Well he doesn't have Schopenhauer's dual aspect view: of being an object and a subject simultaneously, at least not nearly as strongly developed.

But he does say that when we look at our bodies, we are looking at impressions, not the actual body itself. Yes, I do think a Humean mind is not tenable, he is missing out on some important categories and powers - as he more or less recognizes in the Appendix.

But if you take perception as he does, which one can do, while still knowing the mind has more capacities than Hume allows, the problems he points out are still serious problems for perception. So he can be wrong about the powers of the mind, yet correct in observation, at least as I see it.

the animal has instinct moreso than reason, while the human animal has reason moreso than instinct. — Mww

Yes, exactly.

That's how it seems to me too.

Ah, I see, sure in this sense we are talking about then, "instinct" is rather similar to "the human condition". In both cases, funnily enough, these are innate considerations not drawn from, nor extracted by, experience.

While browsing the preceding section which @Srap Tasmaner mentioned in his reply, I found an important quote, which also covers some of @Mww's concerns, and is a very important passage in general, as reading it should cure people of the misimpression of the extent of Hume's skepticism:

"Shou’d it here be ask’d me, whether I sincerely assent to this argument, which I seem to take such pains to inculcate, and whether I be really one of those‘, sceptics, who hold that all is uncertain, and that our judgment is not in any thing possest of any measures of truth and falshood ; I shou’d , reply, that this question is entirely superfluous, and that neither I, nor any other person was ever sincerely and constantly of that opinion. Nature, by an absolute and uncontroulable necessity has determin’d us to judge as well as to breathe and feel; nor can we any more forbear viewing certain objects in a stronger and fuller light, upon account of their customary connexion with a present impression, than we can hinder ourselves from thinking as long as we are awake, or seeing the surrounding bodies, when we turn our eyes towards them in broad sunshine. Whoever has taken the pains to refute the cavils of this total scepticism, has really disputed without an antagonist, and endeavour’d by arguments to establish a faculty, which nature has antecedently implanted in the mind, and render‘d unavoidable." (p.183)

Book 1, Part 4, Section 1

Fair enough.



My reading of Hume is that he does take reason to be a faculty on its own, but he consistently tries to show how weak it is - weaker than we would like to believe. I'd have to enter the moral domain to give a full account of Hume, but I'm not too interested with moral philosophy.

Whether reason is or is not, as strong as we would like is an open question. One can say, that the state of the world we're in certainly shows reason is not our strongest trait. Yet we know many, many instances in which reason shines quite brightly. So, it's not clear to me either way.

According to the generally acknowledged first serious scholarly work on Hume, by Norman Kemp Smith, whom you no doubt know, says that Hume is a philosopher of "passion", if I remember the exact word correctly.

We may not trust our reasons, but we have no choice but to trust reason itself. — Mww

I don't understand what you are saying here. What does "trusting reason itself" imply? I mean, reason told us for thousands of years that we were the center of the universe, which is not at all a silly view due to the evidence available at the time.

So I'm unclear on what you are saying here.

Well, someone else replied to you, which takes a task off of me, not in that I don't mind exchanging ideas with you - truth is the opposite, but I also don't want to be overwhelmingly the only person talking here.

There are many directions to go and one's own inclination will also determine, to an extent, what one finds useful or surprising or revealing. You may be of the opinion that Hume may not be too interesting. Nevertheless, one thing I'll say:

It does not necessarily follow that because he can't find convincing reasons for our belief in the continuity of external objects, that he should also "... ask for the causes by which his believing that the existence of bodies is to be taken for granted."

For him, it is too hard a question to ask. We have reason, which for Hume is "...nothing but a wonderful and unintelligible instinct in our souls..." (p.179) Book 1, Part III, Chapter XVI

An instinct is something that cannot be explained, it is given. It is also something we just do, like perceiving or talking. One can analyze the given, but not explain it. As he says: "Nothing is more suitable to that philosophy, than a modest scepticism to a certain degree, and a fair confession of ignorance in subjects, that exceed all human capacity." (Last sentence of the Appendix.)

Cool! Mason & Dixon is wonderful.

I did not like Against the Day too much, maybe your experience will differ.

Sorry for the late reply, it’s been a busy day. You raise good points, as expected. I’ll give you a due reply tomorrow. All I’d say is to try and keep going, even with those concerns being raised.

We are speaking about different things. The quoted passage is about the reasons surrounding our belief, not about the belief itself.

And even then, he admits that his "hopes vanish", he could not get himself out of his own arguments.

One deals with everyday life, "vulgar reasoning", in which we take for granted and cannot dispute the existence of objects, what you are emphasizing, are the reasons for the belief, not the belief itself, because, as Hume says:

"There is a great difference betwixt such opinions as we form after a calm and profound reflection, and such as we embrace by a kind of instinct or natural impulse, on account of their suitableness and conformity to the mind." (p.214)

You are focusing on his "profound reflections", while minimizing what "we embrace by a kind of instinct or natural impulse".

It just means that body does not exist in the way that we commonly think that it does — Metaphysician Undercover

This must be true.

No. I'm a Chomskyian,

This is a thread trying to explain what Hume believes, I haven't said too much of what I think. In such threads, I think it makes sense to bring out what makes them special or important historical figures.

I think his idea of our minds being like an "empty theatre" and also a bundle of perceptions, to be extremely wrong, heck, Descartes had a more sensible theory of mind than Hume.

What I think Hume gets correct is concerns the nature of perception, how it works phenomenologically, it's as I experience it.

I mean, I think it does make sense to postulate something "behind" the objects as it were, and you can say that we take object X to be X, in virtue of us: we that recognize it (object X) as having the necessary properties found in all objects of X type, it has these properties and we recognize them as such, because of the type of cognition we have.

Still doesn't solve the issue of the perception being new, nor knowing virtually anything about whatever may be the cause of the object, it remains a postulate only, imo, though it is very reasonable, and I agree with it, on the whole.

Unless you had something else in mind.

It's, in a way a natural evolution of traditional propaganda as developed in the early 20th century. We just so happened to develop the internet, and why wouldn't those power not use this to their advantage?

One of the saving graces for the internet is that, if you know how to use it, you can find very good information, which would otherwise be extremely difficult to obtain.

One must assume "they" (CIA, FB - all these government and corporations) have everything on you in terms of information, and will use that info according to how they see fit.

Wars such as this one provides just more example of such a system on controlled information works.

It is a total mind-f*ck. Also that we are, strictly speaking, looking at a new object every time we open our eyes.

Makes no sense at all, but it's what we have.

On 1 and 2, yes, absolutely.

On 3, let's see... I'd only add or stress that the constant object we posit is identical (it looks to me) to the one we have in our perceptions, and it eases our contradictions with reason and reflection. But, yes, agree here too.

Very much so. Heck, we even went so far as to ban Russia Today on YouTube and other platforms. Of course, these can still be reached online. But the idea here being that it is insane to consider how the Russian government (Putin and his allies, essentially) views this issue. Obviously a big mistake, for so called defenders of "free speech". That arises in Europe when it comes to Muslims. Not here.

"Philosophers are so far from rejecting the opinion of a continu’d existence upon rejecting that of the independence and continuance of our sensible perceptions, that tho’ all sects agree in the latter
sentiment, the former, which is, in a manner, its necessary consequence, has been peculiar to a few extravagant sceptics; who after all maintain’d that opinion in words only, and were never able to bring themselves sincerely to believe it. There is a great difference betwixt such opinions as we form after a calm and profound reflection, and such as we embrace by a kind of instinct or natural impulse, on account of their suitableness and conformity to the mind." (p.214)

No, he is not using the word "fiction" as is used today. A fiction can be useful, some more useful than others. The self is a fiction, yet we don't treat it as we do Harry Potter or something, much of our laws are based on the notion of morality which we attach to a person, also a fiction. Hume talks about his furniture and his chamber, true these are fictions, but very useful ones at that.

This error is a form of self-deception which further inclines the mind to create a fiction of the continued existence of an object. We readily associate distinct impressions with each other, and we have a disposition to judge them as the same. This judgement of same is an error, and this error causes us to believe in the continued existence of an object. — Metaphysician Undercover

Which is why I provided in the OP, the following, to which I will add the whole quote:

"We may well ask, What causes induce us to believe in the existence of body? but 'tis in vain to ask, Whether there be body or not? That is a point, which we must take for granted in all our reasonings." (p.187)

What he is discussing here is not the existence of these objects, it's that the reasons we give for our belief in their continued existence to be far weaker than what we ordinarily suppose. But he does not believe that we are deluded or fooling ourselves when we conclude that there are bodies.

I've talked a lot about the Appendix, I will now quote his famous passage where he argues that he cannot renounce his belief in the existence of external objects, a passage of supreme importance in all of philosophy, in my opinion:

"But all my hopes vanish, when I come to explain the principles, that unite our successive perceptions in our thought or consciousness. I cannot discover any theory, which gives me satisfaction on this head.

"In short there are two principles, which I cannot render consistent; nor is it in my power to renounce either of them, viz. that all our distinct perceptions are distinct existences, and that the mind never perceives any real connexion among distinct existences. Did our perceptions either inhere in something simple and individual, or did the mind perceive some real connexion among them, there wou'd be no difficulty in the case. For my part, I must plead the privilege of a sceptic, and confess, that this difficulty is too hard for my understanding." (635-636) (Italics mine)

That's his own conclusion and although he says "I pretend not, however, to pronounce it absolutely insuperable. Others, perhaps, or myself, upon more mature reflections, may discover some hypothesis, that will reconcile those contradictions." (636), his conclusion remains true to this day.

And a final argument against such a view of denying such objects is when he says, also in the Appendix:

"As long as we confine our speculations to the appearances of objects to our senses, without entering into disquisitions concerning their real nature and operations, we are safe from all difficulties, and can never be embarrassed by any question." (638)

Italics his. Bold mine.

Very accurate and quite scary quotes, even some comparisons of Russia to Nazi Germany and the like.

Again, very reminiscent of how mass propaganda was discovered in WWI, turning an isolationist nation to a war crazy society in a short amount of time.

And we still have to say, that what Russia is doing to Ukraine is criminal. Because that's not obvious. If we survive this, be ready for the demonization of China, which has been developing a good deal since Trump and not slowing down with Biden.

It may be there is no purely mental difference between a veridical seeing and an optical illusion: the same predictions of your future states are generated. The difference is out in the future, when your expectation is confirmed or must be revised. — Srap Tasmaner

I suspect that this is the case in many instances of hallucinations or erroneous perceptions (visual tricks and the like). Then again, Hume does say "No simple idea without a corresponding simple impression." This is for simple ideas: red, bitter and so on. With complex ideas, it is more difficult.

I think what you say is true, provided we have had first the initial stimulus for us to recognize an object. After then we can say that optical illusions and veridical perceptions are in essence the same.

that, strangely, in analyzing the behavior of organism, we are driven to imagine that it must behave as if there were only mind, even if, as with our own case, we refuse to believe any such thing. — Srap Tasmaner

Sure. When studies are done on human beings concluding the efficacy of medicine, they assume the patients they choose will count for all people. Likewise with animals. Internalism (which is a kind of idealism) is a given, though not explicitly articulated coherently with enough frequency.

Perhaps it's that we believe in objects, but our minds do not! — Srap Tasmaner

I believe in objects, I don't separate the mind from myself, these I take "for granted". But when I analyze the reasons, as given by Hume, I see that my belief is weaker than I thought, by quite a bit. Stand in front a strobe light that goes on and off very rapidly and examine an object or person moving, you'll quickly see how fallible our reasons for certain beliefs can be, in my experience.

I think both in themselves and by environment are extremely complex. We aren't even aware of how we produce the sentences that we do at the moment we are writing them and also assuming that what I am saying right now, will resonate with you, as they resonate with me. Even how I move a finger is inscrutable to me.

Nature may find the simplest way of making things work, mind included, but look at fractals, or termite mounds or even the barest of all environmental formations, end up with spectacularly complex and beautiful constructions on the basis of quite simple "tools": rocks, dirt, perhaps rules in the case of the mind, such as recursion.

*from the point of view* of such a creature, there is only mind. On this, broadly, Hume, Kant, the Tractatus, and modern psychology are agreed. It is not so, but it *must* appear so, from the point of view of the organism. — Srap Tasmaner

That's exactly right and should not be controversial in the least.

That's interesting. And Hume was on the right track, broadly, in thinking that what you can learn from this recognition is not what's in the world -- whether there be objects, for insurance -- but something about how minds work. — Srap Tasmaner

Correct. One may disagree with his "bundle view" or his account of self, but he is right on many things, including the fact that what we see is our perception of things, not something distinct from them.

I think so too, he even states something similar in the introduction to the Treatise, with the whole "science of man" comment.

As Strawson concludes in The Evident Connection, the failure of Hume's empiricism, admitted by Hume in the Appendix, is that he is actually using more resources of the mind than what his philosophy will allow. But this will force him to explicitly acknowledge a complex mental framework, instead of this notion of a series of perceptions.

These are from Book I, section II, part VI

"...external objects become known to us only by those perceptions they occasion." (p.67)

"...tis impossible for us so much as to conceive or form an idea of any thing specifically different from- ideas and impressions." (p.67)

"The farthest we can go towards a conception of external objects, when suppos’d specifically different from our perceptions, is to form a relative idea of them, without pretending to comprehend the related objects." (p.68)

He does call the idea "absurd" in the chapter we are discussing, but what I take him to be saying in these quotes, is that we cannot conceive of them other than by our perceptions.

I'll later share some of Strawson's observations here, in which I think he argues, persuasively, that Hume can readily allow for these types of metaphysical issues to arise, but we cannot make a conclusion one way or the other about them.

That first quote you gave of Hume is indeed beautiful and I think, spot on. I didn't post it because I don't want to hammer home the "mysterian" angle, but it's there in the text.

But then where does that leave this argument which originally established that only perceptions not objects are present to the mind? If we can't contrast the apparent extension of the table with its 'real' extension, then we have no argument at all. — Srap Tasmaner

Yes, I agree that this is quite a problem for him, because if objects and perceptions were identical in all respects, there would be no way to distinguish the table or chamber because each perception is new and then what reference point would we have between my perception of the table at t1 and my perception of the table at t2?

One wouldn't even be able at t2, to call our perception "a table" at t1, it's a new object. We have to postulate a temporal space (a second, fractions of a second?) to t1 so a resemblance can arise which relates it at t2.

I think a key passage to make this less confusing is when he says:

"The only conclusion we can draw from the existence of one thing to that of another, is by means of the relation of cause and effect, which shews, that there is a connexion betwixt them, and that the existence of one is dependent on that of the other, The idea of this relation is deriv’d from past experience, by which we find, that two beings are constantly conjoin’d together, and are always present at once to the mind." (Italics mine) (p.212)

But then he goes on to say: "But as no beings are ever present to the mind but perceptions; it follows that we may observe a conjunction or a relation of cause and effect between different perceptions, but can never observe. it between perceptions and objects." (p.212)

I think this last quote is problematic, a stimulus is needed.

To end this post, he does say:

"There is a great difference betwixt such opinions as we form after a calm and profound reflection, and such as we embrace by a kind of instinct or natural impulse, on account of their suitableness and conformity to the mind." (p.214) (again, italics mine).

So clearly a "natural impulse" is quite important in our ordinary image of the world.

Ok, now I can reply. There are many aspects one can choose to focus on in this chapter, so it can be interpreted in several ways, I want to single out a brief passage, prior to you quote of "We cannot in any property of speech...", he speaks about how time implies succession, and then says that:

"This fiction of the imagination almost universally takes place; and ’tis by means of it, that a single object, plac’d before us, and survey’d for any time without our discovering in it any interruption or variation, is able to give us a notion of identity." (pp.200-201)

I think it is important to point out, that in Hume's use of the term, "fiction", does not mean what we mean by it today, something not being "real", or belonging to mythical tale or a novel. It simply means "more than is warranted by the empirically available evidence." It is real, in the sense that we do experience the identity of objects, but when we look at the evidence, it turns out to be weaker than we would like.

He says, on p.203:

"When we fix our thought on any object, and suppose it to continue the same for some time; 'tis evident
we suppose the change to lie only in the time, and never exert ourselves to produce any new image or idea of the object. "

That speaks of your concerns that each perception is different, and it is by resemblance that we posit continuity. True. Now he says, on p. 204:

"I survey the furniture of my chamber; I shut my eyes, and afterwards open them; and find the new perceptions to resemble perfectly those, which formerly struck my senses. This resemblance is observ’d in a thousand instances, and naturally connects together our ideas of these interrupted perceptions
by the strongest relation and conveys the mind with an easy transition from one to another. "

Italics mine. Each perception is new, and he does not want to distinguish between objects and perceptions. Yet he still speaks of "my chamber", if he didn't have a notion of identity, he couldn't speak like this, because he would have no way to separate his chamber from anything else.

An important, passage, I think, is this:

"We may begin with observing, that the difficulty in the present case is not concerning the matter of fact, or whether the mind forms such a conclusion concerning the continu'd existence of its perceptions, but only concerning the manner in which the conclusion is forrn'd, and principies from which it is deriv'd."(p.206)

Italics and bold mine. So, I don't think there is a tension is speaking about identity as we do, in regard to the The Ship of Theseus, only that Hume goes deeper and presents us with problems that go beyond, or are deeper in a sense, than the example of the ship.

As I said, one can pick out many quotes here, supporting different views, so one should keep this in mind. What I quoted here is what I think makes sense from a holistic perspective, but this can be debated.

Lula!! A sliver of good news. Now lets see what Bolsonaro does, stupid clown.

Yeah, this will be interesting to discuss, I'll get back to you sometime tomorrow, there's a lot to say here.

If an object has continuous existence, it must continue to be the object which it is, or it becomes something else. That's what change does, it annihilates the object as being what it was, to be something else. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't see how this follows. I mean, one can use the example of the Ship of Thesus: we replace one part of the boat with new wood and discard the old parts, it's literally not the same object - as it has new pieces in it, but we still recognize it as the same ship.

Likewise, if we are looking at a flower, miniscule parts of the flower are blown off by the wind, so it's literally not the exact same object one moment to the next, but we still recognize it as the same object. You can think of it as flower at T1 and flower at T2.

Therefore, that the object is continuous is supported logically, but that the object is distinct is not. This is the consequence of him trying to make the assumption of "object" (as a distinct individual) consistent with sense perception which is continuous. The object loses its status of being a real distinct individual, because it requires the dual status, of two separate instances, and memory to relate them. And the separate instances are similar rather than the same. — Metaphysician Undercover

There is this difficulty, of thinking about distinct existences, I agree. Nevertheless, it looks to me as if there is something about a given object that makes us recognize it as that specific object, otherwise, it seems to me that we would have no way to distinguish on object from another. But it is problematic, no problem granting that.

The "necessary effect" is the assumption itself, the assumption of a body, or an object. If we have no choice in this matter, as Hume says, then this assumption must be taken as necessary. — Metaphysician Undercover

But we have cases, which aren't that rare, in which we imagine objects to exist, when they do not: mirages, dreams, hallucinations, mistaken perceptions and so on. So an object is not, strictly speaking necessary, even if in most of the cases of perception, this is what we assume to be the case.

the skeptic says that we do have a choice in this matter, and even that our belief in such objects is unfounded and therefore a bad choice. — Metaphysician Undercover

As far as I can see, he doesn't present it a choice, postulating an enduring object is kind of like breathing or perceiving. It's not that it's a bad choice, as he says, (and pardon my over-repetition of quotes, but I think they matter):

"tis in vain to ask, Whether there be body or not? That is a point which we must take for granted in all our reasonings."

The issue is that the reasons the (mitigated) skeptic (he's no Pyrrhonian) teases out, turn out to be much weaker than what we would like, particularly when we look at the world through "common sense" - what he calls "the vulgar system".

So skepticism affords us the capacity to believe what you say we have no choice but not to believe. And to validate this statement "we don't have a choice", we need to determine the cause which produces this as a necessary effect. — Metaphysician Undercover

I think that for this, I'll need to introduce the Appendix to the Treatise, there he admits of his failure to provide what you ask for, it's very interesting and also very short, the relevant pages are like 2 at most.

Reading between the lines, it seems to me an inscrutable fact about how we experience the world. We strongly believe in the continuity of objects, but they change all the time. As do our perceptions.

We postulate a continuity we are not sensitive of, and hand wave it away by ignoring that each perception is new, and that in the intervals between experiences of the object it continues to exist as we perceived it, which creates the famous two-objects argument.

So, I see where you are coming from, and it is a very sensible question. But textually, I see no easy answer. In my own opinion, putting Hume aside, it's not evident what this necessary effect would be.

He says that:

"The imagination tells us, that our resembIing perceptions have a continu’d and uninterrupted existence, and are not annihilated by their absence. Reflection tells us, that even our resembling perceptions are interrupted in their existence, and different from each other. The contradiction betwixt these opinions we elude by a new fiction, which is conformable to the hypotheses both of reflection and fancy, by ascribing these contrary qualities to different existences; the interruption to perceptions, and the continuance to objects."

Nature is obstinate, and will not quit the field, however strongly attack’d by reason ; and at
the same time reason is so clear in the point, that there is no possibility of disguising her, Not being able to reconcile these two enemies, we endeavour to set ourselves at ease as much as possible, by succesively granting’ to each whatever it demands, and by feigning a double existence, where each may find something, that has, all the conditions, it desires." (p.215)

He ends this section pretty much in a skeptical crisis, or close to it. The only thing I can read into all his very penetrating critiques that could offer a way out, is the highlighted portions I show above. We grant to each what it desires (nature and reason), but it is something we do,we don't have a choice. That pretty much sounds like an instinct to me, you can also look at javra's posts, which he has been nice enough to quote some of Hume's comments on instinct.

I am starting to realize that, even though one could read this chapter in isolation, it is by going to other parts of Hume's work, that one could find potential, reliefs as solutions seem to be wanting.

I think towards the end of this thread, I'll post here the Appendix, and only focus on like 2 pages, literally, that shows that he is not satisfied with his system, I think it shows that this problem is a bit too hard for us to solve.

is indicative of the external existence of objects — javra

Yes, and that's part of what makes this so fascinating and frustrating, we have indications of the existence of external objects, and plainly we take them as a given in our "vulgar reasoning", but we can't find proof for something that should be so obvious. So, it isn't as obvious as we think it is.

It's very hard for me to sustain his though experiment, that once we stop perceiving an object, we don't have many good reasons (although something must be there, in the world) to suppose it continues to exist. For as he says (I know I'm re-quoting him, but, he articulates it so well):

"...we find ourselves somewhat at a loss, and are involv’d in a kind of contradiction. In order to free ourselves from this difficulty... by supposing that these interrupted perceptions are connected by a real existence, of which we are insensible."

Italics mine.

Still, what I’ve read about Hume is often quite different than what I gathered from directly reading Hume. For one example, to me, Kant borrowed from Hume rather than debunking him. — javra

I think so too on Kant. He improved some of the framework, but did not solve the problems Hume raised. They're too difficult, in my opinion. You are a good reader, had I not read Strawson's work before Hume himself, I might have gotten the impression that causality is just constant conjunction, I can't be sure. But it is very, very clear, that Hume was what is now called a "mysterian", which should be the common- sense view that we are natural creatures, and hence some things are beyond our capacities, as some things are beyond the capacities of dogs or birds.

Yes, that's a great quote from his Treatise. That's exactly right, or at least, that's how it looks like to me as well. This is somewhat paradoxical, given his reputation and thrust of his thought, an argument for innate faculties, as he puts what you quoted in his Enquiry:

"...and in which they improve, little or nothing, by the longest practice and experience. These we denominate Instincts, and are so apt to admire, as something very extraordinary..."

Italics mine.

He was speaking of animals in this quote, but it applies to us too. After all, Hume was a naturalist. And like you say, he had to be somewhat cautious in what he said at his time.

Some of what? — Srap Tasmaner

You're doubts about him depending on perceptions to speak about the continuity of external objects when not perceived. His gives a lot of role to the imagination.

The word might be in there somewhere, but there doesn't seem to be much use made of the idea; the whole flavor of the account is causal, mechanical. — Srap Tasmaner

Yes. I think he has in mind something like mechanical, but also something like an instinct, a phrase he doesn't appear to use in this chapter. Perceiving is like breathing or seeing, we can't not have perceptions.

Even if there are principles connecting objects to each other 'out there', beyond our minds, those principles apply to objects, not to our perceptions of them — thus we must have our own mental principles, which will apply to our perceptions, in order to conceive something like causality. — Srap Tasmaner

This is tricky. He's focusing here on our reasons for believing in them, but I keep going back to the "for granted" comment. The tension here, if there is one, is that there seems to be no connection, under these arguments from perceptions to those bodies we take for granted. But when he leaves philosophy and goes to "the vulgar system" (vulgar meant ordinary people, not an insult as it taken today), there are no problems about our recognizing and interacting with the world.

we need principles that will relate certain perceptions to each other. — Srap Tasmaner

VERY perceptive. This is one of the reasons he gives in the Appendix for, essentially stating that his system fails, or as he puts it "my hopes vanish". This is one of the things he cannot account for, how perceptions relate to each other. The other being that we really do perceive continuity in the objects. In other words, he has used these two principles: the uniting principle and the continuity principle (my terminology, not his), without being able to justify them, but he isn't able to renounce either of them.

That goes way beyond this chapter in terms of pages, but it's connected. Very, very interesting. And humbling too, to be able to say that about one's own system.

Spending waaaay too much time in a lab, or you try to get attention by putting forth a fancy argument.

I dunno. It's very strange.

But but, how can you be a pessimist if Schopenhauer is an idealist?

I mean, his idealism is of the transcendental variety, but idealist nonetheless. How can an Idealist be a pessimist?

hmmmm

Ah. One of those threads. That's a matter of taking physics way, way outside of its purview.

But, that's pertinent for that thread, not this one. Thanks for the clarification.

Some philosophical approaches deny there is any reality. — T Clark

You mean what is usually called an idealist? Roughly the view that there are only ideas and nothing else. But those who take these positions say ideas are real.

Then you have Goodman's "irrealism", roughly the view that what there is, are "versions", theories and descriptions we have of the world, which vary depending on the person's version, a chemist would have a different version than a plumber, most of the time. But the posits made by each respective person's version are real.

Now if you have in mind anti-realism, I can't say much, the very little I know about them don't make much sense to me.

Point being, very few people are just going to say "the things I argue for/believe in are not real", it's a very strange statement to make.

Language and mathematics do NOT exist in the physical world. They are not of matter. — god must be atheist

Where does math come from? Where does language come from? They come from people, who are made of matter, realized in brains, which are modifications of matter.

But if this image of matter is too restrictive, because in a sense it is, not everything in the universe is matter - dark energy, light, etc, are physical.

As Joseph Priestley says:

"It is said that we can have no conception how sensation or thought can arise from matter, they being things so very different from it, and bearing no sort of resemblance to anything like figure or motion; which is all that can result from any modification of matter, or any operation upon it.…this is an argument which derives all its force from our ignorance. Different as are the properties of sensation and thought, from such as are usually ascribed to matter, they may, nevertheless, inhere in the same substance, unless we can shew them to be absolutely incompatible with one another."

And also this quote, even more forcefully stated, from Schopenhauer:

"The tendency to gravity in the stone is precisely as inexplicable as is thinking in the human brain, and so on this score, we could also infer a spirit in the stone. Therefore to these disputants [between 'spiritualists' and 'materialists'] I would say: you think you know a dead matter, that is, one that is completely passive and devoid of properties, because you imagine you really understand everything that you are able to reduce to mechanical effect. But… you are unable to reduce them… If matter can fall to earth without you knowing why, so can it also think without you knowing why… If your dead and purely passive matter can as heaviness gravitate, or as electricity attract, repel, and emit spark, so too as brain pulp can it think."

Emphasis mine.

I think these are very solid arguments. We do not know how it is possible that matter (or physical stuff) can think, but it clearly does, as we see in ourselves.

And it makes sense, because it is essentially the same thought presented in slightly different ways, which can go one forever.

And it is a very narrow topic too, not much to add once the arguments have been established.

It is, and I agree. I do think you are being sensible here, I've protested once or twice before, but you guys do pretty good work by and large, in my opinion.

Beyond a point, there are diminishing returns on this topic.