point at and say that 'grue' is the same thing as my 'water' while pointing at a glass or pouch full of water.

What am I getting at here? Well, the point in my mind is that domains that are non-truth apt (a common criterion cannot be achieved), such as the stuff that Wittgenstein talked about private pains or private languages, are non-nonsensical within language and must be shown. Perhaps @Banno can help out here.

This can be gotten around by defining solipsism a certain way. — Marchesk

True, but, imposing a stipulative definition on a generic one to make the logic fit is basically cheating. I use solipsism not stipulatively here...

First of all, the self is just another experience. — Marchesk

The self is the only experience a solipsist can attest to being true. Again, there is no ordinary 'world' in the "world" of the solipsist.

For the solipsist, all that exists is the experiences a solipsist has. — Marchesk

Yes.

There is no hidden self generating the experiences of a world. — Marchesk

Arguably, yes, although that issue is addressed in the Uppinshads and Bhagavad Gita.

In addition, doubt is just one more kind of experience. — Marchesk

Not true. Doubt is the only experience that is genuine here. Everything else in a solipsistic 'world' are what Wittgenstein might call tautologies.

Also, the solipsist can doubt because they do have experiences of what appears to be an external world full of other people. — Marchesk

Then, that wouldn't make them solipsists.

Remember that solipsism is a philosophical position that only comes about through inquiry and taking skepticism to its logical conclusion. Nobody is a solipsist by default. — Marchesk

Not only that; but, solipsism is an extreme form of idealism. And, I contest here, just for the sake of argument, that the entity we call 'God' is de facto the only true solipsist.

As for new knowledge, it's just another experience. The question is why is there a stream of experiences if nothing is causing them? There's no more answer to that than why anything exists. — Marchesk

Not the same kind-of experience as that of living in a solipsistic world...

Are there any unanswered questions in your mind about epistemic solipsism and how it can be countered by doubt leading to the conclusion that if a person can doubt then that "experience" is grounds for proving the existence of an external world?

You seem to be speaking about so-called lucid dreaming. — Janus

Yeah, pretty much.

But if you can dream and not be cognizant that you are dreaming, then you are not omniscient, which again means there is room for doubt. — Janus

About how every one of us goes about in life, I suppose.

I can counter this by providing the 'Will'. In a dream where one is cognizant that one is dreaming, everything that happens is dictated by a sense of 'willpower' of the subject imposed on the happenings of the dream (now fully realized as one and the same). I haven't come across a better analogy to think of that would reflect the sentiments of this line of reasoning/thread.

Can you explain what you mean by the boundary between doubt and certainty being "rather explicit for a solipsist"? I mean if the world was nothing but you, and you knew yourself exhaustively, there would be nothing but certainty, would there? — Janus

Yes, I'm glad we are on the same page finally...

Or do you think it would be possible, assuming that the world is nothing but you, that there could be any doubt at all, in that case, that the world is nothing but yourself? — Janus

What do you mean?

Anything you experience which you haven't experienced before is a new experience, isn't it? — Janus

Isn't that a metaphysical claim? I believe Wittgenstein addressed this issue of private experiences or some such in the Investigations with his Private Language Argument.

If everything is the self and the solipsist can have new experiences, then she has not experienced all of her self in which case she is never omniscient and so there would be room for doubt, no? — Janus

I don't think that the solipsist can experience genuinely new experiences. The boundary between doubt and certainty is rather explicit for a solipsist, which I assume you don't agree with here?

2) The question here is what is "knowledge". I assumed it to be something along the lines of "the improvement of certainty". — CaZaNOx

I don't think there are degrees of certainty. It's a binary situation here, or at least for the sake of this thread, epistemic closure is guaranteed for the solipsist. Since the solipsist is one and the same with the world, then there's nothing to doubt, yes?

To prevent this you would have to assume something along the lines that there is a net gain over time. I don't see any basis for that. — CaZaNOx

I don't see/understand how the external world enters into this at all. Lets say the Self increases knowledge there is no reason why a solipsist coukdn't just call this an improvement of the knowledge of the Self by the Self (since everything in this view is part of the self). Therefore gaining knowledge/certainty does not necessarily refer to an increase of knowledge of an external world and can not prove the existence of an external world. — CaZaNOx

Well, just take the most popular book in the world, being the Bible. (Keep in mind that God, literally is the ultimate solipsist). S/He/It created us in his own image. While is this sort of irrelevant, I suppose it can be an interested corollary to the topic.